

Subject: RE: Public Records Request (CA-SHASTA-24-0462)
Date: Thursday, May 23, 2024 at 5:46:08 PM Eastern Daylight Time
From: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
To: AO Records
CC: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Attachments: CA-SHASTA-24-0462.pdf, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Appendix (02-16-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Appendix for Hand Counting of Ballots Recommendation (02-25-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) CODE Section 20137 (02-15-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) CODE Sections 3025.5 & 20135-Drop Boxes (02-15-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS (02-16-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Exhibit FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS Recommendation (02-25-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) REPORT FROM ELECTION COMMISSION on DROP BOXES-Feb 15 (02-15-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) REPORT FROM ELECTION COMMISSION on Hand Counting of Ballots-Feb 15 (02-15-24).docx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) REPORT FROM ELECTION COMMISSION on Hand Counting of Ballots-Feb 25 (02-25-24).docx, (REDACTED EMAIL) Attachments for Recommendation Regarding Hand Counting (1) (02-16-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Attachments for Recommendation Regarding Hand Counting (02-16-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Election Commission-REVISED R3 (02-25-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) RE Recommendation from Election Commission on Hand Counting of Ballots (02-15-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Recommendation from Election Commission on Drop Boxes (02-15-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Recommendation from Election Commission on Hand Counting of Ballots (02-15-24).pdf, (DOCUMENT) SCEC Report Recommending Hand Counted Ballots and Paper Pollbooks.pdf, (DOCUMENT) Shasta County Elections Commission - Full Packet (02-26-24).pdf, (DOCUMENT) Shasta County Elections Commission - Minutes (02-26-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) RE_ Agenda request (11-09-23).pdf, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Citizens election committee (11-16-23).pptx, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Logic and Accuracy testing (10-25-23).pdf, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 8-21-23 (12-16-23).doc, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Shasta 378 Report chain of custody2 (02-20-24).pdf, (EMAIL ATTACHMENT) Shasta County Election Hand Tally Cost 5-22-2023 (02-26-24).pptx, (REDACTED EMAIL) FW_ Bev Gray report (03-16-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) FW_ Chain of Custody (02-18-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) In Re_ Shasta County Elections Commission hearing submittal_ Shasta County Election Hand Tally Cost (02-26-24).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Laura Hobbs Presentation for Monday 11-20-23 (11-16-23).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Please forward this to the Citizen's Election Commission (12-16-23).pdf, (REDACTED EMAIL) Please forward to the Citizen's Election Board (10-25-23).pdf

Hi Marwah,

Pursuant to the California Public Records Act (CPRA), the attached documents are responsive to your request dated and received by the Shasta County Clerk of the Board on April 29, 2024, and extended on May 9, 2024, for the following:

- All records reflecting the origin of the report titled “Report from the Shasta County Elections Commission on Recommendations Regarding a Local Ordinance Mandating Hand Counted Ballots at Precincts Using Paper Pollbooks” and dated February 26, 2024, including, but not limited to, any communications sent or received by Commissioners Bev Gray, Ronnean Lund, Dawn Duckett, Susanne Baremore, or Lisa Michaud, or acting County Counsel Alan Cox, about the report.
- All electronic communications (including emails, email attachments, text messages, or messages on messaging platforms, such as Slack, GChat or Google Hangouts, Lync, Skype, or WhatsApp) between (a) Commissioners Bev Gray, Ronnean Lund, Dawn Duckett, Susanne Baremore, or Lisa Michaud, and (b) any of the external individuals or entities listed below, including, but not limited to, at the suggested email addresses or domains.

External Individuals & Entities:

1. Anyone communicating from an email address ending in eip-ca.com
2. Catherine Engelbrecht, and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in truthevote.org or truthevote.com
3. David Clements (davidkclements13@protonmail.com, dkc@theprofessorsrecord.com)
4. Doug Frank (drdouglasgrank@protonmail.com, drdouglasgrank@outlook.com)
5. Jeff O’Donnell (theloneraccoon@protonmail.com)
6. Lisa “Draza” Smith (drazasmith@protonmail.com, drazasmith@gmail.com), and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in ordros.com
7. Linda Rantz (cause.america.mo@pm.me) and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in @causeofamerica.org
8. Mike Lindell and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in @mypillow.com or @frankspeech.com
9. Kaylyn Hipple, and/or anyone communicating on behalf of the Shasta Freedom Coalition, including, but not limited to, from the email address shastafreedomco@gmail.com
10. Conservative Partnership Institute (cpi.org, conservativepartnership.org)
11. Cleta Mitchell (cleta@cletamitchell.com, cmitchell@foley.com, bradleyfdn.org, freedomworks.org)
12. Election Integrity Network (electionintegrity.network)
13. Virginia Institute of Public Policy (virginia institute.org)
14. Anyone communicating from an email address ending in EagleAI.pro

15. Rick Richards (drd@cathaid.com, drd@EagleAI.pro, drdonline@me.com)
16. Mark Cook (patriotmc@protonmail.com)
17. Anyone communicating on behalf of Hand Count Road Show (handcountroadshow.org)
18. Patrick Colbeck (pjcolbeck@comcast.net, patrick@migrassrootsalliance.org)
19. Patrick Byrne, Mike Roman (mikeroman@protonmail.com), and/or anyone communicating from the America Project (americaproject.com or the americaproject.com)
20. Clint Curtis
21. Chriss Street
22. Alex Halderman
23. Ben Cotton
24. Jim Penrose
25. Laura Hobbs
26. Tina Peters

Please note that the records you are requesting are subject to exemptions and, therefore, have been redacted to withhold phone numbers, email addresses, and addresses of members of the public, as well as County employee direct phone numbers and emails. (Government Code §§ 6254(c), 6254(k) and 6255; Cal. Const. art. I, § 1). Such personal identifiable and contact information is also exempt pursuant to Government Code § 6255 on the basis that the public interest served by not disclosing the redacted information clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure. Disclosure of an individual third party's personal identifiable and contact information does not illuminate any government activities or County business and does not otherwise serve to inform the public of any substantive information concerning the topic of your request. For these and other reasons, Government Code § 6255 operates as an additional, separate basis for the above-referenced exemptions and redactions.

I trust that this satisfies your request. Please let us know if there are any questions,

John Sitka
Deputy Clerk of the Board

From: Clerk of the Board Mailbox <ClerkoftheBoard@shastacounty.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 9, 2024 4:41 PM
To: AO Records <records@americanoversight.org>; Clerk of the Board Mailbox <ClerkoftheBoard@shastacounty.gov>
Subject: RE: Public Records Request (CA-SHASTA-24-0462)

Hi Marwah,

The County of Shasta is in receipt of your records request dated and received by the Clerk of the Board on April 29, 2024. Pursuant to Government Code § 7922.535(c)(1), (2) and (3), the County exercises its right to extend the time in which to determine whether your requests seek copies of disclosable records and the

extent of those disclosable records. I anticipate providing you a determination and, if applicable, an estimate as to when the documents will be produced on or before May 23, 2024. The extension is needed due to the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request; and the need to consult with other County departments regarding your requests.

In addition, we will also inform you if any of the requested records are exempt from public disclosure. This response does not serve as a waiver of any CPRA exemptions applicable to your current requests. The County reserves the right to assert any such applicable exemptions as they may pertain to your requests.

Thank you and please let me know if you have any questions,

John Sitka
Deputy Clerk of the Board

From: AO Records <records@americanoversight.org>
Sent: Monday, April 29, 2024 12:31 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox <ClerkoftheBoard@shastacounty.gov>
Subject: Public Records Request (CA-SHASTA-24-0462)

⚠ **EXTERNAL SENDER:** Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Dear Public Records Officer:

Please find attached a request for records under California's Public Records Act.

Sincerely,

Marwah Adhoob | She/Her
Paralegal | American Oversight
records@americanoversight.org
www.americanoversight.org | @weareoversight

PRR: CA-SHASTA-24-0462

**REPORT FROM THE SHASTA COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMISSION
ON
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED
BALLOTS AT PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS**

To the Honorable Board of Supervisors (Board), County of Shasta, State of California:

The Shasta County Elections Commission (Commission) respectfully submits the following information for the Board's consideration at their next scheduled meeting.

As of this date, Committee members include:

Ronnean Lund, Commissioner

Dr. Lisa Michaud, Commissioner

Dawn Duckett, Commissioner

Susanne Baremore, Commissioner

Bev Gray, Commissioner

GENERAL INFORMATION

It is the belief of the Commission that, in order to increase public trust in the Shasta County election processes, there should be a local ordinance mandating that Shasta County conduct their elections using hand counting of ballots at the precincts with paper poll books.

BASIS FOR A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED BALLOTS AT THE PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS

- 1) The California Constitution Article II - Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall; Section 1, states: "All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require." (See Appendix)
- 2) No one can observe the actual tally of ballots by a machine. No one, by watching a machine with their eyes, can know whether votes are being tabulated correctly or incorrectly at any moment. No one except the electronic voting system companies and the Secretary of State have access to the source code or software in voting machine equipment used to tally ballots.
- 3) There is credible evidence that, contrary to state law, voting systems as defined by Election Code §362 (See Appendix) have been connected to the internet in violation of Election Code §19205 (See Appendix). This was demonstrated in Antrim County, Michigan (see [Office of the Special Council Interim Report](#), [Ben Cotton's testimony](#), [Penrose's testimony](#)). (see <http://tinyurl.com/2yz55s6k>, <http://tinyurl.com/msv5b72z>, <http://tinyurl.com/3hwrybuy>). Furthermore, electronic poll books are connected to the internet and are permitted by law to connect to the internet. Voter participation is provided in near real time to NGOs and third parties. This information can be used to calculate how many votes are needed to flip an election.
- 4) Jeffrey O'Donnell's Fingerprints of Fraud Vol. #1 report documents evidence that the United States of America and Shasta County (page 73) were the victims of a coordinated multi-state conspiracy to defraud the 2020 General Election using voting machines; see: fingerprintsoffraud.com

- 5) Jeffrey O'Donnell's analysis of Shasta County's June 2022 Primary shows election fraud occurred. He recommended not to certify the election. [Shasta County Report 2022 Primary](http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t) (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>)
- 6) The [Halderman Report](http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t) (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>) demonstrated how easily electronic voting machines can be hacked. Attacks were "successfully implemented and could be effectuated by malicious actors with very limited time and access to the machines, as little as mere minutes."
- 7) The Transparency Foundation [Audit](http://tinyurl.com/y8jpnrs) (see <http://tinyurl.com/y8jpnrs>) of California elections revealed voter fraud and a failing score on 9 out of 10 of the categories that were looked at. Election system security received a failing score.
- 8) There is an urgent need to restore confidence in our elections and to protect those who raise complaints or questions about the integrity of our elections.
- 9) The lack of transparency in elections is exacerbated by the withholding of public records by county election officials. At the direction of the Secretary of State's Office, county election officials have repeatedly violated The California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000, et seq. (formerly Government Code §§6250, et seq.), enacted pursuant to Article 1(b) of the California Constitution, which states that "The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business . . ." (See Appendix) Click [HERE](#) to enter Library (see teamhopelibrary.org). Hand counting at precincts would eliminate the need for requests of public records regarding counting of ballots from precincts.
- 10) Hand counting of paper ballots is expressly authorized by the California Election Code §§ 15270, et seq (See Exhibit A) which contains established procedures used by all 58 counties before introduction of electronic voting systems, and is still used to conduct a 1% tally (the gold standard of accuracy). The Secretary of State has no veto power over the use of these procedures. No prior approval or special permission from the Secretary of State is needed to conduct elections in accordance with these statutes because the Secretary of State cannot overrule the use of a method the California Legislature has authorized.
- 11) Election Code §19207 (See Appendix) grants authority to the County governing board to adopt any kind of voting system or combination of voting systems. AB969 usurps the County's authority under Election Code §19207. This will likely be litigated in the courts.
- 12) The Secretary of State has failed to factor into her estimates the result of economic impact on the local citizens of counties who will benefit from employment as a result of a full manual tally of ballots.
- 13) The California legislature used a false "Urgency" clause to fast track an unconstitutional law. California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8 says that "urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety." This will likely be litigated in the courts. (See Appendix)
- 14) There is no credible evidence that hand counted elections under these procedures were or will be more expensive than elections conducted with electronic voting systems. In fact, estimates by Linda Rantz (click [HERE](#)) (see <http://tinyurl.com/4xb55dkt>), Clint Curtis (click [HERE](#)) (see <http://tinyurl.com/2bv6uxnu>), and Chriss Street (click [HERE](#)) (see <http://tinyurl.com/5dy9y4p6>) suggest that hand counting will be significantly cheaper than machine counting.
- 15) Hand counting is compatible with casting votes via mail, drop-box, or in person.

- 16) The federal Help America Vote Act requires accommodations to ensure persons with disabilities can vote, but does not require the use of electronic voting systems. Neither does the Americans with Disabilities Act, which only requires that “full and equal opportunity to vote in all elections” be provided to voters with disabilities. On the contrary, 52 USC §21081 (See Appendix) expressly protects traditional paper ballot voting systems.
- 17) “The real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all the provisions of the law.” CA Elections Code 19001. (See Appendix) If the real will of the electors in Shasta County is determined by hand counting then enforcing AB969 would be in direct violation of CA Elections Code 19001 which clearly states that compliance with state law is secondary to ascertaining the true will of the electors.
- 18) CA Elections Code 19003 (See Appendix) states “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.” Therefore, the county laws and ordinances supersede any state laws in regard to voting systems. It is incumbent on the County to dictate the manner in which elections are conducted. See also California Election Code §19207. (See Appendix)
- 19) The citizens desire their elections be conducted at the precinct for maximum transparency and community participation. Currently all ballot tallies are conducted at the ROV office with very little access for the community to observe and participate. In order to restore trust in our elections all citizens need to be able to participate and freely observe the election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) Ballots brought to precincts on election day should be counted at the precincts that day for transparency, citizen participation, and so results from the precincts are available the night of an election.
- 2) Hand counting should be performed at the precincts, per Election Code 15270 et. seq., for complete transparency, increased accuracy, and so results are available the night of an election.
- 3) Paper pollbooks should be used at the precincts for transparency, election security, and to maintain local control over Shasta County’s voter rolls.
- 4) In order to restore trust in the election process the Election Commission recommends the Shasta County Board of Supervisors create a local ordinance which states that Shasta County shall hand count ballots at the precincts the night of an election using paper poll books.

EXHIBIT A

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

California Elections Code

Sec. 15270

This article applies to all elections in which ballots are counted by hand.

Sec. 15271

As soon as the polls are finally closed, the precinct board shall commence to count the votes by taking the ballots cast, unopened, out of the box and counting them to ascertain whether the number of ballots corresponds with the number of signatures on the roster. The precinct board shall make a record upon the roster of the number of ballots in the ballot box, the number of signatures on the roster, and the difference, if any.

Sec. 15272

The count shall be public and shall be continued without adjournment until completed and the result is declared. During the reading and tallying, the ballot read and the tally sheet kept shall be within the clear view of watchers.

Sec. 15273

Unless otherwise provided in this code, the precinct board members may not constitute themselves into separate squads in an attempt to conduct more than one count of the ballots at the same time.

Sec. 15274

The members of the precinct board may relieve each other in the duties of counting ballots.

Sec. 15275

Those ballots not rejected shall be placed in one pile, and the board shall proceed to count by tallying the vote for one or more offices or measures at a time.

EXHIBIT A CONTINUED

Sec. 15276

The precinct board members shall ascertain the number of votes cast for each person and for and against each measure in the following manner: One precinct board member shall read from the ballots. As the ballots are read, at least one other precinct board member shall keep watch of each vote so as to check on any possible error or omission on the part of the officer reading or calling the ballot.

Sec. 15277

(a) Two of the precinct board members shall each keep a tally sheet in a form prescribed by the elections official. Each tally sheet shall contain all of the following:

- (1) The name of each candidate being voted for and the specific office for which each candidate is being voted. The offices shall be in the same order as on the ballot.
- (2) A list of each measure being voted upon.
- (3) Sufficient space to permit the tallying of the full vote cast for each candidate and for and against each measure.

(b) The precinct board members keeping the tally sheets shall record opposite each name or measure, with pen or indelible pencil, the number of votes by tallies as the name of each candidate or measure voted upon is read aloud from the respective ballot.

(c) Immediately upon the completion of the tallies, the precinct board members keeping the tally shall draw two heavy lines in ink or indelible pencil from the last tally mark to the end of the line in which the tallies terminate and initial that line. The total number of votes counted for each candidate and for and against each measure shall be recorded on the tally sheets in words and figures.

Sec. 15278

On completion of the canvass of the returns for each election, the elections official shall compare the vote by mail voters' list with the roster of voters in each precinct to determine if any voter cast more than one ballot at that election.

Sec. 15278.5

No precinct board member may make any tally of votes in any other manner than is provided in this article, nor in any place other than on the tally sheets provided for that purpose.

Sec. 15279

The ballots, as soon as all of the names and measures marked on them as voted for are read and tallied, shall not thereafter be examined by any person, but, as soon as all are counted, shall be carefully sealed in a strong envelope. The signatures of each member of the precinct board shall be written across the seal.

EXHIBIT A CONTINUED

Sec. 15280

The precinct board shall complete, sign, and return to the elections official all furnished forms requiring its signatures. When votes are counted at the precinct, all members of the precinct board, upon the completion of their duties, shall sign the following certificate of performance, which shall be substantially in the following form: for ___ precinct, for the ___ election, held on the ___ day of ___, (year). We hereby certify that the total number of votes received by each candidate for each office and the total number of votes cast for and against each measure is as indicated on the tally sheets. We further certify that the results of votes cast forms posted outside the polling place and transmitted to the county elections official show the total number of votes received by each candidate for each office and the total number of votes cast for and against each measure is as indicated.

Inspector

Assistant Inspector

Judge

Judge

Clerk

Clerk

Clerk

Clerk

Sec. 15281

The precinct board shall sign and post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast. The copy shall remain posted for at least 48 hours after the official time fixed for the closing of the polls. To protect a person's right to cast a secret ballot under Section 7 of Article II of the California Constitution, in cases where fewer than 10 voters cast ballots and the precinct board tallies the results at the precinct, the precinct board shall post only the total number of people who voted at the precinct.

NOTE THAT THERE IS NO ENABLING ACT AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO PRESCRIBE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

APPENDIX

Item 1)

CA Constitution Article 2, SECTION 1

All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.

Item 3)

California Election Law §362

“Voting system” means a mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic system and its software, or any combination of these used for casting a ballot, tabulating votes, or both. “Voting system” does not include a remote accessible vote by mail system.

California Election Law §19205

A voting system shall comply with all of the following:

- (a) No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
- (b) No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
- (c) No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.

Item 9)

Government Code §§7920.000, et seq.

This division shall be known and may be cited as the California Public Records Act. Article 1 Section 3(b) of the California Constitution

(b) (1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.

Item 11)

Election Code §19207

The governing board may adopt for use at elections any kind of voting system, any combination of voting systems, or any combination of a voting system and paper ballots, provided that the voting system or systems involved have been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State or specifically authorized by law pursuant to Section 19209.

Item 13)

California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8

(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement of facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill shall be passed separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring. An urgency statute may not create or abolish any office or change the salary, term, or duties of any office, or grant any franchise or special privilege, or create any vested right or interest.

APPENDIX

Item 16)

52 USC §21081

Voting systems standards

(a) Requirements

Each voting system used in an election for Federal office shall meet the following requirements:

(1) In general

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall-

(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;

(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and

(iii) if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office-

(I) notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot;

(II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and

(III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.

(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by-

(i) establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and

(ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error).

Item 17)

CA Elections Code 19001

This division shall be liberally construed so that the real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all of the provisions of the law.

Item 18)

CA Elections Code 19003

Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.

SHASTA COUNTY

ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Shasta County Administration Center
Board Chambers
1450 Court Street, Suite 263
Redding, California 96001

Lisa Michaud, Ph.D., Member
Dawn Duckett, Member
Susanne Baremore, Member
Bev Gray, Member
Ronnean Lund, Member

REGULAR MEETING AGENDA

Monday, February 26, 2024, 2:00 PM

The Shasta County Elections Commission welcomes you to its meetings which are regularly scheduled for Monday at 2:00 p.m. in the Board Chambers on the second floor of the Shasta County Administration Center, 1450 Court Street, Suite 263, Redding, California. Your interest is encouraged and appreciated.

The agenda is divided into two sections: **CONSENT CALENDAR:** These matters include routine actions and are usually approved by a single majority vote. **REGULAR CALENDAR:** These items include non-routine actions.

TO ADDRESS THE COMMISSION: The Shasta County Elections Commission provides the members of the public with a Public Comment-Open Time period, where the public may directly address the Commission on any agenda item on the regular calendar and on the consent calendar and may also address the Commission on any matter not listed on the agenda that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Shasta County Elections Commission. In addition, members of the public may also comment on any item on the consent calendar before the Commission consideration of the item and may also comment on any item on the regular calendar before or during the Commission's consideration of the item. Pursuant to the Brown Act (Govt. Code section 54950, et seq.), **Commission action or discussion cannot be taken on non-agenda matters**, but the Commission may briefly respond to statements or questions and/or schedule the matter on a subsequent Commission Agenda.

Persons wishing to address the Commission in the Board Room are requested to fill out a Speaker Request Form and provide it to the Clerk before the meeting begins. Submitting a Speaker Request Form is voluntary. Failure to submit a Speaker Request Form may result in the Chair not being aware of and acknowledging that a person wishes to make a public comment. Speaker Request Forms are available at the following locations: (1) <https://www.shastacounty.gov/clerk-board/page/citizens-election-advisory-committee>; (2) from the Clerk of the Board on the third floor of 1450 Court Street, Suite 308, Redding; and (3) in the back of the Board Chambers. If you have documents for the members of the Shasta County Elections Commission to review, please provide a minimum of ten copies. When addressing the Commission in the Board Room, please approach the podium, and after receiving recognition from the Chair, give your comments.

Each speaker is allocated three minutes to speak. Comments should be limited to matters within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission.

The Commission wishes to ensure that business is conducted in an orderly fashion and that all have

an equal opportunity to observe and participate in the proceedings. Each person who addresses the Shasta County Elections Commission shall not use loud, threatening, profane, or abusive language which disrupts, disturbs, or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of the Commission meeting. Any such language or any other disorderly conduct which disrupts, disturbs, or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of the Commission meeting is prohibited.

CALL TO ORDER

Invocation

Pledge of Allegiance - Commissioner Michaud

PUBLIC COMMENT - OPEN TIME

During the Public Comment Open Time period, the public may address the Commission on any agenda item on the regular calendar and on the consent calendar and may address the Commission on any matter not listed on the agenda that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission . Each speaker is allocated three minutes to speak.

CONSENT CALENDAR

The following Consent Calendar items are expected to be routine and non-controversial. They may be acted upon by the Commission at one time without discussion. Any Commission member or staff member may request that an item be removed from the Consent Calendar for discussion and consideration. Members of the public may comment on any item on the Consent Calendar before the Commission's consideration of the Consent Calendar. Each speaker is allocated three minutes to speak.

- C1** Approve the minutes from the February 5, 2024, meeting, as submitted.

Simple Majority Vote

REGULAR CALENDAR

Members of the public may comment on any item on the Regular Calendar before or during the Commission's consideration of the item. Each speaker is allocated three minutes to speak.

- R1** Approve Shasta County Elections Commission Bylaws for recommendation to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors.

Simple Majority Vote

- R2** Consider approving draft recommendations from ad hoc committee members Michaud and Lund regarding vote by mail drop boxes.

Simple Majority Vote

- R3** Consider approving draft recommendations from ad hoc committee members Lund and Gray regarding a local ordinance mandating hand counted ballots at precincts using paper pollbooks.

Simple Majority Vote

- R4** Receive an update from ad hoc committee members Lund and Grey regarding voter rolls.

No Vote

- R5** Receive Commissioner reports.

No Vote

- R6** Take the following actions: (1) Discuss and determine election issues for which the Commission may wish to provide recommendations to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors; and (2) direct two or fewer Commissioners per item to prepare draft recommendations for the Commission to consider approving for Board consideration at a future Commission meeting.

Simple Majority Vote

ADJOURN

ACCESSIBILITY: Reasonable accommodations will be made for individuals with disabilities in order to participate in the public meeting, with any doubt being resolved in favor of accessibility. If you would like to request an accommodation for accessibility, please contact the Clerk of the Board at (530) 225-5550. To better enable us to assist you, please contact us with your request at least 24 hours prior to the meeting.

COMMUNICATIONS: Communications received by the Shasta County Elections Commission are on file and available for review in the Clerk of the Board's Office. Public records which relate to any of the matters on this agenda (except Closed Session items), and which have been distributed to the members of the Committee, are available for public inspection at the office of the Clerk of the Board, 1450 Court Street, Suite 308B, Redding, CA 96001.

FIND MEETING INFORMATION ONLINE: Agendas, minutes, and other Shasta County Elections Commission documents are also available online <https://www.shastacounty.gov/clerk-board/page/citizens-election-advisory-committee>.

The County of Shasta does not discriminate on the basis of disability in admission to, access to, or operation of its buildings, facilities, programs, services, or activities. The County does not discriminate on the basis of disability in its hiring or employment practices. Questions, complaints, or requests for additional information regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) may be forwarded to the County's ADA Coordinator: Director of Support Services, County of Shasta, 1450 Court Street, Room 348, Redding, CA 96001-1676, Phone: (530) 225-5515, California Relay Service: (800) 735-2922, Fax: (530) 225-5345, E-mail: adacoordinator@co.shasta.ca.us. Individuals with disabilities who need auxiliary aids and/or services for effective communication in the County's programs and

services are invited to make their needs and preferences known to the affected department or the ADA Coordinator. For aids or services needed for effective communication during Shasta County Elections Commission meetings, please call Clerk of the Board (530) 225-5550 at least 24 hours before the meeting. This notice is available in accessible alternate formats from the affected department or the ADA Coordinator. Accommodations may include, but are not limited to, interpreters, assistive listening devices, accessible seating, or documentation in an alternate format.

STAFF REPORT

MEETING DATE: February 26, 2024
CATEGORY: Consent Calendar 1
SUBJECT: February 5, 2024, Draft Minutes
VOTE REQUIRED: Simple Majority Vote

RECOMMENDATION:
Approve the minutes of the meeting held on February 5, 2024, as amended.

DISCUSSION:
N/A

ALTERNATIVES:
The Commission could request corrections to the minutes or defer consideration of the approval of minutes to a later date. This could cause a delay in public access to the approved minutes.

ATTACHMENTS:
1: 2/5/24 Draft Minutes

SHASTA COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMISSION

Monday, February 5, 2024

REGULAR MEETING

MINUTES

2:02 p.m.: Chair Lund called the meeting of the Shasta County Elections Commission to order on the above date with the following present:

Present: Commissioners Susanne Baremore, Dawn Duckett, Bev Gray, Ronnean Lund, and Lisa Michaud, Ph.D.

Staff: Deputy County Executive Officer Stewart Buettell, Outside Counsel Joanna Gin, and Chief Deputy Clerk of the Board Stefany Blankenship.

The Commission meeting opened with an invocation and the Pledge of Allegiance.

Commissioner Baremore read a prepared statement concerning the announced retirement of Cathy Darling Allen, County Clerk/Registrar of Voters.

PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD - OPEN TIME

Steve Woodrum, Sheree Amaral, Laura Hobbs, Shawn Henson, Lori Heston, Steve Amaral, Deidre Holliday, Darcy, Nathan Blaze, K.C., Lori Bridgeford, Jim Burnett, Robert Exter, and an anonymous speaker spoke during public comment – open time.

Outside Counsel Joanna Gin explained that under the Brown Act, campaign or political speech is arguably outside the subject matter of the jurisdiction of the body, but that this is gray. Counsel also explained that a different state law, Government Code section 8314, prohibits a local officer from allowing others to use public resources for campaign activity, and that the Chair has satisfied the obligation to notify the public as a precautionary measure.

ITEMS PULLED FROM CONSENT CALENDAR

MINUTES

Commissioner Lund stated that the January 8, 2024, minutes needed to be updated to correct the name of the report submitted to the Board of Supervisors.

A motion was made and seconded (Baremore/Duckett) to approve the January 22, 2024, minutes as submitted.

Laura Hobbs spoke during public comment.

Commissioner Baremore withdrew her motion.

By motion made, seconded (Lund/Duckett), and unanimously carried, the Shasta County Elections Commission approved the minutes of the meeting held on January 8, 2024, as amended.

By motion made, seconded (Duckett/Baremore), and unanimously carried, the Shasta County Elections Commission approved the minutes of the meeting held on January 22, 2024, as submitted.

REGULAR CALENDAR

BYLAWS

The Commission discussed amendments to the proposed bylaws.

Laura Hobbs, Lori Bridgeford, and an anonymous speaker spoke during public comment.

By motion made, seconded (Lund/Duckett), and unanimously carried, the Shasta County Elections Commission directed staff to bring back the bylaws, as amended, at the next meeting.

ELECTION OF 2024 CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIR

Lori Bridgeford, Lori Heston, Thomas Hildebrand, and two anonymous speakers spoke during public comment.

By consensus, the Shasta County Elections Commission took no action.

COMMISSIONER REPORTS

Commissioner Gray discussed her investigation into the County's voter rolls.

Commissioner Michaud discussed the possible public funding of ballot box observation equipment.

Commissioner Baremore spoke about scheduling a presentation from Dr. Justin Grimmer, the possibility of moving the public comment-open time, and mail-in/absentee ballots. She reminded the public about the election observer opportunities for the March 2024 Primary Election.

Commissioner Duckett discussed her meeting with Joanna Francescut, Assistant County Clerk/Registrar of Voters, about ways to increase voter confidence at the local level without violating State or Federal law.

Commissioner Michaud stated that she had also met with Ms. Francescut, and that the Commission was welcome to suggest new topics for or revisions to the existing Frequently Asked Questions section of the Elections' Department website, to assist the County Clerk's office in clarifying subjects that the public was interested in.

Commissioner Lund asked Outside Counsel Gin to report on the question of appointing individuals who are not Commissioners to the Commission's ad hoc committees. Ms. Gin stated that, according to Government Code section 54952, ad hoc committees of a body are comprised solely of members of that body that constitute less than a quorum. Because of that, members of the public cannot be formally appointed to ad hoc committees, but can be invited to join ad hoc committee meetings, as such meetings are not subject to the Brown Act. Ms. Gin cautioned Commissioners against discussing ad hoc committee subjects or views with Commissioners who were not on the same ad hoc committee, as that could violate the serial meeting clause of the Brown Act.

DISCUSSION OF ELECTION ISSUES

Laura Hobbs, Lori Bridgeford, and an anonymous speaker spoke during public comment.

Commissioner Baremore stated that she would reach out to Dr. Grimmer to either arrange for his presentation to the Commission in person or to provide copies of his published material to the Commission members.

4:37 p.m.: The Shasta County Elections Commission adjourned.

Chair

ATTEST:

DAVID J. RICKERT
Clerk of the Shasta County Elections Commission

February 5, 2024

4

By _____
Deputy

DRAFT

STAFF REPORT

MEETING DATE: February 26, 2022

CATEGORY: Regular Calendar 1

SUBJECT: Approve Shasta County Elections Commission Bylaws for recommendation to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors.

VOTE REQUIRED: Simple Majority

RECOMMENDATION:

Approve Shasta County Elections Commission Bylaws for recommendation to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors.

DISCUSSION:

On September 12, 2023, the Board of Supervisors adopted Resolution No. 2023-099, which established the Citizens Election Advisory Committee (Committee) pursuant to Government Code 25201.

On December 5, 2023, the Board of Supervisors adopted Ordinance No. SCC 2023-07, which renamed the “Citizens Election Advisory Committee” as, and established, the “Shasta County Elections Commission,” and repealing Resolution No. 2023-099 which became effective January 4, 2024.

The purpose of the Commission is to foster and maintain the utmost public trust in local elections, strive for fair and transparent elections, increase voter confidence, improve the elections processes using observations, inspections, evaluations, instituting changes, enhancing the voter experience, identifying improvements and reforms, reduce voter fraud, and for other lawful purposes.

The proposed bylaws further define the duties and responsibilities of the Commission. On February 5, 2024, the Commission amended the proposed bylaws. The amended bylaws are attached here for final approval.

ALTERNATIVES:

The Commission could make amendments to the proposed bylaws or could defer consideration to a future date.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Proposed Bylaws

**SHASTA COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION
BYLAWS**

ARTICLE I
NAME AND DURATION

Section 1.1. The name of this Commission shall be the "Shasta County Elections Commission" and shall be referred to in these Bylaws as the "Commission."

Section 1.2. The Shasta County Board of Supervisors (Board) established the Citizens Election Advisory Committee on September 12, 2023, pursuant to [Government Code section 25201](#) and Resolution No. 2023-099, which had a sunset on September 12, 2027, with all rights and authority of the Committee and its members ending at that time.

On December 5, 2023, the Board enacted Ordinance No. SCC 2023-07 renaming the "Citizens Election Advisory Commission" as, and establishing, the "Shasta County Elections Commission," and repealed Resolution No. 2023-099.

ARTICLE II
PURPOSE

Section 2.1. The purpose of the Commission is to advise and make recommendations to the Board. The Commission shall:

- a. Make reports and recommendations to the Board regarding existing programs, policies, and procedures in alignment with the law for future elections.
- b. Have access to places and records, as allowed under the California law, necessary to implement their delegated duties.
- c. Observe, inspect, and examine elections related records and documents, as allowed under California law, for accuracy and completeness.
- d. May make copies of public records, as allowed under California law, for reporting purposes or make notes based on such records.
- e. Tour and observe Elections department and Registrar of Voter facilities during, before or after the election period, as authorized under California law.
- f. Ask questions of elections officials and receive timely answers.
- g. Review how election updates are reported to the public.
- h. In-depth review of voter and vote recordkeeping processes, as allowed under California law.

Section 2.2. The Commission shall regularly prepare reports to the Board summarizing and describing Commission activities and provide commentary on Shasta County elections and election processes. Such reports shall be presented to the Board following each regular or special election, as well as any reports as the Board may from time-to-time request.

Section 2.3. The Commission shall not take any action that impairs or hinders an election authority in the performance of their statutory duties or other authority as granted by the Federal Government or by court order and has no inherent policy-making authority.

ARTICLE III MEMBERSHIP

Section 3.1. The Commission shall consist of five members appointed by the Board, each of whom will be selected by a different Supervisor. Members must be of good character and must be registered voters of Shasta County at the time of appointment.

Section 3.2. All members of the Commission shall serve without compensation.

Section 3.3. Members will serve four-year terms, which shall be concurrent with the term of the Supervisor who appointed them. Initial appointees to the Commission may serve shorter terms due to this concurrence.

Section 3.4. Removal of Commission members shall be subject to Ordinance No. SCC 2023-07 and all applicable laws.

ARTICLE IV OFFICERS

Section 4.1. The members of the Commission shall elect a Chair and a Vice-Chair annually at the first meeting of the year. Officers shall serve a term of one year.

Section 4.2. The Chair shall preside at all meetings of the Commission. The Vice-Chair shall preside in the absence of the Chair and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the Chair. If neither the Chair nor the Vice-Chair are present at a meeting, the members present may select an Interim Chair for the duration of the meeting.

ARTICLE V MEETINGS

Section 5.1. All meetings of the Commission shall be called, noticed, held, and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act ([commencing with section 54950 of Government Code](#)).

Section 5.2. Regular meetings of the Commission shall be held during regular business hours in Board Chambers at the Shasta County Administrative Center, located at 1450 Court Street, Redding, CA. Meetings shall at a minimum be monthly for the three months leading up to each regular or special election to allow observations and inspections, and for the three months following each regular or special election to develop and finalize a report on the election, to be presented to the Board. In any year where there are no regular or special elections, the Commission shall at a minimum meet once **quarterly**. Any regularly scheduled meeting of the Commission may be canceled by majority vote of the Commission, or for lack of business or a quorum, by the Chair.

Section 5.3. Special meetings may be called by the Chair or a majority of the members of the Commission.

Section 5.4. A quorum will consist of a majority of the membership of the Commission, or three (3) members. If, after a quorum has been established, early departures would create less than a quorum, no further business may be conducted. A majority vote of the seated members is required for action to be taken.

Section 5.5. The regular order of business shall be:

1. Call to order
2. Invocation
3. Pledge of Allegiance
4. Public comment period – open time on non-agendized items.
5. Consent Calendar
6. Regular Calendar
7. Adjournment

ARTICLE VI STAFF, AGENDAS, AND MINUTES

Section 6.1. The County shall furnish necessary staff and clerical support. Such staff shall record and maintain all minutes of meetings conducted by the Commission. All records of the Commission shall be kept at the County Administrative Office. Disclosure of records maintained by the Commission is governed by the California Public Records Act ([commencing with Government Code section 7920 et seq.](#)). All records shall be maintained in a manner consistent with Shasta County Administrative Policy 1-500, *Records Retention Schedules*.

Section 6.2. Agenda items shall be added to the agenda by county support staff or by motion and approval of the majority of the commission, at the discretion of the Chair, subject to approval by the Chair.

Section 6.3. Staff shall prepare, post, and otherwise give notice of the agenda for each meeting of the Commission in accordance with the requirements of the Brown Act. No matter may be considered or acted upon unless it is included on the posted agenda or a supplemental agenda. If not so included, questions or comments regarding the matter shall be limited to the scope permitted for “public comment” under the Brown Act.

Section 6.4. Minutes of the Commission shall include the time and date the meeting was conducted; a list of persons who were present, including Commission members and support staff; a list of the members of the public who gave public comment or presentations; and a description of each matter discussed and the action taken, if any, by the Commission. Copies of each report or other document received or approved by the Commission shall be filed with the Commission’s records. The Commission shall approve the accuracy of all minutes.

ARTICLE VII
COMMITTEES

Section 7.1. The Commission may establish ad hoc committees as deemed appropriate. Ad hoc committees shall focus on a particular issue and shall be time-limited. No more than two members of the Commission may be appointed to any one ad hoc committee.

SECTION VIII
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Section 8.1. The integrity of the Commission is of the utmost importance. Therefore, if applicable, any member experiencing a conflict of interest, real or apparent, shall excuse themselves or be excused by the Chair from the relevant issue and shall have no vote in any motions regarding the issue. [Government Code section 1090 et seq.](#) shall apply to the Commission.

ARTICLE IX
PARLIAMENTARY AUTHORITY

The rules contained in the current edition of Rosenberg's Rules of Order shall govern procedures not covered by these Bylaws.

ARTICLE X
AMENDMENTS

These bylaws may be amended by the vote of a majority of the Commission members at any regular meeting of the Commission, after notice of the proposal for an amendment has been given to all Commission members not less than 7 days prior to the meeting at which such amendment is to be considered. All such amendments shall be subject to approval by the Board of Supervisors.

Initial bylaws adopted on the following date by the Shasta County Elections Commission:

Date: _____

Chair

STAFF REPORT

MEETING DATE: February 26, 2024

CATEGORY: Regular Calendar 2

SUBJECT: Consider approving draft recommendations from ad hoc committee members Michaud and Lund regarding vote by mail drop boxes.

VOTE REQUIRED: Simple Majority Vote

RECOMMENDATION:

Consider approving draft recommendations from ad hoc committee members Michaud and Lund regarding vote by mail drop boxes.

DISCUSSION:

At the December 18, 2023, meeting, an ad hoc committee was formed, consisting of Members Michaud and Lund, to look into the installation of camera surveillance at drop box locations and examine the number and locations of drop boxes for the March 5, 2024, election. At the January 8, 2024, meeting, the purpose of the ad hoc committee was revised to include any and all issues related to drop boxes for future elections.

At the January 22 and February 5, 2024, meetings, Member Michaud provided a report from the ad hoc committee created on December 18, 2023, regarding any and all issues related to drop boxes for future elections. She discussed information concerning the purchase of cameras to monitor drop boxes, the question of funding such purchases, and concerns and issues regarding drop boxes.

This item is to consider draft recommendations to be presented to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors for consideration.

ALTERNATIVES:

The Commission could decline the draft recommendations, make changes to the draft recommendations, or defer consideration to a future date.

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1: Draft Recommendations
- 2: Exhibits 1 and B
- 3: Exhibit C

**REPORT FROM THE SHASTA COUNTY CITIZENS ELECTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING VOTE BY MAIL BALLOT DROP BOXES
(DROP BOX)**

To the Honorable Board of Supervisors (Board), County of Shasta, State of California:

The Shasta County Citizens Election Advisory Committee respectfully submits the following information for the Board's consideration at their next scheduled meeting.

As of this date, Committee members include:

Ronnean Lund, Chair

Dr. Lisa Michaud, Vice Chair

Dawn Duckett, Member

Susanne Baremore, Member

Bev Gray, Member

GENERAL INFORMATION

California State Elections Code, Section 3025 states, "Vote by mail ballot drop box" means a secure receptacle established by a county or city and county elections official whereby a voted vote by mail ballot may be returned to the elections official from whom it was obtained." There are several potential issues with drop boxes, including but not limited to:

- 1) Can drop boxes be adequately secured?
- 2) Are ballots safe at every step on the process when drop boxes are in use so that voters have faith in the voting system?
- 3) Can ballots be stolen from drop boxes?
- 4) Are ballots in drop boxes in Shasta County treated with the same security as a bank protects cash?
- 5) Can ballot traffickers add ballots to a drop box?
- 6) Are drop boxes in Shasta County under surveillance, so criminals can be caught and immediately prosecuted?
- 7) Are drop boxes a burden on taxpayers?

A "ballot trafficker" is defined as someone who is paid money to steal, surrender, or deposit a ballot.

NUMBER OF DROP BOXES REQUIRED

Drop boxes are targets for ballot trafficking, so the fewer drop boxes, the better the election security; and the better the election security, the more faith the voters have in their election system.

California Election Code, Section 3025.5 (see Exhibit 1), requires there be at least one drop box for every 30,000 registered voters within the jurisdiction where the election is held, as determined on the 88th day before the day of the election. The 88th day before the March 5, 2024, election was December 8, 2023. From the California Secretary of States website, as of December 19, 2023, there were 112,627 registered voters in Shasta County. That would require Shasta County to have four drop boxes for the upcoming March 5, 2024, election. Per the Shasta County Elections office website, "List of Drop Box Locations", for the upcoming March 5, 2024, election, shows 16 drop box locations being provided.

Each drop box must be installed, monitored, cleared out regularly, removed, stored, and should have appropriately completed chain-of-custodies created for them; all of which require staff time and have associated costs. Extra drop boxes, above and beyond that which is required by law, not only provide potential for illegal activities, but they are a burden on taxpayers.

LOCATION OF DROP BOXES

Some of the current 16 drop box locations the Shasta County Elections office is providing include locations within businesses that are not open 24/7. These locations present insecure situations where no one knows who may have access to the drop boxes during nonbusiness hours.

Except for the cities of Redding and Anderson, all of the current drop box locations are within one mile of the community's United States post office.

Taxpayers already pay the United States Postal Service for mail transportation. If people drop their ballot at a United States post office, it does not cost the County the additional money that drop boxes do, and the tax payers are not paying for two, redundant, mail transportation services. In addition, if a person places a ballot into a United States Postal Service receptacle that was fraudulently filled out or trafficked, they are committing a Federal crime. There are no Federal laws regarding the fraudulent use of drop boxes. Drop boxes make it more convenient and safer for criminals to inject fraudulent ballots into the election system.

For security purposes, all drop boxes should be located at police or fire stations.

VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF DROP BOXES

California Code of Regulations, Title 2, Section 20135(e) states, "If feasible, drop boxes shall be monitored by a video security surveillance system, or an internal camera that can capture digital images and/or video. A video security surveillance system can include existing systems on county, city, or private buildings." (See Exhibit B)

Twenty-four hour video surveillance has proven to be the best way to document crimes at drop boxes. No drop boxes should be placed without 24/7 video surveillance. Surveillance recordings must be clear, record 24/7 when the drop box is in use, be live streamed, be constantly monitored by the Elections office, and the video should be retained for the minimum period required for retention of ballots.

If order to discourage ballot trafficking, video surveillance must capture a front view to show the face of the person delivering the ballot(s) and a side view to see if the person delivering the ballot(s) is photographing the ballot prior to depositing it. If a person visits multiply drop boxes in a day or over a period of time, this may indicate ballot trafficking. Video is the only record of this potential criminal activity. In addition, videos of drop box surveillance should be available for public review upon request.

Signage should be added to every drop box location which states, "You are being recorded." Since all drop boxes are located in public areas, there is no presumption of privacy when placing a ballot in a drop box.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF DROP BOX CONTENTS

Review of the Shasta County 2022 General Election chain-of-custodies for drop boxes shows incomplete information. (See Exhibit C) All drop box contents should have fully completed chains-of-custody. The less number of drop boxes, the less worry about incomplete chains-of-custodies.

Ballot retrievers used to collect the ballots from drop boxes should be bipartisan, so there is no question about the intentions of the ballot retrievers. This implies the Elections office must hire a relatively equal number of people from various political parties as temporary election workers. Bipartisan teams of ballot retrievers have, reportedly, hindered election fraud in other states.

TYPE OF DROP BOXES USED

Some of the drop boxes currently used by Shasta County are flimsy and make it easy to access the contents inside. All drop boxes should be made of material that cannot be tampered with, should be made so contents of the box cannot be accessed by the public, and should be locked in place with a chain and lock or some other securing device.

PROSECUTION OF BALLOT TRAFFICING

If potential ballot trafficking is found through surveillance of ballot boxes, it must be investigated and halted immediately, so the election is not jeopardized or influenced and so the public maintains trust in the election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DROP BOXES TO BOLSTER SHASTA COUNTY'S ELECTION SYSTEM

- 1) Shasta County should use the minimum number of drop boxes required by law, in order to detour illegal activities, including ballot trafficking; to save tax payers money; and to make people feel more confident in their election system.
- 2) All drop boxes should only be located at police or fire stations. Drop boxes should never be located within businesses that are not open 24/7, as it creates insecure circumstances for drop box contents.
- 3) All drop boxes should have clear 24/7 video surveillance. Video surveillance should capture both a front viewing, showing someone's face, and a side view, to see how many ballots someone may be depositing and whether or not they are photographing the deposit. Video surveillance should be live streamed and available to the public upon request. Videos should be retained for the minimum length of time required to retain ballots. Signage should be added to every drop box stating, "You are being recorded".
- 4) The County Elections office should make an effort to assure chains-of-custodies for drop boxes are fully and accurately completed, with all the required information by law.
- 5) The County Elections office should hire a relatively equal number of people from various political parties as temporary election workers, and drop box collection teams should be bipartisan.
- 6) All drop boxes used in Shasta County should be made of material that cannot be tampered with, should be made so contents of the box cannot be accessed by the public, and should be locked in place with a chain and lock or some other securing device.
- 7) The public should be assured by officials that ballot trafficking is actively being deterred and will be prosecuted if found.
- 8) Local laws should be enacted that ensure drop box and ballot safety.

EXHIBIT A

ELECTIONS CODE - ELEC

DIVISION 3. VOTE BY MAIL VOTING, NEW RESIDENT, AND NEW CITIZEN VOTING [3000 - 3503]

(Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 2007, Ch. 508, Sec. 10.)

CHAPTER 1. Vote by Mail Application and Voting Procedures [3000 - 3026]

(Heading of Chapter 1 amended by Stats. 2007, Ch. 508, Sec. 11.)

3025.5.

(a) (1) A county that does not conduct an election pursuant to either Section 4005 or 4007 shall provide at least two vote by mail ballot drop-off locations within the jurisdiction where the election is held or at least one vote by mail ballot drop-off location for every 30,000 registered voters within the jurisdiction where the election is held, as determined on the 88th day before the day of the election, whichever results in more vote by mail ballot drop-off locations.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), for a jurisdiction with fewer than 30,000 registered voters, at least one vote by mail ballot drop-off location shall be provided. The elections official shall make a reasonable effort to provide a vote by mail ballot drop-off location in the jurisdiction where the election is held.

(b) A vote by mail ballot drop-off location provided for under this section consists of a secure, accessible, and locked ballot box located as near as possible to established public transportation routes and that is able to receive voted ballots. All vote by mail ballot drop-off locations shall be open at least during regular business hours beginning not less than 28 days before the day of the election, and on the day of the election.

(c) At least one vote by mail ballot drop-off location shall be an exterior drop box that is available for a minimum of 12 hours per day.

(d) For the purposes of this section, "vote by mail ballot drop-off location" has the same meaning as in Section 3025.

(Amended by Stats. 2022, Ch. 161, Sec. 17. (AB 2608) Effective August 22, 2022.)

EXHIBIT B

California Code of Regulations

Title 2. Administration

Division 7. Secretary of State

Chapter 3. Voting Locations

Article 1. Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations

Section 20135. Drop-off Location and Drop Box Security.

- (a) An unstaffed drop box placed outdoors shall be securely fastened in a manner as to prevent moving or tampering, for example, fastening the drop box to concrete or an immovable object.
- (b) An unstaffed drop box placed inside a building shall be secured in a manner that will prevent unauthorized removal.
- (c) A staffed drop box shall be utilized in one of the following manners: 1) securely fastened to a stationary surface or to an immovable object, 2) placed behind a counter, or 3) portable so it can be transported to a curbside area or a mobile voting area.
- (d) A staffed drop box shall be placed in an area that is inaccessible to the public and/or otherwise safeguarded during the hours the drop box is not in use.
- (e) If feasible, drop boxes shall be monitored by a video security surveillance system, or an internal camera that can capture digital images and/or video. A video security surveillance system can include existing systems on county, city, or private buildings.
- (f) All drop boxes shall be secured by a lock or sealable with a tamper-evident seal. Only an elections official and a designated ballot retriever shall have access to the keys and/or combination of the lock.

EXHIBIT C

California Code of Regulations

Title 2. Administration

Division 7. Secretary of State

Chapter 3. Voting Locations

Article 1. Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations

Section 20137. Ballot Collection Procedures and Chain of Custody.

- 1) The county elections official shall develop ballot collection and chain of custody procedures, which shall be substantially similar to the following:
 - a) The county elections official shall assign at least two designated ballot retrievers to retrieve voted vote-by-mail ballots from a drop box. Each designated ballot retriever shall wear a badge or similar identification that readily identifies them as a designated ballot retriever. In addition, each designated ballot retriever must take the following oath prior to retrieving ballots: "I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter."
 - b) Only designated ballot retrievers and law enforcement identified by the county elections official may transport the retrieved voted vote-by-mail ballots.
 - c) Upon arrival at a drop box, the two designated ballot retrievers shall note, on a retrieval form prescribed by the county elections official, the location and unique identification number of the drop box and the date and time of arrival.
 - d) The designated ballot retrievers shall retrieve the voted ballots from the drop box and place the voted ballots in a secure ballot transfer device, retrieve the secure ballot container that is placed inside the drop box, or retrieve the staffed drop box which also serves as a secure ballot container.
 - e) If a drop box includes a secure ballot container, the designated ballot retrievers shall place an empty secure ballot container inside the drop box prior to departure.
 - f) After the final retrieval after the closing of the polls, an empty secure ballot container shall not be placed in the drop box, and the drop box should be locked and/or covered to prevent any further ballots from being deposited.
 - g) The time of departure from the drop box shall be noted on the form described in (a)(3) above.
 - h) Upon arrival at the office of the county elections official, a ballot receiving center, a designated central count location, or a ballot processing location, the designated ballot retrievers who retrieved the ballots shall note the time of arrival on the form described in (a)(3) above.
 - i) The county elections official, or his or her designee, shall inspect the secure ballot container for evidence of tampering and shall receive the retrieved ballots by signing the retrieval form, and including the date and time of receipt. In the event tampering is evident, that fact shall be noted on the retrieval form.
 - j) The completed retrieval form shall be attached to the outside of the secure ballot container or maintained in a manner prescribed by the elections official that ensures that the form is traceable to its respective secure ballot container.
 - k) When the secure container is opened by the county elections official at the office of the county elections official, a designated central count location, or a ballot processing location, the number of ballots retrieved and placed in that secure container shall be noted on the retrieval form.
- 2) The retrieval form described by this Section may be in an electronic form. In the event an electronic form is used, the secure container must be identified in a manner to match the container with the electronic form. In addition, the elections official must develop a method to capture and retain the required signatures on the electronic form.
- 3) The county elections official shall provide a copy of their ballot collection and chain of custody procedures to the Secretary of State's office by the 30th day before the election.

STAFF REPORT

MEETING DATE: February 26, 2024

CATEGORY: Regular Calendar 3

SUBJECT: Consider approving draft recommendations from ad hoc committee members Lund and Gray regarding a local ordinance mandating hand counted ballots at precincts using paper pollbooks

VOTE REQUIRED: Simple Majority Vote

RECOMMENDATION:

Consider approving draft recommendations from ad hoc committee members Lund and Gray regarding a local ordinance mandating hand counted ballots at precincts using paper pollbooks.

DISCUSSION:

At the October 23, 2023, meeting, an ad hoc committee was formed, consisting of Members Lund and Gray, to review and investigate election issues, including but not limited to the recall of Kevin Crye, District 1 Supervisor.

At the November 20, 2023, meeting, Member Lund provided a report from the ad hoc committee created on October 23, 2023, regarding the review and investigation of election issues, including but not limited to the recall of Kevin Crye, District 1 Supervisor.

It is the belief of the Commission that, in order to increase public trust in the Shasta County election processes, there should be a local ordinance mandating that Shasta County conduct their elections using hand counting of ballots at the precincts with paper poll books.

This item is to consider draft recommendations to be presented to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors for consideration.

ALTERNATIVES:

The Commission could decline the draft recommendations, make changes to the draft recommendations, or defer consideration to a future date.

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1: Draft Recommendations
- 2: Appendix
- 3: Exhibit A

**REPORT FROM THE SHASTA COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMISSION
ON
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED
BALLOTS AT PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS**

To the Honorable Board of Supervisors (Board), County of Shasta, State of California:

The Shasta County Elections Commission (Commission) respectfully submits the following information for the Board's consideration at their next scheduled meeting.

As of this date, Committee members include:

Ronnean Lund, Commissioner

Dr. Lisa Michaud, Commissioner

Dawn Duckett, Commissioner

Susanne Baremore, Commissioner

Bev Gray, Commissioner

GENERAL INFORMATION

It is the belief of the Commission that, in order to increase public trust in the Shasta County election processes, there should be a local ordinance mandating that Shasta County conduct their elections using hand counting of ballots at the precincts with paper poll books.

BASIS FOR A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED BALLOTS AT THE PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS

1) The California Constitution Article II - Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall; Section 1, states: "All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require."

2) No one can observe the actual tally of ballots by a machine. No one, by watching a machine with their eyes, can know whether votes are being tabulated correctly or incorrectly at any moment. No one except the electronic voting system companies and the Secretary of State has access to the source code or software in voting machine equipment used to tally ballots.

3) There is credible evidence that, contrary to state law, voting systems as defined by Election Code §362 (See Exhibit A) have been connected to the internet in violation of Election Code §19205 (See Exhibit B). This was demonstrated in Antrim County, Michigan (see [Office of the Special Council Interim Report](#), [Ben Cotton's testimony](#), [Penrose's testimony](#)). (see <http://tinyurl.com/2yz55s6k>, <http://tinyurl.com/msv5b72z>, <http://tinyurl.com/3hwrybuv>). Furthermore, electronic poll books are connected to the internet and are permitted by law to connect to the internet. Voter participation is provided in near real time to NGOs and third parties and this information can be used to calculate how many votes are needed to flip an election.

4) Jeffrey O'Donnell's Fingerprints of Fraud Vol. #1 report documents evidence that the United States of America and Shasta County (page 73) were the victims of a coordinated multi-state conspiracy to defraud the 2020 General Election using voting machines; see: fingerprintsoffraud.com

- 5) Jeffrey O'Donnell's analysis of Shasta County's June 2022 Primary shows election fraud occurred. He recommended not to certify the election. [Shasta County Report 2022 Primary](http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t) (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>)
- 6) The [Halderman Report](http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t) (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>) demonstrated how easily Dominion Machines are hacked. Attacks were "successfully implemented and could be effectuated by malicious actors with very limited time and access to the machines, as little as mere minutes."
- 7) The Transparency Foundation [Audit](http://tinyurl.com/y8jpnrs) (see <http://tinyurl.com/y8jpnrs>) of California elections revealed voter fraud and a failing score on 9 out of 10 criteria. Election system security received a failing score.
- 8) There is an urgent need to restore confidence in our elections and to protect those who raise complaints or questions about the integrity of our elections.
- 9) The lack of transparency in elections is exacerbated by the withholding of public records by county election officials. At the direction of the Secretary of State's Office, county election officials have repeatedly violated The California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000, et seq. (formerly Government Code §§6250, et seq.), enacted pursuant to Article 1(b) of the California Constitution, which states that "The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business . . ." Click [HERE](http://teamhopelibrary.org) to enter Library (see teamhopelibrary.org)
- 10) Hand counting of paper ballots is expressly authorized by the California Election Code §§ 15270, et seq (See Exhibit C) which contains established procedures used by all 58 counties before introduction of electronic voting systems, and is still used to conduct a 1% tally (the gold standard of accuracy). The Secretary of State has no veto power over the use of these procedures. No prior approval or special permission from the Secretary of State is needed to conduct elections in accordance with these statutes because the Secretary of State cannot overrule the use of a method the California Legislature has authorized.
- 11) Election Code §19207 (See Exhibit D) grants authority to the County governing board to adopt any kind of voting system or combination of voting systems. AB969 usurps the County's authority under Election Code §19207 (See Exhibit E).
- 12) The Board of Supervisors may canvass all election returns pursuant to CA Govt Code § 25201. (See Exhibit F) AB969 usurps the County's authority under §25201
- 13) The Secretary of State has failed to factor into her estimates the result of economic impact on the local citizens of counties who will benefit from employment as a result of a full manual tally of ballots.
- 14) The California legislature used a false "Urgency" clause to fast track an unconstitutional law. California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8 says that "urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety."
- 15) There is no credible evidence that hand counted elections under these procedures were or will be more expensive than elections conducted with electronic voting systems. In fact, estimates by Linda Rantz (click [HERE](http://tinyurl.com/4xb55dkt)) (see <http://tinyurl.com/4xb55dkt>), Clint Curtis (click [HERE](http://tinyurl.com/2bv6uxnu))(see <http://tinyurl.com/2bv6uxnu>), and Chriss Street (click [HERE](http://tinyurl.com/5dy9y4p6))(see <http://tinyurl.com/5dy9y4p6>) suggest that hand counting will be significantly cheaper than machine counting.
- 16) Hand counting is compatible with casting votes via mail, drop-box, or in person.
- 17) The federal Help America Vote Act requires accommodations to ensure persons with disabilities can vote, but does not require the use of electronic voting systems. Neither does the Americans with

Disabilities Act, which only requires that “full and equal opportunity to vote in all elections” be provided to voters with disabilities. On the contrary, 52 USC §21081 (See Exhibit G) expressly protects traditional paper ballot voting systems.

18) “The real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all the provisions of the law.” CA Elections Code 19001. (See Exhibit H) If the real will of the electors in Shasta County is determined by hand counting then enforcing AB969 would be in direct violation of CA Elections Code 19001 which clearly states that compliance with state law is secondary to ascertaining the true will of the electors.

19) CA Elections Code 19003 (See Exhibit I) states “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.” Therefore, the county laws and ordinances supersede any state laws in regard to voting systems. It is incumbent on the County to dictate the manner in which elections are conducted. See also California Election Code §19207. (See Exhibit J)

20) The citizens desire their elections be conducted at the precinct for maximum transparency and community participation. Currently all ballot tallies are conducted at the ROV office with very little access for the community to observe and participate. In order to restore trust in our elections all citizens need to be able to participate and freely observe the election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to restore trust in the election process the Election Commission recommends the Shasta County Board of Supervisors create a local ordinance which states that Shasta County shall hand count ballots at the precincts using paper poll books.

EXHIBIT A

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS

FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

California Elections Code

Sec. 15270

This article applies to all elections in which ballots are counted by hand.

Sec. 15271

As soon as the polls are finally closed, the precinct board shall commence to count the votes by taking the ballots cast, unopened, out of the box and counting them to ascertain whether the number of ballots corresponds with the number of signatures on the roster. The precinct board shall make a record upon the roster of the number of ballots in the ballot box, the number of signatures on the roster, and the difference, if any.

Sec. 15272

The count shall be public and shall be continued without adjournment until completed and the result is declared. During the reading and tallying, the ballot read and the tally sheet kept shall be within the clear view of watchers.

Sec. 15273

Unless otherwise provided in this code, the precinct board members may not constitute themselves into separate squads in an attempt to conduct more than one count of the ballots at the same time.

Sec. 15274

The members of the precinct board may relieve each other in the duties of counting ballots.

EXHIBIT A

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS

FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

Sec. 15275

Those ballots not rejected shall be placed in one pile, and the board shall proceed to count by tallying the vote for one or more offices or measures at a time.

Sec. 15276

The precinct board members shall ascertain the number of votes cast for each person and for and against each measure in the following manner: One precinct board member shall read from the ballots. As the ballots are read, at least one other precinct board member shall keep watch of each vote so as to check on any possible error or omission on the part of the officer reading or calling the ballot.

Sec. 15277

- (a) Two of the precinct board members shall each keep a tally sheet in a form prescribed by the elections official. Each tally sheet shall contain all of the following:
- (1) The name of each candidate being voted for and the specific office for which each candidate is being voted. The offices shall be in the same order as on the ballot.
 - (2) A list of each measure being voted upon.
 - (3) Sufficient space to permit the tallying of the full vote cast for each candidate and for and against each measure.
- (b) The precinct board members keeping the tally sheets shall record opposite each name or measure, with pen or indelible pencil, the number of votes by tallies as the name of each candidate or measure voted upon is read aloud from the respective ballot.
- (c) Immediately upon the completion of the tallies, the precinct board members keeping the tally shall draw two heavy lines in ink or indelible pencil from the last tally mark to the end of the line in which the tallies terminate and initial that line. The total number of votes counted for each

EXHIBIT A

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

candidate and for and against each measure shall be recorded on the tally sheets in words and figures.

Sec. 15278

On completion of the canvass of the returns for each election, the elections official shall compare the vote by mail voters' list with the roster of voters in each precinct to determine if any voter cast more than one ballot at that election.

Sec. 15278.5

No precinct board member may make any tally of votes in any other manner than is provided in this article, nor in any place other than on the tally sheets provided for that purpose.

Sec. 15279

The ballots, as soon as all of the names and measures marked on them as voted for are read and tallied, shall not thereafter be examined by any person, but, as soon as all are counted, shall be carefully sealed in a strong envelope. The signatures of each member of the precinct board shall be written across the seal.

Sec. 15280

The precinct board shall complete, sign, and return to the elections official all furnished forms requiring its signatures. When votes are counted at the precinct, all members of the precinct board, upon the completion of their duties, shall sign the following certificate of performance, which shall be substantially in the following form: for ____ precinct, for the ____ election, held on the ____ day of ____, (year). We hereby certify that the total number of votes received by each candidate for each office and the total number of votes cast for and against each measure is as indicated on the tally sheets. We further certify that the results of votes cast forms posted outside the polling place and transmitted to the county elections official show the total number of votes received by each candidate for each office and the total number of votes cast for and against each measure is as indicated.

EXHIBIT A

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS

FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

Inspector
Assistant Inspector
Judge
Judge
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk

Sec. 15281

The precinct board shall sign and post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast. The copy shall remain posted for at least 48 hours after the official time fixed for the closing of the polls. To protect a person's right to cast a secret ballot under Section 7 of Article II of the California Constitution, in cases where fewer than 10 voters cast ballots and the precinct board tallies the results at the precinct, the precinct board shall post only the total number of people who voted at the precinct.

**NOTE THAT THERE IS NO ENABLING ACT AUTHORIZING THE
SECRETARY OF STATE TO PRESCRIBE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

APPENDIX

1)

CA Constitution Article 2, SECTION 1

All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.

3)

California Election Law §362

“Voting system” means a mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic system and its software, or any combination of these used for casting a ballot, tabulating votes, or both. “Voting system” does not include a remote accessible vote by mail system.

California Election Law §19205

A voting system shall comply with all of the following:

- (a) No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
- (b) No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
- (c) No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.

9)

Government Code §§7920.000, et seq.

This division shall be known and may be cited as the California Public Records Act.

Article 1 section 3(b) of the California Constitution

(b) (1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.

11)

Election Code §19207

The governing board may adopt for use at elections any kind of voting system, any combination of voting systems, or any combination of a voting system and paper ballots, provided that the voting system or systems involved have been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State or specifically authorized by law pursuant to Section 19209.

12)

CA Govt Code § 25201

Subject to the provisions of the Elections Code, the board may establish, abolish, and change election precincts, appoint inspectors, clerks, and judges of election, canvass all election returns, declare the result, and order the county elections official to issue certificates of election.

14)

California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8

(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement of facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill shall be passed separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring. An urgency statute may not create or abolish any office or change the salary, term, or duties of any office, or grant any franchise or special privilege, or create any vested right or interest.

17)

52 USC §21081

Voting systems standards

(a) Requirements

Each voting system used in an election for Federal office shall meet the following requirements:

(1) In general

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall-

(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;

(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and

(iii) if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office-

(I) notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot;

(II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and

(III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.

(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by-

(i) establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and

(ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error).

18)

CA Elections Code 19001

This division shall be liberally construed so that the real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all of the provisions of the law.

19)

CA Elections Code 19003

Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.

SHASTA COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMISSION

February 26, 2024

REGULAR MEETING

MINUTES

2:00 p.m.: Chair Lund called the meeting of the Shasta County Elections Commission to order on the above date with the following present:

Present: Commissioners Susanne Baremore, Dawn Duckett, Bev Gray, Ronnean Lund, and Lisa Michaud, Ph.D.

Staff: Deputy County Executive Officer Stewart Buettell, Acting County Counsel Alan Cox, and Chief Deputy Clerk of the Board Stefany Blankenship.

The Commission meeting opened with an invocation and the Pledge of Allegiance.

PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD - OPEN TIME

Steve Woodrum, Christian Gardinier, Nathan Blaze, Lori Bridgeford, Arthur Coller, Rick H., Joseph Fairfield, and Jim Burnett spoke during public comment – open time.

CONSENT CALENDAR

There was no public comment.

By motion made, seconded (Duckett/Michaud), and unanimously carried, the Shasta County Elections Commission took the following actions, which were listed on the Consent Calendar:

Approved the minutes of the meeting held on February 5, 2024, as submitted.

REGULAR CALENDAR

BYLAWS

There was no public comment.

By motion made, seconded (Duckett/Michaud), and unanimously carried, the Shasta County Elections Commission approved the Shasta County Elections Commission Bylaws, as amended, for recommendation to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors.

AD HOC COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING BALLOT DROP BOXES

Timothy Goebel, Jim Burnett, Lori Bridgeford, Laurie, and an anonymous speaker spoke during public comment.

By motion made, seconded (Duckett/Michaud), and carried 4-1 by roll call vote with Commissioner Baremore voting no, the Shasta County Elections Commission approved the recommendations from ad hoc committee members Michaud and Lund regarding vote by mail drop boxes, as amended, to be presented to the Shasta County Board of Supervisors for consideration.

AD HOC COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED BALLOTS AT PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS

Timothy Goebel, Christian Gardinier, Laura Hobbs, Chris Street, Jeff Lowe, Ken Morrow, and six anonymous speakers spoke during public comment.

By motion made, seconded (Michaud/Gray), and carried 3-2 by roll call vote with Commissioners Baremore and Duckett voting no, the Shasta County Elections Commission approved the recommendations from ad hoc committee members Lund and Gray regarding a local ordinance mandating hand counted ballots at precincts using paper pollbooks, as amended.

VOTER ROLLS

Ken Morrow, Lori Bridgeford, and an anonymous speaker spoke during public comment.

Commissioner Gray gave an update regarding voter rolls.

COMMISSIONER REPORTS

Commissioner Duckett stated that she would be unable to attend the March 11, 2024, Commission meeting.

Commissioner Baremore had nothing to report.

Commissioner Lund had nothing to report.

Commissioner Michaud discussed her recent tour of the Elections office, including changes to the layout and the new machines for disability and aided access for voters.

Commissioner Gray stated that she had spoken with an elections lawyer and would report further at the next meeting.

There was no public comment.

DISCUSSION OF ELECTION ISSUES

There was no public comment.

Commissioner Lund raised the possibility of creating an ad hoc committee to look into election chains of custody.

Commissioners Duckett and Lund expressed their interest in having the Registrar of Voters give a presentation regarding election chains of custody.

4:53 p.m.: The Shasta County Elections Commission adjourned.

Chair

ATTEST:

DAVID J. RICKERT
Clerk of the Shasta County Elections Commission

By _____
Deputy

APPENDIX

1)

CA Constitution Article 2, SECTION 1

All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.

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California Election Law §362

“Voting system” means a mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic system and its software, or any combination of these used for casting a ballot, tabulating votes, or both. “Voting system” does not include a remote accessible vote by mail system.

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A voting system shall comply with all of the following:

- (a) No part of the voting system shall be connected to the Internet at any time.
- (b) No part of the voting system shall electronically receive or transmit election data through an exterior communication network, including the public telephone system, if the communication originates from or terminates at a polling place, satellite location, or counting center.
- (c) No part of the voting system shall receive or transmit wireless communications or wireless data transfers.

9)

Government Code §§7920.000, et seq.

This division shall be known and may be cited as the California Public Records Act.

Article 1 section 3(b) of the California Constitution

(b) (1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.

11)

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The governing board may adopt for use at elections any kind of voting system, any combination of voting systems, or any combination of a voting system and paper ballots, provided that the voting system or systems involved have been certified or conditionally approved by the Secretary of State or specifically authorized by law pursuant to Section 19209.

12)

CA Govt Code § 25201

Subject to the provisions of the Elections Code, the board may establish, abolish, and change election precincts, appoint inspectors, clerks, and judges of election, canvass all election returns, declare the result, and order the county elections official to issue certificates of election.

14)

California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8

(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement of facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill shall be passed separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring. An urgency statute may not create or abolish any office or change the salary, term, or duties of any office, or grant any franchise or special privilege, or create any vested right or interest.

17)

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Voting systems standards

(a) Requirements

Each voting system used in an election for Federal office shall meet the following requirements:

(1) In general

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall-

(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;

(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and

(iii) if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office-

(I) notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot;

(II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and

(III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.

(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by-

(i) establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and

(ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error).

18)

CA Elections Code 19001

This division shall be liberally construed so that the real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all of the provisions of the law.

19)

CA Elections Code 19003

Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.

APPENDIX

Item 1)

CA Constitution Article 2, SECTION 1

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APPENDIX

Item 16)

52 USC §21081

Voting systems standards

(a) Requirements

Each voting system used in an election for Federal office shall meet the following requirements:

(1) In general

(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the voting system (including any lever voting system, optical scanning voting system, or direct recording electronic system) shall-

(i) permit the voter to verify (in a private and independent manner) the votes selected by the voter on the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted;

(ii) provide the voter with the opportunity (in a private and independent manner) to change the ballot or correct any error before the ballot is cast and counted (including the opportunity to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error); and

(iii) if the voter selects votes for more than one candidate for a single office-

(I) notify the voter that the voter has selected more than one candidate for a single office on the ballot;

(II) notify the voter before the ballot is cast and counted of the effect of casting multiple votes for the office; and

(III) provide the voter with the opportunity to correct the ballot before the ballot is cast and counted.

(B) A State or jurisdiction that uses a paper ballot voting system, a punch card voting system, or a central count voting system (including mail-in absentee ballots and mail-in ballots), may meet the requirements of subparagraph (A)(iii) by-

(i) establishing a voter education program specific to that voting system that notifies each voter of the effect of casting multiple votes for an office; and

(ii) providing the voter with instructions on how to correct the ballot before it is cast and counted (including instructions on how to correct the error through the issuance of a replacement ballot if the voter was otherwise unable to change the ballot or correct any error).

Item 17)

CA Elections Code 19001

This division shall be liberally construed so that the real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all of the provisions of the law.

Item 18)

CA Elections Code 19003


Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.

Computer Manipulation in Previous Shasta County Elections -and- Update on Nov 7th 2023 Election

Shasta County Citizen Election Committee 11/20/23

-Report by Laura Hobbs
www.ShastaElectionNews.org

Cast Vote Records



Scrub This Image From Your Mind

On election night we are accustomed to seeing a graph with two lines, one for each candidate. This is the raw election data as it comes in. That is not what we are talking about here.

What we are looking at in the CVR analysis is *one* line representing the total percentage of *one* candidate.

Cast Vote Records a Graph with 2 axes

What is a CVR?

The CVR is the sequence of votes as they are counted. "This allows a data analyst to "replay" the election ballot by ballot to spot unnatural patterns of voting ". You can think of the CVR as an approximation of time.


What is Trump's Percentage?

Trump's percentage is the number of Trump mail-in votes at any given point, divided by the number of Trump mail-in votes plus the number of Biden mail-in votes. This is then multiplied by 100.

$$\text{Avg} = \frac{\text{Trump's Votes}}{\text{Total Vote (Trump+Biden)}}$$

$$\text{Percentage} = \text{Average} \times 100$$

Sample Graph: 2020 Shasta Presidential Election



Why is it Unnatural for the Percentage to Continue to Grow Throughout the Counting?

The reason is because it is a ratio or percentage, not raw counts coming in. You would expect to see some variation at the beginning of counting, but after a large number of votes have been counted (over about 1000) that line should settle down to a flat line vertical to the x-axis in a fair election (see green line in above graph) .

This is due to the law of large numbers or the coin-flip law. At 20K votes if one more vote comes in it has only 1/20,000 of an effect on the final outcome.


Think of how easy it is to change your bowling average at the beginning of the season, and then think of how hard it is to change your bowling average at the end of the season.

The fact that the total percentage continues to rise despite thousands of votes could only be due to computer manipulation.


Law of Large Numbers

States that if a random process is repeatedly observed, then the average of the observed values will be **stable** in the long run

LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS IN AVERAGE OF DIE ROLLS
AVERAGE CONVERGES TO EXPECTED VALUE OF 3.5



County Clerk Bob Holsinger vs Cathy Allen Primary 2022



This chart displays the above but uses the percentage of the top candidate's votes of the total at that vote count.

Time (Cast Vote Record number)

Only mail in votes represented. Graphs produced on votedatabase.com with data from Cathy Allen

What do the red brackets mean?


The red cone represents the highest and lowest limits within the range of possible votes for a fair election, and is based on the published final outcome of an election.

Any line that falls outside the red cone is evidence of computer manipulation. This is what Jeffrey O'Donnell has termed the Fingerprint of Fraud.

This is what I've been referring to as the "Mesa Pattern of Fraud"


Primary June 2022 Superintendent of Schools

County Superintendent of Schools (Judy Flores)




Only mail in votes represented. Graphs produced on votedatabase.com

Board of Education Area 2 Race Nov 2022




6 Local Races June 2022


County Sheriff John Greene vs Michael Johnson Primary 2022



County District Attorney Erik Jensen vs Stephanie Bridgett Primary 2022




County Superintendent of Schools Caples vs Flores Primary 2022



Statewide Races June 2022-analysis of 24 pairwise comparisons

Governor of California: Brian Dahle Vs. Gavin Newsom June 2022

Brian Dahle's Percentage



This chart displays the above but uses the percentage of the top candidate's votes of the total at that vote count.

Methodology:
 50,000 random elections of a half million random votes were simulated. The percentage of candidate 1 votes were observed in all of the simulations was recorded. The difference between the high and low expected values is then expanded by 10% to account for any non-random vote sequences. The resulting conservative high and low values are then included on the charts in red.

If the page indicates that county may fit the "Mesa Pattern", this means that the percentage of the top candidate listed when analyzed over the entire election matches the pattern first observed in the Mesa County, Colorado Cast Vote Record and caused by the ballot and vote manipulation observed in the county's election server. The characteristics of the "Mesa Pattern" are as follows:

- The second candidate chosen (normally the Democrat candidate) achieves their most favorable percentage within the first third of the race.
- The first candidate chosen (normally the Republican candidate)'s overall vote percentage rises, in general, in a fairly linear fashion to the end of the race.
- The difference between the first percentage of the first candidate chosen is between 1 and 1.4 times the percentage they held at the end of the race, referred to as the "Back End Rise" (BER).


Note: This pattern is applicable to mail-in ballots, or early ballots if the precinct distribution shows that they were processed in a random fashion in some cases, the analysis of the entire election, or voting methods, should use the pattern.

Only mail in votes represented. Graphs produced on votedatabase.com

CA Secretary of State: Bernosky Vs. Shirly Webber

June 2022

Bernosky's Percentage




This chart displays the above but uses the percentage of the top candidate's votes of the total at that vote count.

Methodology:
 50,000 random elections of a half million random votes were simulated. The percentage of candidate 1 votes were observed in all of the simulations was recorded. The difference between the high and low expected values is then expanded by 10% to account for any non-random vote sequences. The resulting conservative high and low values are then included on the charts in red.


Time (Cast Vote Record)

3 Federal Races June 2022


US Representative District #1 LaMalfa vs Steiner Primary 2022



US Senate Short Term Meuser vs Padilla Primary 2022




US Senate long term Meuser vs Padilla Primary 2022



8 Judicial Elections Nov 2022

Only 1 of 8 looked like a fair election

Associate Justice, Court of Appeal, 3rd District Harry Hull Percent "No" over time



Full Report can be found at
www.ShastaElectionNew.org

Click on “Report to the Sheriff”

- Over 50 different election contest comparisons.
- Layman’s description of the data analysis
- Hyperlinks to graphs and Jeffrey O’Donnell’s reports
- I am willing to meet one on one to answer any questions on my analysis

Summary of Election Observation to date:

- Logic and Accuracy Test
 - They said 55 ballots were used but in fact 28 ballots were used.
 - These were photocopied ballots of unknown composition, therefore accuracy was not tested.
- Concealing and Changing Observation Times
 - LAT testing time was changed 2 times, and never posted
 - Poll worker training class was not held at the time they said it would be.
- Chain of Custody NOT Maintained
 - No chain of custody in the blue room, nor in the bat cave between the dates of Nov6th-Nov13th (calls into question if a hand count would have any utility at this point)
 - When I asked to see chain of custody on Nov 13 they told me to stop asking Kai questions and to “put it in writing”

Summary of Election Observation to date:

- Questions were often met with hostility (with the exception of Kai), or ignorance.
- Observable activities were limited and typically only seen on a screen or at a distance making meaningful observation near impossible.
 - We were not allowed entrance into any of the rooms where election activities were taking place, and we were often not allowed upstairs to verify with our own eyes that no election activities were taking place.

Summary of Election Observation to date:

- Many violations of Ca Election Code 15104
 - **Nov 6th** Sheriff was called and they directed me to RPD. The attitude of the dispatcher Annie was dismissive. A report was filed by Officer Ruiz because they would not let our group see the ballot envelopes or the signature thereon. Nor would they allow us to challenge any signatures
 - Officer Ruiz Report # RPD23-037-177
 - **Nov 9th** I filed a second report with the RPD because of violations of Ca EC 15104.
 - Section (a)
 - There was a locked door to the entrance of 1643 Market. Eventually I was allowed in but had to sit near the door. At 10:36AM I heard voices of workers upstairs but was not allowed to go look at what was happening.
 - Section (d)
 - Secure the vote by mail ballots to prevent tampering. Serious chain of custody violations (No chain of custody in the blue room, nor in the bat cave between the dates of Nov6th-Nov9th) were reported to Captain Cole.
 - Captain Cole said they would make a note of my call but not investigate.

Summary of Election Observation to date:

- Their ability to explain the in detail to the observers was minimal and on the last day at the 1% canvass we were not allowed to ask any questions except by submitting a slip of paper, which they said they would get the answer to us on another day “because they were working”-Anna
 - I was told at least 30 times (over the course of this election) that “I can’t answer that question right now but I will get back to you”
 - Many questions went unanswered even to this day. I was directed to “put it in writing”

Summary of Election Observation to date:

- Slow walking
 - The ROV chose not to click “tabulate” in the Batcave after ballots were scanned on the evening of Nov 8th. Instead she said that it would be done the following day, leaving people to question if they were simply pretending to go home just to get rid of observers
 - The Hart guy and 2 employees walked two blocks to South St. and then once the office was cleared, they stood there about 10 minutes talking and then turned strait back around toward the office. Why?
 - This paired with the broken chain of custody is a recipe for fraud.

Conclusion and Advice

- Hand Counting is the solution to computer manipulation, but chain of custody must be maintained in order for our votes to be counted accurately.
- Transparency is not a part of our election process, as it exists currently.
- Accurate information and counts should be provided to the public on a daily basis
 - (for instance if you are observing the Agillis you should be told how many ballots were processed and what the outcome was, how many undeliverable, and how many challenged each day)
- The ROV office is intentionally drawing out the counting process
 - Solution is one day voting, and one day counting.

Conclusions and Advice

- Police Reports should be investigated further
- Election should not be certified because of broken chain of custody
- This type of election fraud took place in 2020 without the knowledge of Election Clerks, however now that Election Clerks are aware of the fraud it makes them complicit in the fraud
- Centrally counted votes should not be sorted by precinct (in some states this is illegal)
- Ballots should be hand counted at the precinct where the community can have full participation and involvement

EXHIBIT C

California Code of Regulations

Title 2. Administration

Division 7. Secretary of State

Chapter 3. Voting Locations

Article 1. Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations

Section 20137. Ballot Collection Procedures and Chain of Custody.

- 1) The county elections official shall develop ballot collection and chain of custody procedures, which shall be substantially similar to the following:
 - a) The county elections official shall assign at least two designated ballot retrievers to retrieve voted vote-by-mail ballots from a drop box. Each designated ballot retriever shall wear a badge or similar identification that readily identifies them as a designated ballot retriever. In addition, each designated ballot retriever must take the following oath prior to retrieving ballots: "I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of California; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties upon which I am about to enter."
 - b) Only designated ballot retrievers and law enforcement identified by the county elections official may transport the retrieved voted vote-by-mail ballots.
 - c) Upon arrival at a drop box, the two designated ballot retrievers shall note, on a retrieval form prescribed by the county elections official, the location and unique identification number of the drop box and the date and time of arrival.
 - d) The designated ballot retrievers shall retrieve the voted ballots from the drop box and place the voted ballots in a secure ballot transfer device, retrieve the secure ballot container that is placed inside the drop box, or retrieve the staffed drop box which also serves as a secure ballot container.
 - e) If a drop box includes a secure ballot container, the designated ballot retrievers shall place an empty secure ballot container inside the drop box prior to departure.
 - f) After the final retrieval after the closing of the polls, an empty secure ballot container shall not be placed in the drop box, and the drop box should be locked and/or covered to prevent any further ballots from being deposited.
 - g) The time of departure from the drop box shall be noted on the form described in (a)(3) above.
 - h) Upon arrival at the office of the county elections official, a ballot receiving center, a designated central count location, or a ballot processing location, the designated ballot retrievers who retrieved the ballots shall note the time of arrival on the form described in (a)(3) above.
 - i) The county elections official, or his or her designee, shall inspect the secure ballot container for evidence of tampering and shall receive the retrieved ballots by signing the retrieval form, and including the date and time of receipt. In the event tampering is evident, that fact shall be noted on the retrieval form.
 - j) The completed retrieval form shall be attached to the outside of the secure ballot container or maintained in a manner prescribed by the elections official that ensures that the form is traceable to its respective secure ballot container.
 - k) When the secure container is opened by the county elections official at the office of the county elections official, a designated central count location, or a ballot processing location, the number of ballots retrieved and placed in that secure container shall be noted on the retrieval form.
- 2) The retrieval form described by this Section may be in an electronic form. In the event an electronic form is used, the secure container must be identified in a manner to match the container with the electronic form. In addition, the elections official must develop a method to capture and retain the required signatures on the electronic form.
- 3) The county elections official shall provide a copy of their ballot collection and chain of custody procedures to the Secretary of State's office by the 30th day before the election.

EXHIBIT A

ELECTIONS CODE - ELEC

DIVISION 3. VOTE BY MAIL VOTING, NEW RESIDENT, AND NEW CITIZEN VOTING [3000 - 3503]

(Heading of Division 3 amended by Stats. 2007, Ch. 508, Sec. 10.)

CHAPTER 1. Vote by Mail Application and Voting Procedures [3000 - 3026]

(Heading of Chapter 1 amended by Stats. 2007, Ch. 508, Sec. 11.)

3025.5.

(a) (1) A county that does not conduct an election pursuant to either Section 4005 or 4007 shall provide at least two vote by mail ballot drop-off locations within the jurisdiction where the election is held or at least one vote by mail ballot drop-off location for every 30,000 registered voters within the jurisdiction where the election is held, as determined on the 88th day before the day of the election, whichever results in more vote by mail ballot drop-off locations.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), for a jurisdiction with fewer than 30,000 registered voters, at least one vote by mail ballot drop-off location shall be provided. The elections official shall make a reasonable effort to provide a vote by mail ballot drop-off location in the jurisdiction where the election is held.

(b) A vote by mail ballot drop-off location provided for under this section consists of a secure, accessible, and locked ballot box located as near as possible to established public transportation routes and that is able to receive voted ballots. All vote by mail ballot drop-off locations shall be open at least during regular business hours beginning not less than 28 days before the day of the election, and on the day of the election.

(c) At least one vote by mail ballot drop-off location shall be an exterior drop box that is available for a minimum of 12 hours per day.

(d) For the purposes of this section, "vote by mail ballot drop-off location" has the same meaning as in Section 3025.

(Amended by Stats. 2022, Ch. 161, Sec. 17. (AB 2608) Effective August 22, 2022.)

EXHIBIT B

California Code of Regulations

Title 2. Administration

Division 7. Secretary of State

Chapter 3. Voting Locations

Article 1. Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes and Vote-by-Mail Drop-Off Locations

Section 20135. Drop-off Location and Drop Box Security.

- (a) An unstaffed drop box placed outdoors shall be securely fastened in a manner as to prevent moving or tampering, for example, fastening the drop box to concrete or an immovable object.
- (b) An unstaffed drop box placed inside a building shall be secured in a manner that will prevent unauthorized removal.
- (c) A staffed drop box shall be utilized in one of the following manners: 1) securely fastened to a stationary surface or to an immovable object, 2) placed behind a counter, or 3) portable so it can be transported to a curbside area or a mobile voting area.
- (d) A staffed drop box shall be placed in an area that is inaccessible to the public and/or otherwise safeguarded during the hours the drop box is not in use.
- (e) If feasible, drop boxes shall be monitored by a video security surveillance system, or an internal camera that can capture digital images and/or video. A video security surveillance system can include existing systems on county, city, or private buildings.
- (f) All drop boxes shall be secured by a lock or sealable with a tamper-evident seal. Only an elections official and a designated ballot retriever shall have access to the keys and/or combination of the lock.

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEDURE

California Elections Code

Sec. 15270

This article applies to all elections in which ballots are counted by hand.

Sec. 15271

As soon as the polls are finally closed, the precinct board shall commence to count the votes by taking the ballots cast, unopened, out of the box and counting them to ascertain whether the number of ballots corresponds with the number of signatures on the roster. The precinct board shall make a record upon the roster of the number of ballots in the ballot box, the number of signatures on the roster, and the difference, if any.

Sec. 15272

The count shall be public and shall be continued without adjournment until completed and the result is declared. During the reading and tallying, the ballot read and the tally sheet kept shall be within the clear view of watchers.

Sec. 15273

Unless otherwise provided in this code, the precinct board members may not constitute themselves into separate squads in an attempt to conduct more than one count of the ballots at the same time.

Sec. 15274

The members of the precinct board may relieve each other in the duties of counting ballots.

Sec. 15275

Those ballots not rejected shall be placed in one pile, and the board shall proceed to count by tallying the vote for one or more offices or measures at a time.

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEDURE

Sec. 15276

The precinct board members shall ascertain the number of votes cast for each person and for and against each measure in the following manner: One precinct board member shall read from the ballots. As the ballots are read, at least one other precinct board member shall keep watch of each vote so as to check on any possible error or omission on the part of the officer reading or calling the ballot.

Sec. 15277

(a) Two of the precinct board members shall each keep a tally sheet in a form prescribed by the elections official. Each tally sheet shall contain all of the following:

- (1) The name of each candidate being voted for and the specific office for which each candidate is being voted. The offices shall be in the same order as on the ballot.
- (2) A list of each measure being voted upon.
- (3) Sufficient space to permit the tallying of the full vote cast for each candidate and for and against each measure.

(b) The precinct board members keeping the tally sheets shall record opposite each name or measure, with pen or indelible pencil, the number of votes by tallies as the name of each candidate or measure voted upon is read aloud from the respective ballot.

(c) Immediately upon the completion of the tallies, the precinct board members keeping the tally shall draw two heavy lines in ink or indelible pencil from the last tally mark to the end of the line in which the tallies terminate and initial that line. The total number of votes counted for each candidate and for and against each measure shall be recorded on the tally sheets in words and figures.

Sec. 15278

On completion of the canvass of the returns for each election, the elections official shall compare the vote by mail voters' list with the roster of voters in

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

each precinct to determine if any voter cast more than one ballot at that election.

Sec. 15278.5

No precinct board member may make any tally of votes in any other manner than is provided in this article, nor in any place other than on the tally sheets provided for that purpose.

Sec. 15279

The ballots, as soon as all of the names and measures marked on them as voted for are read and tallied, shall not thereafter be examined by any person, but, as soon as all are counted, shall be carefully sealed in a strong envelope. The signatures of each member of the precinct board shall be written across the seal.

Sec. 15280

The precinct board shall complete, sign, and return to the elections official all furnished forms requiring its signatures. When votes are counted at the precinct, all members of the precinct board, upon the completion of their duties, shall sign the following certificate of performance, which shall be substantially in the following form: for ___ precinct, for the ___ election, held on the ___ day of ___, (year). We hereby certify that the total number of votes received by each candidate for each office and the total number of votes cast for and against each measure is as indicated on the tally sheets. We further certify that the results of votes cast forms posted outside the polling place and transmitted to the county elections official show the total number of votes received by each candidate for each office and the total number of votes cast for and against each measure is as indicated.

Inspector
Assistant Inspector
Judge
Judge
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

Sec. 15281

The precinct board shall sign and post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast. The copy shall remain posted for at least 48 hours after the official time fixed for the closing of the polls. To protect a person's right to cast a secret ballot under Section 7 of Article II of the California Constitution, in cases where fewer than 10 voters cast ballots and the precinct board tallies the results at the precinct, the precinct board shall post only the total number of people who voted at the precinct.

**NOTE THAT THERE IS NO ENABLING ACT AUTHORIZING
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO PRESCRIBE ADDITIONAL
REQUIREMENTS**

EXHIBIT A

ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS FRAMEWORK FOR A PROCEEDURE

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Those ballots not rejected shall be placed in one pile, and the board shall proceed to count by tallying the vote for one or more offices or measures at a time.

Sec. 15276

The precinct board members shall ascertain the number of votes cast for each

EXHIBIT A CONTINUED

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 - (2) A list of each measure being voted upon.
 - (3) Sufficient space to permit the tallying of the full vote cast for each candidate and for and against each measure.
- (b) The precinct board members keeping the tally sheets shall record opposite each name or measure, with pen or indelible pencil, the number of votes by tallies as the name of each candidate or measure voted upon is read aloud from the respective ballot.
- (c) Immediately upon the completion of the tallies, the precinct board members keeping the tally shall draw two heavy lines in ink or indelible pencil from the last tally mark to the end of the line in which the tallies terminate and initial that line. The total number of votes counted for each candidate and for and against each measure shall be recorded on the tally sheets in words and figures.

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Sec. 15280

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EXHIBIT A CONTINUED

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Inspector
Assistant Inspector
Judge
Judge
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk
Clerk

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The precinct board shall sign and post conspicuously on the outside of the polling place a copy of the result of the votes cast. The copy shall remain posted for at least 48 hours after the official time fixed for the closing of the polls. To protect a person's right to cast a secret ballot under Section 7 of Article II of the California Constitution, in cases where fewer than 10 voters cast ballots and the precinct board tallies the results at the precinct, the precinct board shall post only the total number of people who voted at the precinct.

NOTE THAT THERE IS NO ENABLING ACT AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO PRESCRIBE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The Logic and Accuracy test (LAT) was split up into 4 different sessions on two different days, when they resumed testing each day they notified us to return. The overall experience of observers at the Logic and Accuracy Test was that our questions went mostly unanswered and meaningful observation was extremely limited, if not impossible. They provided a computer monitor with no audio for us to witness the programming of the ballot printers downstairs. To observe the scanning of ballots upstairs we had to look through a closed window (again with no audio). On Monday the reports were run, however looking through a closed window it was impossible to see the contents of the reports or hear the conversation within the room. Our host Kai assisted us, she was well-meaning, however did not have the answers to many questions that were asked. She did a great job of relaying our questions by text to her supervisors but many questions were answered by saying "Can you come back again tomorrow and we can answer it then?". Unfortunately, upon return the promised information was not provided.

I believe that what we experienced is a violation of Ca Election Law 15004 (b) that states:

(b) Any bona fide association of citizens or a media organization may employ, and may have present at the central counting place or places, not more than two representatives to check and review the preparation and operation of the tabulating devices, their programming and testing, and have the representatives in attendance at any or all phases of the election.

Summary:

1. Insufficient number of Ballots were used for Logic and Accuracy Testing (LAT) (18)
2. Observers were not told if the test deck count matched the machine count (nor were they allowed to see)
3. Scanning of the ballots will begin sometime at the end of October (prior to polls close, and prior to hand count) (18)
4. Poll Pad KnowINC is connected to the internet (18)
5. The Scanner DOES NOT reject photocopied ballots (18)
6. Hand Writing on the Ballots (in non-target areas) is NOT rejected by the Scanner (17)
7. The ROV Office could not provide valid EAC certificates, if no certificates exist then the voting system is not lawfully certified and the election must be nullified (16)
8. The ballot printing machines were sealed with no meaningful observation of the sealing process or the final seal.
9. The composition of their test ballot deck is a secret.
10. Certificates were not shared. Is this a terminated system?

1. Insufficient number of Ballots were used for Logic and Accuracy Testing (LAT) (18)

We were told by Kia (who asked Anna via text) that 5 batches of 11 were used to conduct the logic and accuracy testing. 10/9/23

After 4 different observation sessions we still do not know if the machine count balanced with the hand count of a known composition. 10/9/23. I was not allowed to see the reports of the Logic and accuracy testing.

Anna said, Ballot touch rider matched machine count because we know that it said “11 ballots were counted” 10/06/23

However on 10/10/23 I examined the Logic and Accuracy Report and found that in fact the number of test ballots provided to us the day before was untrue their test deck did not consist of 55 ballots. Rather it was **ONLY 28 ballots!** (batches of, 5, 4, 5, 11, and 3).

2. Observers were not told if the test deck count matched the machine count (nor were they allowed to see)

It didn't tell you what percentage each candidate won. The composition of the ballots were not matched to a known deck. 10/06/23

Observers were not allowed to see any of the test ballots. 10/09/23

On Monday 10/9/23 we were told to come back at 10am 10/10/23 to see EAC certificates and ask Joanna any unanswered questions

3. Scanning of the ballots will begin sometime at the end of October (prior to polls close, and prior to hand count) (18)

Someone asked if they will start tabulating ballots as soon as ballots start coming in next week.

They said tabulation will not start until the last week, right before the election. (10/06/23 and 10/9/23)

I asked how will the scanner know the difference between a test ballot and a real ballot

Joanna said: The scanner was run in operational mode for LAT testing, however before they use it to scan they have to run "zero proof report" to prove its starting from zero. (someone should file a PRR to verify this takes place) (10/10/23)

Joanna also said: The scanners don't actually tabulate until you click “tabulate”, which won't be clicked until polls close. (10/10/23)

4. Poll Pad KnowWINC is connected to the internet (18)

Sarah Said: The ballots history is updated as they use the Agillus, each evening. In the morning when the signature verification comes the data is updated to DFM (voter registration management system) Poll pad is called KnowWINC. DFM communicates with the KnowWINC so that you know who has voted and not. 10/06/23

We observed a WiFi connection called “KNOWINC” 10/5/23, 10/6/23, and 10/10/23

I asked if the Poll Pad KnowWINC is connected to the internet and why there was a WiFi network named “KNOWINC”

Joanna said: KnowWink is a "secure network" set up just for the poll pads that communicates to the voter registration database on DFM (their election management software). DFM connects to Vote Cal (at the SOS) through the internet on a secured database set up at near real time. DFM

communicates to the poll pads. Third parties have access to the voter history reports on DFM or the SOS website (Vote Cal).

Joanna said: Yes. they do keep a file of who requests a DFM file. They must keep a report. The third parties can request a report everyday to see who has voted or not.

Joanna said that DFM is not connected to the Agillus machine.

5. Questions about cleaning voter rolls (18)

Sarah said: DFM flags bad addresses and they clean them on an “ongoing bases” 10/06/23

Sarah said: If they are not considered valid addresses by the assessor’s office and public works and management then they are not registered by the office, they get a pending status and they must reach out to the voter. Done on an individual bases. 10/06/23

They do check with the non-deliverable database (National Change of Address database) from the post office (10/9/23)

6. The Scanner DOES NOT reject photocopied ballots (18)

The L and A test ballots are photo copied just regular paper. I asked. It looked like the test ballots were just photocopied on regular paper. Is that true?

She said yes.

I said: in theory then, that scanner will read the ballot with the water mark the same way that it will read a photocopy?

She said I think so as long as it has a bar code and it says the right thing.

I said: None of those ballots were rejected because they were photocopied, right?

She said, I don’t know.

By observation we were able to see that none of the photocopied ballots were rejected by the scanner.

7. Hand Writing on the Ballots (in non-target areas) is NOT rejected by the Scanner (17)

The writing that we put on it [the ballot] is for the testing.

Ballots that have personally identifying information: They try to pull those before they go through the scanner.

I said, how come they didn’t reject the ballots with the handwriting on it?

She said the they have to accept handwriting, for the case of a write-in ballot

I said, but that wasn't in the write in section, that was hand writing up above on the top where you'd put a name if you were taking a test.

She said that those ballots get duplicated, they are trying to pull those ballots out, before they scan them.

They are going to make sure that all personal identifying data is taken off. I said, So that means that when I go to make a public records request, you guys will grant me the scanned ballot data, because there is no personal identifying data?

8. The ROV Office could not provide valid EAC certificates, if no certificates exist then the voting system is not lawfully certified and the election must be nullified (16)

I said "I was wanting to see the certificates for these machines."

Kai said "What do you mean certificates?" 10/06/23

There are a couple different ones, one is the certificate of conformance that has to be updated every 2 years. And the other one is an EAC certificate because I went to the EAC website and this what they say, as of Feb 14, 2023 their certificate status is a terminated system for Verity 3.1

Ok, let me see. Can I get a picture of that? [meaning the EAC printout of the terminated system]

I said Yes

Discussion of name placement. Camille will be listed first on all the ballots. In previous election name placement was swapped around.

Again, I asked when meeting with Joanna if I could see the EAC certificates required by 42 U.S.C 231 b, and 42 U.S.C. 311 (b) (c)

Joanna said that she does not keep the certificates on file, that you can only see them on the SOS website.

I told her that I went to the SOS website and the most current "minimum testing standards" was set to expire Oct 9, 2023 (they must be updated every 4 years).

I showed her the information from the EAC website that listed the certificate status for Hart Verity 3.1 as a terminated system. I asked her why that might be.

Joanna said that their website must be out of date, they must have a more current one that is just not listed.

I because 42 U.S.C 231 b, and 42 U.S.C. 311 (b) (c) is a contractual requirement to receive HAVA funds, I asked if they received any HAVA money.

Joanna said that they did in 2002, and since then for accessibility. However, it was not a county requirement to have those certificates, but rather it was the SOS responsibility to have the certificates.

I asked Joanna what is the operating system for the tabulation machine in the Bat Cave.

Joanna looked on the SOS website at the “use procedures for Hart Verity 3.1.1” but could not find that information. She said that she’d get back to me. She also said that she’d get back to me to find out where the software and hardware were manufactured.

9. The ballot printing machines were sealed with no meaningful observation of the sealing process or the final seal.

I asked if they could explain the sealing process of the machines that took place when LAT testing was complete 10/09/23 and what components were sealed.

Joanna said that that information would be provided during the poll worker training on Nov 1st that is open to all observers. She said they will show a diagram of the machine and what areas have been sealed.

10. The composition of their test ballot deck is a secret

I said “I am wondering if you have a known composition of ballots when the machine reads the ballots. So, say we know the deck is composed of a win for Camille at 75% and her opponent in this known deck has 25% so can we see if the machine counted accurately.”

Anna said “That’s not what you are doing in the State of California when you a test deck, you create it so that every position on the ballot is tried, and gets credit. Because you are trying to make sure that everybody on that ballot will count in the system when it goes through. So it’s not a percentage thing, you are not trying to see who wins. You are trying to make sure that every target area that is on the ballot will actually work, that is on the ballot.”

So you don’t actually test whether it or not it counted the ballots correctly?

No, that’s what we are doing. Yes. You run them through and you have all the answers.

So you don’t test the tabulation?

That’s exactly what we are doing right now. We create a test deck and we mark each of those ballots in a way so that every position on that ballot gets a vote. Right, we take turns we rotate them through, so then we know what the answers are going to be.

So what is the answer to the test you just did?

We know what the answers are going to be because we hit every target area on the ballot, right. So once you run them all through then you can run reports, did this all go through did it work, what were the totals, were the totals what we expected the totals to be? There is all that other background stuff that can happen too.

Ok, can you show us that?

I can't. Right now I am going to go downstairs and work with some ladies that go out and collect ballots. But that is part of this. Part of the pre-LAT that we did today is to make sure that what the machines print out from downstairs can be scanned and credited and get scanned correctly. And that's what just happened here.

Ok, will you have a public viewing when you do this part of the test where you actually test the accuracy?

We'll be in that corner running reports, and you can certainly stand here (outside the room) and watch us run reports.

Can we see the reports?

I believe so

On Monday 10/9/23 I arrived hoping to see the reports in the afternoon. I requested to see them but they said to come back tomorrow and they would show them to me.

11. Certificates were not shared. Is this a terminated system?

And I'm also interested in seeing the certificates for these machines. From what I understand I've already been to the SOS website. I've also visited the EAC website, and it looks like this machine is actually as of Feb 2023 (this might be out of date) it says the certificate status is a "terminated system". This is from the EAC website. Do you have a more current one? Just to have for public viewing?

Anna Said "I am the wrong person for you to talk to about this. Sorry above my paygrade. Cathy Darling is probably who you want to talk to"

What we came here to see today was the nuts and bolts. I feel like the public needs to see this.

I have a question card that you can submit. I am not in the position to have that conversation right now.

When you create something for the public to see, full transparency to assure us that everything is on the up and up, those certificates would be really valuable in giving us that assurance.

So there is 11 or 12 voting systems in the united states, CA certifies 3 of them. Because in order to make it through testing it is super stringent in CA. As far as the certification and the paperwork and how they make it through the test, I don't have answers to that. I just know that the choices we have are three.

So for instance when you buy a product and you have a certificate for that product. It's something where it should come with the product, right. (I am interrupted)

I appreciate your question, I'm sorry.

Where you have something to show people to say hey look, I have my license. When we were coming up here in the elevator we looked at the certificate that said hey, this elevator is safe to ride on, it's got a certificate.

I can certainly ask Cathy about posting a certificate. I'm sure that's something the State can also provide. Let me get that in writing and we can do that.

That would be really valuable.

That's not something that I can find for you right now, or put on the window for you right now. But we can certainly find out about posting that.

No I understand, I understand your limitations, but you have to understand that from the perspective of the public whose been told multiple time that this meeting was going to occur and then the meeting times were changed. We've really bent over backwards to be here today, and to do our part, you know our civic duty, and I feel like the [ROV] office isn't really reciprocating that.

Ok, I am sorry that you feel that way. I will see about posting the certification, I don't know what that looks like, but I'm sure there's something from the State about that and we can post that in our window.

12. No Public Meeting Posted for Logic and Accuracy testing.

I appreciate that. The other thing too is that certain times you say you've posted it in the window, but you haven't told people what window, or when it's been posted, for what length of time. So even though it's been posted in a window somewhere, if nobody knows about it then it's pretty much the same as not posting it at all.

OK, all of our posting is done at the front, the front doors is where we post [market st].

I didn't see any signs for today's meeting out there. Did I miss that?

There is no meeting today.

Well it's open to the public right?

I think what you are referring to is normally, and this is Cathy's idea, to send out letters to observers and invite them and let them know what is going on.

What about the general public though?

Observers are the general public, so there's a whole list of folks

What about those of us that are not on the list though?

I think that what happened was that schedule that she [Cathy] posts, that we usually send out before every election. I don't know if it got sent out this time. I think that with everything we had going on, it just got missed. So those are just estimates that hey we are going to try to hit these dates, and if that is what you are referring to, it probably didn't get sent out, with everything that we have. So.

I'm just saying, today, like if you were doing a public meeting. I would put a sign on the door that says all welcome come on in, we are doing a Logic and Accuracy Testing. At the bare minimum.

Totally.

I mean that's not giving anyone notice to plan their calendar and to mark this day off. That's just what I am saying that would be very helpful.

Normally they have a calendar with all that scheduled.

I couldn't find it anywhere on the website.

I think we just dropped the ball on this one because we have a lot going on, so thank you for being gracious about it. We tried to work around a schedule for you today, because I know it was voiced that you guys wanted to be here.

I think the fact that there are only four people here [from the public] speaks to that deficiency. If more people knew about it ahead of time there would be a lot more than just 4 people.

I, Laura Hobbs swear under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct based on my first-hand experience. 10/11/2023

**REPORT FROM THE SHASTA COUNTY CITIZENS ELECTION ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING VOTE BY MAIL BALLOT DROP BOXES
(DROP BOX)**

To the Honorable Board of Supervisors (Board), County of Shasta, State of California:

The Shasta County Citizens Election Advisory Committee respectfully submits the following information for the Board's consideration at their next scheduled meeting.

As of this date, Committee members include:

Ronnean Lund, Chair

Dr. Lisa Michaud, Vice Chair

Dawn Duckett, Member

Susanne Baremore, Member

Bev Gray, Member

GENERAL INFORMATION

California State Elections Code, Section 3025 states, "Vote by mail ballot drop box" means a secure receptacle established by a county or city and county elections official whereby a voted vote by mail ballot may be returned to the elections official from whom it was obtained." There are several potential issues with drop boxes, including but not limited to:

- 1) Can drop boxes be adequately secured?
- 2) Are ballots safe at every step on the process when drop boxes are in use so that voters have faith in the voting system?
- 3) Can ballots be stolen from drop boxes?
- 4) Are ballots in drop boxes in Shasta County treated with the same security as a bank protects cash?
- 5) Can ballot traffickers add ballots to a drop box?
- 6) Are drop boxes in Shasta County under surveillance, so criminals can be caught and immediately prosecuted?
- 7) Are drop boxes a burden on taxpayers?

A "ballot trafficker" is defined as someone who is paid money to steal, surrender, or deposit a ballot.

NUMBER OF DROP BOXES REQUIRED

Drop boxes are targets for ballot trafficking, so the fewer drop boxes, the better the election security; and the better the election security, the more faith the voters have in their election system.

California Election Code, Section 3025.5 (see Exhibit 1), requires there be at least one drop box for every 30,000 registered voters within the jurisdiction where the election is held, as determined on the 88th day before the day of the election. The 88th day before the March 5, 2024, election was December 8, 2023. From the California Secretary of States website, as of December 19, 2023, there were 112,627 registered voters in Shasta County. That would require Shasta County to have four drop boxes for the upcoming March 5, 2024, election. Per the Shasta County Elections office website, "List of Drop Box Locations", for the upcoming March 5, 2024, election, shows 16 drop box locations being provided.

Each drop box must be installed, monitored, cleared out regularly, removed, stored, and should have appropriately completed chain-of-custodies created for them; all of which require staff time and have associated costs. Extra drop boxes, above and beyond that which is required by law, not only provide potential for illegal activities, but they are a burden on taxpayers.

LOCATION OF DROP BOXES

Some of the current 16 drop box locations the Shasta County Elections office is providing include locations within businesses that are not open 24/7. These locations present insecure situations where no one knows who may have access to the drop boxes during nonbusiness hours.

Except for the cities of Redding and Anderson, all of the current drop box locations are within one mile of the community's United States post office.

Taxpayers already pay the United States Postal Service for mail transportation. If people drop their ballot at a United States post office, it does not cost the County the additional money that drop boxes do, and the tax payers are not paying for two, redundant, mail transportation services. In addition, if a person places a ballot into a United States Postal Service receptacle that was fraudulently filled out or trafficked, they are committing a Federal crime. There are no Federal laws regarding the fraudulent use of drop boxes. Drop boxes make it more convenient and safer for criminals to inject fraudulent ballots into the election system.

For security purposes, all drop boxes should be located at police or fire stations.

VIDEO SURVEILLANCE OF DROP BOXES

California Code of Regulations, Title 2, Section 20135(e) states, "If feasible, drop boxes shall be monitored by a video security surveillance system, or an internal camera that can capture digital images and/or video. A video security surveillance system can include existing systems on county, city, or private buildings." (See Exhibit B)

Twenty-four hour video surveillance has proven to be the best way to document crimes at drop boxes. No drop boxes should be placed without 24/7 video surveillance. Surveillance recordings must be clear, record 24/7 when the drop box is in use, be live streamed, be constantly monitored by the Elections office, and the video should be retained for the minimum period required for retention of ballots.

If order to discourage ballot trafficking, video surveillance must capture a front view to show the face of the person delivering the ballot(s) and a side view to see if the person delivering the ballot(s) is photographing the ballot prior to depositing it. If a person visits multiply drop boxes in a day or over a period of time, this may indicate ballot trafficking. Video is the only record of this potential criminal activity. In addition, videos of drop box surveillance should be available for public review upon request.

Signage should be added to every drop box location which states, "You are being recorded." Since all drop boxes are located in public areas, there is no presumption of privacy when placing a ballot in a drop box.

CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF DROP BOX CONTENTS

Review of the Shasta County 2022 General Election chain-of-custodies for drop boxes shows incomplete information. (See Exhibit C) All drop box contents should have fully completed chains-of-custody. The less number of drop boxes, the less worry about incomplete chains-of-custodies.

Ballot retrievers used to collect the ballots from drop boxes should be bipartisan, so there is no question about the intentions of the ballot retrievers. This implies the Elections office must hire a relatively equal number of people from various political parties as temporary election workers. Bipartisan teams of ballot retrievers have, reportedly, hindered election fraud in other states.

TYPE OF DROP BOXES USED

Some of the drop boxes currently used by Shasta County are flimsy and make it easy to access the contents inside. All drop boxes should be made of material that cannot be tampered with, should be made so contents of the box cannot be accessed by the public, and should be locked in place with a chain and lock or some other securing device.

PROSECUTION OF BALLOT TRAFFICING

If potential ballot trafficking is found through surveillance of ballot boxes, it must be investigated and halted immediately, so the election is not jeopardized or influenced and so the public maintains trust in the election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DROP BOXES TO BOLSTER SHASTA COUNTY'S ELECTION SYSTEM

- 1) Shasta County should use the minimum number of drop boxes required by law, in order to detour illegal activities, including ballot trafficking; to save tax payers money; and to make people feel more confident in their election system.
- 2) All drop boxes should only be located at police or fire stations. Drop boxes should never be located within businesses that are not open 24/7, as it creates insecure circumstances for drop box contents.
- 3) All drop boxes should have clear 24/7 video surveillance. Video surveillance should capture both a front viewing, showing someone's face, and a side view, to see how many ballots someone may be depositing and whether or not they are photographing the deposit. Video surveillance should be live streamed and available to the public upon request. Videos should be retained for the minimum length of time required to retain ballots. Signage should be added to every drop box stating, "You are being recorded".
- 4) The County Elections office should make an effort to assure chains-of-custodies for drop boxes are fully and accurately completed, with all the required information by law.
- 5) The County Elections office should hire a relatively equal number of people from various political parties as temporary election workers, and drop box collection teams should be bipartisan.
- 6) All drop boxes used in Shasta County should be made of material that cannot be tampered with, should be made so contents of the box cannot be accessed by the public, and should be locked in place with a chain and lock or some other securing device.
- 7) The public should be assured by officials that ballot trafficking is actively being deterred and will be prosecuted if found.
- 8) Local laws should be enacted that ensure drop box and ballot safety.

**REPORT FROM THE SHASTA COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMISSION
ON
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED
BALLOTS AT PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS**

To the Honorable Board of Supervisors (Board), County of Shasta, State of California:

The Shasta County Elections Commission (Commission) respectfully submits the following information for the Board's consideration at their next scheduled meeting.

As of this date, Committee members include:

Ronnean Lund, Commissioner

Dr. Lisa Michaud, Commissioner

Dawn Duckett, Commissioner

Susanne Baremore, Commissioner

Bev Gray, Commissioner

GENERAL INFORMATION

It is the belief of the Commission that, in order to increase public trust in the Shasta County election processes, there should be a local ordinance mandating that Shasta County conduct their elections using hand counting of ballots at the precincts with paper poll books.

BASIS FOR A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED BALLOTS AT THE PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS

1) The California Constitution Article II - Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall; Section 1, states: "All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require."

2) No one can observe the actual tally of ballots by a machine. No one, by watching a machine with their eyes, can know whether votes are being tabulated correctly or incorrectly at any moment. No one except the electronic voting system companies and the Secretary of State has access to the source code or software in voting machine equipment used to tally ballots.

3) There is credible evidence that, contrary to state law, voting systems as defined by Election Code §362 (See Exhibit A) have been connected to the internet in violation of Election Code §19205 (See Exhibit B). This was demonstrated in Antrim County, Michigan (see Office of the Special Council Interim Report, Ben Cotton's testimony, Penrose's testimony). (see <http://tinyurl.com/2yz55s6k>, <http://tinyurl.com/msv5b72z>, <http://tinyurl.com/3hwrybuy>). Furthermore, electronic poll books are connected to the internet and are permitted by law to connect to the internet. Voter participation is provided in near real time to NGOs and third parties and this information can be used to calculate how many votes are needed to flip an election.

4) Jeffrey O'Donnell's Fingerprints of Fraud Vol. #1 report documents evidence that the United States of America and Shasta County (page 73) were the victims of a coordinated multi-state conspiracy to defraud the 2020 General Election using voting machines; see: fingerprintsoffraud.com

February 15, 2024

- 5) Jeffrey O'Donnell's analysis of Shasta County's June 2022 Primary shows election fraud occurred. He recommended not to certify the election. [Shasta County Report 2022 Primary](http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t) (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>)
- 6) The Halderman Report (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>) demonstrated how easily Dominion Machines are hacked. Attacks were "successfully implemented and could be effectuated by malicious actors with very limited time and access to the machines, as little as mere minutes."
- 7) The Transparency Foundation Audit (see <http://tinyurl.com/y8jpnrs>) of California elections revealed voter fraud and a failing score on 9 out of 10 criteria. Election system security received a failing score.
- 8) There is an urgent need to restore confidence in our elections and to protect those who raise complaints or questions about the integrity of our elections.
- 9) The lack of transparency in elections is exacerbated by the withholding of public records by county election officials. At the direction of the Secretary of State's Office, county election officials have repeatedly violated The California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000, et seq. (formerly Government Code §§6250, et seq.), enacted pursuant to Article 1(b) of the California Constitution, which states that "The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business . . ." Click [HERE](#) to enter Library (see teamhopelibrary.org)
- 10) Hand counting of paper ballots is expressly authorized by the California Election Code §§ 15270, et seq (See Exhibit C) which contains established procedures used by all 58 counties before introduction of electronic voting systems, and is still used to conduct a 1% tally (the gold standard of accuracy). The Secretary of State has no veto power over the use of these procedures. No prior approval or special permission from the Secretary of State is needed to conduct elections in accordance with these statutes because the Secretary of State cannot overrule the use of a method the California Legislature has authorized.
- 11) Election Code §19207 (See Exhibit D) grants authority to the County governing board to adopt any kind of voting system or combination of voting systems. AB969 usurps the County's authority under Election Code §19207 (See Exhibit E).
- 12) The Board of Supervisors may canvass all election returns pursuant to CA Govt Code § 25201. (See Exhibit F) AB969 usurps the County's authority under §25201
- 13) The Secretary of State has failed to factor into her estimates the result of economic impact on the local citizens of counties who will benefit from employment as a result of a full manual tally of ballots.
- 14) The California legislature used a false "Urgency" clause to fast track an unconstitutional law. California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8 says that "urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety."
- 15) There is no credible evidence that hand counted elections under these procedures were or will be more expensive than elections conducted with electronic voting systems. In fact, estimates by Linda Rantz (click [HERE](#)) (see <http://tinyurl.com/4xb55dkt>), Clint Curtis (click [HERE](#))(see <http://tinyurl.com/2bv6uxnu>), and Chriss Street (click [HERE](#))(see <http://tinyurl.com/5dy9y4p6>) suggest that hand counting will be significantly cheaper than machine counting.
- 16) Hand counting is compatible with casting votes via mail, drop-box, or in person.
- 17) The federal Help America Vote Act requires accommodations to ensure persons with disabilities can vote, but does not require the use of electronic voting systems. Neither does the Americans with

Disabilities Act, which only requires that “full and equal opportunity to vote in all elections” be provided to voters with disabilities. On the contrary, 52 USC §21081 (See Exhibit G) expressly protects traditional paper ballot voting systems.

18) “The real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all the provisions of the law.” CA Elections Code 19001. (See Exhibit H) If the real will of the electors in Shasta County is determined by hand counting then enforcing AB969 would be in direct violation of CA Elections Code 19001 which clearly states that compliance with state law is secondary to ascertaining the true will of the electors.

19) CA Elections Code 19003 (See Exhibit I) states “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.” Therefore, the county laws and ordinances supersede any state laws in regard to voting systems. It is incumbent on the County to dictate the manner in which elections are conducted. See also California Election Code §19207. (See Exhibit J)

20) The citizens desire their elections be conducted at the precinct for maximum transparency and community participation. Currently all ballot tallies are conducted at the ROV office with very little access for the community to observe and participate. In order to restore trust in our elections all citizens need to be able to participate and freely observe the election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to restore trust in the election process the Election Commission recommends the Shasta County Board of Supervisors create a local ordinance which states that Shasta County shall hand count ballots at the precincts using paper poll books.

**REPORT FROM THE SHASTA COUNTY ELECTIONS COMMISSION
ON
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED
BALLOTS AT PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS**

To the Honorable Board of Supervisors (Board), County of Shasta, State of California:

The Shasta County Elections Commission (Commission) respectfully submits the following information for the Board's consideration at their next scheduled meeting.

As of this date, Committee members include:

Ronnean Lund, Commissioner

Dr. Lisa Michaud, Commissioner

Dawn Duckett, Commissioner

Susanne Baremore, Commissioner

Bev Gray, Commissioner

GENERAL INFORMATION

It is the belief of the Commission that, in order to increase public trust in the Shasta County election processes, there should be a local ordinance mandating that Shasta County conduct their elections using hand counting of ballots at the precincts with paper poll books.

BASIS FOR A LOCAL ORDINANCE MANDATING HAND COUNTED BALLOTS AT THE PRECINCTS USING PAPER POLLBOOKS

- 1) The California Constitution Article II - Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall; Section 1, states: "All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require." (See Appendix)
- 2) No one can observe the actual tally of ballots by a machine. No one, by watching a machine with their eyes, can know whether votes are being tabulated correctly or incorrectly at any moment. No one except the electronic voting system companies and the Secretary of State have access to the source code or software in voting machine equipment used to tally ballots.
- 3) There is credible evidence that, contrary to state law, voting systems as defined by Election Code §362 (See Appendix) have been connected to the internet in violation of Election Code §19205 (See Appendix). This was demonstrated in Antrim County, Michigan (see Office of the Special Council Interim Report, Ben Cotton's testimony, Penrose's testimony). (see <http://tinyurl.com/2yz55s6k>, <http://tinyurl.com/msv5b72z>, <http://tinyurl.com/3hwrybuy>). Furthermore, electronic poll books are connected to the internet and are permitted by law to connect to the internet. Voter participation is provided in near real time to NGOs and third parties and this information can be used to calculate how many votes are needed to flip an election.
- 4) Jeffrey O'Donnell's Fingerprints of Fraud Vol. #1 report documents evidence that the United States of America and Shasta County (page 73) were the victims of a coordinated multi-state conspiracy to defraud the 2020 General Election using voting machines; see: fingerprintsoffraud.com

- 5) Jeffrey O'Donnell's analysis of Shasta County's June 2022 Primary shows election fraud occurred. He recommended not to certify the election. [Shasta County Report 2022 Primary](http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t) (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>)
- 6) The Halderman Report (see <http://tinyurl.com/r8znp9t>) demonstrated how easily electronic voting machines can be hacked. Attacks were "successfully implemented and could be effectuated by malicious actors with very limited time and access to the machines, as little as mere minutes."
- 7) The Transparency Foundation Audit (see <http://tinyurl.com/y8jpnrs>) of California elections revealed voter fraud and a failing score on 9 out of 10 of the categories that were looked at. Election system security received a failing score.
- 8) There is an urgent need to restore confidence in our elections and to protect those who raise complaints or questions about the integrity of our elections.
- 9) The lack of transparency in elections is exacerbated by the withholding of public records by county election officials. At the direction of the Secretary of State's Office, county election officials have repeatedly violated The California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000, et seq. (formerly Government Code §§6250, et seq.), enacted pursuant to Article 1(b) of the California Constitution, which states that "The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business . . ." (See Appendix) Click [HERE](#) to enter Library (see teamhopelibrary.org). Hand counting at precincts would eliminate the need for requests of public records regarding counting of ballots from precincts.
- 10) Hand counting of paper ballots is expressly authorized by the California Election Code §§ 15270, et seq (See Exhibit A) which contains established procedures used by all 58 counties before introduction of electronic voting systems, and is still used to conduct a 1% tally (the gold standard of accuracy). The Secretary of State has no veto power over the use of these procedures. No prior approval or special permission from the Secretary of State is needed to conduct elections in accordance with these statutes because the Secretary of State cannot overrule the use of a method the California Legislature has authorized.
- 11) Election Code §19207 (See Appendix) grants authority to the County governing board to adopt any kind of voting system or combination of voting systems. AB969 usurps the County's authority under Election Code §19207. This will likely be litigated in the courts.
- 12) The Secretary of State has failed to factor into her estimates the result of economic impact on the local citizens of counties who will benefit from employment as a result of a full manual tally of ballots.
- 13) The California legislature used a false "Urgency" clause to fast track an unconstitutional law. California Constitution Article IV – Legislative Section 8 says that "urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety." This will likely be litigated in the courts. (See Appendix)
- 14) There is no credible evidence that hand counted elections under these procedures were or will be more expensive than elections conducted with electronic voting systems. In fact, estimates by Linda Rantz (click [HERE](#)) (see <http://tinyurl.com/4xb55dkt>), Clint Curtis (click [HERE](#))(see <http://tinyurl.com/2bv6uxnu>), and Chriss Street (click [HERE](#))(see <http://tinyurl.com/5dy9y4p6>) suggest that hand counting will be significantly cheaper than machine counting.
- 15) Hand counting is compatible with casting votes via mail, drop-box, or in person.

- 16) The federal Help America Vote Act requires accommodations to ensure persons with disabilities can vote, but does not require the use of electronic voting systems. Neither does the Americans with Disabilities Act, which only requires that “full and equal opportunity to vote in all elections” be provided to voters with disabilities. On the contrary, 52 USC §21081 (See Appendix) expressly protects traditional paper ballot voting systems.
- 17) “The real will of the electors will not be defeated by any informality or failure to comply with all the provisions of the law.” CA Elections Code 19001. (See Appendix) If the real will of the electors in Shasta County is determined by hand counting then enforcing AB969 would be in direct violation of CA Elections Code 19001 which clearly states that compliance with state law is secondary to ascertaining the true will of the electors.
- 18) CA Elections Code 19003 (See Appendix) states “Notwithstanding any other provision of the law to the contrary, including any city or county ordinance, unless that other provision of the law is deemed consistent with this division, this division shall govern voting systems.” Therefore, the county laws and ordinances supersede any state laws in regard to voting systems. It is incumbent on the County to dictate the manner in which elections are conducted. See also California Election Code §19207. (See Appendix)
- 19) The citizens desire their elections be conducted at the precinct for maximum transparency and community participation. Currently all ballot tallies are conducted at the ROV office with very little access for the community to observe and participate. In order to restore trust in our elections all citizens need to be able to participate and freely observe the election process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1) Ballots brought to precincts on election day should be counted at the precincts that day for transparency, citizen participation, and so results from the precincts are available the night of an election.
- 2) Hand counting should be performed at the precincts, per Election Code 15270 et. seq., for complete transparency, increased accuracy, and so results are available the night of an election.
- 3) Paper pollbooks should be used at the precincts for transparency, election security, and to maintain local control over Shasta County’s voter rolls.
- 4) In order to restore trust in the election process the Election Commission recommends the Shasta County Board of Supervisors create a local ordinance which states that Shasta County shall hand count ballots at the precincts the night of an election using paper poll books.

**RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
COUNTY OF Shasta, California
TO OPPOSE REGULATIONS PROPOSED
BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
REGARDING HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS
[Click here](#), “hereafter ‘PROPOSED REGULATIONS’”]
AND TO TAKE ACTIVE MEASURES WITHIN THE COUNTY TO
ENSURE CONFIDENCE IN ELECTIONS
AND TO PROTECT CITIZENS CONCERNED ABOUT ELECTION
INTEGRITY**

**RESOLUTION NO. _____
RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE
COUNTY OF
Shasta, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIS RESOLUTION IS ADOPTED IN LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING:**

1. There is credible evidence that, contrary to state law, voting systems as defined by Election, Code §362 have been connected to the internet in violation of Election Code §19205.
2. Jeffrey O'Donnell's Fingerprints of Fraud Vol. #1 report documents evidence that the United States of America and Shasta County (page 73) were the victims of a coordinated multi-state conspiracy to defraud the 2020 General Election using voting machines; see: fingerprintsoffraud.com
3. Jeffrey O'Donnell's analysis of Shasta County's June 2022 Primary shows election fraud occurred. He recommended not to certify the election. [Shasta County Report 2022 Primary](#)
4. The [Halderman Report](#) demonstrated how easily Dominion Machines are hacked. Attacks were “successfully implemented and could be effectuated by malicious actors with very limited time and access to the machines, as little as mere minutes.”
5. The Transparency Foundation [Audit](#) of California elections revealed voter fraud and a failing score on 9 out of 10 criteria. Election system security received a failing score.
6. There is an urgent need to restore confidence in our elections and to protect those who raise complaints or questions about the integrity of our elections.
7. No one observes the counting of ballots by machine. No one by watching can know whether votes are being tabulated correctly or incorrectly. No one except the electronic voting system companies and the Secretary of State has access to the source

- code or
software in the equipment used to count ballots.
8. The lack of transparency in elections is exacerbated by the withholding of public records by county election officials. At the direction of the Secretary of State's Office, county election officials have repeatedly violated The California Public Records Act, Government Code §§7920.000, *et seq.* (formerly Government Code §§6250, *et seq.*, enacted pursuant to Article 1(b) of the California Constitution, which states that "The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business . . ." Click [here](#) to enter Library.
9. The hand counting of paper ballots is expressly authorized by the California Election Code §§ 15270, *et seq* which contain established procedures used by all 58 counties before introduction of electronic voting systems, and the Secretary of State has no veto power over the use of these procedures. No prior approval or special permission from the Secretary of State is needed to conduct elections in accordance with these statutes because the Secretary of State cannot overrule the use of a method the California Legislature has authorized. Election Code §19207 grants authority to the County governing board to adopt any kind of voting system or combination of voting systems. To the extent the PROPOSED REGULATIONS usurp the County's authority under §19207, they violate Government Code §11342.2 and constitute an *ultra vires* act.
10. The Secretary of State has violated Government Code §11342.2(b)(1) by failing to state the purpose of each regulation, many of which mandate "the use of specific technologies or equipment".
11. Hand counting is not a pilot program. Without any apparent purpose except to obstruct the lawful counting of votes pursuant to long-established procedures, the Secretary of State has decided to impose regulations designed for electronic voting system pilot programs on Counties that have elected to adopt the more secure and transparent

procedure of hand counting.

12. The Secretary of State has failed to address the fiscal impact of her proposed regulations

by disregarding the cost of requiring the elections official to conduct a simultaneous full

audit of the manual tally with a voting system, which necessitates that a county must

purchase, maintain, license, and securely store this expensive technology, even though a

county wishes only to do a manual tally.

13. The Secretary of State has failed to factor into her estimates the result of economic

impact on the local citizens of counties who will benefit from employment as a result of a

full manual tally of ballots

14. There is no credible evidence that hand counted elections under these procedures were or will be more

expensive than elections conducted with electronic voting systems. In fact, estimates by Linda Rantz ([here](#)), Clint Curtis ([here](#)), and Chriss Street ([here](#)) suggest that hand counting will be significantly cheaper than machine counting.

15. Hand counting is compatible with casting votes via mail, drop-box, or in person.

16. The federal Help America Vote Act requires accommodations to ensure persons with

disabilities can vote, but does not require the use of electronic voting systems. Neither

does the Americans with Disabilities Act, which only requires that “**full and equal opportunity to vote in all elections**” be provided to voters with disabilities. On the

contrary, 52 USC §21081 expressly protects traditional paper ballot voting systems.

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that

SECTION 1 County election officials shall

1. Oppose efforts by the Secretary of State to arrogate to itself the power granted by Election Code §

19207 to the County Board of Supervisors to choose the procedure for conducting elections,

whether using voting systems as defined by Election Code § 362, manual tallies of paper ballots, or any combination of both.

2. Mandate hand counting be performed at the precinct for both in person and mail-in votes.

3. Follow guidelines outlined in Linda Rantz’ [Hand Counting Manuel](#) or other similar method.

4. One Day Voting-Election Day according to the constitution.

5. Paper Poll Books.
6. Publicly available camera recording of all counting tables and ballots.
7. Democrat and Republican election judges at each counting table
8. Enable hand count volunteers (unpaid, not background checked) enrolled without restriction or prejudice by the ROV.
9. Contracted Security, intra-agency contract with Sheriff volunteers. Ballots held in locked cage with 24hr surveillance (all footage property of Shasta County).
10. Document and keep records of all citizen complaints brought to the attention of County election officials concerning election fraud, violation of state or federal election laws, or other election irregularities, and make these records available to the public.
11. Require that all election officials respond to citizen concerns about voter integrity respectfully, factually and completely, without retaliation or disparaging remarks directed at the complainant.
12. Obtain forensic images of the voting machines used in previous elections to preserve records, and make these images available in response to public records requests, in keeping with the intent of the Legislature when it adopted the Public Records Act. These images contain data generated in the course of an election and do not disclose the identity of any voters or compromise voting system security
13. Shasta County elects not to enroll in Electronic Registration Information Center ERIC if the State of California should decide to do so, based on security concerns for citizens private data being shared with non-governmental agencies.
14. Require election observers of mail in ballot signature verification with video documentation that is auditable and publicly available.
15. The ROV shall not use derogatory terms when referring to citizens (these terms include but are not limited to, terrorist, extremist, denialist, skeptic, conspiracy theorist).
16. Ban the use of drop boxes in Shasta County
17. Live stream entire ballot counting for real time public viewing with the recording made publicly available.
18. Outlaw the use of ballot printers on the day of election and for 90 days afterward. Make log files of any printed ballots publicly available.
19. End mail-in balloting and move to restore absentee ballots.
20. Empty voter rolls completely and register only US citizens with picture ID. Paper pollbooks only.

21. Separate our LOCAL elections from state and federal elections in order to minimize state/federal intrusion and litigation. Separate local voter rolls from state-maintained voter rolls.
22. All unused ballots shall be voided at the precinct after the polls close. A large "X" shall be placed spanning the length and width of the entire ballot (including all pages front and back).
23. No ballot printers shall be present anywhere that votes are being counted. All Hart machine audit logs shall be printed and verified to indicate that they were not operational after the polls closed while counting occurred. These logs shall be public record.
24. No hand tallied ballots shall be run through an election tabulating device.
25. Chain of custody of mail-in ballots shall be initiated at the time they arrive at the Post Office. Ballots shall be counted and dated. After a chain of custody is established, they will be given to the ROV office.
26. Undeliverable ballots shall have a chain of custody separate from deliverable ballots. Undeliverable ballots shall be counted and dated prior to delivery to the ROV. They shall remain UNOPENED and in their original envelope, these addresses shall be removed from the voter rolls within 30 days after the receipt of the returned envelope.
27. A list of undeliverable addresses will be maintained by the ROV and provided to the BOS after each election and upon request. Undeliverable addresses shall be removed from the voter rolls immediately and the BOS shall be notified of their removal including details of exact voter and addresses removed and date of removal.
28. Number of total of ballots cast (in person and mail-in) shall be published at the time polls close.
29. No mail-in ballots received after 8PM on election day will be counted, no matter their postmark.
30. Vote tallies shall not be recorded on electronic devices during the count. Every hour on the hour, after polls close, a tally of votes counted during that hour shall be posted on the outside door visible to onlookers, until counting ceases. Election management software (EMS) shall not be used to transmit or consolidate tallies. USB drives, excel, or other computer software shall not be used to tally the votes, nor the tally sheets.
31. Random selection of ballots for the one percent canvass will be performed by 10 members of the public representing various political groups. Election officials, poll workers, hand counters, board supervisors or any others directly involved in the count shall be exempt from the random selection process.
32. To avoid public perception of influence, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) shall not be involved in Shasta Elections in anyway. Money, favors, professional and legal advice shall not be received by the election department. To maintain the bi-partisan commitment of the office of county clerk, the clerk shall not receive funds, favor, or travel to partisan conferences led by NGOs such as the Center for Election Innovation and Research (CEIR), Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL), Foundation for the Carolinas (FFTC), Susan Thompson Buffett Foundation (STBF), and the Tides Foundation.

33. Any ballot whose texture, appearance, card stock, and or fold does not match the official ballot shall not be counted. If independent professional forensic analysis authenticates them, then they may be counted.
34. A full accounting of number of ballots shall be made. The number of undeliverable ballots plus the number of voted ballots, plus the number of mail-in ballots not returned by polls closed, plus the number of voided ballots, plus the number of returned mail-in votes shall match the total number of ballots printed.
35. Full Chain of Custody from beginning to end of election, including after the ballots have been removed from their envelopes.

SHASTA CPRA Number 378 Report

The below summary and provided records from Public Records Requests are actual copies of documents sent to and received from the county. These documents are provided free of charge. Any conclusions the requester may reach in this report were provided from individual citizens, requesting public records, and may include subjective opinions of their analysis. Therefore, review the documents and make your own judgements.

CPRA Dated 02/02/2024: [RC378 20240202 ToROV UpdatedPRR Shasta Fw RE Public Records Request Chain of Custody Procedures sanitized.pdf](#)

This document includes the original PRR, initial response from the ROV and the clarification that makes the PRR. The original PRR is at the bottom of the email chain: Thank you for the information you provided. However, this did not sufficiently address my request.

Follow-up public record request 2/2/2024:

Any chain of custody procedures for ballots, other election records such as poll tapes, etc., and equipment. Section 20137(c) The county elections official shall provide a copy of their ballot collection and chain of custody procedures to the Secretary of State's office by the 30th day before the election.

Please include the chain of custody procedures the ROV submitted to the SOS 30 days before the before the Nov 7th, 2023, election and in addition, any updated procedures. To make it clear I am requesting two separate procedures, old and new, if they exist."

ROV Response Dated 02/09/2024: [RC378 20240209 FromROV RRCOC-DropBoxes Shasta Fw Public Records Request Chain of Custody Procedures sanitized.pdf](#)

For Request 1: Please see the attached supporting document.

Responsive Records:

[RC378 FromROV RR-COCDropBoxes Shasta 02.02.2024 Electronic copy chain of custody 1st follow up Draft Response.pdf](#) Vote by Mail Drop Box Policy, Special Election November 7, 2023

02/09/2024: ROV is *Complaint*. Shasta County provided all the requested records they had. It appears Shasta has no ballot Chain of Custody to reconcile ballots sent by the mail service or received from the mail service. No Chain of Custody of ballots procedures of ballots handed out to and received back from voters either at vote centers or sent through the mail, or any procedure for the security of ballots to verify our votes are counted at the vote center/precincts and reconciled to the ballots received at Central Count let alone any procedures to document boxes of ballots through the ROV's entire process. Per Shasta's response, they have no Chain of Custody except for Ballot Drop Boxes. This from the same ROV who defies the Board of Supervisor and uses subterfuge to work with others outside our county to secure our elections and the citizens demand to hand count our elections. This is an example of her claim of the most secure election EVER!!! We can now clearly see what could go wrong!

FORENSIC ANALYSIS PRESENTED TO SHASTA COUNTY SUPERVISORS

In Re: “Voting Systems and Manual Tally in Shasta County”

Signed Cathy Darling Allen as Shasta County Clerk/Register of Voters

By Chriss W. Street

Ms. Darling Allen reported in open session to Shasta County Board of Supervisors on March 28, 2023, a 3-page Memorandum supported by 26-page Attachment stating:

- 1) Full Manual Tally of Votes will cost = “ **minimum of \$1,651,209.68**”
- 2) Full Manual Tally of Votes will cost = “ **1,300 new staff**”

Conclusion: Calculations Based on Data are False

MS. DARLING ALLEN: 2022 RECOUNT SETS COUNTY COST & TIME

“Following the November 2022 election, staff re-counted 5,535 ballot cards from randomly selected precincts by hand, then compared the hand-counted vote totals to the software counted totals. These hand-counted ballots came from 13 precincts, with no more than five of the contests on the ballot re-counted in 11 of the precincts.

It took two teams of four people 8 days to hand-count this small sampling of ballots, which comprised just 8 percent of the nearly 69,000 ballots cast by Shasta voters in that election.”

Quoting : “Analysis of Manual Tally Options for Shasta County” [Page 11]

Required 8% Hand Recount: California Election Code §§ 15360

2022 Recount Time Sets Hand Tally Cost Basis

Two Sets of Four Staff Workers = 8 Workers

Times Eight-day Recount Period = 64 Worker Days

Times Eight Hours per Worker Day = 512 Hours

Times \$20 per Hour [Min. Wage & Benefit] = \$10,240

Divided by 5,535 ballot cards [8% Recount] = **\$1.85 per Recount Ballot Card**

Times 69,000 ballots cast 2022 Election = **\$127,650 Hand Tally Cost**

Times 111,503 ballots cast 2020 Election = **\$206,280.55 Hand Tally Cost**

2022 Recount Cost Sets Hand Tally Cost

Two Sets of Four Staff Workers	= 8 Workers
Times Eight-day Recount Period	= 64 Worker Days
Times Eight Hours per Worker Day	= 512 Hours
Times 60 [Minutes/hour]	= 30,720 Minutes
Divided by 5,535 ballot cards [8% Recount]	= 10.8 Recount Ballots/Hour
Times 8 Hours/Day	= 86.4 Recount Ballot/Day

2022 Four-day Tally of 69,000 ballots cast = 200 Workers

2020 Four-day Tally of 111,503 ballots cast = 323 Workers

John Sitka

From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, February 16, 2024 12:37 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox; Stefany Blankenship
Subject: Attachments for Recommendation Regarding Hand Counting
Attachments: ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS.docx; Appendix.docx

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Here are Bev's attachment's for the item she is sponsoring.

Ronnean Lund

John Sitka

From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, February 16, 2024 6:33 PM
To: Stefany Blankenship; Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: Attachments for Recommendation Regarding Hand Counting
Attachments: ELECTION CODE FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS.docx; Appendix.docx

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Here are Bev's attachment's for the item she is sponsoring.

Please confirm receipt, thanks.

Ronnean Lund

John Sitka

From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, February 25, 2024 6:32 PM
To: Stefany Blankenship; Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: Election Commission-REVISED R3
Attachments: REPORT FROM ELECTION COMMISSION on Hand Counting of Ballots-Feb 25.docx; Exhibit FOR HAND COUNTING OF BALLOTS Recommendation.docx; Appendix for Hand Counting of Ballots Recommendation.docx

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Completed

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Stefany.

I was able to get together with Bev, and I updated R3, fixing some incorrect words, deleting an item, fixed some formatting issues, and expanding on the recommendation. Nothing was added of substance, except wording to the recommendation at the end. I will be bringing copies for Commission members and the public.

Ronnean Lund
[REDACTED]

John Sitka

From: Joanna Francescut
Sent: Monday, March 18, 2024 8:59 AM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Cc: Debra Kaut
Subject: FW: Bev Gray report

Categories: CEAC

Hi Clerk of the Board,

Please see the correspondence below that was received for Bev Gray.

Thanks,

Joanna Francescut
Assistant County Clerk/Registrar of Voters Shasta County Clerk/Elections
530-510-1185

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure, or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.

Shasta County does not discriminate. Shasta County is an equal opportunity employer. Our ADA Coordinator may be reached at 530.225.5515 or via email at adacoordinator@co.shasta.ca.us. California Relay Service 800.735.2922.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, March 16, 2024 12:07 PM
To: Elections Email <elections@co.shasta.ca.us>
Subject: Bev Gray report

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

When is the "commission" going to have a report? It appears you have a serious lack of communication amongst yourselves.

Why did Bev Gray list a phone number in her radio ad that was disconnected shortly after the ad hit the airwaves? Was it to a personal business or other persons working behind the scenes? If so who are they -what are their names? This was deceptive and misleading false advertising to the voters.

Why are you not working hand in hand with the election department?

The 3/12/24 BOS presentation by Roneanne Lund was insufficient. No useful information was provided. I listened to the 2/26/24 commission meeting audio. Bev Gray stumbled through her presentation at the end without giving any statistics.

If you are not going to be transparent or cooperate with the election office staff this is a waste of our taxpayer dime. You are not working on behalf of Shasta County and your mission is a failure.

Debra Kaut
Shasta County constituent

Sent from my iPhone

John Sitka

From: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Sent: Tuesday, February 20, 2024 8:59 AM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: FW: Chain of Custody
Attachments: Shasta 378 Report chain of custody2.pdf

Good morning,

Our office is forwarding correspondence that was received over the weekend and addressed to both the Board of Supervisors and the Shasta County Elections Commission.

Please let us know if there are any questions,

John Sitka
Deputy Clerk of the Board

From: Mrs.LauraHobbs [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, February 18, 2024 10:54 PM
To: Mary Rickert <mrickert@co.shasta.ca.us>; Timothy Garman <tgarman@co.shasta.ca.us>; Christopher Kelstrom <ckelstrom@co.shasta.ca.us>; Patrick Jones <pjones@co.shasta.ca.us>; Kevin Crye <kcrye@co.shasta.ca.us>; Clerk of the Board Mailbox <ClerkoftheBoard@co.shasta.ca.us>
Subject: Chain of Custody

EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Honorable Supervisors and Commissioners,

RE: Chain of custody
CC: Shasta County Election Commission (Clerk of the Board please forward this to them)

Please read the attached summary of the chain of custody public records requests to the ROV, with links to the actual emails sent. We urgently need chain of custody procedures in order for our elections to be fair and accurate. We no longer have an election day, but rather an election month plus, with early voting and three weeks after election day before counts are complete. This extended period of voting increases the opportunity to cheat, and because of this we must have strict chain of custody rules in place and seriously consider going back to one day voting.

"Shasta County provided all the requested records they had. It appears Shasta has no ballot Chain of Custody to reconcile ballots sent by the mail service or received from the mail service. No Chain of Custody of ballots procedures of ballots handed out to and received back from voters either at vote centers or sent through the mail, or any procedure for the security of ballots to verify our votes are counted at the vote center/precincts and reconciled to the ballots received at Central Count let alone any procedures to document boxes of ballots through the ROV's entire process. Per Shasta's response, they have no Chain of Custody except for Ballot Drop Boxes. This from the same ROV who defies the Board of Supervisor and uses subterfuge to work with others outside our county to secure our elections and the citizens demand to hand count our elections. This is an example of her claim of the most secure election EVER!!! We can now clearly see what could go wrong"

Respectfully,

Dr. Laura Hobbs
Candidate for Shasta County Supervisor District 2

www.VoteLauraHobbs.com

AMERICAN
OVERSIGHT

"The light shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it." [John 1:5](#)

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

John Sitka

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, February 26, 2024 4:36 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: In Re: Shasta County Elections Commission hearing submittal: Shasta County Election Hand Tally Cost 5-22-2023.pptx
Attachments: Shasta County Election Hand Tally Cost 5-22-2023.pptx
Categories: CEAC

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

My name is Chriss Street and I gave public testimony today at the Shasta County Elections Commission hearing. I was prepared to present a study I produced in May, but the overhead was not operational. Enclosed is the document regarding cost of hand counting that I previously presented to the Supervisors meeting. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this matter.

Chriss W. Street
Editor
The Mountain Top Times
[REDACTED]

John Sitka

From: Mrs.LauraHobbs [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2023 12:10 AM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Cc: Ronnean Lund
Subject: Laura Hobbs Presentation for Monday 11-20-23
Attachments: Citizens election committee.pptx

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Categories: Valerie

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Here is the presentation for Monday.

"Computer Manipulation in Previous Shasta County Elections -and-Update on Nov 7th 2023 Election" Report by Laura Hobbs

Thank you so much for preparing this for the Committee,

Laura Hobbs

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

John Sitka

From: Mrs.LauraHobbs [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, December 16, 2023 8:46 AM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: Please forward this to the Citizen's Election Commission
Attachments: RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 8-21-23.doc

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hello,

Please send this to all 5 Shasta County Election Commissioners. Please BCC me or email me confirmation that this was passed along to them.

Thanks,

Laura

Honorable Commission Members,

Here's the broad overview of what needs to be accomplished in order to have fair and transparent elections. I recommend you vote to advance this draft resolution to the Board of Supervisors for consideration.

Sincerely,

Laura Hobbs

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

John Sitka

From: Mrs.LauraHobbs [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2023 9:27 AM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: Please forward to the Citizen's Election Board
Attachments: Logic and Accuracy testing.pdf
Categories: Correspondence

⚠ EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Citizen's Election Board,

I spoke before you on Oct 23, 2023. You requested that I send you the two codes that I referenced: they are 15104 and 15004 part B. I'd also like to report a possible new violation of these laws that occurred yesterday.

New Violation: On 10/24/23 I and a fellow member of our citizen organization observed ballot signature verification. There were approximately 12 signatures (out of approximately 60) that we challenged, however there was no process in place to stop the proceedings despite the challenge. They went forth with their decision despite objections. It appeared to us that there was no formal process to challenge ballot signatures, and if there were formal procedure's they weren't being followed.

- Election code 15104 b
- (b) A member of the county grand jury, and at least one member each of the Republican county central committee, the Democratic county central committee, and of any other party with a candidate on the ballot, and any other interested organization, shall be permitted to observe and challenge the manner in which the vote by mail ballots are handled, from the processing of vote by mail ballot return envelopes through the counting and disposition of the ballots.

I have attached my full summary of the logic and accuracy testing in which only 28 ballots of unknown composition were used to test the accuracy of Hart Verity 3.1

Respectfully Submitted,

Laura Hobbs

Sent with [Proton Mail](#) secure email.

John Sitka

From: Stefany Blankenship
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 4:50 PM
To: 'Ronnean Lund'; Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: RE: Recommendation from Election Commission on Hand Counting of Ballots

Sounds good – thank you Ronnean!

Regards,

Stefany Blankenship

Chief Deputy Clerk of the Board
County of Shasta

1450 Court Street Suite 308B

Office (530) 225-5550

Electronic Privacy/Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail and any attachments contains information that is, or may be covered by, the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, Title 18 U.S.C 2510-2521, and may also be confidential and proprietary in nature and is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). As the intended recipient(s), this disclosure may be protected by Federal confidentiality rules (42 CFR Part 2). The Federal rules prohibit you from making any further disclosure of this information unless further disclosure is expressly permitted by the written consent of the person to whom it pertains or as otherwise permitted by 42 CFR Part 2. A general authorization for the release of medical or other information is not sufficient for this purpose. The Federal rules restrict any use of the information to criminally investigate or prosecute any alcohol or drug abuse patient. If you have received this e-mail in error, contact the sender indicating you received this communication in error and then immediately delete and destroy all copies of the message.

---In a world where you can be anything, be kind---

From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 4:40 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox <clerkoftheboard@co.shasta.ca.us>; Stefany Blankenship <sblankenship@shastacounty.gov>
Subject: Recommendation from Election Commission on Hand Counting of Ballots

EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Stefany.

I failed to mention in my last email that the drop box recommendation is going from the ad hoc committee lisa and I are on regarding drop boxes.

This one is coming from the Ad Hoc committee Bev and I are on, in which we review and investigate election issues.

Although Bev and I have spoken about it quite a bit, Bev is the one who produced the attached report. She is insistent that it be put on the agenda for the 26th. I agree with the topic and conclusion;

however, it is probably not all the logic and format I would have used. I figure I can provide my comments on it during our meeting.

As a courtesy, I have added exhibit items in the document and asked Bev to compile them. She will have them to me tomorrow, and I will forward them to you.

Ronnean Lund



John Sitka

From: Stefany Blankenship
Sent: Saturday, November 11, 2023 11:56 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: Kristin Gulling-Smith; Clerk of the Board Mailbox
Subject: RE: Agenda request

Categories: Kristin

Hi Ronnean,

Thank you for contacting the Clerk of the Board.

I received your voicemail from yesterday but the County offices were closed due to the Veteran's Holiday. I will be out of the office the week of November 13th so please feel free to continue to email the Clerk of the Board or call our main line at (530) 225-5550 so staff can assist you while I am away from the office.

Unfortunately, the projector will not be available for use. If Ms. Hobbs would like to print copies of her presentation for members of the public (I estimate we would need roughly 15 copies), and send me a copy of the Power Point via email, I can push it to the Committee members screens for viewing during the meeting. Please let me know if this will work, I would be happy to add a presentation from Ms. Hobbs to the next meeting agenda.

Regards,

Stefany Blankenship

Chief Deputy Clerk of the Board
County of Shasta
1450 Court Street Suite 308B
Office (530) 225-5550

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From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, November 9, 2023 2:12 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox <clerkoftheboard@co.shasta.ca.us>
Subject: Fwd: Agenda request

EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Stefany. I'd like to put this on the agenda, is there anything we can arrange for her presentation. I'm assuming that you can display it, correct?

Ronnean Lund
[REDACTED]

Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

From: "Mrs.LauraHobbs" [REDACTED]
Date: November 9, 2023 at 11:07:19 AM PST
To: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Subject: Agenda request

Honorable Elections Commission Chair,

I am interest end in presenting my CVR data analysis of the 2020 and 2022 elections in Shasta county, that I delivered to the sheriff on Sept 13, 2023. I would require access to display data in a power point format. Ten to 15 minutes should be sufficient.

Please see my attached report,

Thank you for your consideration,

Laura Hobbs

Sent from Proton Mail mobile

John Sitka

From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 4:04 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox; Stefany Blankenship
Subject: Recommendation from Election Commission on Drop Boxes
Attachments: REPORT FROM ELECTION COMMISSION on DROP BOXES-Feb 15.docx; CODE Sections 3025.5 & 20135-Drop Boxes.docx; CODE Section 20137.docx

EXTERNAL SENDER: Do not follow links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.

Hi Stefany.

Attached are three documents concerning a recommendation on drop boxes for the Commission's February 26th agenda. Please put this on the agenda for a vote, thanks.

Also, as we discussed on the phone, Bev would like to sponsor an item on the agenda regarding discussion about voter rollers, and she would like there to be able to be public comment on it, no vote.

I may be sending one more thing in the next hour for the agenda.

Ronnean Lund
[REDACTED]

John Sitka

From: Ronnean Lund [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2024 4:40 PM
To: Clerk of the Board Mailbox; Stefany Blankenship
Subject: Recommendation from Election Commission on Hand Counting of Ballots
Attachments: REPORT FROM ELECTION COMMISSION on Hand Counting of Ballots-Feb 15.docx

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As a courtesy, I have added exhibit items in the document and asked Bev to compile them. She will have them to me tomorrow, and I will forward them to you.

Ronnean Lund
[REDACTED]



April 29, 2024

VIA EMAIL

Shasta County Clerk of the Board
1450 Court Street, Suite 308B
Redding, CA 96001
clerkoftheboard@co.shasta.ca.us

Re: Public Records Request

Dear Public Records Officer(s):

Pursuant to the California Public Records Act, Cal. Gov't Code §§ 7920.000 et seq., American Oversight makes the following request for records.

Requested Records

American Oversight requests that your office produce the following records within ten days:

For both parts of this request, please provide all responsive records from February 1, 2023, through the date the search is conducted.

1. All records reflecting the origin of the report titled "Report from the Shasta County Elections Commission on Recommendations Regarding a Local Ordinance Mandating Hand Counted Ballots at Precincts Using Paper Pollbooks" and dated February 26, 2024, including, but not limited to, any communications sent or received by Commissioners Bev Gray, Ronnean Lund, Dawn Duckett, Susanne Baremore, or Lisa Michaud, or acting County Counsel Alan Cox, about the report.
2. All electronic communications (including emails, email attachments, text messages, or messages on messaging platforms, such as Slack, GChat or Google Hangouts, Lync, Skype, or WhatsApp) between (a) Commissioners Bev Gray, Ronnean Lund, Dawn Duckett, Susanne Baremore, or Lisa Michaud, and (b) any of the external individuals or entities listed below, including, but not limited to, at the suggested email addresses or domains.

In the case of emails and texts, the search should include those sent or received from the specified officials' personal accounts and/or devices if they were used to conduct official business, as well those sent from their official email addresses or government-issued devices.

External Individuals & Entities:

- a) Anyone communicating from an email address ending in eip-ca.com
- b) Catherine Engelbrecht, and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in truthevote.org or truthevote.com
- c) David Clements (davidkclements13@protonmail.com, dkc@theprofessorsrecord.com)
- d) Doug Frank (drdouglasgrank@protonmail.com, drdouglasgrank@outlook.com)
- e) Jeff O'Donnell (theloneraccoon@protonmail.com)
- f) Lisa "Draza" Smith (drazasmith@protonmail.com, drazasmith@gmail.com), and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in ordros.com
- g) Linda Rantz (cause.america.mo@pm.me) and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in @causeofamerica.org
- h) Mike Lindell and/or anyone communicating from an email address ending in @mypillow.com or @frankspeech.com
- i) Kaylyn Hipple, and/or anyone communicating on behalf of the Shasta Freedom Coalition, including, but not limited to, from the email address shastafreedomco@gmail.com
- j) Conservative Partnership Institute (cpi.org, conservativepartnership.org)
- k) Cleta Mitchell (cleta@cletamitchell.com, cmitchell@foley.com, bradleyfdn.org, freedomworks.org)
- l) Election Integrity Network (electionintegrity.network)
- m) Virginia Institute of Public Policy (virginia institute.org)
- n) Anyone communicating from an email address ending in EagleAI.pro
- o) Rick Richards (dr@cathead.com, dr@EagleAI.pro, dronline@me.com)
- p) Mark Cook (patriotmc@protonmail.com)
- q) Anyone communicating on behalf of Hand Count Road Show (handcountroadshow.org)
- r) Patrick Colbeck (pjcolbeck@comcast.net, patrick@migrassrootsalliance.org)
- s) Patrick Byrne, Mike Roman (mikeroman@protonmail.com), and/or anyone communicating from the America Project (americaproject.com or theamericaproject.com)
- t) Clint Curtis
- u) Chriss Street
- v) Alex Halderman
- w) Ben Cotton
- x) Jim Penrose
- y) Laura Hobbs
- z) Tina Peters

Please note that American Oversight does not seek, and that part 2 of this request specifically excludes, the initial mailing of news clips or other mass-distribution emails. However, subsequent communications forwarding such emails are responsive to this request. In other words, for example, if Commissioner Bev Gray received a mass-distribution news clip email from an

address ending in causeofamerica.org, that initial email would not be responsive to this request. However, if she forwarded that email to another listed individual with her own commentary, that subsequent message would be responsive to this request and should be produced.

Please notify American Oversight of any anticipated fees or costs in excess of \$100 prior to incurring such costs or fee.

Please notify American Oversight of any anticipated fees or costs in excess of \$100 prior to incurring such costs or fee.

Guidance Regarding the Search & Processing of Requested Records

In connection with its request for records, American Oversight provides the following guidance regarding the scope of the records sought and the search and processing of records:

- Please search all locations and systems likely to have responsive records, regardless of format, medium, or physical characteristics. For instance, if the request seeks “communications,” please search all locations likely to contain communications, including relevant hard-copy files, correspondence files, appropriate locations on hard drives and shared drives, emails, text messages or other direct messaging systems (such as iMessage, WhatsApp, Signal, or Twitter.com direct messages), voicemail messages, instant messaging systems such as Lync or ICQ, and shared messages systems such as Slack.
- In conducting your search, please understand the terms “record,” “document,” and “information” in their broadest sense, to include any written, typed, recorded, graphic, printed, or audio material of any kind. We seek records of any kind, including electronic records, audiotapes, videotapes, and photographs, as well as letters, emails, facsimiles, telephone messages, voice mail messages and transcripts, notes, or minutes of any meetings, telephone conversations or discussions.
- Our request for records includes any attachments to those records or other materials enclosed with those records when they were previously transmitted. To the extent that an email is responsive to our request, our request includes all prior messages sent or received in that email chain, as well as any attachments to the email.
- Please search all relevant records or systems containing records regarding agency business. Do not exclude records regarding agency business contained in files, email accounts, or devices in the personal custody of your officials, such as personal email accounts or text messages.
- If any records are withheld in full or in part, please demonstrate that the record(s) in question are exempt under the express provisions of the California Public Records Act or that the public interest served by not disclosing the

record(s) clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record(s).¹

- In the event some portions of the requested records are properly exempt from disclosure, please disclose any reasonably segregable non-exempt portions of the requested records.² If a request is denied in whole, please state specifically why it is not reasonable to segregate portions of the record for release.
- Please take appropriate steps to ensure that records responsive to this request are not deleted by the agency before the completion of processing for this request. If records potentially responsive to this request are likely to be located on systems where they are subject to potential deletion, including on a scheduled basis, please take steps to prevent that deletion, including, as appropriate, by instituting a litigation hold on those records.

If you have any questions regarding how to construe this request for records or believe that further discussions regarding search and processing would facilitate a more efficient production of records of interest to American Oversight, please do not hesitate to contact American Oversight to discuss this request. American Oversight welcomes an opportunity to discuss its request with you before you undertake your search or incur search or duplication costs. By working together at the outset, American Oversight and your agency can decrease the likelihood of costly and time-consuming litigation in the future.

Where possible, please provide responsive material in an electronic format by email. Alternatively, please provide responsive material in native format or in PDF format on a USB drive. Please send any responsive material being sent by mail to American Oversight, 1030 15th Street NW, Suite B255, Washington, DC 20005. If it will accelerate release of responsive records to American Oversight, please also provide responsive material on a rolling basis.

Conclusion

American Oversight is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit with the mission to promote transparency in government, to educate the public about government activities, and to ensure the accountability of government officials. American Oversight uses the information gathered, and its analysis of it, to educate the public through reports, press releases, or other media. American Oversight also makes materials it gathers available on its public website and promotes their availability on social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter.com.³

We share a common mission to promote transparency in government. American Oversight looks forward to working with your agency on this request. If you do not

¹ Cal. Gov't Code § 7922.000.

² Cal. Gov't Code § 7922.525(b).

³ American Oversight currently has approximately 16,000 followers on Facebook and 111,200 followers on Twitter.com. American Oversight, Facebook,

understand any part of this request, please contact Taylor Stoneman at records@americanoversight.org or (202) 848-1319.

Sincerely,

/s/ Taylor Stoneman
Taylor Stoneman
on behalf of
American Oversight

<https://www.facebook.com/weareoversight/> (last visited Apr. 23, 2024); American Oversight (@weareoversight), Twitter.com, <https://twitter.com/weareoversight> (last visited Apr. 23, 2024).