

**Subject:** RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322) - SOS PIR 24-0351  
**Date:** Thursday, May 9, 2024 at 2:06:41 PM Eastern Daylight Time  
**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**To:** AO Records  
**CC:** GeneralCounsel

EXTERNAL SENDER

Good afternoon,

As a follow up to our April 18 email, please follow this [link](#) to access additional documents (“5.9.24 Documents”) in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code. Our Office has set up a file hosting service called “box” to enable us to send large file sizes more efficiently. Please let me know if you are unable to access the files and we can discuss an alternate method of delivery. The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

We appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you additional responsive documents on a rolling basis—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—with our next production by 5:00 p.m. on June 6, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 18, 2024 11:09 AM  
**To:** 'AO Records' <records@americanoversight.org>  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322) - SOS PIR 24-0351

Good morning,

Please see the attached letters, and zipped folder containing documents, in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

As stated in the attached letter, we require more time to continue reviewing our records and produce additional responsive information. We will provide you additional responsive documents on a rolling basis—to the extent

such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—with our next production by 5:00 p.m. on May 9, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, April 11, 2024 11:42 AM  
**To:** 'AO Records' <[records@americanoversight.org](mailto:records@americanoversight.org)>  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322) - SOS PIR 24-0351

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code. We will also provide you with responsive documents and a copy of our brief to the OAG on April 18, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 28, 2024 8:38 AM  
**To:** 'AO Records' <[records@americanoversight.org](mailto:records@americanoversight.org)>  
**Subject:** RE: Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322)

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office via email on March 27, 2024 (the “Request”).

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Friday, March 29th in observance of Good Friday. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, April 11, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

**From:** AO Records <[records@americanoversight.org](mailto:records@americanoversight.org)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 27, 2024 8:47 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Public Information Request (TX-SOS-24-0322)

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Public Information Officer:

Please find attached a request for records under the Texas Public Information Act.

Sincerely,

**Marwah Adhoob** | She/Her  
Paralegal | American Oversight  
[records@americanoversight.org](mailto:records@americanoversight.org)  
[www.americanoversight.org](http://www.americanoversight.org) | @weareoversight

PIR: TX-SOS-24-0322

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, February 12, 2024 10:35 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request  
**Attachments:** 2.12.24 Documents.zip

Good morning,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"). Please see the attached zipped folder containing the documents responsive to your request for information under the PIA.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 30, 2024 12:40 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Regards,

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 29, 2024 3:54 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAadkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAadkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well.

Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000001

Please provide ES&S's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2018 - 2023.

- EVS 6.3.0.0
- EVS 6.2.0.0
- EVS 6.0.3.0
- EVS 6.1.1.0
- EVS 6.1.0.0
- EVS 6.4.0.0
- EVS 6.0.2.0
- EVS 6.0.0.0

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

# VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION – FORM 101

## EVS 6.0.0.0

### 1. PRESERVES THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT:

#### **DS200/DS450/DS850/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote-Tabulator**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on their paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, their ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or casting the ballot as is.

The DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot cards' acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exceptions conditions.

The ExpressVote-Tabulator operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at a polling place. Voters use the ExpressVote-Tabulator to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and then, once finished, cast their ballot after reviewing a summary of their selections. The ExpressVote-Tabulator does give the county the option to return a voter's summary card for manual review of the selections prior to casting the ballot in the ExpressVote-Tabulators ballot box

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays their ballot and allows them to make and review their selections and then cast their ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms their selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes their voting session in the privacy booth.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark their ballots in a privacy booth and either casts them there or returns them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposits them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

#### **ExpressVote-Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are

under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail

## **2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSTL tested by EAC accredited SLI Compliance Laboratory. EVS 6.0.0.0 received EAC # (ESSEVS6000) on July 2, 2018. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

## **3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).

## **4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

## **5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

## **6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

## **7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may

only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

#### **8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

#### **9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

##### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

##### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

#### **10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

##### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

##### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

#### **11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs

events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

## **12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST.**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

## **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

### **DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

### **DS850/DS450**

The DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals. The DS850 and DS450 use a dot matrix printer to print the continuous audit log and a laser printer for printing reports.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch maintains a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date,

time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

## **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

### **DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems minimizes under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through their vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before casting the ballot.

## **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote - Tabulator**

In tabulator mode, the Express-Vote can be set up to eject the summary card to the voter for review prior to casting. Rather than cast said summary card, the voter would be instructed to return the card to an election official and placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

### **ExpressVote – Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE's ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to back up.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200. Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in

model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures Manual* and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

**19. (PRECINCT OS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE.**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which showcase all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL.**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

## VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION – FORM 101 EVS 6.0.2.0

### 1. PRESERVES THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT:

#### **DS200/DS450/DS850/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote-Tabulator**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on their paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, their ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or casting the ballot as is.

The DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot cards' acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exceptions conditions.

The ExpressVote-Tabulator operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at a polling place. Voters use the ExpressVote-Tabulator to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and then, once finished, cast their ballot after reviewing a summary of their selections. The ExpressVote-Tabulator does give the county the option to return a voter's summary card for manual review of the selections prior to casting the ballot in the ExpressVote-Tabulators ballot box

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays their ballot and allows them to make and review their selections and then cast their ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms their selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes their voting session in the privacy booth.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark their ballots in a privacy booth and either casts them there or returns them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposits them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

#### **ExpressVote-Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are

under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail

## **2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSTL tested by EAC accredited SLI Compliance Laboratory. EVS 6.0.2.0 received EAC # (ESSEVS6020) on October 4, 2018. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

## **3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).

## **4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

## **5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

## **6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

## **7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may

only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

#### **8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

#### **9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

##### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

##### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

#### **10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

##### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

##### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

#### **11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs

events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

## **12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST.**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

## **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

### **DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

### **DS850/DS450**

The DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals. The DS850 and DS450 use a dot matrix printer to print the continuous audit log and a laser printer for printing reports.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch maintains a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date,

time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

## **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

### **DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems minimizes under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through their vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before casting the ballot.

## **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote - Tabulator**

In tabulator mode, the Express-Vote can be set up to eject the summary card to the voter for review prior to casting. Rather than cast said summary card, the voter would be instructed to return the card to an election official and placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

### **ExpressVote – Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE's ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to back up.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200. Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in

model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures Manual* and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

**19. (PRECINCT OS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE.**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which showcase all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL.**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

## VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION – FORM 101 EVS 6.0.3.0

### 1. PRESERVES THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT:

#### **DS200/DS450/DS850/ExpressTouch/ ExpressVote XL**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on their paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, their ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or casting the ballot as is.

The DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot cards' acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exceptions conditions.

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays their ballot and allows them to make and review their selections and then cast their ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms their selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes their voting session in the privacy booth.

The ExpressVote XL vote sessions are activated using a blank ExpressVote Activation card. Voters will use the ExpressVote XL screen to make their selections. Once finished the card will be marked and then presented to the voter behind a review screen. Once the voter accepts the marks, the Summary card is ejected into a secure card bin secured with two locks. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark their ballots in a privacy booth and either casts them there or returns them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposits them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

#### **ExpressVote–Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail

**2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSTL tested by EAC accredited Pro V&V. EVS 6.0.3.0 received EAC # (ESSEVS6030) on July 27, 2020. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

**3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 1.0).

**4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

**5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

**6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

**7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

## **8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

## **9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressVote, ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

## **10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressVote, ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

## **11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

## **12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST.**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ES&S ExpressVote, ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

## **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

### **DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

### **DS850/DS450**

The DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals. The DS850 and DS450 use a dot matrix printer to print the continuous audit log and a laser printer for printing reports.

### **ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressTouch and ExpressVote XL maintain a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date, time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of

terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

## **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

### **DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems minimizes under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through their vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

### **ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressTouch and ExpressVote XL include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before casting the ballot.

## **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive

their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote XL**

After a voter marks the selections on the ExpressVote XL, the voter has the option to cancel their vote session. Once canceled, the Summary Card with the voters selections printed will be ejected back to the voter instead of being tabulated. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

### **ExpressVote – Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to back up.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200.

Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures Manual* and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and

procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

**ExpressVote XL/ExpressTouch**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch without closing polls by navigating to the supervisor menu and selecting shut down. An audit log can be printed prior to shut down and immediately following the reboot process to ensure the Tabulators are in the same state they were in the night before.

**19. (PRECINCT OS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE.**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which showcase all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL.**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

**VO TING SYSTEM CERIIFICATION – FORM 101**  
**EVS 6.0.4.0**

**1. PRESERVES THE SEC RECY O F THE BALLO T**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850/ ExpressTo uch/ ExpressVote -Ta bula tor**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on the ir paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, the ir ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case of errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or casting the ballot as is.

The DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot card's acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified, the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exception conditions.

The ExpressVote -Tabulator operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at a polling place. Voters use the ExpressVote -Tabulator to mark the ir ballots in a privacy booth and then, once finished, cast the ir ballot after reviewing a summary of the ir selections. The ExpressVote -Tabulator does give the voter the option to return a voter's summary card for manual review of the selections prior to casting the ballot in the ExpressVote -Tabulators ballot box.

For the ExpressTo uch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activation cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays the ir ballot and allows them to make and review the ir selections and then cast the ir ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms the ir selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes the ir voting session in the privacy booth.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark the ir ballots in a privacy booth and either cast them there or return them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposits them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

**ExpressVote -Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark the ir ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail.

**2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSIL tested by EAC accredited SLI Compliance Laboratory. EVS 6.0.4.0 received EAC # ESSEVS6040 on May 3, 2019. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

**3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).

**4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

**5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

**6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

**7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

**8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

**9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

**ExpressVote / ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

**10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

**ExpressVote / ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

**11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

**12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable.

**ExpressVote / ExpressTouch**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgotten to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

**13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

**EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

**DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

**DS850/ DS450**

The DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals. The DS850 and DS450 use a dot matrix printer to print the continuous audit log and a laser printer for printing reports.

**ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch maintains a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date, time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of terminal activity.

across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

#### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

### **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

#### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

#### **DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

#### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems minimize under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through the irvote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

#### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before casting the ballot.

### **15. (DRES ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

#### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote - Tabulator**

In tabulator mode, the Express-Vote can be set up to eject the summary card to the voter for review prior to casting. Rather than cast said summary card, the voter would be instructed to return the card to an election official and placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

### **ExpressVote - Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to backup.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUT DOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200.

Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedure*s Manual and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

**19. (PRECINCTS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which show case all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

**VO TING SYSTEM CERIFIICATION – FORM 101**  
**EVS 6.1.0.0**

**1. PRESERVES THE SEC RECY O F THE BALLO T**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850/ ExpressTouch**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on the ir paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, the ir ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case of errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or casting the ballot as is.

The DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot card's acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified, the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exception conditions.

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays the ir ballot and allows them to make and review the ir selections and then cast the ir ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms the ir selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes the ir voting session in the privacy booth.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark the ir ballots in a privacy booth and either cast them there or return them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposits them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

**ExpressVote –Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark the ir ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail.

**2. IS SUITABLE FO R THE PURPO SE FO R WHIC H IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSIL tested by EAC accredited Pro V&V Laboratory. EVS 6.1.0.0 received EAC # ESSEVS6100 on September 24, 2019. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

**3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).

**4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

**5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

**6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

**7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

**8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a

contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

**9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

**ExpressVote / ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

**10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

**ExpressVote / ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

**11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

**12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST**

**DS200/ DS450/ DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does

not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable

#### **ExpressVote/ ExpressTouch**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

### **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

#### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

#### **DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

#### **DS850/ DS450**

The DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals. The DS850 and DS450 use a dot matrix printer to print the continuous audit log and a laser printer for printing reports.

#### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch maintains a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date, time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

#### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch

screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

#### **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

##### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

##### **DS850/ DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

##### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems minimize under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through the ir vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

##### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before casting the ballot.

#### **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

##### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

##### **ExpressVote - Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRES ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRES ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to backup.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shut down the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200.

Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures* Manual and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

**19. (PRECINCTS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which show case all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

## VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION – FORM 101 EVS 6.1.1.0

### 1. PRESERVES THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT:

#### **DS200/DS450/DS850/ExpressTouch/ ExpressVote XL**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on their paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, their ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or casting the ballot as is.

The DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot cards' acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exceptions conditions.

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays their ballot and allows them to make and review their selections and then cast their ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms their selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes their voting session in the privacy booth.

The ExpressVote XL vote sessions are activated using a blank ExpressVote Activation card. Voters will use the ExpressVote XL screen to make their selections. Once finished the card will be marked and then presented to the voter behind a review screen. Once the voter accepts the marks, the Summary card is front ejected back to the voter to deposit in a ballot box or tabulator. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark their ballots in a privacy booth and either casts them there or returns them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposits them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

#### **ExpressVote–Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail

**2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSTL tested by EAC accredited Pro V&V. EVS 6.1.1.0 received EAC # (ESSEVS6110) on July 27, 2020. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

**3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 1.0).

**4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

**5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

**6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

**7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

## **8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

## **9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressVote, ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

## **10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressVote, ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

## **11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

## **12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST.**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ES&S ExpressVote, ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

## **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

### **DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

### **DS850/DS450**

The DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals. The DS850 and DS450 use a dot matrix printer to print a continuous audit log and a laser printer for printing reports.

### **ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressTouch and ExpressVote XL maintain a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date, time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of

terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

## **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

### **DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems minimizes under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through their vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

### **ExpressTouch/ExpressVote XL**

The ExpressTouch and ExpressVote XL include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before printing the card or casting the ballot.

## **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive

their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote XL**

After a voter marks the selections on the ExpressVote XL, the voter has the option to cancel their vote session. Once canceled, the Summary Card with the voters selections printed will be ejected back to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

### **ExpressVote – Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE's ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to back up.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200.

Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures Manual* and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and

procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

**ExpressVote XL/ExpressTouch**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the ExpressVote XL and ExpressTouch without closing polls by navigating to the supervisor menu and selecting shut down. An audit log can be printed prior to shut down and immediately following the reboot process to ensure the Tabulators are in the same state they were in the night before.

**19. (PRECINCT OS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE.**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which showcase all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL.**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

## VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION – FORM 101 EVS 6.2.0.0

### 1. PRESERVES THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT:

#### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950/ExpressTouch**

The DS200 is an optical scan paper ballot tabulator designed to be used at the polling place level, but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on their paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, their ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or cast the ballot as is.

The DS950, DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot cards' acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS950, DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified, the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exceptions conditions.

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays their ballot and allows them to make and review their selections and then cast their ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms their selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed and the voter then completes their voting session in the privacy booth.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark their ballots in a privacy booth and either casts them there or returns them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

#### **ExpressVote–Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail

## **2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSTL tested by EAC accredited Pro V&V. EVS 6.2.0.0 received EAC # (ESSEVS6200) on December 23, 2021. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

## **3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 1.0).

## **4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

## **5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,900 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

## **6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

## **7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

## **8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

## **9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

## **10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

## **11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

## **12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST.**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

## **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at anytime throughout an election.

### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

### **DS200**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

### **DS950/DS850/DS450**

The DS950, DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch maintains a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date, time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether or not an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at anytime.

### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

## **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

### **DS200**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

### **DS950/DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote system minimizes under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through their vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before printing the card or casting the ballot.

## **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote – Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to back up.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the DS200 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200.

Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information

### **DS950/DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures Manual* and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS950, DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

### **ExpressTouch**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shutdown the ExpressTouch without closing polls by navigating to the supervisor menu and selecting shut down. An audit log can be printed prior to shut down and immediately following the reboot process to ensure the Tabulators are in the same state they were in the night before.

**19. (PRECINCT OS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE.**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which showcase all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL.**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

# VOTING SYSTEM CERTIFICATION – FORM 101

## EVS 6.3.0.0

### 1. PRESERVES THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT:

#### **DS200/DS300/DS450/DS850/DS950/ExpressTouch**

The DS200 and DS300 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the polling place level but can be used in multiple environments. After the voter makes their selections on their paper ballot with an indelible marker, or a device that was designed to assist with the marking process, their ballot is inserted into the unit for immediate tabulation. Both sides of the ballot are scanned simultaneously using a high-resolution image-scanning device, producing ballot images that are decoded by a proprietary recognition engine. In the case errors or irregularities (as defined by the election jurisdiction), the voter has the ability to return the ballot for review or cast the ballot as is.

The DS950, DS850 and DS450 are optical scan paper ballot tabulators designed to be used at the central count environment. Ballot handling in this environment consists of a ballot cards' acceptance, movement through the read station, and transfer into a collection station or receptacle. The DS950, DS850 and DS450 can be programmed to identify ballots that require special handling by election officials only. When any of the ballots meeting these criteria are identified, the tabulators will outstack ballots that meet defined exceptions conditions.

For the ExpressTouch, vote sessions are activated using secure smart cards. Vote Session Activator cards can be programmed with the voter's authorized ballot and given to the voter. The voter then inserts the card, which displays their ballot and allows them to make and review their selections and then cast their ballot all in a privacy booth. Jurisdictions may also choose to activate ballots using a Supervisor Access Card. The poll worker inserts the Supervisor access card and selects the appropriate ballot, confirms their selection and activates the ballot. The Supervisor card is then removed, and the voter then completes their voting session in the privacy booth.

All of these ES&S systems function as any system at the polling places would. Voters mark their ballots in a privacy booth and either casts them there or returns them to the ballot box in a secrecy sleeve and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

#### **ExpressVote–Marker**

The ExpressVote operates very much the same as any paper ballot system at polling places. Voters use the ExpressVote to mark their ballots in a privacy booth and return them to the ballot box in the usual manner. Voters may request a security sleeve upon leaving the booth and personally deposit them in a sealed box. These functions are under the direct control of the voter and provide no opportunity for anyone to discover how the voter has marked his or her ballot.

Please refer to the *System Security Specifications Document* for further detail

**2. IS SUITABLE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS INTENDED.**

The ES&S Voting System has been VSTL tested by EAC accredited Pro V&V. EVS 6.3.0.0 received EAC # (ESSEVS6300) on November 17, 2022. The proprietary design and operating system are specifically for election use.

**3. OPERATES SAFELY, EFFICIENTLY, AND ACCURATELY:**

All systems were tested and meet or exceed the EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG 1.0).

**4. IS SAFE FROM FRAUDULANT OR UNAUTHORIZED MANIPULATION:**

Implementation of effective election security guards the election process and assures public confidence in the results. All ES&S Systems meet or exceed the EAC Standards in preventing fraudulent and unauthorized use. In addition to physical locks and seals, the voting system administers access controls. Detailed security for each component of the voting system can be found in the System Operations Procedures manuals (SOP) along with the System Security Specs and Hardening Procedures documents.

Please refer to the System Operations Procedures and System Security Folders for documents containing information on this area.

**5. PERMITS VOTING ON ALL OFFICES AND MEASURES TO BE VOTED ON AT AN ELECTION:**

We declare "Voting System Limits" with our voting systems which can be found in Attachment 1: Voting System Limitations of the System Overview document. A couple examples of the declared limits are 9,999 precincts allowed in an election and 10,000 candidates allowed per election. During federal testing, each declared limit is tested up to and also beyond to ensure declared boundaries and limitations can be met.

Please refer to *Attachment 1: Voting Systems Limitations of the System Overview*.

**6. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES ON OFFICES AND MEASURES ON WHICH THE VOTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

If a precinct has multiple ballot styles created by split districts within that precinct, a ballot style is assigned to each split. Poll officials select the appropriate ballot style for the voter. Only those offices and questions associated with the ballot style that voter has the right to vote are available.

**7. PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES BY THE SAME VOTER FOR MORE THAN ONE CANDIDATE FOR THE SAME OFFICE, AND PREVENTS COUNTING VOTES FOR MORE THAN THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES FOR WHICH THE VOTER IS ENTITLED TO VOTE:**

In the election definition, an individual candidate is assigned to a contest one time. Each candidate only appears on the ballot once for each office. Thus, the voter may only select a candidate once before casting their ballot. Once the voter has cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered. In addition, the systems are specifically designed to prevent an over-vote from being counted.

## **8. PREVENTS COUNTING A VOTE ON THE SAME OFFICE OR MEASURE MORE THAN ONCE:**

The election definition contains each race and measure one time. Each contest is then assigned to the correct precinct or ballot style(s) to which it belongs. Each precinct or ballot style includes its associated contests one time. Thus, the voter may only vote a contest once before casting their ballot. Again, once the voter cast their ballot, the ballot is tabulated and cannot be altered.

## **9. PERMITS WRITE-IN VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed with a write-in line for each applicable race. The voter is instructed to write-in the name on the line provided. With the write-in response area provided for on the ballot, the integrity of the ballot is preserved.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch provide a very simple method for accommodating write-in votes. An active write-in vote location is provided in each office where write-in voting is allowed. To vote a write-in, the voter follows the audio prompts and uses the keypad or touch screen to select the write-in location. A write-in screen appears which allows the voter to spell out the write-in name by following the audio prompts and selecting the letters of the name. When the voter has spelled out the name, he or she accepts the name and the terminal immediately returns to the ballot screen and displays the write-in name in the list of candidates where it belongs. The write-in name may be changed or deleted any time prior to the voter casting their ballot.

## **10. IS CAPABLE OF PERMITTING STRAIGHT PARTY VOTING:**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950**

The ES&S paper ballot can be printed and programmed with a straight party section to accomplish this requirement. The voter chooses straight party by marking the response area next to the appropriate party.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ExpressVote and ExpressTouch can accommodate Straight Party Voting. The voter may select a Straight Party candidate by following the audio prompts and selecting the oval next to the appropriate party. Once the voter selects a Straight Party choice, all candidates of that party are selected (i.e., highlighted). This choice does not affect any non-partisan candidates or questions. Voters must still vote the non-partisan offices independently.

## **11. IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING RECORDS FROM WHICH THE OPERATION OF THE VOTING SYSTEM MAY BE AUDITED:**

Event Log Service includes a series of applications that track user and equipment actions during the election process. ES&S ballot marking and tabulation equipment maintain comprehensive internal logs that can be viewed anytime throughout an election by printing them out or viewing them on screen. ES&S Election Management Software logs events through a combination of custom tools (ES&S Event Log Service) and COTS utilities (Windows Event Viewer).

## **12. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A SUMMARY SCREEN TO ALLOW VOTERS TO EXAMINE THEIR CHOICES BEFORE THE BALLOT IS FINALLY CAST.**

### **DS200/DS450/DS850/DS950**

The ES&S paper ballot allows the voter to review the ballot as many times as the voter would like before they deposit the ballot into the ballot box. To ensure that the voter does not forget a contest, there are instructions on the ballot to vote both sides of the ballot when applicable.

### **ExpressVote/ExpressTouch**

The ES&S ExpressVote and ExpressTouch systems include a summary screen at the end of each ballot. This screen both displays and uses audio prompts to describe each contest and candidate on the ballot as well as whom the voter selected in each contest. The voter is able to go back to any contest and change their mind and vote in any contest they may have forgot to vote on initially. Since the summary screen is part of the ballot, the voter must at least review this screen before marking their ballot. When the voter finishes reviewing his or her selections, the ballot can then be either printed or tabulated. Changes to the ballot after that point will require the poll worker to spoil the ballot and start again.

## **13. IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING A REAL-TIME AUDIT LOG (TAC 81.62)**

All ES&S systems provide a continuous internal real-time audit log that is held in memory. Audit data include all events that occur on each terminal or optical scan device. These logs can be viewed or printed at any time throughout an election.

### **EMS Workstation**

Event Log Service provides a permanent event log repository. Event Log Service data remains in the database until it is purged by the election administrator. The data can be exported to a file in a format readable by third-party applications such as Microsoft Excel.

### **DS200/ DS300**

All status messages and alerts are stored to the system real-time audit log. Election officials have the option to print or view the Audit Log at any time during an election. Printing Audit Logs by the county during voting is done in accordance to their procedure. Audit Log printing is also available at any time after closing polls.

### **DS950/DS850/DS450**

The DS950, DS850 and DS450 records errors and major events and tags these incidents with the date and time the incident occurred based on the real-time clock settings. Audit log information can be exported to a USB thumb drive inserted into a USB port on the tabulator. The Zero Report, which is printed before polls are open on Election Day, is used to indicate no tampering has been done to the vote totals.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch maintains a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered accurately and accountably. The audit log records the date, time, and description of every user- or system-initiated event that occurs on the terminal. The audit log is always available whether an election is loaded on the terminal. This log is not cleared by the EQC process and therefore contains record of terminal activity across elections. The audit log can be viewed, printed, or exported from the ExpressTouch at any time.

### **ExpressVote**

The ExpressVote's Operations Log and System Log reports comprise a system-generated audit trail jurisdictions can use to verify elections are administered fairly, accurately, transparently, and efficiently. Jurisdictions can view audit logs on the ExpressVote's touch screen by displaying the Operations Log and System Log reports. Jurisdictions can also print both logs using the unit's internal card printer or, if present, the external thermal tape printer in the rolling kiosk.

## **14. IS CAPABLE OF CASTING A BLANK BALLOT**

### **DS200/DS300**

The DS200 includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Election officials have the option to program the scanner to return ballots containing exception conditions to the voter for revision. They can be programmed to apply special rules to ballots that may be mismarked. These include ballots that appear blank, overvoted, cross-voted, undervoted, or have marginal voter marks. Each of these types of anomalies can be programmed for unconditional accept, unconditional reject, or query, which informs voters of the condition and allows them to correct the ballot if they choose.

### **DS950/DS850/DS450**

These tabulators include provisions for detecting exception conditions such as ballot misreads, ballots not recognizable, ballots unable to be processed, ballot jams while navigating through the transport, cross-voted ballots in an open primary, ballots with write-ins, overvotes and undervotes as well as blank ballots or ballots marked too lightly for the scanner to register. Initial settings for the sorting of such conditions are set in the EMS and loaded onto the tabulator as part of the election definition. Election officials have the option to change these settings after the proper access code is provided and as the laws of the particular jurisdiction allow.

### **ExpressVote**

The ES&S ExpressVote system minimizes under-voting by providing voters with a Summary Page and alerting voters as they progress through their vote session. Voters are able to review their selections and contests not voted; always free to change their selections prior to printing selections or casting their ballot.

### **ExpressTouch**

The ExpressTouch includes provisions for detecting exception conditions such as overvotes, undervotes as well as blank ballots. If the election definition is set to warn voters when the ballot is blank the system displays an alert window before printing the card or casting the ballot.

## **15. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR PROVISIONAL VOTING (TAC 81.176)**

Elections can be coded to have the ballots rejected by the DRE if it is provisional.

### **ExpressTouch**

When using the ExpressTouch, Electionware provides three options for how the ExpressTouch should be configured to process provisional ballots: not allowed, allowed-not counted, allowed-counted. If allowed-not counted is selected, a voter would receive their ballot as normal, but the total count would be listed after total ballots cast in the master accounting section of the summary reports.

### **ExpressVote – Marker**

In marker mode, the ExpressVote would automatically return the summary card to the voter. At this time the voter would return the summary card to an election administrator so it can be placed in a provisional envelope to be later reviewed/tabulated per Texas rules and regulations.

## **16. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE FOR A RECOUNT**

### **ExpressTouch**

If a recount occurs, an election administrator can make a backup of the election and bring results back into the Reporting module. From there, the user can view the cast vote records for the affected contests/precincts. If required, an election administrator can pull the internal redundant memory CFast card and reconcile vote totals from there.

## **17. (DRE'S ONLY) LIST PROCEDURE TO BACKUP ELECTRONIC FILES**

### **ExpressTouch**

A user can use a blank ES&S USB flash drive to create a Backup Flash drive from a closed ExpressTouch terminal. It is important to note that a separate blank flash drive must be used for each closed terminal an election administrator would like to back up.

Please refer to the *ExpressTouch Operator's Guide* for more information.

## **18. PROCEDURES ON HOW TO PROPERLY SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DURING EARLY VOTING OR REFERENCE WHERE THIS IS IN YOUR DOCUMENTATION**

### **DS200/DS300**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shut down the DS200/DS300 without closing polls by navigating to the Tools menu. From the following screen, the user can select the Report Options. From the Report options screen there will be an Admin button icon. Once logged into the Admin menu, they can shut down the DS200/DS300. Please refer to the *DS200 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 or the *DS300 Operator's Guide* Section 7.13 for more information.

### **DS950/DS850/DS450**

In the precinct-based model, the central count scanner is used to process early voting and absentee ballots by scanning the ballots in the days up to and including election day and subsequently tabulating them when the election is closed. In an all mail-in model, all ballots are physically collected via mail to one or more central locations and scanned up until the polls close on Election Day, at which time they are tabulated. The *Standard Operating Procedures Manual* and the *System Maintenance Manual* for the DS950, DS850 and DS450 is intended to help you develop election procedures. However, election laws and procedures vary from state to state, and your procedures must be in compliance with the laws and procedures that apply to your jurisdiction.

### **ExpressTouch**

During the early voting period, an election administrator can shut down the ExpressTouch without closing polls by navigating to the supervisor menu and selecting shut down. An audit log can be printed prior to shut down and immediately following the reboot process to ensure the Tabulators are in the same state they were in the night before.

**19. (PRECINCT OS ONLY) CAN TWO LOCKS BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT BOX TO MAKE IT LEGAL TO USE AT AN EARLY VOTING SITE? IF SO, PLEASE LIST HOW A JURISDICTION CAN HAVE THIS DONE.**

Yes, please refer to the *System Operating Procedures Manual: Chapter 6 Pre-Election Day Tasks* for respective tabulators which showcase all locks and seals associated with the tabulators and the ballot boxes. Also refer to Best Practices for Physically Securing ES&S equipment for more information.

**20. ARE YOUR MANUFACTURERS ISO 9000 COMPLIANT? IF NOT, EXPLAIN QUALITY CONTROL.**

ES&S partner manufacturers use internally defined quality control procedures for procuring and inspecting parts and raw materials. ES&S prioritizes selection of ISO certified or similarly certified partner manufacturing facilities to ensure that all parts used in the assembly of ES&S designed voting equipment meets or exceeds Federal voting system guidelines.

Please refer to the *ES&S Quality Assurance Program for Manufacturing Document* for further detail.

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 30, 2024 12:40 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Regards,

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 29, 2024 3:54 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>; Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well.

Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide ES&S's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2018 - 2023.

- EVS 6.3.0.0
- EVS 6.2.0.0
- EVS 6.0.3.0
- EVS 6.1.1.0
- EVS 6.1.0.0
- EVS 6.4.0.0
- EVS 6.0.2.0
- EVS 6.0.0.0

Thank you for you help.

Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,

Laura

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000059

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, February 12, 2024 11:19 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Ms. Williams and Mr. Bitter,  
Thank you.  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, February 12, 2024 10:34 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"). Please see the attached zipped folder containing the documents responsive to your request for information under the PIA.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel



TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000061

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 30, 2024 12:40 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Regards,

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 29, 2024 3:54 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** ES&S Form 101s - SoS Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well.  
 AMERICAN OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000062

Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide ES&S's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2018 - 2023.

- EVS 6.3.0.0
- EVS 6.2.0.0
- EVS 6.0.3.0
- EVS 6.1.1.0
- EVS 6.1.0.0
- EVS 6.4.0.0
- EVS 6.0.2.0
- EVS 6.0.0.0

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 7, 2024 8:07 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

We sent them to you on February 29<sup>th</sup> and I resent them to you a few minutes ago. Please let me know if you still didn't receive them.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 6, 2024 7:03 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear SoS,

Do you have any updates on the request below?  
Your last communication noted records would be provided on March 1.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000064

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the “Request”).

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000066



---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, March 6, 2024 7:03 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear SoS,

Do you have any updates on the request below?  
Your last communication noted records would be provided on March 1.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State ("Office"). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for you help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do  
not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Thursday, February 29, 2024 11:27 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233  
**Attachments:** Verity Voting 2.4 Form 101\_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.5 Form 101\_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.7 Form 101\_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 1.0 Form 101\_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.0 Form 101\_Responses.pdf; Verity Voting 2.3 Form 101\_Responses.pdf

Good morning,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"). Please see the attached documents responsive to your request for information under the PIA.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] >  
**Subject:** RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State ("Office"). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000071

To: GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

Subject: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**



## Verity Voting 2.4 Certification Application

### Form 101 Responses

#### Explain How the Voting System:

**1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;**

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer Duo)
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
  - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
  - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

## 2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

## 3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

**Safety.** Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

**Accuracy.** Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, "All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass."

**Efficiency.** Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

## 4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

### Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

### Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

### Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

### Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

### Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

### Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

#### Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

#### Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

#### Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

#### System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

#### **5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;**

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

#### **6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;**

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

#### **7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;**

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

**8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;**

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

**9. Permits write-in voting;**

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the "Write-In" option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

**10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;**

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to "Include in Straight Party". If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

**11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and**

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

**12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and**

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

**13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and**

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

**14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and**

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

**15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and**

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

**16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and**

**Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)**

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

**Printing of Audit Logs**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

**17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

**18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and**

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

**19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and**

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

**20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.**

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.



## Verity Voting 2.5 Certification Application

### Form 101 Responses

#### Explain How the Voting System:

**1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;**

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer Duo)
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
  - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
  - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

## 2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

## 3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

**Safety.** Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

**Accuracy.** Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, "All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass."

**Efficiency.** Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

## 4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

### Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

### Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

### Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

### Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

### Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

### Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

#### Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

#### Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

#### Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

#### System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

#### **5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;**

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

#### **6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;**

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

#### **7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;**

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

**8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;**

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

**9. Permits write-in voting;**

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the “Write-In” option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

**10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;**

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to “Include in Straight Party”. If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

**11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and**

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

**12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and**

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

**13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and**

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

**14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and**

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

**15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and**

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code** with **Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

**16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and**

**Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)**

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

**Printing of Audit Logs**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

**17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

**18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and**

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

**19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and**

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

**20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.**

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.



## Verity Voting 2.7 Certification Application

### Form 101 Responses

#### Explain How the Voting System:

**1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;**

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Touch Writer Duo)
- Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
  - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
  - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

## 2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

## 3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

**Safety.** Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

**Accuracy.** Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

**Efficiency.** Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

## 4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

### Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

### Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

### Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

### Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

### Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

### Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

#### Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

#### Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

#### Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

#### System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

#### **5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;**

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

#### **6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;**

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

#### **7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;**

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

**8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;**

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

**9. Permits write-in voting;**

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the “Write-In” option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

**10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;**

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to “Include in Straight Party”. If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

**11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and**

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

**12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and**

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

**13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and**

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

**14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and**

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

**15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and**

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

**16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and**

**Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)**

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

**Printing of Audit Logs**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

**17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

**18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and**

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

**19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and**

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

**20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.**

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.



## Verity Voting 1.0 Certification Application

### Form 101 Responses

#### Explain How the Voting System:

**1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;**

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Build (the election definition software application that is also used to print ballots) includes a user-customizable option that allows election administrators to decide whether to include anonymous unique identifiers on ballots, or not
- If users want to completely leave off unique identifiers of any kind on printed ballots, they can – in this way, no ballot has a unique or sequential number of any kind, human-readable or not
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of duplicate ballots, the unique identifiers are randomized, in a non-sequential way
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of unique ballots, users can turn off human-readability of any numbers
- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (BMD, Touch Writer):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only
- Verity Touch Writer includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch Writer employs distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not

- Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
- Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

## 2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

## 3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

**Safety.** Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Global Solutions, Verity Voting passed this testing. In addition, a variety of environmental and safety hardware test reports from accredited third-party examiners are included in our EAC Technical Data Package (TDP), which has been included with this application.

**Accuracy.** Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Global Solutions as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

**Efficiency.** Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch Writer and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to

minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

#### **4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;**

##### Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

##### Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

##### Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

##### Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

##### Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

#### Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

#### Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

#### Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

#### Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network. Verity components that can use LAN networks include Build, Central, and Count.

#### Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

#### System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

#### **5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;**

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Build application.

#### **6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;**

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

**7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;**

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch Writer and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch Writer to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

**8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;**

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

**9. Permits write-in voting;**

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch Writer, that voter will select the "Write-In" option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

**10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;**

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to "Include in Straight Party". If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight

Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

**11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and**

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for Touch Writer and Scan are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

**12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and**

Verity Touch Writer, the Ballot Marking Device, provides a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

**13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and**

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is printed on a line printer.

**14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and**

Verity Touch Writer allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

**15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and**

Not applicable.

**16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and**

Not applicable.

**17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)**

Not applicable.

**18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and**

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 29, 32, 48, and 52).

**19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and**

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

**20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.**

TS3 Technology, the manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001 certified.



## Verity Voting 2.0 Certification Application

### Form 101 Responses

#### Explain How the Voting System:

**1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;**

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Build (the election definition software application that is also used to print ballots) includes a user-customizable option that allows election administrators to decide whether to include anonymous unique identifiers on ballots, or not
- If users want to completely leave off unique identifiers of any kind on printed ballots, they can – in this way, no ballot has a unique or sequential number of any kind, human-readable or not
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of duplicate ballots, the unique identifiers are randomized, in a non-sequential way
- If users want to use unique identifiers in order to disallow scanning of unique ballots, users can turn off human-readability of any numbers
- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not

- Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
- Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

## 2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

## 3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;

**Safety.** Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing. In addition, a variety of environmental and safety hardware test reports from accredited third-party examiners are included in our EAC Technical Data Package (TDP), which has been included with this application.

**Accuracy.** Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

**Efficiency.** Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they

can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

#### **4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;**

##### Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

##### Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

##### Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

##### Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

##### Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network. Verity components that can use LAN networks include Data, Build, Central, and Count.

Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

**5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;**

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

**6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;**  
Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

**7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;**

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch Writer to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

**8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;**

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

**9. Permits write-in voting;**

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer, that voter will select the "Write-In" option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

**10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;**

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to "Include in Straight Party". If this

option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

**11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and**

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

**12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and**

Verity Touch Writer, the Ballot Marking Device, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

**13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and**

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is printed on a line printer.

**14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and**

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

**15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and**

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects “Provisional” for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the pollworker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

**16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and**

**Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)**

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

**Printing of Audit Logs**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

**17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

**18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and**

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

**19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and**

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

**20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.**

TS3 Technology, the manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001 certified.



## Verity Voting 2.3 Certification Application

### Form 101 Responses

#### Explain How the Voting System:

**1. Preserves the secrecy of the ballot;**

Verity does not associate any cast vote records or ballots with the voters who cast those ballots.

For all system components:

- No Verity component stores any uniquely identifying voter information (e.g. registration identifiers, voter names, residences, etc.)
- Cast Vote Records never include unique identifying information that can be associated with a specific ballot
- Cast Vote Records are stored without recording the Date/Time the file was created, so that voter order cannot be reconstructed

For printed ballots:

- Verity Scan is compatible with the use of privacy sleeves
- Verity Scan includes fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine

For Electronic Ballots (Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo):

- Access Codes are based on precinct identifiers only (Specific to Verity Touch, Touch with Access, and Touch Writer Duo)
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, and Touch Writer Duo include fabric privacy screens to protect ballot secrecy while a voter is using the machine
- Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo employ distinctive color coding for interface screens, so polling place officials who need to provide assistance can always tell at a glance whether a voter screen includes private ballot selections, or not
  - Screens with voter selection marks are light gray
  - Screens that include information only, with no voter selection marks, are blue

In Tabulation/Reporting:

To assist in managing the reporting of precinct results that contain small numbers of ballots, in Verity Count software, users may consolidate those votes with other results and report

them in user-defined ways, so as to protect the secrecy of votes when small numbers of ballots are involved.

**2. Is suitable for the purpose for which it is intended;**

The Verity Voting system includes software, hardware, device, and peripheral components that allow election professionals to accomplish the following high-level tasks:

Pre-voting tasks:

- Ballot definition and production
- Voting machine configuration and use

Voting tasks:

- Ballot marking device
- DRE voting device
- Digital scanning for paper ballots
- High-speed, large volume ballot scanning

Post-voting tasks:

- Ballot adjudication
- Counting of votes
- Consolidation and reporting of results and audit logs

**3. Operates safely, efficiently, and accurately;**

**Safety.** Verity Voting components were subjected to stringent safety testing as part of the EAC certification test campaign. As indicated by the test report issued by SLI Compliance, Verity Voting passed this testing.

**Accuracy.** Verity Voting was subjected to accuracy testing at SLI Compliance as part of the EAC certification test campaign. The test report issued by SLI states, “All Accuracy tests were completed without issue, and each device and application was considered to pass.”

**Efficiency.** Efficiency is a core design principle of the Verity Voting system. For example, the Verity Touch, Touch with Access, Touch Writer, Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan devices are designed so that they can be converted from one type of device to another. The ballot box that is used with Verity Scan is collapsible, to minimize storage and delivery requirements. The device interfaces share the same basic design, to make learning easier and the voting process more efficient, for election staff, poll workers, and voters.

**4. Is safe from fraudulent or unauthorized manipulation;**

Cross Functional Security Principles:

Security for the Verity Voting system includes various levels and types of security that have cross-functional purposes. Actions and security features for one level may aid and support

others, such as providing network security having set access restrictions and application security with user account and role validation.

Physical Security:

All devices, hardware, and ballot boxes are required to have a level of physical security to ensure the components have not been tampered with and are stored correctly. This security includes placing tamper-resistant seals, locks, and safe locations with secured access. All labels and seals follow guidelines on internal and external seams, ports, and doors.

Authentication:

The Verity Voting system provides authentication to ensure software and device components are protected and monitored for usage. Authentication provides security through user access control through unique accounts, associated permission roles, and features assigned specific roles for usage. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Authorization:

Authorization determines if a user is allowed to access features and data, what level they can make modifications, and managing attempted commands with success or failure. Once a user is authenticated, the assigned role to their account enables specific access to features within the system. An account can have multiple roles associated, including modifying data and performing complex actions such as account management, election data updates, and ballot management. All user account permissions and role association is managed through the Verity User Management application.

Audit Logs:

Audit logging is stored per application on every computer and device used within the Verity Voting system. Two logs for application and system level are created, written to, and maintained for production builds, installations, and environments by all applications. These logs provide detailed information into errors that occur, actions attempted and completed by users, and events automated by the software.

Verity Key Management:

Verity Key provides a level of security for accessing, using, and managing applications, data, and devices within the Verity Voting system. A user cannot access software, hardware, or devices without a Verity Key associated with the specific election and an authenticated user account. Verity Key supports NIST compliant key management, encryption and hashing (FIPS 140-2, level 1).

#### Voting Integrity:

The Verity Voting system includes various options for ensuring cast vote integrity without bias of contest choices through randomized election data displays in ballots, physical and data protection of entered voter ballots, encryption of data, and air gaps without access by networks.

#### Data Protection:

All data is protected within the Verity system through access and security protocols, managed through authentication and authorization procedures. Hardware and device security settings further protect data including election data/definitions, election settings, report results, and CVRs.

#### Telecommunications Security:

Telecommunication security protects all access traffic, transfer of data, and usage of other LANs for Verity components on a network.

#### Application Security:

Applications on all Verity Voting system components include a set of security measures that restrict access, monitor action attempts, and authorization.

#### System Validation:

System validation ensures the Verity Voting system is operating as intended for various aspects of functionality. Validation can be completed by voting officials within jurisdictions. The entire Verity Voting system engages in validation tests and results during application installation, component setup, dataset import/export/loading, and election data import/loading. Error handling messages respond along with audit log entries to aid in reviewing attempts, successes, and failures.

#### **5. Permits voting on all offices and measures to be voted on at an election;**

Offices and measures are included in the ballot definition process. Once configured and assigned to the appropriate precincts/precinct-splits, they will be available on the corresponding ballots for those precincts. This can be verified during the proofing process using multiple reports available in the Verity Data and Build applications.

#### **6. Prevents counting votes on offices and measures on which the voter is not entitled to vote;**

Office and measures that are not assigned to a given precinct/precinct-split are not shown on ballots for that precinct/precinct-split.

#### **7. Prevents counting votes by the same voter for more than one candidate for the same office, and prevents counting votes for more than the number of candidates for which the voter is entitled to vote;**

The number of valid selectable options for a contest is configured within the contest definition, and that information is passed to Verity Touch/Touch with Access, Verity Touch Writer, Verity Touch Writer Duo, and Verity Scan. When using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Touch

Writer/Touch Writer Duo to mark the ballot, a voter is not allowed to select more than the valid number of options for a given contest. Verity Scan can also be configured to reject overvotes, so that a hand marked paper ballot containing overvotes will require either a poll worker or voter override to accept the ballot.

Any contest on a ballot that is marked with more selections than the valid number of selections is counted as an over vote, and neither selection is otherwise counted.

**8. Prevents counting a vote on the same office or measure more than once;**

The electronic record of the vote contained on the election media contains only a single instance of the office or measure. When the tabulation is performed, operations are performed on record-by-record basis. As a record is decoded and added to the totals, the record is marked as having been recorded preventing it from being read more than once.

**9. Permits write-in voting;**

The number of write-in candidates allowed is an option within the contest definition. The user selects the number of write-in lines that should appear on the ballot using this option. If a voter wishes to vote for a write-in candidate using the Verity Touch/Touch with Access or Verity Touch Writer/Touch Writer Duo, that voter will select the “Write-In” option in the candidate list for that contest. The voter is then taken to a Write-In entry screen to spell out the name of the write-in candidate. Using preprinted paper ballots, the user marks the square opposite the Write-In line and writes in the name of the candidate on the line.

Verity Scan saves the write-in images to the vDrive, and they are then assigned using the Verity Count tabulation application. If a jurisdiction is using Verity Central to centrally scan ballots, write-in adjudication can be performed within the Verity Central application prior to writing Cast Vote Records to the vDrive. Alternately, the user may choose to defer write-in adjudication to the Verity Count application.

**10. Is capable of permitting straight-party voting;**

The user can define a straight-party contest in the election definition. When contests are entered in the election definition, the user has the option to “Include in Straight Party”. If this option is selected, Straight Party logic will apply to that contest. If a voter selects a Straight Party option on the ballot, and there are candidates for the contest associated with that party option, then the appropriate candidate will be selected.

**11. Is capable of providing records from which the operation of the voting system may be audited; and**

Verity provides many options by which the voting system may be audited. If selected in the election configuration, the Verity Scan ballot images can be saved to the vDrive election media and accessed independently of the voting system. Additionally, the device audit logs for all Verity devices are saved to the vDrive and read into and reported from the Count tabulation and

reporting application. The Count tabulation software also provides highly filterable exports of Cast Vote Records for auditing purposes.

In addition to the device audit reporting functionality, Verity applications also include audit logs that are accessible through simple user reports.

**12. Is capable of producing a summary screen to allow voters to examine their choices before the ballot is finally cast; and**

Verity Touch Writer and Verity Touch Writer Duo, the Ballot Marking Devices, and Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, provide a summary screen that allows voters to examine their choices before printing the ballot.

**13. Is capable of producing a real-time audit log (Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 81.62); and**

Verity Count, the tabulation application, is capable of producing a real-time audit log that is accessible through the Count application interface and can be physically printed or exported as a PDF file.

**14. Is capable of producing a blank ballot; and**

Verity Touch and Touch with Access, the DRE voting devices, allow a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to casting the blank ballot, the device will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to cast the blank ballot.

Verity Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo allows a voter to produce a blank ballot. Prior to printing the blank ballot, the Touch Writer and Touch Writer Duo will present the voter with a warning. From that message, the voter can proceed to print the blank ballot.

Verity Scan can accept blank ballots. The jurisdiction may choose whether to accept blank ballots by default or to require either additional approval by either the voter or the poll worker before accepting a blank ballot.

**15. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for provisional voting or reference where this is in your documentation. (TAC 81.176); and**

On the Verity Controller, the polling place management device, the poll worker selects "Provisional" for the voter. A Provisional Access Code is printed from the Controller. The Provisional Access Code includes the following items:

- **Access Code with Provisional Ballot Code** that is torn off and given to the voter. The voter uses the Access Code to initiate the voting session on the Verity Touch or Touch with Access voting device. The Provisional Ballot Code can be used after the election to determine whether the ballot was counted.
- **Provisional Stub** that contains the Provisional Ballot Code and lines for the Printed Name and Signature of the Voter. The Provisional Ballot Code will be sealed into the Provisional Ballot Envelope per local procedures.

Once the poll worker prints the Provisional Access Code and the voter completes standard Provisional Ballot procedures, the voter will vote normally using the Access Code.

By default, Provisional ballots are not included in tabulation reports until they are included by the election official in the Verity Count software application.

**16. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE) only) List procedure for a recount (printing of electronic ballot images and audit logs); and**

**Printing of Electronic Ballot Images (Cast Vote Records)**

Within the Auditing Dashboard in Verity Count, the user selects the desired filters (filter types include Location, Voting Equipment Used, Ballot Type, and Ballot Content). Once the appropriate filters have been selected, the user prints the Cast Vote Record report.

**Printing of Audit Logs**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. In order to access the device audit logs, the user prints the standard Device Logs report from the Count interface. The Device Logs report can be filtered by polling place, by device, and by date/time range.

**17. (Electronic Ballot Image Systems (EX: DRE)only) List procedure to backup electronic files created from the election (EX: electronic ballot images and audit logs, etc.)**

All device audit logs are saved to the vDrive and transferred to Verity Count when that vDrive is read. To back up the Verity Count election, the user archives the election in Verity Election Manager to an external drive.

**18. Procedures on how to properly shutdown equipment during early voting or reference where this is in your documentation; and**

This information is located in the Verity Polling Place Operations Technical Reference Manual (pages 33, 36, 52, 56, 74, and 77).

**19. (Precinct Optical Scanners only) Can two locks be placed on the ballot box to make it legal to use at an early voting site? If so, please list how a jurisdiction can have this done; and**

Yes, the Verity Scan ballot box is designed so that a second lock can be placed on the ballot box, to make it legal to use at an early voting site. Hart will configure ballot boxes with the appropriate number of locks based on a customer's implementation order, and deliver the boxes pre-configured, so that no additional customer action is required.

**20. Are your manufacturers ISO 9000 compliant? If not, explain quality control.**

Virtex Enterprises, the contract manufacturer of Verity Voting Devices, is ISO 9001:2008 standards certified.

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 16, 2024 11:02 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

thank you

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State ("Office"). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000117

- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the “Request”).

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000119

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2 Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 7, 2024 1:59 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Thank you!

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, March 7, 2024 7:56 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

We sent the information to you on February 29<sup>th</sup>.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Sent:** Thursday, February 29, 2024 11:27 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"). Please see the attached documents responsive to your request for information under the PIA.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Friday, February 16, 2024 10:45 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 24-0233

Good morning,

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000122

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”). This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on February 14, 2024, and is considered received on February 15, 2024 (the “Request”).

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. Our Office will be closed on Monday, February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on or before the 10th business day, March 1, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:48 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Hart InterCivic Form 101's - Open Records Request

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide Hart InterCivic's Form 101 responses related to certification of the following ES&S EVS systems certified from 2015 - 2024.

- Verity Voting 2.7
- Verity Voting 2.5
- Verity Voting 2.4
- Verity Voting 2.3
- Verity Voting 2.0
- Verity Voting 1.0

Thank you for your help. Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:24 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins  
**Subject:** RE: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair - SOS PIR 23-1219  
**Attachments:** 12-28-23 Request for Clarification - Pressley PIR 23-1219.pdf

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>; Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**AMERICAN OVERSIGHT**  
The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000125

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000126

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for you help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

# The State of Texas

Executive Division  
Capitol Building, 1E.8  
P.O. Box 12697  
Austin, Texas 78711-2697



Jane Nelson  
Secretary of State

Phone: 512-463-5770  
Fax: 512-475-2761  
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services  
www.sos.texas.gov

December 28, 2023

Laura Pressley

***Sent via Electronic Mail to:*** [REDACTED]

Re: Request for records, considered received: December 11, 2023 (SOS PIR No. 23-1219)

Dear Dr. Pressley:

This letter responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on Sunday, December 10, 2023 and is considered received on Monday, December 11, 2023 (the "Request").<sup>1</sup> In the Request, you state:

*For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:*

- *notes (written and electronic),*
- *list of attendees (written and electronic)*
- *emails,*
- *presentations (hard copies and electronic),*
- *reports (hard copies and electronic)*
- *proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)*

## **CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222**

In order to fulfill your inquiry, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State's office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

<sup>1</sup> The Office was closed on December 22 and December 25-26, 2023 in observance of Christmas. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the Request is considered received by the Office is today, December 28, 2023. TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000128

1. With respect to any e-mails or other written communications to which the Request extends, are you seeking (1) communications that the Secretary of State and staff sent to or received from *external* sources (*i.e.*, individuals and entities outside the Secretary of State's office) regarding the meeting(s) referenced in the Request; (2) *internal* communications exchanged solely among Secretary of State employees before or after the specified meeting(s); or (3) both?
2. As to any standalone documents, is the Request limited to materials that Secretary of State staff received from *external* sources in connection with the meeting(s) referenced in the Request, or does your inquiry also encompass *internal* Secretary of State documents prepared in advance of or after the meeting(s)?<sup>2</sup>

Depending on your clarification, we may have to provide you a statement of estimated costs pursuant to Section 552.2615 of the Texas Government Code. Likewise, providing the requested information may require programming and/or manipulation of data and would be available only at a cost that covers such programming or manipulation. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.231. In addition, some responsive information may be exempted from public disclosure under the PIA. However, we cannot make any of these determinations until we receive a clarified request from you.

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn. The Secretary of State is a strong supporter of open government, and this Office is ready and willing to respond to any and all public information requests. However, we must require that requests provide sufficient detail regarding the records being sought so that we may fulfill our duties under the PIA.

If you have any questions or need additional information, or if you would like to submit a clarified request, please contact our office at (512) 463-5770 or at the e-mail address listed below.

Sincerely,



Adam Bitter  
General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov  
AB/jw

---

<sup>2</sup> If you are seeking internal Secretary of State communications/materials, please note that certain responsive information may be exempt from disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information protected by attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege and/or information that is otherwise confidential by law. *See, e.g.*, Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, 552.111. Thus, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold such information from disclosure.

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:28 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins  
**Subject:** RE: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2 Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins  
**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000132

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,

- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do  
not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, March 11, 2024 10:59 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

Good morning,

As a follow up to our February 23 email, we appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on April 1, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 23, 2024 2:05 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED] >  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

Good afternoon,

Thank you for confirming. Please see the attached zipped folder containing an initial production of documents responsive to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA").

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

We appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State



**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2024 10:48 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hello Jennifer.

To answer the clarifications noted below, the requests clearly states for production of "Form 200."  
Nothing in the request asks for Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides,etc.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 9:00 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning, Dr. Pressley,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request"). We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA.

CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222



TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000136

In order to fulfill the Request, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State's office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

1. As to the first portion of the Request—which references the “Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200”—are you only seeking copies of the completed Form 200 for each electronic pollbook specified in your email? Or does the Request also extend to the Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides submitted with the application (as identified on the Form 200's Materials Checklist)? If the latter, please specify the precise materials encompassed by this part of the Request.
1. If you are seeking any technical materials that each vendor submitted to the Office with the completed Form 200, certain responsive information may be exempt from public disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information that implicates the privacy or property interests of third parties. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.101, 552.110, 552.1101, 552.139. As such, if your Request encompasses this information, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold responsive information that we believe is confidential under the PIA. Will you agree to us excluding responsive information that would be subject to mandatory exceptions and/or discretionary exceptions under the PIA without the necessity of seeking a ruling from the Attorney General?

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000138

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

- A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the
- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
  - List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200  
Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85  
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex  
Votec  
Knowink  
ES&S

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, February 23, 2024 2:19 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Thank you.  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Friday, February 23, 2024 2:04 PM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good afternoon,

Thank you for confirming. Please see the attached zipped folder containing an initial production of documents responsive to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA").

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

We appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted

from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2024 10:48 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hello Jennifer.

To answer the clarifications noted below, the requests clearly states for production of "Form 200."

Nothing in the request asks for Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides, etc.

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000142

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 9:00 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning, Dr. Pressley,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request"). We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA.

**CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC.  
552.222**

In order to fulfill the Request, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State's office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

1. As to the first portion of the Request—which references the “Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200”—are you only seeking copies of the completed Form 200 for each electronic pollbook specified in your email? Or does the Request also extend to the Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides submitted with the application (as identified on the Form 200’s Materials Checklist)? If the latter, please specify the precise materials encompassed by this part of the Request.
  
1. If you are seeking any technical materials that each vendor submitted to the Office with the completed Form 200, certain responsive information may be exempt from public disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information that implicates the privacy or property interests of third parties. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.101, 552.110, 552.1101, 552.139. As such, if your Request encompasses this information, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold responsive information that we believe is confidential under the PIA. Will you agree to us excluding responsive information that would be subject to mandatory exceptions and/or discretionary exceptions under the PIA without the necessity of seeking a ruling from the Attorney General?

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200  
Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
VoteC VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85  
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex  
VoteC  
Knowink  
ES&S

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

pp

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	Election Systems & Software
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1
Street Address, City, State, Zip	11208 John Galt Blvd, Omaha, NE 68137
Contact Name & Title	TJ Burns – State Certification Manager
Phone Number	(402) 970 - 1129
Fax Number	(402) 970 - 1276
E-Mail Address	██████████

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Microsoft Surface Go	Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC	None
2	DYMO LabelWriter 450 Turbo Thermal Printer	1750283	None
3	TP Link Router	TL-WR902AC	None
4	ExpressPoll Terminal Stand	100-10007-00	None
5	ExpressVote Thermal Printer	4200	None
6	Verizon Mi-Fi Device	MIF18800L	None
7	ExpressPoll Application	7.1.3.0	None
9	Epson Printer	TM-m30-012	None

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

### Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")

X	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
N/A	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the

	requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	1/21/2020

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	State Certification Manager	1/21/2020

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	Election Systems & Software
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	ExpressPoll 7.2.5.0
Street Address, City, State, Zip	11208 John Galt Blvd, Omaha, NE 68137
Contact Name & Title	TJ Burns – Sr. State Certification Manager
Phone Number	(402) 970 - 1129
Fax Number	(402) 970 - 1276
E-Mail Address	██████████

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Microsoft Surface Go 1	Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC	6/1/2022
2	Microsoft Surface Go 2	Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC	6/1/2022
3	DYMO LabelWriter 450 Turbo Thermal Printer	1750283	6/1/2022
4	TP Link Router <i>This device is provided only as a suggested peripheral for Wireless LAN connectivity.</i>	TL-WR902AC	6/1/2022
5	ExpressPoll Flip Stand	M01600	6/1/2022
6	ExpressPoll Terminal Stand	100-10007-00	6/1/2022
7	ExpressVote Thermal Printer	4200	6/1/2022
8	Verizon Mi-Fi Device <i>This device is provided only as a suggested peripheral for Wireless WAN connectivity. For jurisdictions using external connectivity to communicate with Host Server, Mi-Fi devices must be capable of broadcasting 5Ghz only.</i>	MIF18800L	6/1/2022
9	ExpressPoll Application	7.2.5.0	6/1/2022

10	Epson Printer	TM-m30-012	6/1/2022
----	---------------	------------	----------

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
X	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	8/26/2022

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	Sr. State Certification Manager	August 16, 2022

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

Wednesday, November 29, 2023

Chuck Pinney  
Senior Staff Attorney – Elections Division  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
1019 Brazos Street | Rudder Building, 2nd Floor  
Austin, Texas 78701

**RE: Election Systems & Software ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0 Application Additional Information**

Mr. Pinney,

The information below is additional information requested by the State as part of the Application Process detailed in the *Texas Certification Procedures for Electronic Pollbooks*.

- A completed Application for Certification

**ES&S Response:** The Application for Texas certification of Electronic Pollbook – Form 200 has been completed and submitted as part of the application process.

- A Technical Data Package which includes the following documentation:
  - User Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals
  - Training Materials and Instruction Guides
  - Recommended Use Procedures
  - Software License Agreement
  - Software System Design
  - Warranty Information
  - Recommended Security Practices

**ES&S Response:** The ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0 Technical Data Package which includes all the documentation listed above has been submitted to Pro V&V for their review and is included in the application that has been submitted to the State.

- A list of certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions

**ES&S Response:** ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0 is pending certification in OH and will be taken to all other states that require certification.

- A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the electronic pollbook system and a description of the resolution for each anomaly

**ES&S Response:** Currently there are no known anomalies to report for ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0. When anomalies are discovered, ES&S will troubleshoot to determine the root cause and resolution and provide this information to the jurisdiction and State. If further action is required, please let ES&S know and we will make sure to comply with any additional requirements.

- A list of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables

**ES&S Response:** Printer paper rolls are the only true consumable of the ExpressPoll system. All components of the ExpressPoll system are Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) items and can be purchased through any distributor. ES&S can also supply any consumable required at [shop.essvote.com](http://shop.essvote.com)

- A list of compatible peripheral devices used with the electronic pollbook system

**ES&S Response:** A list of compatible peripheral devices is listed in the ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0 Administrator's Guide, Appendix C: Supported Integrated and Peripheral Devices.

- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interests in the electronic pollbook system

**ES&S Response:** Election Systems & Software, LLC is not owned by any foreign individuals and/or entities. All ownership in Election Systems & Software, LLC are United States of America individuals and/or entities.

- A description of additional compatible languages (if any)

**ES&S Response:** ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0 support English, Spanish, Chinese, Vietnamese, and any other language supported by Microsoft.

- A description of accessibility features (if any)

**ES&S Response:** There are no accessibility features at this time.

- Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**ES&S Response:** Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters is detailed in Chapter 2 of the ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0 User Guide.

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	Election Systems & Software
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	ExpressPoll 7.2.6.0
Street Address, City, State, Zip	11208 John Galt Blvd, Omaha, NE 68137
Contact Name & Title	TJ Burns – Sr. State Certification Manager
Phone Number	(402) 970 - 1129
Fax Number	(402) 970 - 1276
E-Mail Address	██████████

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Microsoft Surface Go 1 & 2	Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC	4/20/2023
2	Microsoft Surface Go 3	Windows 10 Enterprise 2019 LTSC	None
3	DYMO LabelWriter 450 Turbo Thermal Printer	1750283	4/20/2023
4	TP Link Router <i>This device is provided only as a suggested peripheral for Wireless LAN connectivity.</i>	TL-WR902AC	4/20/2023
5	ExpressPoll Flip Stand	M01600	4/20/2023
6	ExpressPoll Terminal Stand	100-10007-00	4/20/2023
7	ExpressVote Thermal Printer	4200	4/20/2023
8	Verizon Mi-Fi Device <i>This device is provided only as a suggested peripheral for Wireless WAN connectivity. For jurisdictions using external connectivity to communicate with Host Server, Mi-Fi devices must be capable of broadcasting 5Ghz only.</i>	MIF18800L	4/20/2023
9	ExpressPoll Application	7.2.6.0	4/20/2023

10	Brother BOD9310 Compact Color Printer	HL-L9310CDW	4/20/2023
11	Brother BOD6400 Compact Printer	HL-L6400DW	4/20/2023

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
X	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	11/29/2023

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	Sr. State Certification Manager	11/29/2023

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060



**STATEMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOK OR VOTING SYSTEM VENDOR  
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF VENDOR**

**(IEC-23)**

State Form 56709 (5-19)  
Indiana Election Division (IC 3-11-17-8)

**NOTE:** This statement must be filed with the Indiana Election Division, and set forth the name of any foreign national who directly or indirectly owns or controls an electronic poll book vendor or voting system vendor with a poll book or voting system certified to be used in Indiana elections. The statement must indicate the nature and extent of the ownership or control of the foreign national in the vendor. If more than one foreign national directly or indirectly owns or controls the vendor, file a separate statement regarding each foreign national. An amended statement must be filed with the Election Division not later than noon thirty (30) days after a change in the identity of the foreign national (or in the nature of the ownership or control of a foreign national) occurs.

**VENDOR INFORMATION**

Name of Vendor <i>KNOWENK LLC</i>	Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Address of Vendor (Number, Street or Rural Route) <i>2111 OLIVE ST</i>	E-mail Address [REDACTED]
City, State, ZIP Code <i>ST. LOUIS MO. 63103</i>	Fax number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Name of contact person for the vendor <i>KEVIN J. SCHOTT CFO</i>	Contact Person's Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723 EXT. 126</i>
Type of vendor product certified for use in Indiana elections. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic Poll Book <input type="checkbox"/> Voting System <input type="checkbox"/> Both of above	Does any foreign national directly or indirectly own or control the vendor? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No If "No", proceed to Oath or Affirmation below.
Name of Foreign National: _____	
Type of Foreign National (Individual, Corporation, Limited Liability Company, for example): _____	
Contact Information for Foreign National (Provide name of individual contact; mailing address; electronic mail address.): _____ _____ _____	
Describe nature of ownership or control by foreign national (If ownership, identify percentage of ownership; if control, provide detailed description of nature of control.): _____ _____ _____	

**OATH OR AFFIRMATION**

I swear or affirm under the penalty for perjury I am personally authorized by the vendor to make the statements above and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, all the information contained in this statement is true.

Signature <i>[Signature]</i>	Title <i>CFO</i>	Date (month, day, year) <i>12/2/19</i>
---------------------------------	---------------------	---



# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	<b>KNOWiNK, LLC</b>
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	<b>Poll Pad 2.4.9</b>
Street Address, City, State, Zip	<b>2111 Olive Street, St. Louis, MO 63103</b>
Contact Name & Title	<b>Timothy Vlach, Director of Client Success</b>
Phone Number	<b>402.319.4687</b>
Fax Number	<b>NA</b>
E-Mail Address	<b>[REDACTED]</b>

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Apple iPad	Air	None
2	Apple iPad	Air 2	None
3	Apple iPad	4 <sup>th</sup> Gen	None
4	Apple iPad	5 <sup>th</sup> Gen	None
5	Apple iPad	6 <sup>th</sup> Gen	None
6	Apple iPad	7 <sup>th</sup> Gen	None
7	Star Printer Thermal Printer	TSP650ii	None
8	Star Micronics Label Printer	TSP700II	None
9	KNOWiNK Poll Pair Cord	PPCCv1	None
10	FEITAN Encoder/iOS Reader	iR301	None
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
NA	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
NA	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	12/13/2019

**Additional Comments:**

The Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters item above is currently being created by our vendor and we will send our as soon as we have the workflow chart finished from our vendor.

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
<i>Timothy W. Vlach</i>	Director of Client Success	12/02/2019

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060



**STATEMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOK OR VOTING SYSTEM VENDOR  
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF VENDOR**

**(IEC-23)**

State Form 56709 (5-19)  
Indiana Election Division (IC 3-11-17-8)

**NOTE:** This statement must be filed with the Indiana Election Division, and set forth the name of any foreign national who directly or indirectly owns or controls an electronic poll book vendor or voting system vendor with a poll book or voting system certified to be used in Indiana elections. The statement must indicate the nature and extent of the ownership or control of the foreign national in the vendor. If more than one foreign national directly or indirectly owns or controls the vendor, file a separate statement regarding each foreign national. An amended statement must be filed with the Election Division not later than noon thirty (30) days after a change in the identity of the foreign national (or in the nature of the ownership or control of a foreign national) occurs.

**VENDOR INFORMATION**

Name of Vendor <i>KNOWENK LLC</i>	Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Address of Vendor (Number, Street or Rural Route) <i>2111 OLIVE ST</i>	E-mail Address [REDACTED]
City, State, ZIP Code <i>ST. LOUIS MO. 63103</i>	Fax number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Name of contact person for the vendor <i>KEVIN J. SCHOTT CFO</i>	Contact Person's Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723 EXT. 126</i>
Type of vendor product certified for use in Indiana elections. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic Poll Book <input type="checkbox"/> Voting System <input type="checkbox"/> Both of above	Does any foreign national directly or indirectly own or control the vendor? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No If "No", proceed to Oath or Affirmation below.
Name of Foreign National: _____	
Type of Foreign National (Individual, Corporation, Limited Liability Company, for example): _____	
Contact Information for Foreign National (Provide name of individual contact; mailing address; electronic mail address.): _____ _____ _____	
Describe nature of ownership or control by foreign national (If ownership, identify percentage of ownership; if control, provide detailed description of nature of control.): _____ _____ _____	

**OATH OR AFFIRMATION**

I swear or affirm under the penalty for perjury I am personally authorized by the vendor to make the statements above and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, all the information contained in this statement is true.

Signature <i>[Signature]</i>	Title <i>CFO</i>	Date (month, day, year) <i>12/2/19</i>
---------------------------------	---------------------	---



# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	KNOW iNK, LLC
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	Pollpad v2.5.2
Street Address, City, State, Zip	2111 Olive St, St. Louis, MO 63103
Contact Name & Title	Mitch Milleville, Certification Mgr
Phone Number	618-972-6338
Fax Number	
E-Mail Address	

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Apple iPad	Air 2	1/24/20
2	Apple iPad	4th Gen	1/24/20
3	Apple iPad	5th Gen	1/24/20
4	Apple iPad	6th Gen	1/24/20
5	Apple iPad	6th Gen Cellular	1/24/20
6	Apple iPad	7th Gen	1/24/20
7	Star Printer Thermal Printer	TSP650ii	1/24/20
8	KNOWiNK Poll Pair Cord	PPCCv1	1/24/20
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"


**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
NA	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
X	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
PRO V&V	12/30/20

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	Certification Mgr	12/30/20

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	KNOW iNK, LLC
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	Pollpad v2.5.2 (15) & v3.0.0
Street Address, City, State, Zip	2111 Olive St, St. Louis, MO 63103
Contact Name & Title	Mitch Milleville, Certification Mgr
Phone Number	618-972-6338
Fax Number	
E-Mail Address	

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Apple iPad	Air 2	1/24/20
2	Apple iPad	4th Gen	1/24/20
3	Apple iPad	5th Gen	1/24/20
4	Apple iPad	6th Gen	1/24/20
5	Apple iPad	6th Gen Cellular	1/24/20
6	Apple iPad	7th Gen	1/24/20
7	Apple iPad	8th Gen	
8	Apple iPad	9th Gen	
9	Star Printer Thermal Printer		1/24/20
10	KNOWiNK Poll Pair Cord		1/24/20
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
NA	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
X	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
PRO V&V	1/4/22

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	Certification Mgr	1/4/22

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060



**STATEMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOK OR VOTING SYSTEM VENDOR  
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF VENDOR**

**(IEC-23)**

State Form 56709 (5-19)  
Indiana Election Division (IC 3-11-17-8)

**NOTE:** This statement must be filed with the Indiana Election Division, and set forth the name of any foreign national who directly or indirectly owns or controls an electronic poll book vendor or voting system vendor with a poll book or voting system certified to be used in Indiana elections. The statement must indicate the nature and extent of the ownership or control of the foreign national in the vendor. If more than one foreign national directly or indirectly owns or controls the vendor, file a separate statement regarding each foreign national. An amended statement must be filed with the Election Division not later than noon thirty (30) days after a change in the identity of the foreign national (or in the nature of the ownership or control of a foreign national) occurs.

**VENDOR INFORMATION**

Name of Vendor <i>KNOWENK LLC</i>	Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Address of Vendor (Number, Street or Rural Route) <i>2111 OLIVE ST</i>	E-mail Address [REDACTED]
City, State, ZIP Code <i>ST. LOUIS MO. 63103</i>	Fax Number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Name of contact person for the vendor <i>KEVIN J. SCHOTT CFO</i>	Contact Person's Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723 EXT. 126</i>
Type of vendor product certified for use in Indiana elections. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic Poll Book <input type="checkbox"/> Voting System <input type="checkbox"/> Both of above	Does any foreign national directly or indirectly own or control the vendor? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No If "No", proceed to Oath or Affirmation below.
Name of Foreign National: _____	
Type of Foreign National (Individual, Corporation, Limited Liability Company, for example): _____	
Contact Information for Foreign National (Provide name of individual contact; mailing address; electronic mail address.): _____ _____ _____	
Describe nature of ownership or control by foreign national (If ownership, identify percentage of ownership; if control, provide detailed description of nature of control.): _____ _____ _____	

**OATH OR AFFIRMATION**

I swear or affirm under the penalty for perjury I am personally authorized by the vendor to make the statements above and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, all the information contained in this statement is true.

Signature <i>[Handwritten Signature]</i>	Title <i>CFO</i>	Date (month, day, year) <i>12/2/19</i>
---	---------------------	---



# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	KNOW iNK, LLC
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	Pollpad v3.3 & v3.4
Street Address, City, State, Zip	2111 Olive St, St. Louis, MO 63103
Contact Name & Title	Mitch Milleville, Certification Mgr
Phone Number	618-972-6338
Fax Number	
E-Mail Address	[REDACTED]

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Apple iPad	Air 2	Jan 2022
2	Apple iPad	4th Gen	Jan 2022
3	Apple iPad	5th Gen	Jan 2022
4	Apple iPad	6th Gen	Jan 2022
5	Apple iPad	7th Gen	Jan 2022
6	Apple iPad	8th Gen	Jan 2022
7	Apple iPad	9th Gen	Jan 2022
8	Apple iPad	10th Gen	
9	Star Printer Thermal Printer		Jan 2022
10	KNOWiNK Poll Pair Cord		Jan 2022
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
X	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
X	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
ProV&V	February 10, 2023

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	Certification Manager	01/30/23

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060



**STATEMENT OF ELECTRONIC POLL BOOK OR VOTING SYSTEM VENDOR  
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONAL OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF VENDOR**

**(IEC-23)**

State Form 56709 (5-19)  
Indiana Election Division (IC 3-11-17-8)

**NOTE:** This statement must be filed with the Indiana Election Division, and set forth the name of any foreign national who directly or indirectly owns or controls an electronic poll book vendor or voting system vendor with a poll book or voting system certified to be used in Indiana elections. The statement must indicate the nature and extent of the ownership or control of the foreign national in the vendor. If more than one foreign national directly or indirectly owns or controls the vendor, file a separate statement regarding each foreign national. An amended statement must be filed with the Election Division not later than noon thirty (30) days after a change in the identity of the foreign national (or in the nature of the ownership or control of a foreign national) occurs.

**VENDOR INFORMATION**

Name of Vendor <i>KNOWENK LLC</i>	Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Address of Vendor (Number, Street or Rural Route) <i>2111 OLIVE ST</i>	E-mail Address [REDACTED]
City, State, ZIP Code <i>ST. LOUIS MO. 63103</i>	Fax number <i>855-765-5723</i>
Name of contact person for the vendor <i>KEVIN J. SCHOTT CFO</i>	Contact Person's Telephone Number <i>855-765-5723 EXT. 126</i>
Type of vendor product certified for use in Indiana elections. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Electronic Poll Book <input type="checkbox"/> Voting System <input type="checkbox"/> Both of above	Does any foreign national directly or indirectly own or control the vendor? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No If "No", proceed to Oath or Affirmation below.
Name of Foreign National: _____	
Type of Foreign National (Individual, Corporation, Limited Liability Company, for example): _____	
Contact Information for Foreign National (Provide name of individual contact; mailing address; electronic mail address.): _____ _____ _____	
Describe nature of ownership or control by foreign national (If ownership, identify percentage of ownership; if control, provide detailed description of nature of control.): _____ _____ _____	

**OATH OR AFFIRMATION**

I swear or affirm under the penalty for perjury I am personally authorized by the vendor to make the statements above and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, all the information contained in this statement is true.

Signature <i>[Signature]</i>	Title <i>CFO</i>	Date (month, day, year) <i>12/2/19</i>
---------------------------------	---------------------	---



# Compatible Peripherals

Tenex Software Solutions, Inc.

5402 W. Laurel Drive  
Suite 206  
Tampa, FL 33607

Revised: November 2019

## Hardware Options

Item	Required/Optional
iPad	Required
Epson TM-m30 Bluetooth Printer	Optional
Epson TM-p80 Battery Powered Bluetooth Printer	Optional
Epson TM-L90 Label Printer	Optional
Flip & Share Case/Stand	Optional
Feitian Bluetooth Card Encoder	Optional
Feitian Wired Card Encoder	Optional
ID Scanner/Bar Code Reader	Included on iPad device
Keyboard	Included on iPad device
Stylus Pen	Optional
10-foot Charging Cable	Optional
Brother QL-820NW Printer	Optional
Print Server	Optional
OKI B432DN Printer	Optional
OKI B532DN Printer	Optional
Gemstar 2x2 Carrying Case	Optional
Gemstar 1x1 Carrying Case	Optional
ExpressLink Printer	Optional

# Foreign Ownership Statement

Tenex Software Solutions, Inc.

5402 W. Laurel Drive  
Suite 206  
Tampa, FL 33607

Revised: November 2019

There is no foreign ownership interest in Tenex Software Solutions, Inc. The company is wholly owned by Ravi Kallem and Alka Gupta of Tampa, Florida.

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	Tenex Software Solutions, Inc.
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	Precinct Central, release 4.2.2
Street Address, City, State, Zip	5021 W Laurel St, Tampa, FL 33607
Contact Name & Title	Rebecca Quinn, Project Manager
Phone Number	407-346-6241
Fax Number	N/A
E-Mail Address	[REDACTED]

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Precinct Central Touchpad	4.2.2	None
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

x	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
N/A	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
To be submitted by December 6	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
x	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
x	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
x	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
x	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
x	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
x	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
x	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
x	A description of accessibility features (if any)
x – All screenshots of the system are seen in the Training Guide	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	December 6, 2019

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	President	11/20/19

Please submit and all relevant materials to:  
 Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
Fax: 512-475-2811  
TTY: 7-1-1  
(800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	Tenex Software Solutions, Inc.
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	Precinct Central, Release # 4.5.2.4
Street Address, City, State, Zip	5021 W Laurel St, Tampa, FL 33607
Contact Name & Title	Fred Gonzales, Project Manager
Phone Number	214-789-2706
Fax Number	N/A
E-Mail Address	[REDACTED]

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	Precinct Central Touchpad	4.5.2.4	Mar 2021
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
X	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
NC	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
NC	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
NC	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
NC	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
NC	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
NC	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
NC	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
NC	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
NC	A description of accessibility features (if any)
NC	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	N/A

**Additional Comments:**

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
<i>Timothy Vlach</i>	Director of Client Services	2/8/2022

Please submit and all relevant materials to:  
 Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	<b>VOTEC Corporation</b>
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	<b>VoteSafe/ Texas Standard 1</b>
Street Address, City, State, Zip	<b>10920 Via Frontera Ste. 110 San Diego, CA. 92127</b>
Contact Name & Title	<b>Karen Richards – Director of Compliance Practices                  Dan Veres – Product Manager for VoteSafe                  Rubi Barrera – Executive Assistant</b>
Phone Number	<b>800-348-6832</b>
Fax Number	<b>858-674-6050</b>
E-Mail Address	[REDACTED]

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	VoteSafe	1.0.34	N/A
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			

10			
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
N/A	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
X	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
X	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters


**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	completed on 11/22/2019

**Additional Comments:**

Technical Matrix Test results from Pro V&V will accompany application submission. Screenshots are included in Training Manuals.

--

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	CEO	11/25/2019

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

*List of Compatible Peripheral Devices used with VoteSafe*

<b>Part Name</b>	<b>Model Number</b>	<b>Description</b>
Logitech WebCamera + Stand	C525	COTS Barcode Scanner
Secure-Tech IC-Card Terminal*	ST-U100CT	COTS Card Encoder
Barcode Scanner	MS9540 Honeywell	COTS Barcode Scanner
Barcode Camera	Apple IPAD	COTS Barcode Camera
Magtek Mini Stripe	21073062	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek (Magswipe)	MSR-90	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek (Magswipe)	21040108	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek (Magswipe)	1710 Apollo (BM2190);	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek (Magswipe)	PN-21073145	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek (Magswipe)	PN21040140	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek (Magswipe)	21040107	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek - Centurion SCRA 3 Track Black	21073145	COTS DL Swipe
Brother Label Printer	QL-700	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-800	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-570	COTS Label Printer
Citizen Printer	CL9521	Thermal Paper printer
Expansion Rosewill Hubs	RHB-220	COTS Hub
IOGEAR Hub	GUH285W6	COTS Hub
Magtek (Magswipe)	1710 Apollo (BM2190)	COTS DL Swipe



## Statement on Foreign Ownership Interest

There are no foreign ownership relations or interest in VOTEC Corporation.

*List of Compatible Peripheral Devices used with VoteSafe*

<b>Part Name</b>	<b>Model Number</b>	<b>Description</b>
Logitech WebCamera + Stand	C525	COTS Barcode Scanner
Secure-Tech IC-Card Terminal*	ST-U100CT	COTS Card Encoder
Barcode Scanner	Zebra DS4608-SR	COTS Barcode Scanner
Magtek Mini Stripe	21073062	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek - Centurion SCRA 3 Track Black	21073145	COTS DL Swipe
Brother Label Printer	QL-700	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-800	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-570	COTS Label Printer
Citizen Printer	CL9521	Thermal Paper printer
Expansion Rosewill Hubs	RHB-220	COTS Hub
IOGEAR Hub	GUH285W6	COTS Hub
Elo 10" Monitor	1002L	COTS Monitor

Elo Edge Connect 2D Barcode Scanner	4107	COTS Barcode reader
-------------------------------------	------	---------------------

Zebra Barcode Scanner	DS9308	COTS Barcode reader
-----------------------	--------	---------------------

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	VOTEC Corporation
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	VoteSafe
Street Address, City, State, Zip	10920 Via Frontera Ste. 110 San Diego, CA. 92127
Contact Name & Title	Karen Richards - President/Dir of Compliance Practices
Phone Number	800.348.6832
Fax Number	858.674.6050
E-Mail Address	[REDACTED]

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	VoteSafe	1.3.116	1/23/20, 5/31/22, 3/22/23
2	PollPower	1.3.113	
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

✓	Completed application Form 200
✓	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
✓	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
✓	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
✓	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
✓	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
✓	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
✓	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
✓	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
✓	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
✓	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
✓	A description of accessibility features (if any)
✓	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
Pro V&V	11/21/2023

**Additional Comments:**

Screenshots are included in Training Manuals.

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
<i>Alex Z. Richard</i>	<i>President / AVot Compliance</i>	<i>11/21/23</i>

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

*List of Compatible Peripheral Devices used with VoteSafe*

<b>Part Name</b>	<b>Model Number</b>	<b>Operating System</b>	<b>Description</b>
Logitech WebCamera + Stand	C525	N/A	COTS Barcode Scanner
Zebra Barcode Handgun Scanner	DS-4608	N/A	COTS Barcode Scanner
Zebra Barcode Tabletop Scanner	DS-9308	N/A	COTS Barcode Scanner
Magtek - Magswipe Centurion SCRA 3 Track Black	21073145	N/A	COTS DL Swipe
Brother Label Printer	QL-570	N/A	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-700	N/A	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-800	N/A	COTS Label Printer
Citizen Printer	CL9521	N/A	Thermal Paper printer
Expansion Rosewell Hubs	RHB-220	N/A	COTS Hub
IOGEAR Hub (Gray)	GUH285W6	N/A	COTS Hub
IOGEAR Hub (Silver)	GUH304P	N/A	COTS Hub
VoteSafe Laptop	HP Probook x360 11 G7 EE	Windows 10 LTSC 2019	ePB Laptop
VoteSafe Laptop	HP Probook x360 11 G5 EE	Windows 10 LTSC 2019	ePB Laptop
VoteSafe Laptop	HP Probook x360 11 G3 EE	Windows 10 LTSC 2019	ePB Laptop
VoteSafe Laptop	Acer Travelmate B-117 C37N	Windows LTSC 2016	ePB Laptop
VoteSafe Laptop	Acer Travelmate B-117 C8J5	Windows LTSC 2016	ePB Laptop

*List of Compatible Peripheral Devices used with VoteSafe*

VoteSafe Laptop	Acer Travelmate B-117 C169	Windows LTSC 2016	ePB Laptop
VoteSafe Voter Interface w/enclosure	Microcom Ployer MC1217V1	Windows 10 Home	ePB Tablet
VoteSafe Voter Interface w/enclosure	Microcom SH W210	Windows 10 Home	ePB Tablet
VoteSafe Voter Interface w/enclosure	Acer Switch 10E T77H482	Windows 10 Home	ePB Tablet

Phone: 512-463-5650  
 Fax: 512-475-2811  
 TTY: 7-1-1  
 (800) 252-VOTE (8683)

Elections Division  
 P.O. Box 12060  
 Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

# The State of Texas



## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	<b>VOTEC Corporation</b>
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	<b>VoteSafe</b>
Street Address, City, State, Zip	<b>10920 Via Frontera Ste. 110 San Diego, CA. 92127</b>
Contact Name & Title	<b>Karen Richards - President/Director of Compliance Practices        Craig Dunham - Product Manager for VoteSafe        Rubi Barrera - Executive Assistant</b>
Phone Number	<b>800-348-6832</b>
Fax Number	<b>858-674-6050</b>
E-Mail Address	

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	VoteSafe	1.3.73	5/31/22 and 1/23/20
2			
3	PollPower	1.3.102	
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			

9		
---	--	--

10		
11		
12		
13		
14		

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Completed application Form 200
<input type="checkbox"/>	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A description of accessibility features (if any)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based of the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected" delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name <i>Pro V o V</i>	Delivery Date <i>2/20/23</i>
--	------------------------------



ProV&V	Initially completed on 11/22/2019 – Not applicable for Recertification

**Additional Comments:**

Screenshots are included in Training Manuals.

Page 2 of 3 Revised

**Title**

*President/Dir. of Compliance Practices*

*Gregory Richard 2/21/2023*

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
Fax: 512-475-2811  
TTY: 7-1-1  
(800) 252-VOTE (8683)

## Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

Name of Company	VOTEC Corporation
E-Pollbook Name and Release #	VoteSafe/ Texas Standard 2
Street Address, City, State, Zip	10920 Via Frontera Ste. 110 San Diego, CA. 92127
Contact Name & Title	Karen Richards – President / Director of Compliance Practices Craig Dunham – Product Manager for VoteSafe Rubi Barrera – Executive Assistant
Phone Number	800-348-6832
Fax Number	858-674-6050
E-Mail Address	[REDACTED]

	Component Submitted for Certification	Version/ Firmware #	Previous Texas Certification Date*
1	VoteSafe	VSA 1.3.77 FS 1.3.67	N/A
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			

10			
11			
12			
13			
14			

\*For the most recent certification, or state "None"

**Materials Checklist (Indicate materials submitted with an "X")**

X	Completed application Form 200
N/A	If applicable, attach Form 200 - Schedule A, listing recommendations/issues made from previous Texas examination. List how they have been corrected or addressed. If they have not, explain why.
N/A	If component has been modified, include log detailing changes from the previously Texas certified version
N/A	Report from a NIST-certified testing laboratory demonstrating that the e-pollbook system meets the requirements of the Texas Technical Testing Matrix for e-pollbooks.
N/A	The Technical Data Package (TDP), which includes: Operating, Support, and Maintenance Manuals, Training Materials and Instruction Guides, Recommended Use Procedures, Software License Agreement, Software System Design, Warranty Information, and Recommended Security Practices
X	All certifications and denials of certification for the system in other jurisdictions
X	A list of any and all known anomalies experienced with the use of the e-pollbook system and a description of the resolution of each anomaly, attach Form 200-Schedule A
X	List of all consumables required for the continued operation of the system, and the supply chain for those consumables
X	List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system
X	A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system
X	A description of additional compatible languages (if any)
X	A description of accessibility features (if any)
X	Screenshots of all phases of the pollbook process that interact with election workers and/or voters

**Acknowledge which NIST-certified test laboratory has been notified to send a copy of the report based off the Texas Technical Training Matrix and expected delivery date to our office.**

NIST-certified test laboratory Name	Delivery Date
N/A	

**Additional Comments:**

Screenshots are included in Training Manuals.

Signature of Person Making Request	Title	Date
	CEO	1/28/22

Please submit and all relevant materials to:

Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060

*List of Compatible Peripheral Devices used with VoteSafe*

<b>Part Name</b>	<b>Model Number</b>	<b>Description</b>
Logitech WebCamera + Stand	C525	COTS Barcode Scanner
Secure-Tech IC-Card Terminal*	ST-U100CT	COTS Card Encoder
Barcode Scanner	Zebra DS4608-SR	COTS Barcode Scanner
Magtek Mini Stripe	21073062	COTS DL Swipe
Magtek - Centurion SCRA 3 Track Black	21073145	COTS DL Swipe
Brother Label Printer	QL-700	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-800	COTS Label Printer
Brother Label Printer	QL-570	COTS Label Printer
Citizen Printer	CL9521	Thermal Paper printer
Expansion Rosewill Hubs	RHB-220	COTS Hub
IOGEAR Hub	GUH285W6	COTS Hub

## Statement on Foreign Ownership Interest

There are no foreign ownership relations or interest in VOTEC Corporation.

# The State of Texas



Elections Division  
P.O. Box 12060  
Austin, Texas 78711-2060  
www.sos.state.tx.us

Phone: 512-463-5650  
Fax: 512-475-2811  
TTY: 7-1-1  
(800) 252-VOTE (8683)

John B. Scott  
Secretary of State

September 1, 2022

Karen Richards  
Director of Compliance Practices  
Votec Corporation  
10920 Via Frontera, Suite 110  
San Diego, CA 92127

Dear Ms. Richards:

Pursuant to our authority to certify electronic pollbook systems under Election Code 31.014, we have reviewed your modification request for the VOTEC VoteSafe 1.3.77 Electronic Pollbook system. This modification updates the version number of this system to VOTEC VoteSafe 1.3.85.

We have reviewed the information you provided with your request. Our examiners reviewed the information submitted and agreed that VOTEC's proposed modification does not warrant additional examination, and that a full certification review is not required.

Based on the information provided by VOTEC, I hereby formally approve the certification of the VOTEC VoteSafe 1.3.85 Electronic Pollbook system for use in Texas elections.

If you need additional information, please contact the Elections Division toll-free at 1-800-252-2216.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Keith Ingram", written over a light blue rectangular background.

Keith Ingram  
Director of Elections

Enclosures

KI:DVP

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Friday, February 23, 2024 2:05 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208  
**Attachments:** 2.23.24 Documents.zip

Good afternoon,

Thank you for confirming. Please see the attached zipped folder containing an initial production of documents responsive to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA").

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

We appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2024 10:48 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hello Jennifer.

To answer the clarifications noted below, the requests clearly states for production of "Form 200." Nothing in the request asks for Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides, etc.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000195

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 9:00 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning, Dr. Pressley,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request"). We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA.

#### CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

In order to fulfill the Request, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State's office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

1. As to the first portion of the Request—which references the "Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200"—are you only seeking copies of the completed Form 200 for each electronic pollbook specified in your

email? Or does the Request also extend to the Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides submitted with the application (as identified on the Form 200's Materials Checklist)? If the latter, please specify the precise materials encompassed by this part of the Request.

1. If you are seeking any technical materials that each vendor submitted to the Office with the completed Form 200, certain responsive information may be exempt from public disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information that implicates the privacy or property interests of third parties. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.101, 552.110, 552.1101, 552.139. As such, if your Request encompasses this information, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold responsive information that we believe is confidential under the PIA. Will you agree to us excluding responsive information that would be subject to mandatory exceptions and/or discretionary exceptions under the PIA without the necessity of seeking a ruling from the Attorney General?

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000197

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM

To: GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000198

**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85  
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex  
Votec  
Knowink  
ES&S

Blessings,  
Laura

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000199

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.  
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do  
not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2024 10:48 AM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hello Jennifer.

To answer the clarifications noted below, the requests clearly states for production of "Form 200." Nothing in the request asks for Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides, etc.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 9:00 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning, Dr. Pressley,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request"). We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA.

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT  
CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000201

In order to fulfill the Request, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State's office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

1. As to the first portion of the Request—which references the “Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200”—are you only seeking copies of the completed Form 200 for each electronic pollbook specified in your email? Or does the Request also extend to the Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides submitted with the application (as identified on the Form 200's Materials Checklist)? If the latter, please specify the precise materials encompassed by this part of the Request.
1. If you are seeking any technical materials that each vendor submitted to the Office with the completed Form 200, certain responsive information may be exempt from public disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information that implicates the privacy or property interests of third parties. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.101, 552.110, 552.1101, 552.139. As such, if your Request encompasses this information, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold responsive information that we believe is confidential under the PIA. Will you agree to us excluding responsive information that would be subject to mandatory exceptions and/or discretionary exceptions under the PIA without the necessity of seeking a ruling from the Attorney General?

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000203

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

- A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the
- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
  - List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200  
Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85  
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex  
Votec  
Knowink  
ES&S

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2024 9:00 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

Good morning, Dr. Pressley,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”) via email on February 5, 2024 (the “Request”). We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA.

#### CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

In order to fulfill the Request, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State’s office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

1. As to the first portion of the Request—which references the “Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200”—are you only seeking copies of the completed Form 200 for each electronic pollbook specified in your email? Or does the Request also extend to the Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides submitted with the application (as identified on the Form 200’s Materials Checklist)? If the latter, please specify the precise materials encompassed by this part of the Request.
2. If you are seeking any technical materials that each vendor submitted to the Office with the completed Form 200, certain responsive information may be exempt from public disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information that implicates the privacy or property interests of third parties. *See, e.g.*, Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.101, 552.110, 552.1101, 552.139. As such, if your Request encompasses this information, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold responsive information that we believe is confidential under the PIA. Will you agree to us excluding responsive information that would be subject to mandatory exceptions and/or discretionary exceptions under the PIA without the necessity of seeking a ruling from the Attorney General?

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

- A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the
- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
  - List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
  - A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85  
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000207

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200

- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex

Votec

Knowink

ES&S

Blessings,

Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**

**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 11, 2024 4:34 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Thank you.  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, March 11, 2024 10:58 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

As a follow up to our February 23 email, we appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on April 1, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  


TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000209

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 23, 2024 2:05 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

Good afternoon,

Thank you for confirming. Please see the attached zipped folder containing an initial production of documents responsive to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”).

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

We appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 11, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Tuesday, February 20, 2024 10:48 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA - SOS PIR 24-0208

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hello Jennifer.

To answer the clarifications noted below, the requests clearly states for production of "Form 200."

Nothing in the request asks for Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides, etc.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000211

On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 9:00 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning, Dr. Pressley,

This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”) via email on February 5, 2024 (the “Request”). We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA.

#### CLARIFICATION REQUEST/NOTICE OF APPLICATION OF SEC. 552.222

In order to fulfill the Request, we need clarification regarding the scope and type of records that you are seeking to obtain from the Secretary of State’s office. Clarifying or narrowing the scope of your request may help avoid the production of, and potential charges for, responsive information that you are not interested in receiving. It also may allow us to produce responsive documents to you more quickly. Additionally, we may be able to avoid having to withhold certain information under the Public Information Act and seek a ruling from the Office of the Attorney General regarding the release of such records.

To that end, please clarify or narrow your inquiry by responding to the following items:

1. As to the first portion of the Request—which references the “Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200”—are you only seeking copies of the completed Form 200 for each electronic pollbook specified in your email? Or does the Request also extend to the Technical Data Package and similar manuals/guides submitted with the application (as identified on the Form 200’s Materials Checklist)? If the latter, please specify the precise materials encompassed by this part of the Request.

1. If you are seeking any technical materials that each vendor submitted to the Office with the completed Form 200, certain responsive information may be exempt from public disclosure under the Public Information Act, including information that implicates the privacy or property interests of third parties. See, e.g., Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.101, 552.110, 552.1101, 552.139. As such, if your Request encompasses this information, we would have to seek a ruling from the Attorney General allowing us to withhold responsive information that we believe is confidential under the PIA. Will you agree to us excluding responsive information that would be subject to mandatory exceptions and/or discretionary exceptions under the PIA without the necessity of seeking a ruling from the Attorney General?

Under Section 552.222 of the PIA, if you do not respond in writing to this request for clarification within sixty-one days of this communication, your request for information is deemed by Texas law to be withdrawn.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM

To: GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85  
Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex  
Votec  
Knowink

ES&S

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." -  
*2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 2:43 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

Good afternoon,

This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office") via email on February 5, 2024 (the "Request").

We will process your Request in accordance with the PIA and will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification. The Office will be closed on February 19, 2024 in observance of Presidents Day. You will receive a response from our Office on the 10<sup>th</sup> business day, which will be February 20, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, February 5, 2024 12:46 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>; Christina Adkins <CADkins@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Pollbook Certifications - SoS PIA

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552. Please provide the following information regarding certification of electronic pollbooks in Texas.

A. For each vendor and pollbook system noted below, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex Precinct Central 4.2.2 and 4.5.2.4  
Votec VoteSafe 1.0.34, 1.3.77 and 1.3.85

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000217

Knowink Poll Pad 2.4.9, 2.5.2 and 3.0.0  
ES&S ExpressPoll 7.1.3.1 and 7.2.3.0.

B. For each electronic pollbook vendor noted below, that may have been certified after 2022, please provide the

- Application for Texas Certification of Electronic Pollbook - Form 200
- List of compatible peripheral devices used with the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200
- A statement regarding any foreign ownership interested in the e-pollbook system submitted with Form 200

Tenex  
Votec  
Knowink  
ES&S

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Friday, February 9, 2024 11:51 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel; Christina Adkins  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219  
**Attachments:** 2-9-24 15 Day Letter to Requestor - Pressley PIR 23-1219.pdf; 2-9-24 15 Day Letter to OAG - Pressley PIR 23-1219.pdf; 2.9.24 Documents.zip; How to appeal the withholding of information under 552.136.pdf; How to appeal the withholding of information under 552.130.pdf

Good morning,

Please see the attached letters, with enclosures, in response to your clarified Request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

The information you requested also contains information that relates to a motor vehicle operator's or driver's license or permit issued by an agency of this state or another state or country. This information is confidential under section 552.130 of the Texas Government Code. Section 552.130 allows us to withhold this specific information without requesting a ruling from the attorney general. You have the right to appeal our decision to withhold this information from you. Instructions for appeal are also attached. If you do not want to appeal, you do not need to do anything else.

The information you requested contains access device numbers that are collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body. This information is confidential under section 552.136 of the Texas Government Code. Section 552.136 allows us to withhold this specific information without requesting a ruling from the attorney general. You have the right to appeal our decision to withhold this information from you. Instructions for appeal are attached. If you do not want to appeal, you do not need to do anything else.

In addition, dates of birth have been redacted from the attached production pending the determination from the Attorney General's Open Records Division on our request for a ruling.

As stated in the attached letter, we require more time to continue reviewing our records and produce additional responsive information. We will provide you additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 15, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 2, 2024 12:04 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000219

Good afternoon,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your clarified Request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 9:24 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good morning,

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000220

Thank you in advance for your help.  
Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000221

To: GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins  
<[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

Subject: Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas  
County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,  
 AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000222

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you

believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**



# The State of Texas

Executive Division  
Capitol Building, 1E.8  
P.O. Box 12697  
Austin, Texas 78711-2697



Jane Nelson  
Secretary of State

Phone: 512-463-5770  
Fax: 512-475-2761  
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services  
www.sos.texas.gov

February 9, 2024

Laura Pressley

***Sent via Electronic Mail to:*** [REDACTED]

Re: Clarified request for records, considered received: January 18, 2024 (SOS PIR No. 23-1219)

Dear Dr. Pressley:

Please find enclosed a copy of the written comments, without exhibits, submitted to the attorney general. The comments are regarding the request for a decision on whether information withheld from you in response to your January 18, 2023 clarified request for records (the “January 18 Request”) is confidential under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.<sup>1</sup>

Consistent with our February 2, 2024 letter, please find the enclosed documents responsive to the January 18 Request. We require more time to continue reviewing our records and produce additional responsive information. We will provide you additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 15, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(d).

If you have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact our office at (512) 463-5770

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Adam Bitter".

Adam Bitter  
General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov  
AB/jw

Enclosures

# The State of Texas

Executive Division  
Capitol Building, 1E.8  
P.O. Box 12697  
Austin, Texas 78711-2697



Phone: 512-463-5770  
Fax: 512-475-2761  
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services  
www.sos.texas.gov

Jane Nelson  
Secretary of State

February 9, 2024

Office of the Attorney General  
Open Records Division  
300 W. 15th Street  
Austin, TX 78701

## ***Via Hand Delivery***

Re: Clarified request for records, considered received: January 18, 2024 (SOS PIR No. 24-1219)

Dear General Paxton:

On Sunday, December 10, 2023, the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”) received a written request for information from Laura Pressley (the “Requestor”) under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”). On December 28, 2023, we asked the Requestor to clarify certain items in the request (considered received on December 11, 2023). On January 17, 2024, after business hours, the Requestor responded with a clarified request (the “January 18 Request”). Copies of the Requestor’s initial request, the Office’s December 28 letter, and the Requestor’s January 18 Request are attached as Exhibit A. A statement regarding the date of receipt is attached as Exhibit B.<sup>1</sup> I hand-delivered this letter to the Open Records Division on February 9, 2024.

The January 18 Request seeks records related to a meeting between the Secretary of State, Office staff, and other individuals. *See* Exhibit A. We intend to produce some responsive information to the Requestor today and provide additional documents by March 15, 2024. The Office asserts that other information responsive to the January 18 Request is excepted from public disclosure under Sections 552.101 and 552.107 of the Texas Government Code. Thus, we are requesting a ruling regarding the release of these records.

## SECTION 552.107 OF THE TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE

The Office contends that certain information responsive to the January 18 Request should be excepted from public disclosure pursuant to Section 552.107 of the Texas Government Code. Section 552.107 provides that “[i]nformation is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021 if: (1) it is information that the attorney general or an attorney of a political subdivision is prohibited from disclosing because of a duty to the client under the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct; or (2) a court by order has prohibited disclosure of the information.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.107(1).

The Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024 in observance of Confederate Heroes Day. Therefore, the 15th business day from the date that the January 18 Request is considered received by the Office is today, February 9, 2024.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000227

Relevant here, Texas Rule of Evidence 503 encompasses the attorney-client privilege. The Attorney General has determined that “information that is protected under Texas Rule of Evidence 503 is excepted from disclosure under section 552.107(1).” Open Records Decision No. 676 at 4 (2002). Rule 503(b)(1) provides:

A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services to the client:

- (A) between the client or the client’s representative and the client’s lawyer or the lawyer’s representative;
- (B) between the client’s lawyer and the lawyer’s representative;
- (C) by the client, the client’s representative, the client’s lawyer, or the lawyer’s representative to a lawyer representing another party in a pending action or that lawyer’s representative, if the communications concern a matter of common interest in the pending action;
- (D) between the client’s representatives or between the client and the client’s representative; or
- (E) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client.

Tex. R. Evid. 503(b)(1). Rule 503 further provides that “[a] communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* R. 503(a)(5). So, to withhold information under Section 552.107 as subject to attorney-client privilege, the governmental body must: (1) show that the document is a communication transmitted between privileged parties or reveals a confidential communication; (2) identify the parties involved in the communication; and (3) show that the communication is confidential by explaining that it was not intended to be disclosed to third persons and that it was made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the governmental body. *See* Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-8; *accord* OR2023-29954 at 2-3; OR2023-28280 at 1-2; OR2023-14000 at 2-3.

The January 18 Request seeks certain internal communications and draft documents shared among the undersigned General Counsel, other Secretary of State attorneys, and non-attorney employees of the Office. Specifically, the responsive information includes communications reflecting the provision—or a request for the provision—of legal advice by the Office’s General Counsel and other staff attorneys (such as Christina Adkins) regarding the certification of voting systems for use in Texas elections; the drafting and review of agency materials; and the application of statutory provisions involving voter registration and the administration of elections.

The responsive communications were made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the Office. The communications were not intended to be disclosed to third persons; nor have such communications been disclosed publicly. Each of these communications satisfies the requirements of Texas Rule of Evidence 503 and is thus entitled to protection under Section 552.107(1). *See, e.g.*, OR2023-29954 at 2-3; OR2023-28280 at 1-2; OR2023-14000 at 2-3; OR2023-11899 at 2; OR2023-08963 at 2-3.

Exhibit C contains a representative sample of the responsive information that the Office asserts is excepted from public disclosure pursuant to Section 552.107, as reflected by the Office’s notations on the documents.

SECTION 552.101 OF THE TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE

Additionally, the Office asserts that a portion of the information responsive to the January 18 Request is exempt from disclosure under Section 552.101 of the Texas Government Code. This provision excepts information that is “considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.”

The responsive information includes voters’ dates of birth. In *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at \*3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.), the court determined that citizens’ dates of birth are protected by common law privacy and thus can be withheld under Section 552.101. While the dates of birth may derive from the voter registration database, the January 18 Request is not being made under Chapter 18 of the Texas Election Code, which might otherwise permit dates of birth to be produced. *See, e.g.*, OR2022-22160 at 2-3; OR2016-16898 at 5-6; *accord* OR2021-03259 at 3-4; OR2016-23745 at 1 n.2, 3; OR2016-14985 at 3-4.

Exhibit C contains the responsive information that the Office asserts is excepted from public disclosure pursuant to Section 552.101, as reflected by the Office’s notations on the materials.

For the reasons stated above, the Office asserts that certain information responsive to the January 18 Request is excepted from disclosure under the Public Information Act. Accordingly, we are requesting a ruling from the Attorney General regarding the release of these records. A representative sample of the responsive information that the Office seeks to withhold is attached as Exhibit C.

If you have any questions or need additional information from our office regarding this request, please contact me at (512) 463-5770.

Sincerely,



Adam Bitter  
General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov  
AB/jw

Enclosures

Cc: Requestor (via email) without Exhibits

## How to appeal the withholding of information under Government Code Section 552.136

If you wish to appeal the withholding of information discussed on the previous page, you must send the following to the attorney general:

- 1) a signed, written statement indicating your wish to appeal the withholding of information;
- 2) the name of the governmental body that withheld information from you;
- 3) the date you made your original request for information; and
- 4) a copy of your original request for information, or if you are unable to provide a copy, a description of your original request for information.

You may also submit written comments stating why you think the information should be released to you, but you are not required to do so.

Send your appeal by mail to the attorney general at:

Open Records Division  
P.O. Box 12548  
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Within forty-five business days after receiving all of the above-listed items necessary to file your appeal, the attorney general will issue a written ruling on the matter. You will receive a copy of this ruling in the mail.

## EVENT REPORT

Election Day Voting 11/7/2023  
Joint Constitutional & General Election  
Rowlett Elementary V-2925

Filed by T. E. Sumner

Date 11/13/2023

Address 5201 Panama Drive, Rowlett, TX 75088

Phone (214)924-2700

Email [REDACTED]

As Election Judge I arrived at Rowlett Elementary at 6AM on Election Day and got the workers inside the locked and dark building. Immediately, we all started finishing the set-up and opening the site for voting. The wireless router is required first to be set up to allow workers to sign the oath and sign in for work. We had already set up the ExpressVote machines the night before and plugged in the locked DS-200 tabulator. After getting everyone signed in and outside work (signage) started, I unlocked the DS-200 tabulator, while I had a clerk firing up the ExpressVote marking machines.

The DS-200 tabulator opened to a screen that said the POLLS ARE NOW CLOSED and asked if I wanted to RE-OPEN THE POLLS?

One of the six ExpressVote machines did not open properly and displayed a boot-up error.

The tabulator error offered to Re-Open or Shut Down. I selected Re-Open and it then asked for the OVERRIDE CODE. I called the help line immediately and got into the queue for technical assistance. After about 20 minutes of waiting, just before 7AM a rep answered and told me; the CODE was a certain string of 7 letters and she was trying to get it for me.

The rep finally came back on the phone and gave me the CODE. It did not work. The machine continued to ask for the CODE and after I tried upper and lower versions of the string, it finally shut down completely, and then tried to boot back up.

My call again to the help line yielded a callback from a different number and the tech told me that he wasn't sure he could give me the RE-OPEN CODE. I told him we had only 1 tabulator and if he wanted to come out personally and reset the machine himself, I would give him the address so he could keep the code secret. After a short pause, he gave it to me. It worked. We were able to boot the tabulator.

NOTE: an issue with the Rules given us by Election Department is that if the Emergency Door #5 is used that ballots are to remain uncounted behind the door until the polls close. We are then expected to put the ballots into a plastic bag and seal it with a green adhesive seal. No rule is expressed about who should unlock the door or witness that 1) no ballots are present, or 2) that all ballots are retrieved and placed in the plastic bag with no extra ballots from somewhere before sealing.

I would suggest that Door #5 be unlocked with at least the APEO witnessing the event, whether Door #5 was used or not, and the ballots present inside be counted, face down, and placed in the plastic bag. Since this exercise is pointless when the tabulator is working, I suggest the Rule be: after counting the ballots found there, they should be run through the tabulator, making certain that the hand-count of ballots match the increase in the Public Count shown on the DS-200 display.

Notice that while a place is provided on the Ballot & Seal Report for unused blank ballots, both in sealed packages and from packages broken open, the total number of ballots is NOT reconciled to match anything. This is not proper. The number of ballots used plus voided must equal the number of ballots delivered. The number of ballots used must equal the number of voters checked in to vote on the e-Pollbook and on the Voter Roster. Voters cancelling mailed-out ballots should match the number of surrendered ballots, or provisional ballots for those not surrendering a ballot.

Previously, we had reached agreement to take 2 USB media drives from the DS-200 and have 1 delivered with ballots and voter rosters to the PEO and the other USB drive sequestered for possible later audit, by the APEO. In other words, 2 people each handling USB drives separately is more robust than everything done by 1 person.

The broken ExpressVote remained inoperable for the whole day. Turning it ON and OFF did no good, and going to Admin mode to Voting mode no difference.


That machine and one other had a problem with the barrel locks protecting the ON/OFF and mode switches. The lock was stuck locked open and could not be reset because the barrel key alignment tab was turned 90° preventing the insertion of any barrel key.

*Further Affiant sayeth not"*

*[Signature]*  
R.C. Summer, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS  
COUNTY OF DALLAS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 13th day of November, 2023



*[Signature]*  
NOTARY

**AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN KNOLL**

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, John Knoll who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is John Knoll. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I served as the Republican Presiding Judge (PEO) for Voting Center V2922 Liberty Grove Elementary School on Tuesday, November 7, 2023. The Computer Room in Liberty Grove Elementary School V2922 in Rowlett is not an acceptable location with the current hardware and software provided by the Dallas County Election Department. The amount of physical space and location is good.

The past two elections, the Judge’s phone many times does not connect to the cell tower and shows” for emergency calls only”.

A land line for the phone, a voice over internet to a dedicated computer, a cell phone relay or other communication device(s) are needed.


Two voters in May could not connect to the Mandarin language app. The Judge’s Line is not accessible most of the day.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

*John C Knoll*  
John Knoll Presiding Judge (PEO), *Affiant*

STATE OF TEXAS           §  
  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS    §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 10th day of November, 2023.



*Susan A Fountain*  
Notary Public, State of Texas

AFFIDAVIT OF Thomas Parsonault


BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Thomas Parsonault, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Thomas Parsonault. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I am the Alternate Judge for Voting Center E0021. On (11/3/2023) I observed:


I am Alt at E0021, IANT. Our pollbooks, etc. get an "F" grade from both me and our Presiding. Today is the first day ours were online before 10 am. Sometimes they weren't online until 2 or 3 pm. One of the books had the printer dropping off every few hours. That one also wouldn't reliably read my DL at all, even after 5 minutes of testing. It did read others however. The poll books messed up our time clocking in and out. We clocked in several days with the PB offline. When they went online, some workers were deleted, and some were duplicated. Thank heaven for the paper time sheets! Total votes for this center was light, about 300 for the entire two weeks. I suspect some of these issues are related to the "downtown" system and not the poll books themselves. Our router seemed to stay up reliably, so I doubt that was an issue.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NAME, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS       §  
                                      §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS   §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 6th day of NOVEMBER, 2023.



  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public, State of Texas

AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY FARTHING

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, LARRY FARTHING, who being by me duly sworn, deposed, and stated as follows:

“My name is Larry Farthing. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I am the Alternate Judge for Dallas County Voting Center E4029. On Friday, November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2023, I observed that we had one e-poll book, out of three assigned to our Voting Center, that showed 3 fewer checked-in voters than the correct number for at least 4 or 5 days.


To my knowledge, the other two e-poll books and the tabulator showed the correct number throughout the entire Early Voting period. The errant e-poll book continued to show 3 fewer checked-in voters through the closing of the Early Voting period on Friday, November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2023.


FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

  
NAME, Affiant: Larry Farthing

STATE OF TEXAS §  
  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 6th day of NOVEMBER, 2023.



  
Notary Public, State of Texas

AFFIDAVIT OF MARIANNE MORRIS

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Marianne Morris, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

"My name is MARIANNE MORRIS. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.


I am the Alternate Judge for Voting Center 1094 Sylvia Mendez Crew. On November 7th I observed the Judge, Andre Turner using an electronic poll book which was online without registering voters. He had a clipboard with multiple pages of what appeared to have been candidate endorsement forms, and it appeared that he was filling in information from the poll book. He made efforts to conceal what was he was doing. I asked if he was completing some paperwork and he gave a vague reply.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT."

MARIANNE MORRIS  
NAME, Affiant MARIANNE MORRIS

STATE OF TEXAS §  
§  
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 13th day of November, 2023.



Susan A Fountain  
Notary Public, State of Texas

AFFIDAVIT OF Marguerite Buccino

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Marguerite, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows: Lincoln Buccino

"My name is Marguerite Buccino. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.


I am, the Alternate Judge for Voting Center V4094. On (date) 11-7-2023 I observed about 4:30pm e-poll book # 0815 shut itself down with the message in red letters that "The Polls Are closed." The polls close at 7pm on Election Day, this occurred while our student clerk was attempting to check in a voter. I asked her to move to # 0816 to check in the voter. I also checked to be certain all FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT." The total totals for 0814, 0815 and 0816 were still accurate. The 0815 came back on line after a couple of minutes.

M. Buccino  
NAME, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS §  
§  
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 13 day of November, 2023.

J. Colleen Canion  
Notary Public, State of Texas



---

AFFIDAVIT OF LILA FARMER

---

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, LILA FARMER, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Lila Farmer. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I am the Alternate Judge for Voting Center E2407 Josey Ranch Lake Library, Carrollton, TX. On November 3, 2023, I observed that when I sat at E-Poll book #0203 from 7 AM- 2 PM, the cloud was red until 12:20 PM. The cloud on the other two E-Poll books #0199 and 0202 were green all day.


There were updates at 9:02 AM, 2:53 PM and 5:47 PM. When the E-Poll book updated the rooster and voter numbers matched.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

Lila Farmer  
NAME, Affiant LILA FARMER

STATE OF TEXAS           §  
  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS    §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 13TH day of NOVEMBER, 2023.



Susan A Fountain  
Notary Public, State of Texas

AFFIDAVIT OF Nancy Anderton

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Nancy Anderton who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Nancy Anderton. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I am the Alternate Judge for Voting Center E1074. On (10/24/2023 thru 11/03/2023) I observed  
This was from Early Voting.

We had 3 Epollbooks in the same room and after the first day of Early voting the totals on all of them were off.

The first 2 days of Early Voting we were offline not connected till about 12:30 pm each day.

Our numbers on the Epollbook never match the rest of the 11 days of Early Voting.

We had calls from the Ballot Board saying that just add your 2 Provisionals to the Tabulator total so we balance, and I stated that the numbers on the Epollbooks were different, and I was told by the Ballot Board to not record the numbers from the Epollbook, that they were wrong and we should just add our Provisionals to the tabulator totals to stay in balance.

After keeping track that way we were able to stay in balance.


FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

Anderton Nancy Anderton Nancy  
NAME, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS §  
§  
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 13 day of November, 2023.

J. Colleen Canion  
Notary Public, State of Texas



TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000239

**AFFIDAVIT OF NANCY ANDERTON**


---

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Nancy Anderton, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Nancy Anderton. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.


I am the Presiding Judge for Lovers Lane United Methodist Church, Voting Center V2013 Presiding Judge On November 7 2023 I observed the E-Pollbook #0151 and the Printer the printer malfunctioned and did not print the header on the ballot. We used the same ballot to reprint and it printed out the header correctly. But the E-Pollbook recorded that as a reissue ballot and we used the same ballot because it was clean and not printing appeared. This rest of the day during voting the machine carried that reissue and we had not done that. We did not spoil any ballots either. So the E-Pollbook total was wrong because we did not reissue a ballot. At the end the Tabulator total was 210 and our Voter Rosters totaled 210 and we had used 210 ballots and had 40 ballots left from the pack of 250 that we opened. Everything balanced, except for the reissue ballot on the E-Pollbook.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

  
Nancy Anderton, *Affiant*

STATE OF TEXAS           §  
  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS    §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 11th day of November, 2023.



  
Notary Public, State of Texas



---

**AFFIDAVIT OF DANNY A. HERRERA**

---

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Danny A. Herrera who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

"My name is Danny A. Herrera. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I was a clerk for Voting Center V2805. On November 6, 2023 I observed that during equipment setup, two voting machines malfunctioned and were deemed unusable for the election.

On November 7, 2023, I saw the e-poll book screen to my right go black. The red light below the screen was visible and flashing periodically, but the screen was black. It was the first failure of an e-poll book that day. The clerk had no choice but to abandon it.

As I continued to check in voters using the e-poll book, a message appeared on screen titled "Microsoft" and provided two options, "End process" or "Ignore." I tapped "Ignore." The message reappeared. I tried selecting "Ignore" a few times but the same message reappeared each time. At that time, I tapped "End process" and the system began shutting down. The e-poll book software appeared to be no longer running. I followed the instructions provided on the screen which told me to slide the window down to power down, which I did. Once the system appeared to be powered down, I held the power button down to power it up. The system powered up and I was able to follow the login procedures and resumed checking in voters.

After polls closed and we were putting away e-poll books, I noticed that another e-poll book had the same error message on screen as the one that I saw on the system I had been using. It was abandoned at one point because I recall not seeing anyone at that terminal for a few to several hours.


I took photos of the e-Poll books with permission from the Election Judge before the polls opened and after the polls closed. The data shows numerous inconsistencies in Registered Voters in the County, Absentee numbers, and Early Voting numbers as evidenced by the Exhibit Summary and supporting photos in Exhibits 1 to Exhibit 8.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT."

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NAME, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS            §  
   §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 12 day of November, 2023.



*J. Colleen Canion*  
 Notary Public, State of Texas

Exhibit Summary

Source	Device Name	Serial Number	Date	Time	Registered Voters in the County	Absentee	Early Voting	Time	Registered Voters in the County	Absentee	Early Voting
Exhibit 1	2846PB00780	001136392951	11/7/2023	6:51 AM	1409470	4303	49101				
Exhibit 2	2846PB00776	009950593451	11/7/2023	6:51 AM	1409473	4303	47612	7:42 PM	1408753	4259	60880
Exhibit 3	2846PB00781	000967692951	11/7/2023	6:52 AM	1409471	4334	47500	7:39 PM	1408748	4283	60878
Exhibit 4	2846PB00771	000492694451	11/7/2023	6:52 AM	1409524	4303	47495	7:40 PM	1408801	4259	60873
Exhibit 5	2846PB00783	001016694451	11/7/2023	6:52 AM	1409476	4303	47500				
Exhibit 6	2846PB00782	001259492951	11/7/2023	6:53 AM	1409476	4304	47045	7:40 PM	1408753	4259	60880
Exhibit 7	2846PB00778	000591694451	11/7/2023	6:54 AM	1409521	4303	47606	7:43 PM	1408801	4259	60874
Exhibit 8	2846PB00787	000950792951	11/7/2023					7:42 PM	1408748	4283	60874

Exhibit 1

V2805-Coppell Town Center | 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In | Tue Nov 07 6:51 AM | 100% EB

### Monitor Poll

**Poll Place**  
 V2805-Coppell Town Center  
 255 E Parkway Blvd  
 COPPELL, TX 75019

**Ballots**  
 ExpressVote: 0  
 Provisional ExpressVote: 0

**Voters**  
 Checked In: 0  
 Not in Roster: 4,303  
 Absentee: 4,303  
 Early Voting: 49,101

**Registered Voters in the County:** 1,409,470

**Open Time:** 7:00 AM  
**Close Time:** 7:00 PM

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

Exhibit 2

V2805-Coppell Town Center 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In Tue Nov 07 6:51 AM 100%

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters	
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	0 ExpressVote	0 Provisional ExpressVote	0 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00776 Serial Number 009950593451		0 Not in Roster	1,409,473 Registered Voters in the County
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time 7:00 PM Close Time		47,612 Early Voting	4,303 Absentee

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

V2805-Coppell Town Center 1,807 Issued | 11 Reissued | 1,795 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:42 PM 100%

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters	
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	1,804 ExpressVote	3 Provisional ExpressVote	1,795 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00776 Serial Number 009950593451		8 Not in Roster	1,408,753 Registered Voters in the County
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time 7:00 PM Close Time		60,880 Early Voting	4,259 Absentee

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

Exhibit 3

V2805-Coppell Town Center 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In Tue Nov 07 6:52 AM 100% 80

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	0 ExpressVote	0 Provisional ExpressVote
Device Name 2846PB00781 Serial Number 000967692951		0 Checked In 1,409,471 Registered Voters in the County
Poll Time 7:00 AM 7:00 PM Open Time Close Time		0 Not in Roster 4,334 Absentee
		47,500 Early Voting

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

V2805-Coppell Town Center 1,807 Issued | 11 Reissued | 1,795 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:39 PM 100% 80

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	1,804 ExpressVote	3 Provisional ExpressVote
Device Name 2846PB00781 Serial Number 000967692951		1,795 Checked In 1,408,748 Registered Voters in the County
Poll Time 7:00 AM 7:00 PM Open Time Close Time		8 Not in Roster 4,283 Absentee
		60,878 Early Voting

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

V2805-Coppell Town Center 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In Tue Nov 07 8:52 AM 100% 4G

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters	
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	0 ExpressVote	0 Provisional ExpressVote	0 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00771 Serial Number 000492694451		0 Not in Roster	1,409,524 Registered Voters in the County
Poll Time 7:00 AM 7:00 PM Open Time Close Time		47,495 Early Voting	4,303 Absentee

[View Reports](#) Close Poll

V2805-Coppell Town Center 1,807 Issued | 11 Reissued | 1,795 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:40 PM 55% 4G

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters	
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	1,804 ExpressVote	3 Provisional ExpressVote	1,795 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00771 Serial Number 000492694451		8 Not in Roster	1,408,801 Registered Voters in the County
Poll Time 7:00 AM 7:00 PM Open Time Close Time		60,873 Early Voting	4,259 Absentee

[View Reports](#) Close Poll

Exhibit 5

V2805-Coppell Town Center 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In Tue Nov 07 6:52 AM 100%

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters		
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	0 ExpressVote	0 Provisional ExpressVote	0 Checked In	1,409,476 Registered Voters in the County
Device Name 2846PB00783 Serial Number 001016694451		0 Not in Roster	4,303 Absentee	
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time	7:00 PM Close Time	47,500 Early Voting		

[View Reports](#) Close Poll

Exhibit 6

V2805-Coppell Town Center 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:54 AM 100% (0)

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPELL, TX 75019	0 ExpressVote	0 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00782 Serial Number 001259492951	0 Provisional ExpressVote	0 Not in Roster
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time		1,409,476 Registered Voters in the County
7:00 PM Close Time		4,304 Absentee
		47,045 Early Voting

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

V2805-Coppell Town Center 1,807 Issued | 11 Reissued | 1,795 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:40 PM 100% (3)

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPELL, TX 75019	1,804 ExpressVote	1,795 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00782 Serial Number 001259492951	3 Provisional ExpressVote	8 Not in Roster
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time		1,408,753 Registered Voters in the County
7:00 PM Close Time		4,259 Absentee
		60,880 Early Voting

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

Exhibit 7

V2805-Coppell Town Center 0 Issued | 0 Reissued | 0 Checked In Tue Nov 07 8:54 AM 100%

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	0 ExpressVote	0 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00778 Serial Number 000591694451	0 Provisional ExpressVote	0 Not in Roster
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time		47,606 Early Voting
		1,409,521 Registered Voters in the County
		4,303 Absentee

[View Reports](#) [Open Poll](#)

V2805-Coppell Town Center 1,807 Issued | 11 Reissued | 1,795 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:43 PM 100%

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters
V2805-Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	1,804 ExpressVote	1,795 Checked In
Device Name 2846PB00778 Serial Number 000591694451	3 Provisional ExpressVote	8 Not in Roster
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time		60,874 Early Voting
		1,408,801 Registered Voters in the County
		4,259 Absentee

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

V2805-Coppell Town Center 1,807 Issued | 11 Reissued | 1,795 Checked In Tue Nov 07 7:42 PM 100%

### Monitor Poll

Poll Place	Ballots	Voters		
V2805 - Coppell Town Center 255 E Parkway Blvd COPPELL, TX 75019	1,804 ExpressVote	3 Provisional ExpressVote	1,795 Checked In	1,408,748 Registered Voters in the County
Device Name 2846PB00787 Serial Number 000950792951			8 Not in Roster	4,283 Absentee
Poll Time 7:00 AM Open Time	7:00 PM Close Time		60,874 Early Voting	

[View Reports](#) [Close Poll](#)

AFFIDAVIT OF \_\_\_\_\_

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, \_\_\_\_\_, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

"My name is Debbie Arnett. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.


I am the Alternate Judge for Voting Center TRINITY CITY HALL. On (date) I observed

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT."

Debbie Arnett  
NAME, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS §  
  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 20 day of November, 2023.



[Signature]  
Notary Public, State of Texas

**Subject:** Re: Poll Book Abnormalities

**From:** Debbie <[REDACTED]>

**Date:** 11/9/2023, 12:02 PM

**To:** [REDACTED] susan Fountain [REDACTED]

Election Day was even worse--- we had 1300 voters on Election Day , with a line most of the day--- Our Tech for the new ( 1 of 12) Wifi/Spiders came out 3-4 times to help with what we thought was slow process by the Wifi--- we were told it was the ePollbooks freezing up and it was not the Wifi-- To check in a voter if u scanned the photo ID and the epoll didn't find or respond to that, you had to wait to get out of that mode to try to type the last name/birthday or what ever way u were looking for the voter (ePoll was freezing up)--- Told we were the 4th busiest location on election Day---We had 4 check in ePolls and the Judges used for curb sides--very frustrating for us and the voter- PRIMARIES will be busier!!!!

This is being mailed with the notary statement....

On 11/5/2023 9:40 AM, Debbie wrote:

Alternate Judge at Irving City Hall--- Our ePollbooks were never correct during whole early voting--- we were from 1-3 votes off always at close of day--Our reports always balanced due to using the DS200 and our rosters----- We had 3 ePollbooks---2 to check in and the Judges ePollbook- we used the Judges book for curb side-- one day about 11am did a curb side and then reconnected the pollbook back to the Judges table and that pollbook remained in the RED- cloud/WIFI for approx 6 hours ----Pollbooks got slow or just hung up(searching) for the voters toward the end of each day--NOT much better after we got the new WIFI/spider-----Many calls to our tech and told it was the amount of data going through----- NOT THIS ELECTION----- this will be a disaster during the big elections in 2024.....

Additionally our cloud would go yellow for few minutes through out the day or red---don't know the reason--We would see the yellow arrow-told that was the down load of the information--- BUT it never changed our numbers and at close on Friday we were still off by 1-3 voters depending on the pollbook looked at---

Debbie Arnett

972-554-6122 home 214-532-9597 cell

**Subject:** Poll Book Abnormalities

**From:** Debbie [REDACTED]

**Date:** 11/5/2023, 9:40 AM

**To:** [REDACTED] susan Fountain [REDACTED]

Alternate Judge at Irving City Hall--- Our ePollbooks were never correct during whole early voting--- we were from 1-3 votes off always at close of day--Our reports always balanced due to using the DS200 and our rosters----- We had 3 ePollbooks---2 to check in and the Judges ePollbook- we used the Judges book for curb side-- one day about 11am did a curb side and then reconnected the pollbook back to the Judges table and that pollbook remained in the RED- cloud/WIFI for approx 6 hours ----Pollbooks got slow or just hung up(searching) for the voters toward the end of each day--NOT much better after we got the new WIFI/spider-----Many calls to our tech and told it was the amount of data going through----- NOT THIS ELECTION----- this will be a disaster during the big elections in 2024.....

Additionally our cloud would go yellow for few minutes through out the day or red---don't know the reason---We would see the yellow arrow-told that was the down load of the information--- BUT it never changed our numbers and at close on Friday we were still off by 1-3 voters depending on the pollbook looked at---

Debbie Arnett

972-554-6122 home 214-532-9597 cell

## AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN KNOLL

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, John Knoll, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is John Knoll I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I am the Alternate Judge (AEO) for Voting Center E1029 Richland Campus – Dallas College between October 23, 2023 and November 3, 2023 I observed

A vendor arrived at 6:00 pm November 30, 2023 stating she was exchanging our 4G Wireless Router with the 5G Wireless Router she had in hand. She stated Dallas County was testing 10 to 12 upgraded routers for Early Voting elections. The PEO, AEO, the inspector nor the Judge’s Hotline were notified. The inspector, Frank C, after calling some people at Dallas County, gave approval to swap the routers around 6:20 – 6:25 pm.

The closing count was off by two ballots. Two people were registering to vote about the time both routers were down for the router exchange. The two voters were on the handwritten Voter Roster and not on the E-Pollbooks were identified. One was on E-Pollbook 0308 and the other was on E-Pollbook 0309. The two names were identified, along with the two vote difference on our Early Voting Daily Report to the ballot board. The names on the handwritten Voter Roster matched the voters listed on E-Pollbook 0307.

A request to replace a slower responding E-Pollbook was made before this incident. The inspector swapped one of the E-Pollbooks at a later date.

This following report was signed by me and given to the PEO.

October 31, 2023

E-Pollbook 0307 is not showing the same information as E-pollbook 0308 and E-Pollbook 0309.

E-Pollbook was restarted about 3:00 pm but the discrepancies continued.

\*0307 shows 0308 lists 25 voters

\*0308 and 0309 shows 0308 lists 26 voters


\*0307 shows 0309 lists 30 voters

\*0308 and 0309 shows 0308 lists 31 voters  
[End of October 31, 2023 report]

On the afternoon of November 2 one of the E-Pollbooks updated the 26<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> voter's names (from October 30) and increase to number of ballots issued and the number of voters by two displayed on the top of the E-Pollbook screen showing the correct number.


Late on November 3 the third E-Pollbook did not update the 26<sup>th</sup> and 31<sup>st</sup> names (from October 30) and number of ballots issued and the number of voters displayed two less ballots issued and two less voters than actual.


FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

  
John Knoll, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS       §  
                                  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS   §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 10th day of November, 2023.



  
Notary Public, State of Texas

## AFFIDAVIT OF Judith Colleen Canion

---

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Judith Colleen Canion, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Judith Colleen Canion. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I was the Presiding Judge for Voting Center Coppell Town Center. On November 7, 2023 I observed:

### **By Judith Colleen Canion, Presiding Republican Election Judge**

7:09 am - All 8 e poll books here are green currently! 2 broken ballot marking machines down here! (never repaired or replaced all day)

Lots of spoiled ballots today! I think the Democrats running The Election Department have changed the calibration on the ballot marking machines! My signature stamp always was accepted by the machines (past elections 2015 – to present) but now we have half a page of spoiled ballots (we ended up with 13 spoiled ballots at the end of the day) which were rejected!

8:19 am -

One man, 2 votes – Charles Arista – see photo attached – The Alternate Democrat Judge, Lisa Lundgren, called the Dallas County Elections Judges Hotline – 972-225-7323 who told her (I heard them on the speaker phone) to “vote the green one “! That is exactly what they told me with John Buie voter fraud case, 11/22 – 1 man 3 votes, Balch Springs (see photo attached). You may recall I submitted this case to the SOS Election Fraud division and have not heard a word back from them to date!! Consistent cheating by \_\_\_\_??!

I told the Democrat Alternate Judge going forward, I would handle all the problem voters. This is how we briefly see “phantom voters” they show up, vote multiple times and all but 1 disappear tomorrow after election day. It is one of many cheating methods!

What should have happened - It would be completely appropriate and legal if the Hotline judge told the clerk to vote this person provisionally. It is still not good that we had a voter show up and get told they had already voted though.

9:30 am – vote count 216 count from the tabulator. 224 from e-poll books.

10:15 am - Poll book #4 just decided to reboot itself at 10:15 am and no one knows why. The tech guy Erik (from Dallas CO Elections) was here and says “it’s working now so don’t worry about it!”

The Tech guy also just told me we can't have food in the Voting area, I should move it into the kitchen- where we can't see it! Is this true or micromanaging? I think it is way over micromanaging. It appears they are grasping for straws. Trying to find some reason to make this a systemwide problem. Operator errors?

Here are the treats I brought! (see photo) They are putting some on paper plates I brought and snacking on occasion!

11:00 am - 566 issued ballots on poll books, 545 on tabulator. Apparently, it only reads ballots if they go in face up? (per Dan McNabb, Republican Clerk) Why such a large discrepancy? Lisa is calling judges Hotline about our numbers being so far apart. Tech coming soon?! The trainer in the Judge class I attended last month, said you could put the ballot up or down either tray and it would count. Apparently that's not the case! Training issue!?

12:30 pm - Dallas County Elections just called and said they have a complaint against me that I did a provisional ballot incorrectly. I have not done 1 provisional ballot all day! Who do you think is complaining against me in the middle of an election day? They are after me with lies now?

HDQ IT guy called - he diagnosed over the phone that "our tabulator is fine and no action or repairs are needed." He thinks numbers this far apart are okay. He told the Clerk, Dan McNabb, to put a note on the tabulator to check it when it got back to the warehouse! At the end of the day, I did see his note taped to the tabulator to check it.

12:45 pm and 1:06 pm - Just did a Yellow upload/ download on us at both times. Numbers keep changing. Still off tabulator by 3 votes now! Not sure what is going on! More cheating?

1:15 pm - 768 poll book, 773 tabulator

2:19 pm - Downloading - Yellow icon again - count 910 on poll book.

3:13 pm - Downloading again - 1053 checked in on poll book!

4:20 pm another download- yellow arrow down

Elections called with an email complaint but could not explain the error he was calling about?!

4:35 pm - Elections called to leave me a message I had too many Clerks because 5 of them were PT, working half a day. Now we are down to 5 Clerks, 2 judges and the line to the parking lot with 15 minutes wait time. Are they still going to bitch at me about that problem? Sad!

5:09 pm downloading again; Wait time 23 minutes now

6:00 pm - Bill Hurlbert showed up to work for an hour! A Miracle!

6:18 pm - Downloading again

6:31 pm - Downloading again


FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

*Judith Colleen Canion*

Judith Colleen Canion  
NAME, *Affiant*

STATE OF TEXAS       §  
                                  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS   §

9 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the  
day of November, 2023.



*Susan A Fountain*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Notary Public, State of Texas

Last Name: [AR] First Name: [CH] Date of Birth: [REDACTED] Voter ID: [REDACTED]

Clear all

Matching results 2 Results

ARISTA	CHARLES	160 HIGHLAND MEADOW CIR COPPELL, TX 75019	[REDACTED]	Active ELIGIBLE
ARISTA	CHARLES	160 HIGHLAND MEADOW CIR COPPELL, TX 75019	[REDACTED]	NOT IN ROSTER NOT IN ROSTER

If you didn't find the voter that you were looking for:

1 Check search criteria for accuracy

2 Voter Not Found

### BUIE, JOHN NOLAN

14800 OAKWOOD LN, BALCH SPRINGS, TX 75180

[Manage Voter >](#)

Basic Info

Identification

Voter History

[Update Voter Details](#)

Voter Registration Number  
**181372**

Jurisdiction Name  
**Dallas**

Alt Voter ID  
**1083966690**

Back

Reissue Provisional

Last Name

First Name

Date of Birth

BUIE

JOHN

MM-DD-YYYY

[Clear all](#)

Matching results: 3 Results

BUIE	JOHN	14800 OAKWOOD LN BALCH SPRINGS, TX 75180	[REDACTED]	Active Early Ballot Issued
BUIE	JOHN	14800 OAKWOOD LN BALCH SPRINGS, TX 75180	[REDACTED]	NOT IN ROSTER NOT IN ROSTER
BUIE	JOHN	14800 OAKWOOD LN BALCH SPRINGS, TX 75180	[REDACTED]	NOT IN ROSTER NOT IN ROSTER

Q W E R T Y U I O P

A S D F G H J K L

Z X C V B N M space

# BUIE, JOHN N

14800 OAKWOOD LN , BALCH SPRINGS, TX 75180

Basic Info

Identification

Voter History

[Update Voter Details](#)

Voter Registration Number

Jurisdiction Name

Dallas

Alt Voter ID

Not Available

Back

Issue Provisional

# BUIE, JOHN N

14800 OAKWOOD LN , BALCH SPRINGS, TX 75180

Basic Info

Identification

Voter History

[Update Voter Details](#)

Voter Registration Number

Jurisdiction Name

Dallas

Alt Voter ID

Not Available

Back

Issue Provisional



Michael Scorpeola, Voter Registrar  
 489-2077-VOTE (8683)  
 www.dallascountyvoters.org  
 1520 Round Table Dr.  
 Dallas, TX 75247

Secretary of State's Office  
 Elections Division  
 1-800-252-VOTE (8683)  
 www.sos.state.tx.us

FIRST-CLASS MAIL  
 PRESORTED  
 U.S. POSTAGE PAID  
 DALLAS, TEXAS  
 PERMIT NO. 4846

RETURN SERVICE REQUESTED

N16496718

**VOTER REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE**  
 (Certificado de Registro Electoral)  
 Giấy Chứng Nhận Ghi Danh Cử Cử Tr

**DALLAS COUNTY (Condado de Dallas) Quận Dallas**

U.S. REP. (Đại biểu Quốc hội) Đầu bảng Hoa Kỳ	STATE SEN. (Đại biểu) Đầu bảng Texas	STATE REP. (Đại biểu) Đầu bảng Tiểu bang	County (Huyện) Số Cử Tr	J.P. (Thẩm phán) Số Cử Tr	CITY (Thành phố) Số Cử Tr	ISD
32	16	110	4	2	657	MEO

ID Exempt (Số miễn lệ bầu cử) Số Miễn Bầu	Gender (Sex) (Giới Tính)	Valid from (Valid dates) (Ngày Từ Đến)
066690	M	01/1/2022

Year of Birth (Año de nacimiento) (Năm Sinh)	Precinct Number (Número de Precinct) (Số Khu Vực)	Exp. (hasta) đến hết
1941	1411	12/31/2023

Name and Mailing Address (Nombre y Dirección de Correo) Tên Họ và Địa Chỉ Thư Trì

1083966690

JOHN NOLAN BUIE  
 14800 OAKWOOD LN  
 BALCH SPRINGS TX 75180-2518

YOU MUST PERSONALLY SIGN HIS/HER NAME IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT, IF ABLE.  
 (Usted debe firmar esta tarjeta personalmente al recibirla, si puede.)  
 Phải đích thân ký tên của mình ngay khi nhận được, nếu có thể.

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT

---

## AFFIDAVIT OF Thomas Turner

---

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Thomas Turner, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Thomas Turner. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I am the Alternate Judge for Early and Election Day Voting Centers V1096 Pleasant Grove Center – Dallas College & V1061 – Gaston Middle School. On 10/30/23, I observed one of the clerk’s e-Poll books continuously be one person checked-in short for half of early voting and it never corrected itself. The tech, Terry, said it is a known issue, but it caused us to get confused on our daily counts on many different days. On 11/7/23, I observed one of the e-Poll books displaying 0 checked-in, while the other 3 e-Poll books were accurately displaying the amount of people that had come through our doors up until that point. That didn’t correct itself until about 3-4 hours of downloading updates. At one point, all 3 e-Poll books received a notice from Round Table to unplug the router, wait for 10 seconds, then plug it back in. We couldn’t do that because we had a line at that moment and waited until there was no one else in the Voting Center to take it offline temporarily. They should have at least explained the purpose of this to instill trust in our election process, which I still don’t know why this was requested. The single biggest irregularity shared amongst all clerks, judges and some voters at both polling locations was the latency of these e-Poll books. As a person with a strong IT background, I am accustomed to response times of milliseconds, and there were times where the e-Poll books registered our selection, but would not display the desired action for up to 10 seconds! This is a disaster situation on many fronts, starting with frustrating our voters. Many times I witnessed them tapping on the blue “Accept” button after signing their name, then nothing would happen. Then they would tap again and again and again waiting for it to register. Sometimes, confused voters would even ask me, or the clerk, if there is something more they needed to do. Only then did it finally display that accept was selected, but by tapping over and over again, it also hit the blue button we as election workers are supposed to tap to print their ballot after we verify that they provided their signature. One voter, in particular, was highly skeptical of these new e-Poll books, asking what happened to the old paper poll books we would sign with ink pens. In the process of checking him in, the awful laggy latency hit again, and I was getting frustrated at how slow it was, and he was able to see this frustration and he said, it’s stuff like what you’re dealing with that concerns me with these devices. I explained, it was just a little slow, but everything is in working order, and he felt better about the whole process after. This opened my eyes to how our confusion and frustration with the latency can have a negative impact on voters. I heard our clerk, Barbara, dealing with this issue, unsure if the e-Poll book registered her selection to move the screen to the next page or if she just was not tapping where she needed to with the stylus and she verbally said it was a glitch or glitching. She’s 80 years old, so I don’t blame her for being so confused on what is going on, and not having the technical ability to understand why this is

occurring and that it isn't a glitch, per se. This does not instill the kind of trust we are looking for in our elections. Most of the voters and Election Workers are not tech savvy, so we should go above and beyond the bare minimum to make things as smooth and easy as possible for all involved. I recommend adding more RAM with better CAS latency or equipping them with CPUs that have significantly better clock speeds. The routers are also outdated and I would highly recommend upgrading those as well to alleviate the stress on the e-Poll books CPUs, which is more than likely causing the latency issues. I would, bare minimum, supply Voting Centers with routers that have 1Gbps output speed capabilities. The easiest and most affordable solution is just to return to paper ballots with precinct only voting. Voters are already familiar with this methodology and they have the most trust in our election institution using this process. If Dallas County Elections truly cared about trust in our elections, it would return to paper ballots, as this is the best option for voters and election workers alike.


FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

Thomas Tran  
NAME, Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS       §  
                                  §  
COUNTY OF DALLAS   §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 12 day of November, 2023.

J. Colleen Canion  
Notary Public, State of Texas



Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I, Jennifer Lee Jenkins, make the following declaration:

Affiant supports in writing a cause that demonstrates Respondents' actions as outlined above in this complaint/petition violate several state and federal laws, which are against The People of Texas, and against the peace and dignity of the State.

On May 6th, 2023, I worked as an alternate election judge at University Park United Methodist Church vote location 2220. We serviced 464 voters that day. The poll books were set up across from the vote machines that day. In the morning we had several people ask us where the School Board was on the ballot. We explained that not everyone had School Board on their ballot. The voters seemed to be fine with that explanation, which we believed to be truthful.

Around noon a husband and wife came to vote together and went to the vote machines directly in front of my work station. The husband asked me where the School Board was on his ballot and I explained that not everyone was voting for School Board. He then explained that there were yard signs all over his neighborhood for School Board and he felt certain he was to vote this on his ballot. They finished voting and he was still lamenting when I brought this to our election judge's attention. She went over the Sample Ballot with the man and he pointed to the District 2 School Board election. At this point I witnessed both husband and wife's voter registration cards which said DA2 for the ISD portion. The election judge then called the judges hotline which took about an hour to get someone on the phone and was given no resolution. The election judge was thinking there could be a difference between D or DA on the ISD.

The husband and wife left while the election judge was on hold. The election judge did take down their name and number in case we had a resolution or should we need them to fill out an affidavit in the future.

A few hours later a woman came in to vote and asked where the School Board was on her ballot. I walked over to her but out of the way of the view screen and asked if she had her voter card on her which she did and it said she should be voting in DA2 for ISD. Having no resolution from earlier I just told her we had problems earlier and she should call the candidate and let them know we were having issues.

I am confident there were at least a dozen people that day asking about where the missing School Board was on their ballot.

(edited on November 11, 2023 with additional information)

At 8:04am the recorded registered voters is 1,389,234, Absentee 1,340, Early Voting 0, Check in 1. This is on poll book number 1808 which shows a Wi-Fi connection. We had no router issues this day.

At 10:02am Registered Voters is 1,389,234, Absentee is 1,340, Early Voting is 8, Check In 15.

At 12:06pm the Registered Voters is 1,388,144, Absentee 2,665, Early Voting is 50,752, Check In 29.

This poll book was the only poll book working alone in the morning. Meaning it was not aggregating/syncing with the others.

At 12:06pm it aggregates with the other 3 poll books. When this happens it's instant not catching up as was described by county officials in past. Now it reads Registered Voters 1,387,528, Absentee, 2,661, Early Voting 66,791, Check In 169.


At 12:32pm Registered Voters 1,387,528, Absentee 2,660, Early Voting 66,792, Check In 191.

At 1:34pm Registered Voters 1,387,528, Absentee 2,660, Early Voting 66,791, Check In 246.

Screen shot from county website the following day reads, Registered Voters 1,291,448, EV-in person 66,786, EV-Mail 2,188, EV-ED Provision 18, Election Day 45,205.

Executed this ~~September 18, 2023~~ <sup>November 13, 2023</sup>

Affiant: /s/ Jennifer Lee Jenkins



*Jennifer Lee Jenkins*  
*Susan A Fountain*  
*Witnessed*  
*11/13/23*

Jennifer Lee Jenkins  
8030 Fall River DR.  
Dallas, TX 75228

## AFFIDAVIT OF MADELINE DVOROCSIK

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day, in the above entitled and numbered cause, personally appeared before me, Madeline Dvorocsik, who being by me duly sworn, deposed and stated as follows:

“My name is Madeline Dvorocsik. I am over twenty-one (21) years of age, of sound mind, have never been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, and am fully qualified to make this Affidavit.

I served as the Republican Alternate Judge for the Voting Center at Paul L. Dunbar Library vote center E3043, for the Early Voting period beginning Monday, October 23, 2023, thru Wednesday, November 1, 2023.

The vote center used 3 E-Pollbooks (EPBs): 0295, 0296, and 0297. The serial number of the tabulator was DS0319341237. When the polls opened on Monday 10/23/23, the public count on the tabulator was zero (0), and the total check-ins on the EPBs was also zero (0). I worked at the vote center while it was open for voting on the following days and hours:

- Monday 10/23/23 through Friday 10/27/23 from 8:00am to 5:00pm
- Saturday 10/28/23 from 7:00am to 7:00pm
- Sunday 10/29/23 from 12:00pm to 6:00pm
- Monday 10/30/23 through Wednesday 11/1/23 from 7:00am to 7:00pm

I observed many instances in which the EPBs at our vote center had red clouds, yellow clouds, and yellow download symbols and in which the EPBs did not synchronize within the vote center. The following is a log of the instances in which I personally observed red clouds, yellow clouds, and yellow download symbols on the EPBs.

I personally observed multiple instances of the following circumstance: A voter was checked in one EPB while the cloud was red. After that voter voted, if I looked up the voter on another EPB in the vote center, the voter was denoted as not having voted because the EPBs were not syncing within the vote center.

When the EPBs were not syncing, the names on the voted list on one EPB would not appear on the voted list on another EPB within the vote center.

During all the days that I worked, no one checked in on EPB 0295, so all total for that EPB were zero (0).

Monday 10/23/23

- 29 votes total for day (per Today’s EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- All E-Pollbooks (EPBs) within the vote center had a red cloud and were not syncing within the vote center from open of polls until 12:23pm.

- At 12:23pm, the cloud was green for first time for that day, but the EPBs still were not synced within vote center.
- At 1:15pm, all EPBs were green and synced within vote center.
- **20 voters** voted at the vote center before 12:20pm, all while EPBs had red cloud and were not syncing (69% of the day's votes).

#### Tuesday 10/24/23

- 31 votes total for day (per Today's EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- All E-Pollbooks (EPBs) within vote center had red cloud and were not syncing within vote from open of polls until 9:33am.
- At 9:33am, the cloud was green on EPB 0296, but still red on EPB 0297.
- At 1:28pm, EPB 0297 had a green cloud with yellow download symbol. EPBs still were not synced within vote center.
- At 1:36pm, all EPBs were green and synced within vote center.
- **2 voters** voted at the vote center before 9:33am while EPBs had red cloud and were not syncing.
- One person came to vote about 10:15am. She had proper ID and her voter registration card. The voter registration card had effective date of 10/12/23, but she was not in the EPB. The vote center's Presiding Judge, Yvonne Williams, called Dallas County Voter Registration department (VR). According to Judge Williams, VR said there was delay in processing voters and that the voter should come back Monday of the second week of early voting to vote and that she should be processed by then. Judge Williams gave her the option to vote provisionally while she was there on 10/24, but the voter said she'd return the next week.

#### Wednesday 10/25/23

- 45 votes total for day (per Today's EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- EPBs mostly had green clouds throughout the day, but occasionally an EPB had a red cloud. EPBs did not always have red clouds at same time; sometimes one would be red and others green.
- Did not notice any voters voting while cloud was red.

#### Thursday 10/26/23

- 26 votes total for day (per Today's EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- Ballot Board member assigned to our location (Penne Collett) called and spoke to Judge Williams and me. She said their EPB was showing that our vote center had 43 voters for our location on the previous day, 10/25/23, but our daily report (including DS tabulator votes) and voter rosters showed 45 voters.
  - They identified two (2) voters whose names were on the voter rosters and whose individual EPB records (on the Ballot Board's EPB) showed they had voted on 10/25/23 at our location. But the two (2) voters were not on the Ballot Board's EPB

voted list. We pulled up the voted lists on the vote center's EPBs, and both voters were on the voted lists for 10/25/23:

- Voter #8 on EPB 0296 Relema Hargove
- Voter #15 on EPB 0297 Carolyn Dumas
- Ballot Board asked if we had edited any voters or had any computer glitches. We said that we had not edited anyone and that the only computer glitches we experienced were the EPBs having red cloud and/or yellow download symbol periodically throughout the day.

#### Friday 10/27/23

- 62 votes total for day (per Today's EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- All E-Pollbooks (EPBs) within vote center had red cloud and were not syncing within vote center from open of polls until 12:05pm.
- At 12:05pm, the cloud was green for first time for that day on all EPBs with yellow download symbol, but EPBs still were not synced within vote center.
- At 12:26pm, all EPBs had green cloud and were synced within vote center.
- From 3:50pm to 4:56pm, EPB 0296 had red cloud and was not syncing within vote center. EPB 0297 had green cloud during that time.
- At 4:56pm, EPB 0296 had green cloud with yellow download symbol.
- At 5:04pm, EPB 0296 had green cloud and was synced with rest of vote center.
- **26 voters** voted at the vote center had before 12:05pm, all while EPBs had red cloud and were not syncing.

#### Saturday 10/28/23

- 21 votes total for day (per Today's EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- All E-Pollbooks (EPBs) within vote center had red cloud and were not syncing within vote center from open of polls at 7:00am until 8:02am.
- At 8:02am, the cloud was green for first time for that day, but EPBs still were not synced within vote center.
- At 8:07am, all EPBs were green and synced within vote center.
- **3 voters** voted at the vote center before 8:02am, all while EPBs had red cloud and were not syncing.

#### Sunday 10/29/23

- 6 voters total for day (per Today's EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- From 11:45am to 12:20pm, all EPBs had red cloud, but no voters voted during that time.

#### Monday 10/30/23

- 36 votes total for day (per Today’s EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- The EPBs did not sync accurately for the day’s voting. At the close of polls, I observed the following:
  - On EPB 0296, the voted list showed 20 voters on EPB 0296 and 15 voters on EPB 0297, for a total of 35 check-ins for the day. The paper Voter Roster for EPB 0296 listed 20 voters.
  - On EPB 0297, the voted list showed 19 voters on EPB 0296 and 16 voters on EPB 0297, for a total of 35 check-ins for the day. The paper Voter Roster for EPB 0297 listed 16 votes.
  - The tabulator showed 36 votes for the day (close of 256 less open of 220).
  - I personally reviewed the names of all voters for the day in the EPBs and on the paper Voter Rosters.
  - I discovered that voter William James Terrell was missing from the EPB’s voted list **on EPB 0296**. When I pulled up his individual vote record on EPB 0296, his voter history said he voted at 3:32pm. His name was on the paper Voter Roster for EP 0297 and on the voted list on EPB 0297.
  - I then discovered that voter Patricia Lane was missing from the EPB’s voted list **on EPB 0297**. When I pulled up her individual vote record, her voter history said she voted at 2:13pm. Her name was on the paper Voter Roster for EP 0296 and on the voted list on EPB 0296. I checked in Patricia Lane myself on EPB 0296 and therefore know she checked in and voted. I did not observe that the cloud was red when I checked in Patricia Lane.
  - The EPBs never synced correctly on 10/30/23, even after polls closed when the cloud was green on all EPBs. Each EPB left off 1 voter from the voted list for the day, but the specific voter left off varied by EPB. The EPB Closing Count also was incorrect by 1 vote, showing 255 instead of what should have been 256. The DS tabulator Closing Public Count was 256.
  - Because of these syncing errors, the EPB total check-ins for the day of 35 was erroneously 1 vote less than the accurate vote total of 36 as shown on the DS. That was true at the close of polls on Monday 10/30/23 and remained the same through the close of polls on Wednesday 11/1/23, the last time I worked at the vote center. In other words, the EPBs synced incorrectly on 10/30/23 and never corrected themselves.
  - On the Daily Report, Judge Williams wrote 36 as the “Total E-Pollbook Check-ins” even though the EPBs all said the amount was 35. I therefore did not sign the Daily Report that day. She did include the following in the judge’s notes section of the report: “E-Pollbook shows 255 total & DS200 shows 256 total.”

Tuesday 10/31/23

- 45 votes total for day (per Today’s EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- EPB Closing Count: 255; Closing Public Count on DS tabulator: 256

Wednesday 11/1/23


- 34 votes total for day (per Today’s EPB Check-ins, Voter Roster Check-ins, and Ballots Cast on Tabulator)
- EPB Closing Count: 334; Closing Public Count on DS tabulator: 335
- All EPBs were red at open of polls. The poll worker management function was not working.
- At 12:05pm until 12:13pm and then again from 4:13pm to 5:45pm, EPB 0296 showed a **yellow cloud** (not a yellow download symbol). At 12:13, the cloud switched to green. At 5:45pm, the cloud switched from yellow to red; at 6:03pm, all EPBs showed green cloud.
- I observed 2 voters voting while the cloud was not green.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.”

*Madeline Dvorocik*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Madeline Dvorocik Affiant

STATE OF TEXAS           §  
   §  
 COUNTY OF DALLAS       §

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, on this the 17<sup>th</sup> day of NOVEMBER, 2023.



*Susan A Fountain*  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Notary Public, State of Texas

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746, I, Jennifer Lee Jenkins, hereby declare, under penalty of perjury, that I have full personal knowledge of the events and matters set forth herein, and that the following is true and accurate.

I am over 18 years of age and competent to make the following representations.

I am a citizen of the State of Texas and have legal standing to assert my rights.

Tuesday, November 7, 2023 I worked for Dallas County Elections as an Election Clerk at UPUMC V-2220, 4024 Caruth Blvd. Dallas, Tx 75225. This is my account of working that day.

We had 5 e-poll books at our location. In the morning one of our e-poll books was not functioning and someone from the county came by and replaced it with a working e-poll book.

This poll book is number 0507. This is important to note as this is the only poll book that is accurate at the close of day with a reading of 307 Issued, 1 Reissued, 306 Checked In at 8:02 pm.

This matches the hand written ledger for the day.

The second thing of note in the morning is that our Wi-Fi router is not able to connect and a technician was called. All poll book times were operating one hour ahead as they had not been adjusted with daylight savings time. The technician arrives sometime between 3:00pm - 4:00pm.

Wi-Fi is now working. The poll books started being slow to respond in the morning around 10:00, meaning that when someone handed me their drivers license to scan you would get no response and there was no way to see if it was just a slow system or we needed to enter their name manually. While the Wi-Fi technician was there he said they were all functioning slow since there was record turn outs for the election. I find it curious if we are not connected to the internet why would our poll books be slow? Once connected to Wi-Fi they remained slow.

We were very busy throughout the day and somewhere around 5:00pm I am now at the judges poll book so the the alternate judge can check in and make ready more ballots, while she does

this task I check in voters on poll book number 2214. At approximately 6:45 I look at my poll book which shows I have checked in 215 people and I look and my hand written ledger which shows 182 and I ask the judge to come look at my screen and tell me what is going on. The judge then instructs me to record the screen for county and I capture the poll book check ins rising every one minute from 6:47pm - 7:27pm when it finally stops increasing. The final numbers on the poll book is 1,674 Issued, 2 Reissued, 1,672 Checked In. The Total count for UPUMC as an aggregate on check in's should be 1,608 (we had one spoiled ballot from a fleeing voter). The total voted on the tabulator DS200 at the end of the night was 1,607. My detailed video shows we went over the threshold of checkins at 7:20pm.

7:20pm 1,618 Check In

7:21pm 1,625

7:22pm 1,610 (at this time the Check In drops)

7:22pm 1,635

7:23pm 1,647

7:25pm 1,658

7:26pm 1,671

7:27pm 1,672 (final)

At 6:54am I recorded 1,409,632 Registered Voters, 4,297 Absentee, 37,877 Early Voting on poll book number 2216.

6:50pm I recorded 1,408,753 Registered Voters, 4,271 Absentee, 60,875 Early voting on poll book number 2214.


I have a screenshot from the county website showing 1,412,325 Registered Voters, 3,057 Absentee, 60,876 Early Voting, taken the following morning November 8, 2023.

I declare under penalty of perjury that I personally know that all the allegations are true and correct. Executed this ~~Friday~~ <sup>Monday</sup> 13<sup>9</sup> / 23, November 10, 2023.

*Jennifer Lee Jenkins*

*Witnessed  
Susan A Fountain  
11/13/23*

Jennifer Lee Jenkins  
jenxcorp@me.com  
214-537-5024



---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 21, 2023 4:01 PM  
**To:** Jane Nelson; Jane Nelson (Personal)  
**Cc:** Beauregard Hanley; Dean Mitchell; Elizabeth Rice; Alicia Pierce; Carlos Ealy; Adam Bitter; Kim Bergmann; Zeenia Challa  
**Subject:** FYI Memo

**FYI MEMORANDUM**

**Date: 11/21/23**

---

**CALLS TO RETURN:**

**SCHEDULING:**

Monday, November 27: 9:00AM – Mtg: Senior Staff (877-226-9790; Code: [REDACTED])

#Canvass – Constitutional Election Results

6:00PM – AA857-AUS ([REDACTED])

Tuesday, November 28: 10:30AM – OV: Parker/O’Grady

1:00PM: OVs w/ Staff (1pm-4pm)

6:30PM: AA1060-DFW ([REDACTED])

December 13<sup>th</sup> Flight from DFW to AUS has been updated to the 11:15am flight. (kb)

\_\_Received an email today from the Consul General of Ukraine. There will be a senior level delegation of Ukrainian Parliamentarians visiting Texas next week and are requesting a meeting on Tuesday, Nov. 28 to brief you about the situation in Ukraine and talk about broadening cooperation between Ukraine and Texas. Delegation: Oleksandra Ustinova – Head of the “Holos” (“Voice”) Party and member of the Law Enforcement Committee; Mariia Mezentseva – Deputy Chairperson of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union; Consul General Tarasuik. \_\_Accept \_\_Decline; If Accept \_11:45am \_Noon (kb)

New on Calendar: January 9: 4:30PM – AA1088-LBB ([REDACTED])

January 10: 6:30PM – AA839-DFW ([REDACTED])


**MEDIA/COMMS:**

Thanksgiving Day post:



Saturday post:

Texas is the best state for business, including small and independent businesses. On this Small Business Saturday consider shopping locally.



**AGENCY / DIVISION NOTES:**

**STAFF NOTES:**

Purchase Request has been submitted for 45 folders. (kb)

FedExing a packet to you this afternoon. You will receive it tomorrow. Tracking #: [REDACTED]. (kb)

Secretary, have a safe and happy Thanksgiving with your family!

**BUZZ:**

**STAFF CALENDAR:**

Beau out of office/teleworking next week 11/21 and 11/22/23 (bh)

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8  
Dec 18  
Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

**From:** Jane Nelson <sjn2012@att.net>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 21, 2023 9:17 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann  
**Cc:** Jane Nelson; Elizabeth Rice; Alicia Pierce; Adam Bitter  
**Subject:** Re: FYI Memo

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 21, 2023, at 4:00 PM, Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

## **FYI MEMORANDUM**

**Date: 11/21/23**

### **CALLS TO RETURN:**

### **SCHEDULING:**

Monday, November 27: 9:00AM – Mtg: Senior Staff (877-226-9790; Code:

██████████ #)

#Canvass – Constitutional Election Results

6:00PM – AA857-AUS (██████████)

Tuesday, November 28: 10:30AM – OV: Parker/O’Grady

1:00PM: OVs w/ Staff (1pm-4pm)

6:30PM: AA1060-DFW ██████████

December 13<sup>th</sup> Flight from DFW to AUS has been updated to the 11:15am flight.  
(kb)

\_\_ Received an email today from the Consul General of Ukraine. There will be a senior level delegation of Ukrainian Parliamentarians visiting Texas next week and are requesting a meeting on Tuesday, Nov. 28 to brief you about the situation in Ukraine and talk about broadening cooperation between Ukraine and Texas. Delegation: Oleksandra Ustinova – Head of the “Holos” (“Voice”) Party and member of the Law Enforcement Committee; Mariia Mezentseva – Deputy Chairperson of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the European Union; Consul General Tarasuik. \_\_ Accept \_\_ Decline; If Accept \_ 11:45am \_ Noon

(kb) \*\*accept for noon but let them know we can only allow 20 min at such late notice.

New on Calendar: January 9: 4:30PM – AA1088-LBB [REDACTED]  
January 10: 6:30PM – AA839-DFW [REDACTED]

**MEDIA/COMMS:**

Thanksgiving Day post:  
<image001.jpg>

Saturday post:

Texas is the best state for business, including small and independent businesses. On this Small Business Saturday consider shopping locally.

<image002.jpg>

**AGENCY / DIVISION NOTES:**

**STAFF NOTES:**

Purchase Request has been submitted for 45 folders. (kb)

FedExing a packet to you this afternoon. You will receive it tomorrow. Tracking #: [REDACTED]. (kb)

Secretary, have a safe and happy Thanksgiving with your family!

**BUZZ:**

**STAFF CALENDAR:**

Beau out of office/teleworking next week 11/21 and 11/22/23 (bh)

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 9:56 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Great! Also, will Sen. Parker and/or staff be attending as well? I assume so, but wanted to make sure.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 3:33 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000285

Capitol Building, Room 1E.8

(512) 463-5702

[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann

**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM

**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to

Secretary of State Jane Nelson

Capitol Building, Room 1E.8

(512) 463-5702

[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

512.463.0112

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000286

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 9:34 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah!

Would you mind giving me a quick call today when you have a few minutes. My direct line is 512-463-5702.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

AMERICAN OVERSIGHT  
On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000288

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 9:42 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000291

To: Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

Subject: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8  
Dec 18  
Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112



TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000293

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:16 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

I just like to inform the Secretary who all will be in the meeting. We have room.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:08 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

We had planned on having him staffed with myself or our Dept. Chief, but if that's too many people for y'all, just say the word! He'll be fine by himself!

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 9:56 AM



TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000295

**To:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Great! Also, will Sen. Parker and/or staff be attending as well? I assume so, but wanted to make sure.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 27, 2023 3:08 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! Still good for tomorrow! Our Dept Chief, Nick Eastwood, will be staffing the Senator! Thank you, again for all of your help with scheduling! I appreciate you!

Best,

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 27, 2023, at 1:08 PM, Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Hope you had a great Thanksgiving! Just confirming that we are still on for tomorrow's meeting?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:16 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

I just like to inform the Secretary who all will be in the meeting. We have room.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000299

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:08 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

We had planned on having him staffed with myself or our Dept. Chief, but if that's too many people for y'all, just say the word! He'll be fine by himself!

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 9:56 AM  
**To:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Great! Also, will Sen. Parker and/or staff be attending as well? I assume so, but wanted to make sure.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann  
<[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:08 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

We had planned on having him staffed with myself or our Dept. Chief, but if that's too many people for y'all, just say the word! He'll be fine by himself!

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 9:56 AM  
**To:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Great! Also, will Sen. Parker and/or staff be attending as well? I assume so, but wanted to make sure.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000304

512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000305

(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8  
Dec 18  
Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

Hi Savannah:

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000311

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8

Dec 18

Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**

*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*

*Office of Senator Tan Parker*

*512.463.0112*

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 27, 2023 7:08 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Hope you had a great Thanksgiving! Just confirming that we are still on for tomorrow's meeting?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:16 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

I just like to inform the Secretary who all will be in the meeting. We have room.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)



---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:08 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

We had planned on having him staffed with myself or our Dept. Chief, but if that's too many people for y'all, just say the word! He'll be fine by himself!

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 9:56 AM  
**To:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Great! Also, will Sen. Parker and/or staff be attending as well? I assume so, but wanted to make sure.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8  
Dec 18  
Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 27, 2023 3:48 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann'  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Thank you so much Savannah! Yes, I talked with Nick earlier. Hope you had a great Thanksgiving!

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 27, 2023 3:08 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <KBergmann@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! Still good for tomorrow! Our Dept Chief, Nick Eastwood, will be staffing the Senator! Thank you, again for all of your help with scheduling! I appreciate you!

Best,

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 27, 2023, at 1:08 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Hope you had a great Thanksgiving! Just confirming that we are still on for tomorrow's meeting?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000317

[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:16 AM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

I just like to inform the Secretary who all will be in the meeting. We have room.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 10:08 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

We had planned on having him staffed with myself or our Dept. Chief, but if that's too many people for y'all, just say the word! He'll be fine by himself!

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Thursday, November 16, 2023 9:56 AM

**To:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Great! Also, will Sen. Parker and/or staff be attending as well? I assume so, but wanted to make sure.

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 10:30 PM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Yes ma'am! They do!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 15, 2023, at 3:33 PM, Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Savannah:

Just wanted to double check, they know the meeting is only for an hour correct?

Best,  
Kim

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 12:52 PM

**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim!

Apologies! I thought I answered, and it got put in my drafts.

He could do the 28th anytime before 1:00pm or after 3:45pm!

Savannah Mann  
Policy Analyst/ Scheduler  
Office of Senator Tan Parker  
512.463.0112

On Nov 14, 2023, at 9:41 AM, Kim Bergmann  
<[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Hi Savannah:

Just checking to see if you saw the email below that I sent yesterday.

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8  
(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 1:55 PM  
**To:** 'Savannah Mann' <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** RE: Potential Dates

Hi Savannah:

Does Senator Parker have any availability the week after Thanksgiving?

Best,

*Kim Bergmann*

Executive Assistant/Scheduler to  
Secretary of State Jane Nelson  
Capitol Building, Room 1E.8

(512) 463-5702  
[kbergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:kbergmann@sos.texas.gov)

<image001.jpg>

---

**From:** Savannah Mann <[Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov](mailto:Savannah.Mann@senate.texas.gov)>  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 11:35 AM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann <[KBergmann@sos.texas.gov](mailto:KBergmann@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Potential Dates

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please report this email as an attachment to [informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Hi, Kim

Below are a few dates that could work for Senator Parker:

Dec 8  
Dec 18  
Dec 19

Let me know if any of these work for Secretary Nelson! If not, we will keep trying!

Best,

**Savannah Mann**  
*Policy Analyst/ Scheduler*  
*Office of Senator Tan Parker*  
512.463.0112

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message, including any attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipients and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail, delete this message and destroy all copies thereof.

---

**Subject:** Tan Parker Meeting (Election Integrity)  
**Location:** SOS Exec Office

**Start:** Tue 11/28/2023 10:30 AM  
**End:** Tue 11/28/2023 11:30 AM  
**Show Time As:** Tentative

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Meeting Status:** Not yet responded

**Organizer:** Adam Bitter  
**Required Attendees**Christina Adkins

I can't tell from the Secretary's calendar if you were included on her calendar appointment for this meeting.

How to appeal the withholding of information under Government Code Section 552.130

If you wish to appeal the withholding of information discussed on the previous page, you must send the following to the attorney general:

- 1) a signed, written statement indicating your wish to appeal the withholding of information;
- 2) the name of the governmental body that withheld information from you;
- 3) the date you made your original request for information; and
- 4) a copy of your original request for information, or if you are unable to provide a copy, a description of your original request for information.

You may also submit written comments stating why you think the information should be released to you, but you are not required to do so.

Send your appeal by mail to the attorney general at:

Open Records Division  
P.O. Box 12548  
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Within forty-five business days after receiving all of the above-listed items necessary to file your appeal, the attorney general will issue a written ruling on the matter. You will receive a copy of this ruling in the mail.

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Friday, February 2, 2024 12:04 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219  
**Attachments:** 2-2-24 10 Day Letter to Requestor - Pressley PIR 23-1219.pdf; 2-2-24 10 Day Letter to OAG - Pressley PIR 23-1219.pdf

Good afternoon,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your clarified Request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 9:24 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good morning,

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CADkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CADkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.  
Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000325

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

 The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000326

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000327

To: Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*  
"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." -  
*2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

# The State of Texas

Executive Division  
Capitol Building, 1E.8  
P.O. Box 12697  
Austin, Texas 78711-2697



Phone: 512-463-5770  
Fax: 512-475-2761  
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services  
www.sos.texas.gov

Jane Nelson  
Secretary of State

February 2, 2024

Laura Pressley

***Sent via Electronic Mail to:*** [REDACTED]

Re: Clarified request for records, considered received: January 18, 2024 (SOS PIR No. 23-1219)

Dear Dr. Pressley:

This letter responds to your clarified request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was sent to the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”) via email, after business hours, on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024 (the “January 18 Request”).<sup>1</sup> Your original request was sent to the Office via email on Sunday, December 10, 2023 and was considered received on Monday, December 11, 2023 (the “December 11 Request”).

In the December 11 Request, you stated:

*For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:*

- *notes (written and electronic),*
- *list of attendees (written and electronic)*
- *emails,*
- *presentations (hard copies and electronic),*
- *reports (hard copies and electronic)*
- *proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)*

On December 28, 2023, we asked you to clarify or narrow the December 11 Request in certain respects. In response, you clarified the scope of information encompassed by your inquiry.

We are processing the January 18 Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. To that end, we require additional time to review our records and produce responsive information. We will provide you responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from

disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on February 9, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

The Office asserts that certain information responsive to the January 18 Request is protected from disclosure under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code. Accordingly, the Office is requesting a decision from the Texas Attorney General as to whether it may withhold this information.

**NOTICE PURSUANT TO SEC. 552.301**

As indicated above, this letter provides you with notice that the Secretary of State has requested a decision from the Texas Attorney General regarding whether certain information relating to the January 18 Request may be withheld under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code. Enclosed is a copy of the request for decision from the Texas Attorney General.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact our office at (512) 463-5770.

Sincerely,



Adam Bitter  
General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov  
AB/jw

Enclosure

# The State of Texas

Executive Division  
Capitol Building, 1E.8  
P.O. Box 12697  
Austin, Texas 78711-2697



Phone: 512-463-5770  
Fax: 512-475-2761  
Dial 7-1-1 For Relay Services  
[www.sos.texas.gov](http://www.sos.texas.gov)

Jane Nelson  
Secretary of State

February 2, 2024

Office of the Attorney General  
Open Records Division  
300 W. 15th Street  
Austin, TX 78701

## *Via Hand Delivery*

Re: Clarified request for records, considered received: January 18, 2024 (SOS PIR No. 24-1219)

Dear General Paxton:

On Sunday, December 10, 2023, the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (“Office”) received a written request for information from Laura Pressley (the “Requestor”) under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”). On December 28, 2023, we asked the Requestor to clarify certain items in the request (considered received on December 11, 2023). On January 17, 2024, after business hours, the Requestor responded with a clarified request (the “January 18 Request”). Copies of the Requestor’s initial request, the Office’s December 28 letter, and the Requestor’s January 18 Request are attached as Exhibit A. I hand-delivered this letter to the Open Records Division on February 2, 2024.<sup>1</sup>

The Office asserts that certain information responsive to the January 18 Request is excepted from disclosure under the PIA. The Office understands that certain information requested by the Requestor may be excepted from disclosure under Sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, and 552.111 of the Texas Government Code. Specifically, the Secretary invokes all of the exceptions provided by, and the exceptions incorporated into, Sections 552.101 through 552.162 of the PIA, including, without limitation, Sections 552.101, 552.103, 552.107, and 552.111.

Pursuant to Section 552.301(a) of the PIA, this letter is submitted in order to seek a decision as to whether the exceptions apply. To assist in your review, the Office will provide a brief of written comments and copies, or a representative sample, of the responsive documents not later than the 15th business day from the date that the January 18 Request is considered received by the Office.

Should you need additional information, please feel free to contact me at (512) 463-5770.

Sincerely,



Adam Bitter  
General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State  
generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov  
AB/jw

Enclosure

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 4:39 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Jennifer,

Thank you for the clarification regarding the *receipt date* is not counted as one of the business days.

Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, January 22, 2024 3:34 PM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good afternoon,

Here is how we are calculating the business days under the PIA. Your email was submitted to our Office after business hours on January 17, 2024. Therefore, under the PIA, it is considered received during business hours on January 18, 2024 (the date the request is received is not counted towards the 10 business days). January 19, 2024 is not counted and it is not considered a business day as our Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis in observance of [Confederate Heroes Day](#) according to the State Holiday Schedule. The first business day after the date the request was considered received by our Office is today, January 22, 2024.

January 18 – Request is considered received – not counted as a business day

January 19 – Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis – not counted as a business day

January 22 – 1<sup>st</sup> business day after the date the request was considered received

January 23 – 2<sup>nd</sup> business day

January 24 – 3<sup>rd</sup> business day

January 25 – 4<sup>th</sup> business day

January 26 – 5<sup>th</sup> business day

January 29 – 6<sup>th</sup> business day

January 30 – 7<sup>th</sup> business day

January 31 – 8<sup>th</sup> business day

February 1 – 9<sup>th</sup> business day

February 2 – 10<sup>th</sup> business day.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 2:55 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000335

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Jennifer,

Thank you for the email. Note that the Secretary may only designate not more than 10 nonbusiness days each calendar year as specified by Tex. Gov't Code [552.0031\(f\)](#). Please let Mr. Bitter know that we are counting Feb. 19th as one of the Secretary's 10 nonbusiness days for 2024.

With January 19th as a nonbusiness day designation, then it appears the 10th business day is Feb. 1st, not Feb. 2nd. For PIR 23-1219, are there more days considered nonbusiness days other than January 19th for this request?

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, January 22, 2024 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you

believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.

Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,

Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.  
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>;  
Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS  
ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me,  
delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:**

[REDACTED]  
>

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins  
<[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of  
State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County  
Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" -  
*1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE  
TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please  
notify me, delete this email and do not use  
or distribute this email.**



---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 3:35 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good afternoon,

Here is how we are calculating the business days under the PIA. Your email was submitted to our Office after business hours on January 17, 2024. Therefore, under the PIA, it is considered received during business hours on January 18, 2024 (the date the request is received is not counted towards the 10 business days). January 19, 2024 is not counted and it is not considered a business day as our Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis in observance of [Confederate Heroes Day](#) according to the State Holiday Schedule. The first business day after the date the request was considered received by our Office is today, January 22, 2024.

January 18 – Request is considered received – not counted as a business day  
January 19 – Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis – not counted as a business day  
January 22 – 1<sup>st</sup> business day after the date the request was considered received  
January 23 – 2<sup>nd</sup> business day  
January 24 – 3<sup>rd</sup> business day  
January 25 – 4<sup>th</sup> business day  
January 26 – 5<sup>th</sup> business day  
January 29 – 6<sup>th</sup> business day  
January 30 – 7<sup>th</sup> business day  
January 31 – 8<sup>th</sup> business day  
February 1 – 9<sup>th</sup> business day  
February 2 – 10<sup>th</sup> business day.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 2:55 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Jennifer,

Thank you for the email. Note that the Secretary may only designate not more than 10 nonbusiness days each calendar year as specified by Tex. Gov't Code [552.0031\(f\)](#). Please let Mr. Bitter know that we are counting Feb. 19th as one of the Secretary's 10 nonbusiness days for 2024.

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000344

With January 19th as a nonbusiness day designation, then it appears the 10th business day is Feb. 1st, not Feb. 2nd. For PIR 23-1219, are there more days considered nonbusiness days other than January 19th for this request?

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, January 22, 2024 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.

Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,

Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

 AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000346

313-720-5471

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of  
State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General  
Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of

your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for you help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS  
ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me,  
delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**



---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 2:55 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** Re: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Jennifer,

Thank you for the email. Note that the Secretary may only designate not more than 10 nonbusiness days each calendar year as specified by Tex. Gov't Code [552.0031\(f\)](#). Please let Mr. Bitter know that we are counting Feb. 19th as one of the Secretary's 10 nonbusiness days for 2024.

With January 19th as a nonbusiness day designation, then it appears the 10th business day is Feb. 1st, not Feb. 2nd. For PIR 23-1219, are there more days considered nonbusiness days other than January 19th for this request?

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, January 22, 2024 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000352

skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>

**Cc:** Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>

**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000353

Thank you in advance for your help.

Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,

Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.  
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do  
not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information  
under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000354

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." -  
*2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of  
State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General  
Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of  
your request for information under the Public Information  
Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of  
the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need  
clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for your help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS  
ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me,  
delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 9:24 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good morning,

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins <CADkins@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.  
Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,  
Laura

Laura Pressley, Ph.D.  
Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC  
313-720-5471

OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000359

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000360

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to

and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,
- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for you help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." -  
*2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Friday, March 15, 2024 8:05 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins; GeneralCounsel  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219  
**Attachments:** 11.28.23 Calendar entries\_Redacted.pdf; FYI Memo (5)\_Redacted.pdf; FYI Memo (6)\_Redacted.pdf; FYI Memo (7).pdf; How to appeal the withholding of information under 552.136.pdf

Good morning,

As a follow up to our February 9 email, please see the attached documents responsive to your clarified Request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

The information you requested contains access device numbers that are collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body. This information is confidential under section 552.136 of the Texas Government Code. Section 552.136 allows us to withhold this specific information without requesting a ruling from the attorney general. You have the right to appeal our decision to withhold this information from you. Instructions for appeal are attached. If you do not want to appeal, you do not need to do anything else.

In addition, certain other information has been redacted from the attached production pending the determination from the Attorney General's Open Records Division on our request for a ruling.

We appreciate your patience as we continue to process your request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. We require additional time to review our records and produce additional responsive documents. We will provide you any additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on April 12, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, February 9, 2024 11:51 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>; Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good morning,

Please see the attached letters, with enclosures, in response to your clarified Request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

The responsive documents contain email addresses of the general public. An email address of a member of the public is confidential under section 552.137 of the Texas Government Code. The attorney general authorized all governmental bodies to withhold an email address of a member of the public without first requesting an attorney general opinion in Open Records Decision No. 684 (2009). Thus, this information has been redacted.

The information you requested also contains information that relates to a motor vehicle operator's or driver's license or permit issued by an agency of this state or another state or country. This information is confidential under section 552.130 of the Texas Government Code. Section 552.130 allows us to withhold this specific information without requesting a ruling from the attorney general. You have the right to appeal our decision to withhold this information from you. Instructions for appeal are also attached. If you do not want to appeal, you do not need to do anything else.

The information you requested contains access device numbers that are collected, assembled, or maintained by or for a governmental body. This information is confidential under section 552.136 of the Texas Government Code. Section 552.136 allows us to withhold this specific information without requesting a ruling from the attorney general. You have the right to appeal our decision to withhold this information from you. Instructions for appeal are attached. If you do not want to appeal, you do not need to do anything else.

In addition, dates of birth have been redacted from the attached production pending the determination from the Attorney General's Open Records Division on our request for a ruling.

As stated in the attached letter, we require more time to continue reviewing our records and produce additional responsive information. We will provide you additional responsive documents—to the extent such information is not excepted from disclosure under state or federal law—by 5:00 p.m. on March 15, 2024. *See* Tex. Gov't Code § 552.221(d).

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Sent:** Friday, February 2, 2024 12:04 PM

**To:** [REDACTED] >

**Cc:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good afternoon,

Please see the attached letter, with enclosure, in response to your clarified Request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Monday, January 22, 2024 9:24 AM

**To:** [REDACTED] >

**Subject:** RE: Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

Good morning,

 AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000365

This email acknowledges receipt of your clarified Request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was sent to the Office via email after business hours on January 17, 2024 and is considered received on January 18, 2024. Please note that the Office operated on a skeleton-crew basis on January 19, 2024. Therefore, the 10th business day from the date that the clarified Request was considered received by the Office will be February 2, 2024.

Kind regards,

*Jennifer Williams*

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, January 17, 2024 7:45 PM  
**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Cc:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Pressley Response - Open Records Request - SOS PIR 23-1219

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter,

Hope you are doing well. This attached letter responds to your December 28, 2023 request for clarification for SOS PIR No. 23-01219. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact my office at (313) 720-5471 or at the e-mail address listed above.

Thank you in advance for your help.  
Copying Mrs. Adkins.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**



TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000366

On Thursday, December 28, 2023 9:23 AM, GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Please see the attached letter in response to your request for information under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams

Legal Assistant to the General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, December 11, 2023 10:31 AM

**To:** GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>; Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Re: Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina and Ms. Williams,

Thank you.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.  
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do  
not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, December 11, 2023 10:27 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Good morning,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. Your email was forwarded to the Office's General Counsel for response. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Kind regards,

Jennifer Williams  
Legal Assistant to the General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Sunday, December 10, 2023 4:55:23 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Open Records Request - Sec. of State Jane Nelson Meeting with Dallas County Rep. Party Chair

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Christina,

Hope you are doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code chapter 552.

For the meeting with the Texas Secretary of State Jane Nelson and the Dallas County Republican Party Chair (and others) that occurred in November 2023, please produce the following documents related to and/or discussed at, that meeting and any other meeting after that related to it for the dates of November 1, 2023 through December 10, 2023:

- notes (written and electronic),
- list of attendees (written and electronic)
- emails,

- presentations (hard copies and electronic),
- reports (hard copies and electronic)
- proposals/plans (hard copies and electronic)

Thank you for you help.  
Electronic copies of these documents are sufficient.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." -  
*2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**

## Kim Bergmann

---

**Subject:** OV: Parker/O'Grady

**Start:** Tue 11/28/2023 10:30 AM  
**End:** Tue 11/28/2023 10:30 AM

**Recurrence:** (none)

**Organizer:** Jane Nelson



---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Wednesday, November 15, 2023 4:09 PM  
**To:** Jane Nelson; Jane Nelson (Personal)  
**Cc:** Beauregard Hanley; Dean Mitchell; Elizabeth Rice; Alicia Pierce; Carlos Ealy; Adam Bitter; Kim Bergmann; Zeenia Challa  
**Subject:** FYI Memo

**FYI MEMORANDUM**

**Date: 11/15/23**

---

**CALLS TO RETURN:**

**SCHEDULING:**

**New on Calendar:** Monday, November 27: #Canvass – Constitutional Amendments  
6PM – AA857-AUS ( )  
Tuesday, November 28: 10:30AM – OV: Parker/O’Grady  
1PM – OVs w/ Staff (1pm-4pm)  
6:30PM – AA1060-DFW ( )

**MEDIA/COMMS:**

We have requested appointments from the Governor and Lt. Governor for the Election Advisory Committee which is the committee of members of the media and other stakeholders who come together to coordinate the release of election night results to the press. You will also get to appoint six members. I will send over a list of recommended appointments. (app)

**AGENCY / DIVISION NOTES:**

**STAFF NOTES:**

**BUZZ:**

**STAFF CALENDAR:**

Wednesday- Briefing with BTAC Member Stan Meador of Texas Pacifico Transportation (ce)

---

**From:** Elizabeth Rice  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 14, 2023 4:06 PM  
**To:** Kim Bergmann; Jane Nelson; Jane Nelson (Personal)  
**Cc:** Beauregard Hanley; Dean Mitchell; Alicia Pierce; Carlos Ealy; Adam Bitter; Zeenia Challa  
**Subject:** FYI Memo

**FYI MEMORANDUM**

**Date: 11/14/23**

---

**CALLS TO RETURN:**

**SCHEDULING:**

\_\_ U.S. Election Assistance Commissioner, Don Palmer, will be in Austin on Monday, December 4, and is requesting a meeting with you or member of staff. \_\_ Accept \_\_ Decline \_\_ Offer staff (kb)

\_\_ Received notice that the Governor's Hanukkah Celebration will be on Sunday, December 10. There will be a Menorah lighting at 4:30pm (SOS normally does not attend this) and a reception at 5:30pm. I know last year Secretary Scott did not attend. (I don't believe staff attended either.) \_\_ Attend \_\_ Decline \_\_ Staff Attend (kb/br)

\_\_ Received an invite today from Sen. LaMantia to attend a Ladies weekend at the LaMantia's Delores Ranch in Laredo, TX for Friday, December 15 – Sunday, December 17. \_\_ Accept \_\_ Decline (kb)

\_\_ Heard back from Sen. Parker's office. He has availability on Tuesday, November 28<sup>th</sup>, any time before 1pm or after 3:45pm. Thoughts? (kb)


**MEDIA/COMMS:**

**AGENCY / DIVISION NOTES:**

**STAFF NOTES:**

We learned today that the power will not be shut down at the Capitol over the Thanksgiving break (because of special session). However, our office will still schedule a clean-out of the fridge/freezer before the break. (br)

Emailed an update and a couple of questions about the protocol posting. Also emailed draft of staff holiday letter. (br)



I spoke to Adriana Cruz about the El Paso Company you two met with in Europe. It is [Schneider Electric](#), and they are actually a French company that recently built a new “engineer-to-order” smart manufacturing facility in El Paso. This facility is the company’s largest manufacturing hub in the US. Let me know if you would like me to reach out to them and invite them to the next BTAC meeting or if you would like to tour their facilities while we are out there. (ce)

**BUZZ:**

Comfort (tour guide) said to say hello to you and to please let you know her daughter has been accepted to St. Andrew’s (England) for her graduate degree. Daughter is waiting to also hear back from Oxford, and will be studying cybersecurity. (br)

Saw former Sen. Larry Taylor in hallway. (br)

**STAFF CALENDAR:**

Out of office - flu (bh)

Wednesday- Briefing with BTAC Member Stan Meador of Texas Pacifico Transportation (ce)

---

**From:** Kim Bergmann  
**Sent:** Monday, November 13, 2023 4:02 PM  
**To:** Jane Nelson; Jane Nelson (Personal)  
**Cc:** Beauregard Hanley; Dean Mitchell; Elizabeth Rice; Alicia Pierce; Carlos Ealy; Adam Bitter; Kim Bergmann; Zeenia Challa  
**Subject:** FYI Memo

**FYI MEMORANDUM**

**Date: 11/13/23**

---

**CALLS TO RETURN:**

**SCHEDULING:**

\_ Talked with Sen. Parker's office. He will be in the district on Dec. 13. His scheduler gave me a few dates that he is available; Dec. 8, Dec. 18 or Dec. 19. I have reached out to see if he has any availability for the week after Thanksgiving, but have not heard back yet. (kb)

\_ Toby from OOG will be taking the meeting with the Ambassador of Georgia. (kb)

New on Calendar: December 11, 2023 at 6:00 PM - filing deadline for primary candidates  
January 1, 2203 - first day to apply for ballot by mail  
February 5, 2023 – last day to register to vote in time for March 5 Primary  
February 20-March 1 – early voting  
May 4 – uniform election day (many local elections)  
October 7, 2024 – last day to register to vote for November 5 Election  
October 21-November 1 – Early Voting in Person  
November 5 – Election Day

**MEDIA/COMMS:**

**AGENCY / DIVISION NOTES:**

**STAFF NOTES:**

I will be FedExing a packet to you today. (kb)

I included 3 organizational charts in the packet today, however, we will be cleaning these up further this week. I'll send the updated charts in the next few days. (br)

**BUZZ:**

AMERICAN  
OVERSIGHT

**STAFF CALENDAR:**

Out of office - sick (bh)

Wednesday- Briefing with BTAC Member Stan Meador of Texas Pacifico Transportation (ce)

## How to appeal the withholding of information under Government Code Section 552.136

If you wish to appeal the withholding of information discussed on the previous page, you must send the following to the attorney general:

- 1) a signed, written statement indicating your wish to appeal the withholding of information;
- 2) the name of the governmental body that withheld information from you;
- 3) the date you made your original request for information; and
- 4) a copy of your original request for information, or if you are unable to provide a copy, a description of your original request for information.

You may also submit written comments stating why you think the information should be released to you, but you are not required to do so.

Send your appeal by mail to the attorney general at:

Open Records Division  
P.O. Box 12548  
Austin, Texas 78711-2548

Within forty-five business days after receiving all of the above-listed items necessary to file your appeal, the attorney general will issue a written ruling on the matter. You will receive a copy of this ruling in the mail.

**From:** [GeneralCounsel](#)  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** [GeneralCounsel](#)  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records  
**Date:** Monday, February 12, 2024 10:40:25 AM

---

Dr. Pressley,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the “Office”). This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the “PIA”), which was received by the Office on January 29, 2024 (the “Request”).

We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. To that end, we do not maintain a comprehensive list containing the information specified in the Request. The Office’s [website](#) provides certain information regarding voting systems certified for use in Texas elections. The PIA applies only to information in existence as of the date that the governmental entity receives the request and thus does not require the entity to create new information in response to a request or comply with a continuing request to supply information on a periodic basis as such information is prepared in the future. *See* Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.002, .021, .227, .351; *A&T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp*, 904 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Tex. 1995); *Fish v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 31 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied); Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. JM-48 at 2 (1983); Open Records Decision Nos. 476 at 1 (1987), 465 at 1 (1987), 452 at 2–3 (1986), 342 at 3 (1982).

As you know, pursuant to Chapter 123, Subchapter C of the Texas Election Code, the Office collects and maintains certain information submitted annually by each authority that operates a voting system. This information—referred to as the Annual Voting Systems Report (“AVSR”)—includes details relating to the voting systems and electronic pollbooks that a county used in the preceding year (among other information), as reported by each county. If you would to receive a copy of the most recent AVSR—covering the reporting period of July 2022 through June 2023—for all counties across the State, or for a subset of counties, you may submit a request to the Office via [generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov). In the request, please identify the precise scope of information encompassed by your inquiry.

Sincerely,

**Adam Bitter**

General Counsel  
Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 30, 2024 12:43 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Regards,

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Sent:** Monday, January 29, 2024 4:03 PM

**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>

**Subject:** Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide an up to date list of voting systems and electronic pollbooks that each county in Texas have been authorized by the SoS to use for the March 2024 Primary.

Please include information such as

- all voting system components and version, and
- pollbook systems and version.

Blessings,

Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel  
**Sent:** Tuesday, January 30, 2024 12:43 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Regards,

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, January 29, 2024 4:03 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <CAdkins@sos.texas.gov>; GeneralCounsel <GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov>  
**Subject:** Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide an up to date list of voting systems and electronic pollbooks that each county in Texas have been authorized by the SoS to use for the March 2024 Primary. Please include information such as

- all voting system components and version, and
- pollbook systems and version.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1 Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

TX-SOS-24-0322-B-000381

**From:** [REDACTED]  
**To:** [GeneralCounsel](#)  
**Subject:** Re: Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records  
**Date:** Wednesday, February 14, 2024 6:58:31 PM

---

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Thank you, Mr. Bitter.

Just found a list of voting system equipment the SoS published for 2024.  
Can you confirm that this listing is accurate through 2/6/24 as it states?  
<https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/voting-sys-bycounty.pdf>

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**  
**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." - *2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC CONFIDENTIAL.**  
**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this email and do not use or distribute this email.**

On Monday, February 12, 2024 10:40 AM, GeneralCounsel  
<[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)> wrote:

Dr. Pressley,

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State (the "Office"). This email responds to your request for information under the Public Information Act, Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code (the "PIA"), which was received by the Office on January 29, 2024 (the "Request").

We are processing the Request in accordance with the terms of the PIA. To that end, we do not maintain a comprehensive list containing the information specified in the Request. The Office's [website](#) provides certain information regarding voting systems certified for use in Texas elections. The PIA applies only to information in existence as of the date that the governmental entity receives the request and thus does not require the entity to create new information in response to a request or comply with a continuing request to supply information on a periodic basis as such information is prepared in the future. *See* Tex. Gov't Code §§ 552.002, .021, .227, .351; *A&T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp*, 904 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Tex. 1995); *Fish v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 31 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Tex. App. —Eastland 2000, pet. denied); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. JM-48 at 2 (1983); Open Records Decision Nos. 476 at 1 (1987), 465 at 1 (1987), 452 at 2–3 (1986), 342 at 3 (1982).

As you know, pursuant to Chapter 123, Subchapter C of the Texas Election Code, the Office collects and maintains certain information submitted annually by each authority that operates a voting system. This information—referred to as the Annual Voting Systems Report (“AVSR”)—includes details relating to the voting systems and electronic pollbooks that a county used in the preceding year (among other information), as reported by each county. If you would to receive a copy of the most recent AVSR—covering the reporting period of July 2022 through June 2023—for all counties across the State, or for a subset of counties, you may submit a request to the Office via [generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:generalcounsel@sos.texas.gov). In the request, please identify the precise scope of information encompassed by your inquiry.

Sincerely,

**Adam Bitter**

General Counsel

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** GeneralCounsel

**Sent:** Tuesday, January 30, 2024 12:43 PM

**To:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** RE: Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Texas Secretary of State. This email acknowledges receipt of your request for information under the Public Information Act, and we will process it in accordance with Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code.

We will let you know if we have any questions or need clarification.

Regards,

Office of the Texas Secretary of State

---

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Sent:** Monday, January 29, 2024 4:03 PM  
**To:** Christina Adkins <[CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov](mailto:CAAdkins@sos.texas.gov)>; GeneralCounsel <[GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov](mailto:GeneralCounsel@sos.texas.gov)>  
**Subject:** Voting Sys and Pollbook System List - SoS Open Records

**CAUTION:** This email originated from OUTSIDE of the SOS organization. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you are expecting the email and know that the content is safe. If you believe this to be a malicious or phishing email, please send this email as an attachment to [Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov](mailto:Informationsecurity@sos.texas.gov).

Dear Mr. Bitter and Christina,

Hope you are both doing well. Please consider this an open records request pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code Chapter 552.

Please provide an up to date list of voting systems and electronic pollbooks that each county in Texas have been authorized by the SoS to use for the March 2024 Primary. Please include information such as

- all voting system components and version, and
- pollbook systems and version.

Blessings,  
Laura

**Laura Pressley, Ph.D.**  
**Founder, True Texas Elections, LLC**

**313-720-5471**

"Occupy till I come" - *Luke 19:13*

"As for those who persist in sin...rebuke them" - *1Timothy 5:20*

"Be not afraid nor dismayed...for the battle is not yours, but God's." -  
*2Chron 2:15*

**The content of this message is TRUE TEXAS ELECTIONS, LLC  
CONFIDENTIAL.**

**If you are not the intended recipient, please notify me, delete this  
email and do not use or distribute this email.**