



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 2022

Case No. FL-2019-07655

Taylor Stoneman
Counsel
American Oversight
1030 15th St. NW, Suite B255,
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Ms. Stoneman:

As noted in our letter dated March 9, 2022, we are processing your request for material under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The processing of records is ongoing and has yielded an additional 37 records responsive to your request. We have determined that 3 records may be released in full and 34 records may be released in part.

An enclosure explains the FOIA exemptions and other grounds for withholding material. Where we have made redactions, the applicable FOIA exemptions are marked on each document. All non-exempt material that is reasonably segregable from the exempt material has been released and is enclosed.

We will keep you informed as your case progresses. If you have any questions, your attorney may contact Assistant United States Attorney Benton Peterson, at (202) 252-2534 or Benton.Peterson@usdoj.gov. Please refer to case number, FL-2019-07655, and the civil action number, 19-cv-02728-ABJ, in all correspondence about this request

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jeanne Miller for".

Jeanne Miller
Chief, Programs and Policies Division
Office of Information Programs and Services

Enclosures: As stated.

The Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552)

FOIA Exemptions

- (b)(1) Information specifically authorized by an executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. Executive Order 13526 includes the following classification categories:
- 1.4(a) Military plans, systems, or operations
 - 1.4(b) Foreign government information
 - 1.4(c) Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
 - 1.4(d) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the US, including confidential sources
 - 1.4(e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(f) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
 - 1.4(g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to US national security, including defense against transnational terrorism
 - 1.4(h) Weapons of mass destruction
- (b)(2) Related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than 5 USC 552), for example:
- | | |
|----------------|---|
| ARMSEXP | Arms Export Control Act, 50a USC 2411(c) |
| CIA PERS/ORG | Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC 403(g) |
| EXPORT CONTROL | Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 USC App. Sec. 2411(c) |
| FS ACT | Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 USC 4004 |
| INA | Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1202(f), Sec. 222(f) |
| IRAN | Iran Claims Settlement Act, Public Law 99-99, Sec. 505 |
- (b)(4) Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
- (b)(5) Interagency or intra-agency communications forming part of the deliberative process, attorney-client privilege, or attorney work product
- (b)(6) Personal privacy information
- (b)(7) Law enforcement information whose disclosure would:
- (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings
 - (B) deprive a person of a fair trial
 - (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 - (D) disclose confidential sources
 - (E) disclose investigation techniques
 - (F) endanger life or physical safety of an individual
- (b)(8) Prepared by or for a government agency regulating or supervising financial institutions
- (b)(9) Geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells

Other Grounds for Withholding

- NR Material not responsive to a FOIA request excised with the agreement of the requester

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6) petesessions (b)(6)
CC:	Matous, Kyle (b)(6)
Subject:	Sessions NODEL Materials
Date:	Sun, 1 Apr 2018 11:43:46 -0400

Mr. Chairman,

Please find attached the two documents promised yesterday:

-- Embassy Caracas Points of Contact, and

--a one-pager on the Core Four issues the opposition and international community have long pressed the Maduro regime to commit to.

Please confirm the US cell phone number and any mobiles you will be using.

Thanks very much,

Charles

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6) petesessions (b)(6) Matous, Kyle (b)(6)



Rep. Pete Sessions Visit April 1-3, 2018

TELEPHONE DIALING INSTRUCTIONS:

USA Phone to VZLA: 011-58- Plus 10-digit Number (drop any leading zero)

VZLA to USA Phone: 011- Plus US Area Code and Number

**US STATE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS CENTER (24 hrs):
011-202-647-1512**

CONTROL OFFICER:

Mercedes Crosby, Political Officer

Office: 0 212-907-8493

Cell: (b)(6)

Home: (b)(6)

E-mail :

CrosbyML@state.gov

US EMBASSY:

Calle F con Calle Suapure, Edificio Embajada Americana, Colinas de Valle Arriba.

TEL 1: 0212-975-6411

TEL 2: 0 212-907-8166 (AFTER HOURS ECCO Patrol)

Post 1 (Marines): 0212-907-8400; Post 1 Backup: 0414-150-9507

Post Duty Officer – Cell: (b)(6)

U.S. Chargé d’Affaires:

AMB Todd Robinson

Cell: (b)(6)

Office: 0212-907-8607

Residence: (b)(6)

MOTORPOOL SERVICES:

Motorpool Dispatcher: 0212-907-8586

Duty Driver: 0424-1992598

EXPEDITORS:

(b)(6)

CARACAS LODGING:
JW Marriott

Avenida Venezuela con Calle Mohedano, El Rosal
Phone: 0212-957-2222

KEY CONTACTS:

DCM Brian Naranjo – Cell: (b)(6)

CDA/DCM OMS Heidi Sierra – Office: 0212-907-8607

Cell: (b)(6)

DAO Frank Fidiani- Office: 0212-907-8409 Cell: (b)(6)

GSO Carolyn Cooley- Office: 0212-907-8399 Cell: (b)(6)

PAO Rebecca Thompson -Office: 0212-907-8325 Cell: (b)(6)

IO Christine Meyer – Office: 212-907-8363 Cell: (b)(6)

SECURITY:

RSO (b)(6); Office: 0424-231-7862

(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

DRSO (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

BG Supervisor (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Cell: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Bodyguard (BG) Duty Phone

Cell: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

GBRV CONTACTS:

DIRECTOR OF PROTOCOL: Ricardo Sanchez Nino

Cell: (b)(6)

CHIEF OF STAFF: Maria Jose Gomez

Cell: (b)(6)

Caracas Weather: High 85°F Low 72°F, chance of thunderstorms during rainy season, May-Oct.

Suggested Attire: Tropical Weight Business Suit

The Four Points of Reconciliation for Venezuela

Cardenal Pietro Parolin, Secretary of State of the Vatican, sent a letter to Venezuelan President Maduro in December 2016, laying out four steps for the regime to take in support of a “truly effective dialogue” with the opposition. The government’s refusal closed out the Vatican’s then-formal role in facilitating talks. The Vatican has been involved on the margins since; but absent these four steps, it has not seen the good faith necessary to support more direct involvement. These four conditions, evolved slightly, form the basis for most international messaging to the Venezuelan government, and have been reiterated by U.S. officials, the OAS Secretary General, the Lima Group (14 hemispheric partners with sustained interest, under Peru’s initial leadership, to support a return to democracy in Venezuela), the EU, and numerous heads of state and other officials. They remain the baseline demands on the Venezuelan government by those seeking a sign of good faith. The four conditions are:

1. **Immediate freeing of political prisoners:** The Venezuelan human rights NGO Foro Penal counted 237 political prisoners in Venezuelan jails as of February 2018. These included opposition members and leaders, youth involved in street demonstrations, as well as some prominent former regime members. The prisons are a revolving door of political repression, with the fear (and reality) of prison or house arrest used to restrict political activism. Prominent opposition leaders (e.g., Leopoldo Lopez, Henrique Capriles) have been alternatively jailed, subjected to house arrest, and denied right to participate in politics; others, such as Julio Borges, have gone abroad after repeated threats of violence or prison.

2. **Opening of a humanitarian channel for food and medicine:** The Maduro regime’s mismanagement and wholesale looting of Venezuela’s economy has led to what may be the greatest drop in any nation’s well-being in peacetime history. The IMF estimates the economy will contract 45% by year’s end and inflation could reach 13,000 percent. The country is in the throes of a humanitarian crisis, with lack of basic food, medicine, and widespread unemployment. More than one million have fled since 2015 in the largest cross-border exodus in the hemisphere’s history; UNHCR predicts another 1.5 million may leave in 2018. The region’s countries all feel the pressure from these incoming migrants. The United States and many other countries have expressed a willingness to send humanitarian assistance to Venezuela if the government would accept it. Maduro, unwilling to acknowledge the failure of his policies, has refused. The United States in the meantime works to assist Venezuelan migrants in other countries and has begun to provide food, medicines, and services to regional partners.

3. **Free, Fair and Internationally Observed Elections:** Under Venezuela’s constitution, the next president is to be inaugurated in January 2019. Tradition would put the vote in October-to-December timeframe. Fearing Maduro cannot maintain power until then under current conditions, the regime began negotiations in late 2017 in the Dominican Republic with the opposition to agree on an electoral plan. Talks died after the regime refused to meet any of 10 minimum conditions, and it announced in February elections in April, far short of the 6 months sought to build conditions for credible elections. With other leaders denied their rights or boycotting, only one prominent opposition candidate, Henri Falcon, an ex-Chavista, agreed to participate, and the government delayed the vote until May 20 to accommodate him.

4. **Respect for the National Assembly and the 1999 Constitution:** Ever since the opposition won super-majority control of the National Assembly in 2015, the government has moved to neuter it. In March 2017 the Supreme Court took away most of its powers. In August, the government illegally seated a supra-powerful Constituent Assembly composed of ruling party members. (Seven million had opposed the Constituent Assembly and its task to rewrite the Constitution in an opposition-backed plebiscite two weeks earlier.) The regime likely has not yet completely closed the National Assembly due to the latter’s sole authority to transact international loans, approve debt refinancing or other instruments for the State.

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6)petesessions (b)(6) Matous, Kyle (b)(6)
Subject:	Rep. Sessions Information on Migration Routes
Date:	Mon, 2 Apr 2018 10:59:05 -0400

See below

##

The vast majority enter Colombia first.

A distant second as first point of entry is via the very remote/desolate Brazilian border.

Many attempt to stay there, in either of those countries, if they can.

But for those who either immediately or subsequently travel: where do they go from there?

Everywhere.

Every other country in South America, plus Panama, Mexico, US, Canada, Spain, France and many island nations of the Caribbean have all seen dramatic increases in Venezuelan arrivals.

In the last few years, the bulk of the out-migration seemed to be by air -- those with the means to fly out, did so.

But now those fleeing arrive with virtually nothing.

In Colombia, for example, if the newly arrived have passports and intend to move on, Colombia facilitates their onward travel.

As many as one thousand now arrive daily at the Ecuador-Colombia border (after some 36 hours on bus rides across Colombia).

Many then stay in Ecuador -- or move along via buses further south: to Peru, Chile, Argentina, Chile.

I have attached one map, which provides some data, as of January. I believe these numbers to be both:

a) somewhat dated (reflecting earlier numbers, not necessarily from Jan 2018 in all cases), b) very conservative, and c) not indicating the current rate of flow (which has increased dramatically in recent months).

Official

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6)petesessions (b)(6) Matous, Kyle (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Troutman, Katie A <TroutmanKA@state.gov>; Transformation2017 <Transformation2017@state.gov>; Korde, Sonali (AID/A) <skorde@usaid.gov>; Ritchey, Katherine (US - Arlington <kritchey@deloitte.com>; Kuban, Sara A. (US - Arlington <skuban@deloitte.com>; Gressett, Donald(GC/LP) <dgressett@usaid.gov>; jpezzullo@usaid.gov <jpezzullo@usaid.gov>; Rademacher, Paul R <Rademachpr@state.gov>; Harris, Katherine A <HarrisKA2@state.gov>; Espinosa, Caroline M <EspinosaCM2@state.gov>; Napoli, Roman G. (AID/A/BRM) <rnapoli@usaid.gov>; Kosmowski, Jessica Fleming (US - Arlington <jkosmowski@deloitte.com>
Subject:	RE: Weekly TMO Comms – Hill Engagement Meeting
Date:	Fri, 22 Sep 2017 10:35:30 -0400

Good morning,

How many TMO meetings have taken place with Hill? Specific to HFAC, SFRC, HAC/SAC?

Thanks,

Charles

Official
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From: Troutman, Katie A
Sent: Friday, August 04, 2017 2:06 PM
To: Transformation2017; Korde, Sonali (AID/A); Ritchey, Katherine (US - Arlington; Kuban, Sara A. (US - Arlington; Gressett, Donald(GC/LP); jpezzullo@usaid.gov; Rademacher, Paul R; Faulkner, Charles S; Harris, Katherine A; Espinosa, Caroline M; Napoli, Roman G. (AID/A/BRM); Kosmowski, Jessica Fleming (US - Arlington
Subject: RE: Weekly TMO Comms – Hill Engagement Meeting

Hello All,

This is a reminder that we are still having our Hill Engagement conference call – we anticipate it to be brief.

Thank you,

Katie

Dial-in information:

Call: 1-888-675-2535

Access Code: (b)(6);
(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Appointment-----

From: Transformation2017

Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2017 12:14 PM

To: Transformation2017; Korde, Sonali (AID/A); Ritchey, Katherine (US - Arlington; Kuban, Sara A. (US - Arlington; Troutman, Katie A; Gressett, Donald(GC/LP); jpezzullo@usaid.gov; Rademacher, Paul R; Faulkner, Charles S; Harris, Katherine A; Espinosa, Caroline M; Napoli, Roman G. (AID/A/BRM); Kosmowski, Jessica Fleming (US - Arlington

Subject: Weekly TMO Comms – Hill Engagement Meeting

When: Friday, August 04, 2017 2:00 PM-2:45 PM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).

Where: HST 5241 Conf Rm and Dial In

Dial-in information:

Call: 1-888-675-2535

Access Code: (b)(6);
(b)(7)(F)

Official

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Troutman, Katie A <TroutmanKA@state.gov>; Transformation2017 <Transformation2017@state.gov>; Korde, Sonali (AID/A) <skorde@usaid.gov>; Ritchey, Katherine (US - Arlington <kritchey@deloitte.com>; Kuban, Sara A. (US - Arlington <skuban@deloitte.com>; Gressett, Donald(GC/LP) <dgressett@usaid.gov>; jpezzullo@usaid.gov < jpezzullo@usaid.gov >; Rademacher, Paul R <Rademachpr@state.gov>; Harris, Katherine A <HarrisKA2@state.gov>; Espinosa, Caroline M <EspinosaCM2@state.gov>; Napoli, Roman G. (AID/A/BRM) < rnapoli@usaid.gov >; Kosmowski, Jessica Fleming (US - Arlington < jkosmowski@deloitte.com >

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Denzel, Kris [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Time for coffee?
Date:	Thu, 18 Oct 2018 14:45:18 +0000

I'd love to. Things are less crazy now. Next week?

Get [Outlook for iOS](#)

From: Denzel, Kris [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2018 9:34:04 AM

To: Faulkner, Charles S

Subject: Time for coffee?

Mr. Faulkner – Hope all is well. Wanted to see if you had some time to catch up this month. I'm over by the WH so happy to find somewhere to grab coffee in between.

Kris Denzel
Senior Director, International Policy
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
1615 H Street NW
Washington D.C., 20062
(202) 463-5880
<http://www.uschamber.com>

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Denzel, Kris [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Wendy Kennedy (b)(6) Guest-Bakker, Janelle R <GuestBakkerJR@state.gov>
CC:	Jensen, Aaron W <JensenAW@state.gov>; Kennedy, Wendy <KennedyW@state.gov>; Schwab, Carol M <SchwabCM@state.gov>; Unlu, Kathy M <UnluKM1@state.gov>; Sandel, Jessika S <SandelJS@state.gov>; Shane, Lynnea L <ShaneLL@state.gov>; Lorman, Amanda L <LormanAL@state.gov>; H_Staffers <H_Staffers@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Talking Points for POTUS on Irish E-3 Visas
Date:	Sat, 1 Dec 2018 19:52:54 +0000

Appreciate this.

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From: Wendy Kennedy (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, December 1, 2018 11:06:57 AM

To: Guest-Bakker, Janelle R

Cc: Faulkner, Charles S; Jensen, Aaron W; Kennedy, Wendy; Schwab, Carol M; Unlu, Kathy M; Sandel, Jessika S; Shane, Lynnea L; Lorman, Amanda L; H_Staffers

Subject: Re: Talking Points for POTUS on Irish E-3 Visas

Thanks for doing this by dictation Janelle!

Sent from my iPhone

On Dec 1, 2018, at 2:01 PM, Guest-Bakker, Janelle R <GuestBakkerJR@state.gov> wrote:

Good afternoon,

I am dictating this email on behalf of Wendy Kennedy who is locked out of her BB at the moment. Carol and Kathy, please feel free to make any suggestions. Copying her personal and State email.

(b)(5)

BACKGROUND: The House introduced HR 7164 –**To Add Ireland to the E-3 Nonimmigrant Visa Program** on November 20. The House passed the legislation on November 28 and was sent to the Senate on November 29. The E-3 program was designed to enable 10,500 highly skilled Australian workers and their families to opportunity to come to the United States. The Australians generally use around 5,000 of these visas annually and renew nearly 3,000 visas each year. The renewals do not count against the 10,500 cap. The legislation would enable the Irish to use visa numbers not used by the Australians. Approximately 5,000 Irish workers and their dependents would likely benefit from this legislation each year.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Janelle Guest-Bakker
2201 C. Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520
Telephone: 202-647-8943
Email: GuestJR@state.gov

Official

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Wendy Kennedy (b)(6) Guest-Bakker, Janelle R <GuestBakkerJR@state.gov>; Jensen, Aaron W <JensenAW@state.gov>; Kennedy, Wendy <KennedyW@state.gov>; Schwab, Carol M <SchwabCM@state.gov>;

Unlu, Kathy M <UnluKM1@state.gov>;
Sandel, Jessika S <SandelJS@state.gov>;
Shane, Lynnea L <ShaneLL@state.gov>;
Lorman, Amanda L <LormanAL@state.gov>;
H_Staffers <H_Staffers@state.gov>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Klein, Christopher C <KleinCC@state.gov>; Manning, Marilyn F <ManningMF@state.gov>; Brett O'Donnell [REDACTED] (b)(6) 'Chuck Larson' [REDACTED] Tyner, Nicholas J <TynerNJ@state.gov>; Miller, Andrea R (Beijing) <MillerAR@state.gov>; Churchill, Steven W (Beijing) <ChurchillSW@state.gov>; Goodman, Charles R <GoodmanCR@state.gov>; Sayles, Ambrose G <SaylesAG@state.gov>; Boggs, Gladys D <BoggsGD2@state.gov>; Sandel, Jessica S <SandelJS@state.gov>; Tillou, Patrick A <TillouPA@state.gov>; Kissel, Mary E (S) <KisselME2@state.gov>; Bell, Shannon E <BellSE@state.gov>; Wilezol, David C <WilezolDC@state.gov>; SP_SpeechWriters <SP_SpeechWriters@state.gov>; Fitzgerald, Sharyn C <FitzgeraldSC@state.gov>; Barz, Chloe O <BarzCO@state.gov>
Subject:	RE: Request: Iowa Planning Call
Date:	Tue, 26 Feb 2019 14:28:08 +0000

Since we have only had one Member RSVP "yes" to travel with S to Iowa, we would like to extend a second round of invitations. H recommends inviting the following Members of Congress:

Rep. Yoho (R-FL) reason for invite: Ranking Member of HFAC Asia Pacific Subcommittee, on Agriculture Committee, up for reelection in 2020

Sen. Sasse (R-NE) reason for invite: proximity, up for reelection in 2020

Sen. Fischer (R-NE) reason for invite: proximity, on Agriculture Committee

Sen. Moran (R-KS) reason for invite: good relationship with S, on SACFO

Sen. Daines (R-MT) reason for invite: strong interest in US-China relations, on SACFO, up for reelection in 2020

From: Klein, Christopher C <KleinCC@state.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, February 26, 2019 9:01 AM

To: Manning, Marilyn F <ManningMF@state.gov>; Brett O'Donnell [REDACTED] (b)(6)
'Chuck Larson' [REDACTED] (b)(6) Tyner, Nicholas J <TynerNJ@state.gov>; Miller, Andrea R (Beijing) <MillerAR@state.gov>; Churchill, Steven W (Beijing) <ChurchillSW@state.gov>; Goodman, Charles R <GoodmanCR@state.gov>; Sayles, Ambrose G <SaylesAG@state.gov>; Boggs, Gladys D <BoggsGD2@state.gov>; Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>; Sandel, Jessica S <SandelJS@state.gov>; Tillou, Patrick A <TillouPA@state.gov>; Kissel, Mary E (S) <KisselME2@state.gov>; Bell, Shannon E <BellSE@state.gov>; Wilezol, David C <WilezolDC@state.gov>; SP_SpeechWriters <SP_SpeechWriters@state.gov>; Fitzgerald, Sharyn C <FitzgeraldSC@state.gov>

Subject: Request: Iowa Planning Call

Importance: High

All,

I would like to convene an Iowa trip planning conference call at 8 PM Washington time Wednesday (8 AM Hanoi time, 9 AM Beijing time on Thursday). If you can't join, could you please designate a proxy?

Marilyn – Could you please arrange the call-in number and details? And could you then send an email invite to the addresses?

Thanks and best,
Chris

Official - SBU
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Klein, Christopher C <KleinCC@state.gov>; Manning, Marilyn F <ManningMF@state.gov>; Brett O'Donnell (b)(6) 'Chuck Larson' Tyner, Nicholas J <TynerNJ@state.gov>; Miller, Andrea R (Beijing) <MillerAR@state.gov>; Churchill, Steven W (Beijing) <ChurchillSW@state.gov>; Goodman, Charles R <GoodmanCR@state.gov>; Sayles, Ambrose G <SaylesAG@state.gov>; Boggs, Gladys D <BoggsGD2@state.gov>; Sandel, Jessika S <SandelJS@state.gov>; Tillou, Patrick A <TillouPA@state.gov>; Kissel, Mary E (S) <KisselME2@state.gov>; Bell, Shannon E <BellSE@state.gov>; Wilezol, David C <WilezolDC@state.gov>; SP_SpeechWriters <SP_SpeechWriters@state.gov>; Fitzgerald, Sharyn C <FitzgeraldSC@state.gov>; Barz, Chloe O <BarzCO@state.gov>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Lutes, Steve [REDACTED] (b)(6)
CC:	Rising, Carin [REDACTED]
Subject:	Re: Qatar question
Date:	Sat, 2 Dec 2017 15:04:01 -0500

Call tomorrow?

From: Lutes, Steve [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Date: December 2, 2017 at 1:27:39 PM EST
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: Rising, Carin [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Qatar question

Is it OK to call you on the weekend or would you prefer next week? Happy to either way

On Dec 2, 2017, at 9:06 AM, Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

From: Lutes, Steve [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Date: December 1, 2017 at 1:30:38 PM EST
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: Rising, Carin [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: Qatar question

Hi Charles,

Hope you are well and enjoying your position at State.

I am reaching out to see if you have a few minutes to speak regarding Qatar and a piece of legislation on the Hill? I'm off to Dubai on Saturday but was hoping to catch you some time next week.

Please let me know at your convenience.

Best regards,
Steve

Steve Lutes
Vice President, Middle East Affairs
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Cell: [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Email [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Lutes, Steve [REDACTED] (b)(6) Rising, Carin [REDACTED]

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Leaksmy [REDACTED] (b)(6)
CC:	Dougherty, Margaret R <DoughertyMR@state.gov>; Norin, Leaksmy X <NorinLX@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: phone call today?
Date:	Sun, 17 Sep 2017 17:00:43 -0400

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

What's best?

From: Leaksmy [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Date: September 17, 2017 at 4:52:52 PM EDT
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: Norin, Leaksmy X <NorinLX@state.gov>, Dougherty, Margaret R <DoughertyMR@state.gov>
Subject: Re: phone call today?

5:00pm works for me. Thanks.

Sent from my iPhone

> On Sep 17, 2017, at 3:52 PM, Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov> wrote:

>

> How bout 5?

>

>

>

>

> From: Dougherty, Margaret R <DoughertyMR@state.gov>

> Date: September 17, 2017 at 2:54:56 PM EDT

> To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>, Norin, Leaksmy X <NorinLX@state.gov>,

> 'lcnorin [REDACTED] (b)(6)

> Subject: phone call today?

>

> Charles/Leaksmy-

>

> Let me know if y'all still want to do a phone call today. I have a meeting at 3PM and a walk through at 730PM.

>

> Best,

> Maggie

>

>

> Official

> UNCLASSIFIED

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Leaksmys [REDACTED] (b)(6) Dougherty, Margaret R <DoughertyMR@state.gov>; Norin, Leaksmys X <NorinLX@state.gov>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	David Jessup [mailto:[REDACTED]] (b)(6)
CC:	Phil Scanlan <[REDACTED]>
Subject:	RE: Phil SCANLAN/Charles Faulkner - State Department
Date:	Wed, 5 Jul 2017 17:47:40 -0400

Thanks for keeping me informed!

Charles

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: David Jessup [mailto:[REDACTED]] (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 05, 2017 5:26 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S
Cc: Phil Scanlan
Subject: Re: Phil SCANLAN/Charles Faulkner - State Department

Sorry Charles - just received advice from the Australia Desk indicating A/AS Thornton will be traveling with Sec Tillerson at the time and so won't be able to attend.

Apologies for the barrage of emails.

Thanks

David

David Jessup

Executive Director USA

Australian American Leadership Dialogue

1155 F St NW, Suite 1050

Washington DC 20004

c [REDACTED] (b)(6)
o [REDACTED]

www.aald.org

On Jul 5, 2017, at 5:11 PM, David Jessup [mailto:[REDACTED]] (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Charles,

Sorry, further to my message below, I should have also mentioned that from State we have invited Susan Thornton, Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Would be great if you could put in a good word in support of her attendance, should you get the chance. I appreciate it is a bit

outside your current wheelhouse. The Australia desk is aware of the invitation and I am following up with them.

Thanks again your ongoing support.

Best,
David

David Jessup
Executive Director USA
Australian American Leadership Dialogue

1155 F St NW, Suite 1050
Washington DC 20004

c [REDACTED] (b)(6)
o [REDACTED]
www.aald.org

On Jul 5, 2017, at 11:31 AM, David Jessup [REDACTED] (b)(6) wrote:

Hi Charles, and congratulations on the move to State – nice title. Well done!

As promised by Phil, below is an outline of plans for the 25th Anniversary Forum on the Gold Coast, 3-5 August.

August 3

- welcome reception followed by nightcap discussions - topics still being finalized but likely to include democracy/fake news; trade; and technology/cyber

August 4

- morning session on Geo-strategic / national security issues
- lunchtime discussion on Australian political situation
- afternoon session on Global trade/economic issues
- evening dine-arounds - smaller discussions on issues such as energy/climate change, smart cities/urban regeneration, held in unique venues.

August 5

- morning session on innovation, technology, cyber, cyber education, cyber workforce development, energy and climate change
- lunchtime discussion on US political situation
- afternoon session on the alliance with flexibility to cover a topic that breaks between now and then
- evening gala dinner with keynote speakers

Attendees

The guest list is still being finalized but we expect:

- senior representation from Australian State and Federal Governments including possibly Prime Minister and State Premiers (Governors) as well as innovation/technology/cybersecurity Ministers from a number of States
- Director NSA Admiral Rogers
- a US Congressional Delegation, led by Senator Blunt and including Senator Cardin, Senator Cochran, Senator Kennedy, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen, Rep. Turner, and Rep. Smith. Rep. Courtney is also expected to attend separately. Blunt and Courtney are co-chairs of the newly formed Senate and House Friends of Australia Caucuses, so is great to have them attending.
- up to 10 Presidents from Australia's top universities
- Senior representation from Defense primes, including Lockheed Martin, Boeing, BAE Systems

Things are coming together really well, particularly on the Congressional Delegation - if we can just get them out of the Capitol on time. Talk of extending the sitting will impact our plans, big-time!

Best,
David

David Jessup
Executive Director USA
Australian American Leadership Dialogue

<image002.jpg>

1155 F St NW, Suite 1050
Washington DC 20004

c (b)(6)
o
www.aald.org

From: Phil Scanlan

Sent: Monday, July 3, 2017 2:28 PM

To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>

Cc: kimchristianbeazley (b)(6) David Jessup (b)(6)

Subject: Phil SCANLAN/Charles Faulkner - State Department

Charles,

Nice to hear from you and that you are back at State. David Jessup is copied and will provide you with background to our plans for the 25th anniversary AALD August 3-5 on the Gold Coast. Your thoughts are always valued, as you know.

Regards to you and the family,
Phil

Phil Scanlan
FOUNDER

M (b)(6)
E

W www.aald.org

On 4 Jul 2017, at 1:08 AM, Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov> wrote:

Gentlemen,

Just wanted to let you know, I've returned to the State Department. My contact information is below. Please let me know if I can be a resource or when you are next in Washington.

Best,

Charles

Charles S. Faulkner
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)
(202) 647-1656
FaulknerCS@state.gov

Personal

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" < FaulknerCS@state.gov >	
Recipient:	David Jessup	(b)(6)
	Phil Scanlan	

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Michael Allen [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Munich
Date:	Sat, 17 Feb 2018 08:13:10 -0500

At BDI lunch. Are you free at 3:30? Meet at Control room?

From: Michael Allen [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Date: February 17, 2018 at 9:53:13 AM GMT+1
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Subject: Munich

Charles: Let's visit today. I'm free largely from 1-4. Michael

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Michael Allen [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Brian Diffell [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: Iran Sanctions European forum
Date:	Wed, 11 Jul 2018 15:25:01 +0000

Hi! Thanks for the message. I'll see if there's anything I can learn.

Charles

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Charles S. Faulkner
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)
(202) 647-1656
FaulknerCS@state.gov

From: Brian Diffell [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, July 11, 2018 10:24 AM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Subject: Fwd: Iran Sanctions European forum

Charles, I hope you are doing well!

Can you see below? I have no idea why I didn't just go to you with this right away! Is there anything you can advise here? I have a very anxious client...

Brian

----- Forwarded message -----

From: Brian Diffell [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Date: Tue, Jul 10, 2018 at 2:39 PM
Subject: Re: Iran Sanctions European forum
To: hookbh@state.gov

Hi Brian. I am sure things are busy. I just wanted to see if you are able to give me any guidance on the email below. Even just connecting me to the right person. Thank you so much!

Brian

On Fri, Jun 29, 2018 at 1:42 PM, Brian Diffell [REDACTED] (b)(6) wrote:

Brian, I hope you are well. By way of introduction, I used to handle foreign policy for now-Senator Blunt during his time in House leadership and for the first several years in the Senate, before starting a practice downtown. I'm sorry we have not had the chance to meet personally, but I was advised by folks who have worked with you that you may be able to help me locate the right resource on this topic.

I have a client, Swiss Reinsurance, which is headquartered in Zurich and obviously paying close attention to next steps related to Iran Sanctions. Several weeks ago the State Department hosted a forum in Milan for stakeholders to meet in a roundtable setting to talk about sanctions policy and the response was very positive. Unfortunately Swiss Re was not able to participate. The question is whether State is considering holding additional similar events in Europe in the future. Specifically, if such events were in London or Bern, they would be most interested, but given the nature of the issue, they will travel just about anywhere to participate if there is something on the horizon.

Do you have any advice or feedback? Anything, even a referral elsewhere in the department, would be very useful.

Thanks so much. I hope you have a great 4th of July.

--

Brian C. Diffell
Adeline Strategies, LLC

(b)(6)

--

Brian C. Diffell
Adeline Strategies, LLC

(b)(6)

--

Brian C. Diffell
Adeline Strategies, LLC

(b)(6)

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Brian Diffell (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Aisha Sabar [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: Introductory Meeting Request for UNICEF ED Henrietta Fore and A/S Taylor: April 9-10
Date:	Mon, 25 Mar 2019 22:23:36 +0000

Yes, The 8th might be the best as S testifies on the 9/10th.

Working on this.

From: Aisha Sabar [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 6:13 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Subject: Re: Introductory Meeting Request for UNICEF ED Henrietta Fore and A/S Taylor: April 9-10

Hi Charles - So sorry to ping, but making sure you've received (ie that I've sent to correct email address) and checking in to see who can assist on the scheduling side. Henrietta's schedule is getting tight if you all know what might work!

Kind regards,
Aisha

Aisha I. Sabar

Senior Advisor and Team Lead
Public Partnerships Division

United Nations Children's Fund - New York

[REDACTED] (b)(6) | (212) 326.7707 (office) | [REDACTED] (b)(6) cell)



On Mar 22, 2019, at 2:52 PM, Aisha Sabar <asabar@unicef.org> wrote:

Hi Charles – Quick amendment to below: Monday, April 8 in the afternoon is also a possibility. Many thanks!

From: Aisha Sabar
Sent: Friday, March 22, 2019 2:25 PM
To: faulknercs@state.gov
Subject: Introductory Meeting Request for UNICEF ED Henrietta Fore and A/S Taylor: April 9-10

Dear Charles,

Thanks for the quick chat just now. As discussed, UNICEF Executive Director Fore will be in town during the week of April 8, and it would be great to set up an introductory meeting for her with A/S Taylor. Would she be available either sometime on Tuesday, April 9, or on Wednesday, April 10 before 4:00?

Kind regards,
Aisha

Aisha I. Sabar

Senior Advisor and Team Lead

Public Partnerships Division

United Nations Children's Fund - New York

(b)(6) (212) 326.7707 (office) | (b)(6) (cell)

<image001.png>

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Aisha Sabar (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Simpson, Melissa M <SimpsonMM@state.gov>; Fannon, Frank [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: introduction
Date:	Wed, 14 Jun 2017 21:31:29 -0400

Yes!! I'm going to NYC tomorrow pm until Sunday. Can we meet Mon or Tues?

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: Simpson, Melissa M
Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2017 8:34 AM
To: Fannon, Frank; Faulkner, Charles S
Subject: RE: introduction

Thank you, Frank. I will be in touch regarding E&C.

Hi Charles! Welcome aboard. Would you like to meet for coffee sometime? I work in the Bureau of Energy Resources. We focus foreign policy related to energy and are working on several exciting initiatives that should be of interest to H.

Best, Melissa

This email is UNCLASSIFIED.

From: Fannon, Frank [mailto:[REDACTED]] (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2017 2:29 PM
To: Simpson, Melissa M
Cc: Faulkner, Charles S
Subject: introduction

Melissa –

I hope this email finds you well. I am following up on our conversation and would like to introduce you to Charles Faulkner (copied) the newly minted DAS (?) for legislative affairs. Charles is a great guy and part of the movement.

Also, please let me know if you would like me to facilitate an introduction to the chief counsel for E&C.

Best,
Frank



Frank Fannon

BHP Billiton

1455 Pennsylvania Ave, NW

Suite 610

Washington, DC 20004

Office: +1 202 383 4440

Direct: (b)(6)

E: (b)(6)

W: www.bhpbilliton.com

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Simpson, Melissa M <SimpsonMM@state.gov>; Fannon, Frank (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	David Adams [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Good Chatting With You
Date:	Sun, 2 Jul 2017 14:44:38 +0000

Fite has it

Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

From: David Adams

Sent: Friday, June 30, 2017 5:08 PM

To: Faulkner, Charles S

Subject: Re: Good Chatting With You

Hi Charles-Good talking to you last night. My colleague says he talked to Fite in the hour and he still hasn't received the letter. Thanks for any info you can provide. Have a great weekend. Best, Dave

Sent from my iPhone

> On Jun 29, 2017, at 8:40 PM, Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov> wrote:

>

> Dave

>

> Give me a call again on cell!

>

> Charles

>

> Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone.

> From: David Adams

> Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2017 1:27 PM

> To: Faulkner, Charles S

> Subject: FW: Good Chatting With You

>

>

> Hi Charles - Just wanted to follow up on the letter. Our understanding is that it has been delivered to the Hill but Fite says he still doesn't have it. Can you confirm it was sent, where and how? Thanks. Dave

>

> From: David Adams

> Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2017 2:58 PM

> To: 'faulknercs@state.gov' <faulknercs@state.gov>

> Subject: Good Chatting With You

>

> Hi Charles - Good talking to you and congrats on the new position. Happy to chat about lessons learned in H. Coffee, lunch, grab a beer, whatever works for you. Contact info is below.

Best, Dave

>

>

>

>

> [cid:image001.jpg@01D2EF55.CB031080]

>

> DAVID ADAMS PRINCIPAL

> O 202.879.9325 / C [REDACTED] (b)(6) / W

www.podestagroup.com<<http://www.podestagroup.com>><<http://www.podestagroup.com>>

> 1001 G Street NW, Suite 1000 West, Washington, DC 20001

[cid:image002.jpg@01D2EF55.CB031080] <<https://www.facebook.com/thepodestagroup>>

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" < FaulknerCS@state.gov >
Recipient:	David Adams [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Evan Feigenbaum (b)(6) Alexander Taylor (b)(6)
CC:	csfaulkner (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Charles Faulkner
Date:	Sat, 2 Feb 2019 17:07:30 +0000

Many thanks!

Charles S. Faulkner

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)

(202) 647-1656

FaulknerCS@state.gov

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From: Evan Feigenbaum (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, February 2, 2019 3:48:25 PM

To: Alexander Taylor

Cc: Faulkner, Charles S; csfaulkner (b)(6)

Subject: Charles Faulkner

Alex,

Cc'ing Charles so that you can connect on the Engel event.

Charles,

Alex arranged everything with the Carnegie events people so you should be all set.

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Evan Feigenbaum (b)(6) Alexander Taylor (b)(6) csfaulkner (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Zach, Gabriella <(b)(6)> Anderson, Doug
CC:	Douglas Anderson <(b)(6)> Frideres, Taryn F <FrideresTF@state.gov>
Subject:	Re: Chabad
Date:	Wed, 11 Jul 2018 14:02:31 +0000

We are here at 2170

Get Outlook for iOS

From: Zach, Gabriella <(b)(6)>

Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 1:31:56 PM

To: Faulkner, Charles S; Anderson, Doug

Cc: Douglas Anderson; Frideres, Taryn F

Subject: RE: Chabad

Hi Charles,

I've spoken with Doug and we can confirm for 10 AM tomorrow in 2170. Thank you.

Gabriella

From: Faulkner, Charles S [mailto:FaulknerCS@state.gov]

Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 1:26 PM

To: Zach, Gabriella <(b)(6)> Anderson, Doug

<(b)(6)>

Cc: Douglas Anderson <(b)(6)> Frideres, Taryn F <FrideresTF@state.gov>

Subject: RE: Chabad

How about 10am tomorrow?

Official

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From: Zach, Gabriella <(b)(6)>

Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 1:09 PM

To: Anderson, Doug <(b)(6)> Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>

Cc: Douglas Anderson <(b)(6)>

Subject: RE: Chabad

Tomorrow works for me. Thank you.

From: Anderson, Doug

Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 1:08 PM

To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>

Cc: Zach, Gabriella [REDACTED] (b)(6) Douglas Anderson [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Chabad

Charles: Sorry for any communication lags – I’m having significant email server issues, and emails arrive hours delayed, if at all. I’m glad to try to meet tomorrow (Wed.). Just name a time that works for you, and hopefully both Gabriella and I can make it. And please “Reply to All” so that I receive a copy at my personal email.

Thanks,
Doug

Douglas C. Anderson
General Counsel and Parliamentarian
House Foreign Affairs Committee
(202) 225-5021
<http://foreignaffairs.house.gov>
[Twitter](#) • [YouTube](#) • [Facebook](#)

From: Faulkner, Charles S [<mailto:FaulknerCS@state.gov>]
Sent: Tuesday, July 10, 2018 11:19 AM
To: Anderson, Doug [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Chabad

Doug-
Would you have any time tomorrow?

CF

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From: Faulkner, Charles S
Sent: Monday, July 9, 2018 5:28:51 PM
To: Anderson, Doug
Cc: Frideres, Taryn F; Zach, Gabriella; Moore, Jessica L
Subject: RE: Chabad

Wednesday morning around WHA hearing?

Official
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From: Anderson, Doug [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2018 2:58 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: Frideres, Taryn F <FrideresTF@state.gov>; Zach, Gabriella [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Chabad

Charles: Apologies for the delay. We're having system-wide email problems that are delaying mail delivery by about 3 hours. Your message just now came through.

Can't meet tomorrow (Tues.) or Thursday afternoon, but name some other time that works for you, and we can get together.

Many thanks,
Doug

From: Faulkner, Charles S [<mailto:FaulknerCS@state.gov>]
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2018 11:54 AM
To: Anderson, Doug (b)(6)
Cc: Frideres, Taryn F <FrideresTF@state.gov>
Subject: FW: Chabad

Doug,

Taryn and I want to come and see you. When's a good time this week?

CF

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Sheehy, Tom (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2018 11:49 AM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>; Cottle, Emily (b)(6)
Cc: Frideres, Taryn F <FrideresTF@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Chabad

Doug Anderson

From: Faulkner, Charles S [<mailto:FaulknerCS@state.gov>]
Sent: Monday, July 09, 2018 11:38 AM
To: Cottle, Emily
Cc: Sheehy, Tom; Frideres, Taryn F
Subject: Chabad

Who handles Chabad issues with the Committee?

Charles S. Faulkner
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)
(202) 647-1656
FaulknerCS@state.gov

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Zach, Gabriella (b)(6) Anderson, Doug (b)(6) Douglas Anderson (b)(6) Frideres, Taryn F <FrideresTF@state.gov>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Ceren, Omri (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6)
CC:	Peek, Andrew L <PeekAL@state.gov>; Donnelly, Colleen G <DonnellyCG@state.gov>; Leahy, Samantha (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6) Samantha Leahy [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: Call with NEA DAS Peek
Date:	Wed, 20 Mar 2019 21:19:49 +0000

Can you chat at 5:30?

From: Ceren, Omri (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 2:25 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: Peek, Andrew L <PeekAL@state.gov>; Donnelly, Colleen G <DonnellyCG@state.gov>; Leahy, Samantha (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6) Samantha Leahy [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Call with NEA DAS Peek

Hi folks –

I'm around for another few hours today before I have to hop on a plane. Let me know when's good.

From: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 2:15 PM
To: Ceren, Omri (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Cc: Peek, Andrew L <PeekAL@state.gov>; Donnelly, Colleen G <DonnellyCG@state.gov>; Leahy, Samantha (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6) Samantha Leahy [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject: Call with NEA DAS Peek

Omri,

Andrew Peek would be happy to walk you through the Senators concerns about Iraq's usage of Iranian electricity. When would be a good time to discuss? We should also look at a meeting between you guys.

Charles

Charles S. Faulkner
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)
(202) 647-1656
FaulknerCS@state.gov

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Ceren, Omri (Cruz) [REDACTED] (b)(6)

Peek, Andrew L <PeekAL@state.gov>;
Donnelly, Colleen G <DonnellyCG@state.gov>;
Leahy, Samantha (Cruz) [REDACTED]
Samantha Leahy [REDACTED]

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Bruce <[REDACTED]> (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Bolton
Date:	Sat, 24 Mar 2018 19:05:11 -0400

Let me see

From: Bruce <[REDACTED]> (b)(6)
Date: March 24, 2018 at 6:52:13 PM EDT
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Subject: Bolton

Charles, I'm sure the answer is no, but did H keep the numerous binders I had on the Bolton confirmation back in 05? A lot of the material in those notebooks successfully answered many of the accusations that were then made against Bolton and are now again being dredged up by the Dems and others. If they have not been thrown away, they might be useful to the Bolton team.

Hope all is well.

Bruce

Sent from my iPhone

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Bruce <[REDACTED]> (b)(6)



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R45122

CRS REPORT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

AMERICAN
OVERSIGHT

STATE-19-0802-C-000041

**SUMMARY****R45122**

May 1, 2019

Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern
Affairs

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Afghanistan has been a central U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported it. In the intervening 17 years, the United States has suffered around 2,400 fatalities in Afghanistan (including seven in 2019 to date) and Congress has appropriated approximately \$133 billion for reconstruction there. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and nearly every measure of human development has improved, although future prospects of those measures remain mixed. The fundamental objective of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan is “preventing any further attacks on the United States by terrorists enjoying safe haven or support in Afghanistan.”

In early 2019, U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan appears closer to ending than perhaps ever before as U.S. officials negotiate directly with Taliban interlocutors on the issues of counterterrorism and the presence of U.S. troops. However, U.S. negotiators caution that talks are still at a preliminary stage, and Afghan government representatives have not been directly involved. Lead U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad insists that the U.S. seeks a comprehensive peace agreement but some worry that the U.S. will prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001. It remains unclear what kind of political arrangement could satisfy both Kabul and the Taliban to the extent that the latter fully abandons armed struggle.

Press reports in December 2018 and early 2019 indicate that the Trump Administration may be considering withdrawing some U.S. forces, though U.S. officials maintain that no policy decision has been made to reduce U.S. force levels. Many observers assess that a full-scale U.S. withdrawal would lead to the collapse of the Afghan government and perhaps even the reestablishment of Taliban control. By many measures, the Taliban are in a stronger military position now than at any point since 2001, though at least some once-public metrics related to the conduct of the war have been classified or are no longer produced (including district-level territorial and population control assessments, as of the April 30, 2019, quarterly report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction). Underlying the negotiations is the unsettled state of Afghan politics, which is a major complicating factor: Afghanistan held inconclusive parliamentary elections in October 2018 and the all-important presidential election, originally slated for April 2019, has been postponed twice and is now scheduled for September 2019.

For background information and analysis on the history of congressional engagement with Afghanistan and U.S. policy there, as well as a summary of recent Afghanistan-related legislative proposals, see CRS Report R45329, *Afghanistan: Legislation in the 115th Congress*, by Clayton Thomas.

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Overview

The U.S. and Afghan governments, along with partner countries, remain engaged in combat with a robust Taliban-led insurgency. While U.S. military officials maintain that Afghan forces are “resilient” against the Taliban,¹ by some measures insurgents are in control of or contesting more territory today than at any point since 2001.² The conflict also involves an array of other armed groups, including active affiliates of both Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym *Da’esh*). Since early 2015, the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, known as “Resolute Support Mission” (RSM), has focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan government forces; combat operations by U.S. counterterrorism forces, along with some partner forces, also continue. These two “complementary missions” make up Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS).³

Simultaneously, the United States is engaged in an aggressive diplomatic effort to end the war, most notably through direct talks with Taliban representatives (a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy). A draft framework, in which the Taliban would prohibit terrorist groups from operating on Afghan soil in return for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces, was reached between U.S. and Taliban negotiators in January 2019, though lead U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad insists that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”⁴ Negotiations do not, as of May 2019, directly involve representatives of the Afghan government, leading some to worry that the U.S. will prioritize a military withdrawal over a complex political settlement that preserves some of the social, political, and humanitarian gains made since 2001.

Underlying the negotiations is the unsettled state of Afghan politics, which is a major complicating factor: Afghanistan held inconclusive parliamentary elections in October 2018 and the all-important presidential election, originally scheduled for April 2019, has now been postponed twice until September 2019. The Afghan government has made some progress in reducing corruption and implementing its budgetary commitments, but faces domestic criticism for its failure to guarantee security and prevent insurgent gains.

The United States has contributed approximately \$133 billion in various forms of aid to Afghanistan over the past decade and a half, from building up and sustaining the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) to economic development. This assistance has increased Afghan government capacity, but prospects for stability in Afghanistan appear distant. Some U.S. policymakers still hope that the country’s largely underdeveloped natural resources and/or geographic position at the crossroads of future global trade routes might improve the economic life of the country, and, by extension, its social and political dynamics as well. Nevertheless, Afghanistan’s economic and political outlook remains uncertain, if not negative, in light of ongoing hostilities.

¹ Lolita C. Baldor and Matthew Pennington, “Attack in Afghanistan is Reminder of Formidable Task,” *Washington Post*, October 20, 2018.

² SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2019.

³ “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 1 to September 30, 2018,” Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, November 19, 2018.

⁴ Pamela Constable and Paul Sonne, “U.S.-Taliban Talks Appear Closer to Pact after Marathon Negotiations in Qatar,” *The Washington Post*, January 26, 2019.

U.S.-Taliban Negotiations

In August 2017, President Trump announced what he termed a new South Asia strategy in a nationally-televised address. Many Afghan and U.S. observers interpreted the speech and the policies it promised (expanded targeting authorities for U.S. forces, greater pressure on Pakistan, a modest increase in the number of U.S. and international troops) as a sign of renewed U.S. commitment.⁵ However, after less than a year of continued military stalemate, the Trump Administration in July 2018 reportedly ordered the start of direct talks with the Taliban that did not include the Afghan government. This represented a dramatic reversal of U.S. policy, which had previously been to support an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” peace process.⁶

In September 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo appointed former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad to the newly-created post of Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation; Khalilzad has since met several times with Taliban representatives in Doha, Qatar (where the group maintains a political office). He has also had consultations with the Afghan, Pakistani, and other regional governments.

After a six-day series of negotiations in Doha in late January 2019, Khalilzad stated that, “The Taliban have committed, to our satisfaction, to do what is necessary that would prevent Afghanistan from ever becoming a platform for international terrorist groups or individuals,” in return for which U.S. forces would eventually fully withdraw from the country.⁷ Khalilzad later cautioned that “we made significant progress on two vital issues: counter terrorism and troop withdrawal. That doesn’t mean we’re done. We’re not even finished with these issues yet, and there is still work to be done on other vital issues like intra-Afghan dialogue and a complete ceasefire.”⁸ After a longer series of talks that ended on March 12, 2019, Khalilzad announced that an agreement “in draft” had been reached on counterterrorism assurances and U.S. troop withdrawal. He noted that after the agreement is finalized, “the Taliban and other Afghans, including the government, will begin intra-Afghan negotiations on a political settlement and comprehensive ceasefire.”⁹

The Taliban have long refused to negotiate with representatives of the Afghan government, which they characterize as a corrupt and illegitimate puppet of foreign powers, and Kabul is not directly involved in the ongoing U.S.-Taliban negotiations.¹⁰ Some observers have criticized that arrangement; former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker argued that by not insisting on the inclusion of the Afghan government in these negotiations “we have ourselves

⁵ Pamela Constable, “In Afghanistan, Trump’s Speech Brings Relief to Some. To Others, ‘It Means More War, Destruction,’” *Washington Post*, August 22, 2017.

⁶ Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct Taliban Talks to Jump-Start Afghan Negotiations,” *New York Times*, July 15, 2018.

⁷ Mujib Mashal, “U.S. and Taliban Agree in Principle to Peace Framework, Envoy Says,” *New York Times*, January 28, 2019.

⁸ U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad, Twitter, January 31, 2019. Available at <https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1090944551500607488>.

⁹ U.S. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad, Twitter, March 12, 2019. Available at <https://twitter.com/US4AfghanPeace/status/1105513781705302016>

¹⁰ “Letter of the Islamic Emirate to the American people!” February 14, 2018. Available at <http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/taliban-attempts-to-appeal-to-us-audience-in-new-letter/2770/>.

delegitimized the government we claim to support,” and advocated that the U.S. halt talks until the Taliban agree to include the Afghan government.¹¹

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani has promised that his government will not accept any settlement that limits Afghans’ rights. In a January 2019 televised address, he further warned that any agreement to withdraw U.S. forces that did not include Kabul’s participation could lead to “catastrophe,” pointing to the 1990s-era civil strife following the fall of the Soviet-backed government that led to the rise of the Taliban.¹² President Ghani’s concern about being excluded from the talks surfaced in mid-March when his national security advisor accused Khalilzad of “delegitimizing the Afghan government and weakening it,” and harboring political ambitions within Afghanistan, leading to a sharp rebuke from the State Department.¹³ According to a former State Department official, “The real issue is not the personality of an American diplomat; the real issue is a policy divergence.”¹⁴

It remains unclear what kind of political arrangement could satisfy both Kabul and the Taliban to the extent that the latter fully abandons armed struggle in pursuit of its goals. The Taliban have recently given some more conciliatory signs, with one spokesman saying the group is “not seeking a monopoly on power.”¹⁵ Still, many Afghans, especially women, who remember Taliban rule and oppose the group’s tactics and beliefs, remain wary.¹⁶

Afghan Political Situation

The unsettled state of Afghan politics is a major complicating factor for current negotiations. The leadership partnership (referred to as the national unity government) between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah, which was brokered by the United States in the wake of the disputed 2014 election, has encountered challenges but remains intact. However, a trend in Afghan society and governance that worries some observers is increasing political fragmentation along ethnic lines.¹⁷ Such fractures have long existed in Afghanistan but were relatively muted during Hamid Karzai’s presidency.¹⁸ These divisions are sometimes seen as a driving force behind some of the political upheavals that have challenged Ghani’s government.¹⁹

¹¹ Ryan Crocker, “I Was Ambassador to Afghanistan. This Deal is a Surrender,” *Washington Post*, January 29, 2019.

¹² Hasib Danish Alikozai and Mohammad Habibzada, “Afghans Worry as US Makes Progress in Taliban Talks,” *Voice of America*, January 29, 2019.

¹³ Philip Stewart, Jonathan Landay, and Hamid Shalizi, “In U.S. pursuit of peace talks, perilous rift opens with Afghan leaders,” *Reuters*, March 27, 2019.

¹⁴ Laurel Miller, quoted in Mark Landler, “U.S. Diplomat Is Focus of Afghan Leaders’ Anger Over Peace Talks With Taliban,” *New York Times*, March 15, 2019.

¹⁵ Kathy Gannon, “Taliban Say They Are Not Looking to Rule Afghanistan Alone,” *Associated Press*, January 30, 2019.

¹⁶ Pamela Constable, “The Return of a Taliban Government? Afghanistan Talks Raise Once-Unthinkable Question,” *Washington Post*, January 29, 2019.

¹⁷ Frud Bezhan, “Leaked Memo Fuels New Allegations of Ethnic Bias in Afghan Government,” *RFERL*, November 20, 2017.

¹⁸ See, for example, Azam Ahmed and Habib Zahori, “Afghan Ethnic Tensions Rise in Media and Politics,” *New York Times*, February 18, 2014.


¹⁹ Namely, contention with such powerbrokers as Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum, leader of the country’s Uzbek minority; former Balkh governor Atta Mohammad Noor, prominent member of Afghanistan’s major Tajik political party; and former President Hamid Karzai, who maintains support among some Afghans.

Afghanistan held parliamentary elections in October 2018 that were marred by logistical, administrative, and security problems; results are still, as of May 2019, incomplete, though the new parliament was inaugurated in April 2019. The all-important presidential election, originally scheduled for April 2019, has now been postponed twice, until September 2019. It is unclear to what extent, if any, those delays are related to ongoing U.S.-Taliban talks.²⁰ U.S. officials have denied that the establishment of an interim government is part of their negotiations with the Taliban, but some observers speculate that such an arrangement (which Ghani has rejected) might be necessary to accommodate the reentry of Taliban figures into public life and facilitate the establishment of a new political system, which a putative settlement might require.²¹

Military and Security Situation

Since early 2015, the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan of 17,000 troops, known as “Resolute Support Mission” (RSM), has focused on training, advising, and assisting Afghan government forces. Combat operations by U.S. forces also continue and have increased in number since 2017. These two “complementary missions” comprise Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS).²² There are around 14,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, of which approximately 8,500 are part of RSM. The remaining 8,400 troops of RSM come from 38 partner countries.

Figure I. Control of Districts in Afghanistan



Source: SIGAR Quarterly Reports.

Notes: The y-axis represents the number of districts, of which the U.S. government counts 407 in Afghanistan.

²⁰ Hamid Shalizi, “Afghanistan to Delay Presidential Election to July: Election Body,” Reuters, December 30, 2018.


²¹ Gul Maqsood Sabit, “On the Verge of Peace, Afghanistan Needs a Carefully Managed Strategy,” *Diplomat*, January 4, 2019; Ali Yawar Adili, “Afghanistan’s 2019 Elections (1): The Countdown to the Presidential Election Has Kicked Off,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 23, 2019.

²² “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel, Quarterly Report to Congress, July 1 to September 30, 2018,” Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations, November 19, 2018.

Since at least early 2017, U.S. military officials have publicly stated that the conflict is “largely stalemated.”²³ Arguably complicating that assessment, the extent of territory controlled or contested by the Taliban has steadily grown in recent years by most measures (see **Figure 1**). In its January 30, 2019, report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that the share of districts under government control or influence fell to 53.8%, as of October 2018. This figure, which marks a slight decline from previous reports, is the lowest recorded by SIGAR since tracking began in November 2015; 12% of districts are under insurgent control or influence, with the remaining 34% contested.²⁴

According to SIGAR’s April 30, 2019, quarterly report, the U.S. military is “no longer producing its district-level stability assessments of Afghan government and insurgent control and influence.” This information, which was in every previous SIGAR quarterly report going back to January 2016, estimated the extent of Taliban control and influence in terms of both territory and population, and was accompanied by charts portraying those trends over time along with a color-coded map of control/influence by district (see). SIGAR reports that it was told by the U.S. military that the assessment is no longer being produced because it “was of limited decision-making value to the [U.S.] Commander.”²⁵

Figure 2. Insurgent Activity in Afghanistan by District



Source: SIGAR, January 30, 2019, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.

While the Taliban retain the ability to conduct high-profile urban attacks, they also demonstrate considerable tactical capabilities.²⁶ Reports indicate that ANDSF fatalities have averaged 30-40 a day in recent months, and President Ghani stated in January 2019 that over 45,000 security

²³ Ellen Mitchell, “Afghanistan War at a Stalemate, Top General Tells Lawmakers,” *The Hill*, December 4, 2018.

²⁴ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 30, 2018.

²⁵ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 30, 2019.

²⁶ Alec Worsnop, “From Guerilla to Maneuver Warfare: A Look at the Taliban’s Growing Combat Capability,” *Modern War Institute*, June 6, 2018.

personnel had paid “the ultimate sacrifice” since he took office in September 2014.²⁷ Insider attacks on U.S. and coalition forces by Afghan nationals are a sporadic, but persistent, problem—several U.S. servicemen died in such attacks in 2018, as did 85 Afghan soldiers.²⁸ In October 2018, General Miller was present at an attack inside the Kandahar governor’s compound by a Taliban infiltrator who killed a number of provincial officials, including the powerful police chief Abdul Raziq; Miller was unhurt but another U.S. general was wounded.²⁹

Beyond the Taliban, a significant share of U.S. operations are aimed at the local Islamic State affiliate, known as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, also known as ISIS-K), although there is debate over the degree of threat the group poses.³⁰ ISKP and Taliban forces have sometimes fought over control of territory or because of political or other differences.³¹ U.S. officials are reportedly tracking attempts by IS fighters fleeing Iraq and Syria to enter Afghanistan, which may represent a more permissive operating environment.³² ISKP also has claimed responsibility for a number of large-scale attacks, many targeting Afghanistan’s Shia minority. The UN reports that Al Qaeda, while degraded in Afghanistan and facing competition from ISKP, “remains a longer-term threat.”³³

ANDSF Development and Deployment

The effectiveness of the ANDSF is key to the security of Afghanistan. As of March 2019, SIGAR reports that Congress has appropriated at least \$83.3 billion for Afghan security since 2002.³⁴ Since 2014, the United States generally has provided around 75% of the estimated \$5-6 billion a year to fund the ANDSF, with the balance coming from U.S. partners (\$1 billion annually) and the Afghan government (\$500 million).

Concerns about the ANDSF raised by SIGAR, the Department of Defense, and others include

- absenteeism, the fact that about 35% of the force does not reenlist each year, and the potential for rapid recruitment to dilute the force’s quality;
- widespread illiteracy within the force;³⁵

²⁷ “Afghanistan’s Ghani says 45,000 Security Personnel Killed Since 2014,” BBC, January 25, 2019.

²⁸ Richard Sisk, “85 Afghan Troops Killed in Insider Attacks This Year, Report Finds,” *Military.com*, November 5, 2018.

²⁹ Pamela Constable and Sayed Salahuddin, “U.S. Commander in Afghanistan Survives Deadly Attack at Governor’s Compound That Kills Top Afghan Police General,” *Washington Post*, October 18, 2018.

³⁰ See, for example, Kyle Rempfer, “Is ISIS Gaining ‘Serious’ Ground in Afghanistan? Russia Says Yes. The US Says No,” *Military Times*, March 26, 2018.

³¹ See, for example, Amira Jadoon, et al., “Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 11, Issue 4, April 26, 2018; Najim Rahim and Rod Nordland, “Taliban Surge Routs ISIS in Northern Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, August 1 2018.

³² “ISIS terrorists heading to Afghanistan from Syria and Iraq to plot attacks,” *Khaama Press*, April 30, 2019. In April 2018, a U.S. air strike killed the ISKP leader (himself a former Taliban commander) in northern Jowzjan province, which NATO described as “the main conduit for external support and foreign fighters from Central Asian states into Afghanistan.” NATO Resolute Support Media Center, “Top IS-K Commander Killed in Northern Afghanistan,” April 9, 2018.

³³ Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, S/2018/705, July 27, 2018.

³⁴ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2019.

³⁵ SIGAR reported in January 2014 that means of measuring the effectiveness of ANDSF literacy programs were “limited,” and that judgment seems not to have changed in the years since.

- credible allegations of child sexual abuse and other potential human rights abuses;³⁶ and
- casualty rates often described as unsustainable.

Key metrics related to ANDSF performance, including casualties, attrition rates, and personnel strength, were classified by U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) starting with the October 2017 SIGAR quarterly report, citing a request from the Afghan government. Although SIGAR had previously published those metrics as part of its quarterly reports, they remain withheld.³⁷ In both legislation and public statements, some Members have expressed concern over the decline in the types and amount of information provided by the executive branch.

U.S. Troop Levels and Authorities

At a February 2017 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, then-mission commander of Resolute Support Mission General Nicholson indicated that the United States had a “shortfall of a few thousand” troops that, if filled, could help break the “stalemate.”³⁸ In June 2017, President Trump delegated to then-Secretary Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to around 3,500 additional troops, in June 2017; Secretary Mattis signed orders to deploy them in September 2017.³⁹ Those additional forces put the total number of U.S. troops in the country at around 14,000.⁴⁰

Some reports in late 2018 and early 2019 indicate that President Trump may be contemplating ordering the withdrawal of some U.S. forces from Afghanistan.⁴¹ Still, U.S. officials maintain that no policy decision has been made to reduce U.S. force levels. During a visit to Kabul on February 11, 2019, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated “I have not been directed to step down our forces in Afghanistan.”⁴² Also in February 2019, the Senate passed S. 1, which includes language (Section 408) warning against a “precipitous withdrawal” of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and Syria.⁴³

NATO Contribution

The current train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan, Resolute Support Mission (RSM), is led by NATO, and NATO partners have been heavily engaged in Afghanistan since 2001. At its height in 2012, the number of NATO and non-NATO partner forces reached 130,000, around 100,000 of whom were American. As of March 2019, RSM is made up of around 17,000 troops from 39 countries, of whom 8,475 are American. This represents an

³⁶ See SIGAR Report 17-47, “Child Sexual Assault in Afghanistan: Implementation of the Leahy Laws and Reports of Assault by Afghan Security Forces,” June 2017 (released on January 23, 2018).

³⁷ Shawn Snow, “Report: US Officials Classify Crucial Metrics on Afghan Casualties, Readiness,” *Military Times*, October 30, 2017.

³⁸ Statement for the record by General John W. Nicholson, Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan, February 9, 2017.

³⁹ Tara Copp, “Mattis Signs Orders to Send about 3,500 More US Troops to Afghanistan,” *Military Times*, September 11, 2017.

⁴⁰ As of September 30, 2017, the total number of active duty and reserve forces in Afghanistan was 15,298. Defense Manpower Data Center, *Military and Civilian Personnel by Service/Agency by State/Country Quarterly Report*, September 2017.

⁴¹ Dan Lamothe and Josh Dawsey, “Trump Wanted a Big Cut in Troops in Afghanistan. New U.S. Military Plans Fall Short,” *Washington Post*, January 8, 2019.

⁴² “Acting Pentagon Chief: No Orders to Withdraw From Afghanistan,” *Al Jazeera*, February 11, 2019.

⁴³ Patricia Zengerle, “Senate Breaks from Trump with Syria Troops Vote,” *Reuters*, February 4, 2019.

increase of about 3,000 troops from NATO and other partner countries. At the NATO summit in July 2018, NATO leaders extended their financial commitment to Afghan forces to 2024 (previously 2020).⁴⁴

Additionally, U.S. forces now have broader authority to operate independently of Afghan forces and “attack the enemy across the breadth and depth of the battle space,” expanding the list of targets to include those related to “revenue streams, support infrastructure, training bases, infiltration lanes.”⁴⁵ This was demonstrated in a series of operations, beginning in the fall of 2017, against Taliban drug labs. These operations, often highlighted by U.S. officials, sought to degrade what is widely viewed as one of the Taliban’s most important sources of revenue, namely the cultivation, production, and trafficking of narcotics.⁴⁶ Some have questioned the impact of that campaign, which came to an end in late 2018.⁴⁷ In November 2018, the United Nations reported that the total area used for poppy cultivation in 2018 was 263,000 hectares, the second-highest level recorded since monitoring began in 1994.⁴⁸

Regional Dynamics: Pakistan and Other Neighbors

Regional dynamics, and the involvement of outside powers, are central to the conflict in Afghanistan. The neighboring state widely considered most important in this regard is Pakistan, which has played an active, and by many accounts negative, role in Afghan affairs for decades. President Trump has directly accused Pakistan of “housing the very terrorists that we are fighting.”⁴⁹ Afghan leaders, along with U.S. military commanders, attribute much of the insurgency’s power and longevity either directly or indirectly to Pakistan. Experts debate the extent to which Pakistan is committed to Afghan stability or is attempting to exert control in Afghanistan through ties to insurgent groups, most notably the Haqqani Network, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) that has become an official, semiautonomous component of the Taliban.⁵⁰ U.S. officials have repeatedly identified militant safe havens in Pakistan as a threat to security in Afghanistan, though some observers question the validity of that charge in light of the Taliban’s increased territorial control within Afghanistan itself.⁵¹

Pakistan may view a weak and destabilized Afghanistan as preferable to a strong, unified Afghan state (particularly one led by a Pashtun-dominated government in Kabul; Pakistan has a large and restive Pashtun minority). However, at least some Pakistani leaders have stated that instability in Afghanistan could rebound to Pakistan’s detriment; Pakistan has struggled with indigenous Islamist militants of its own.⁵² Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are further complicated by the large Afghan refugee population in Pakistan and a long-standing border dispute over which violence

⁴⁴ Brussels Summit Declaration, issued July 11, 2018.

⁴⁵ Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Nicholson via teleconference from Kabul, Afghanistan, November 20, 2017.

⁴⁶ Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan estimated in a February 6, 2018, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that 65% of Taliban revenues are derived from narcotics.

⁴⁷ Kyle Rempfer, “Doubts Rise Over Effectiveness of Bombing Afghan Drug Labs,” *Military Times*, February 5, 2018.

⁴⁸ “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 19, 2018.

⁴⁹ White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017.

⁵⁰ For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, *Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan*, by Clayton Thomas.

⁵¹ Author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 21, 2018.

⁵² Jon Boone, “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s Backing for ‘Proxies’ in Afghanistan Must Stop,” *Guardian*, February 13, 2015; author interviews with Pakistani military officials, Islamabad, Pakistan, February 2018.

has broken out on several occasions.⁵³ Pakistan sees Afghanistan as potentially providing strategic depth against India, but may also anticipate that improved relations with Afghanistan's leadership could limit India's influence in Afghanistan. Indian interest in Afghanistan stems largely from India's broader regional rivalry with Pakistan, which impedes Indian efforts to establish stronger and more direct commercial and political relations with Central Asia.

In his August 2017 speech, President Trump announced what he characterized as a new approach to Pakistan, saying, "We can no longer be silent about Pakistan's safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond."⁵⁴ He also, however, praised Pakistan as a "valued partner," citing the close U.S.-Pakistani military relationship. In January 2018, the Trump Administration announced plans to suspend security assistance to Pakistan, a decision that has affected billions of dollars in aid.⁵⁵ In February 2019, CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel stated, "Pakistan has not taken concrete actions against the safe havens of violent extremist organizations inside its borders," but praised Pakistan for some "positive steps" in assisting Special Representative Khalilzad's reconciliation efforts.⁵⁶

Afghanistan largely maintains cordial ties with its other neighbors, including the post-Soviet states of Central Asia, though some warn that rising instability in Afghanistan may complicate those relations.⁵⁷ In the past two years, multiple U.S. commanders have warned of increased levels of assistance, and perhaps even material support, for the Taliban from Russia and Iran, both of which cite IS presence in Afghanistan to justify their activities.⁵⁸ Both nations were opposed to the Taliban government of the late 1990s, but reportedly see the Taliban as a useful point of leverage vis-a-vis the United States. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.⁵⁹

President Trump mentioned neither Iran nor Russia in his August 2017 speech, and it is unclear how, if at all, the U.S. approach to them might have changed as part of the new strategy. Afghanistan may also represent a growing priority for China in the context of broader Chinese aspirations in Asia and globally.⁶⁰ In his speech, President Trump did encourage India to play a greater role in Afghan economic development; this, along with other Administration messaging, has compounded Pakistani concerns over Indian activity in Afghanistan.⁶¹ India has

⁵³ About two million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since 2001, but approximately 2.4 million remain.

⁵⁴ White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia, August 21, 2017.

⁵⁵ Mark Landler and Gardiner Harris, "Trump, Citing Pakistan as a 'Safe Haven' for Terrorists, Freezes Aid," *New York Times*, January 4, 2018. Pakistan closed its ground and air lines of communication (GLOCs and ALOCs, respectively) to the United States after the latter suspended security aid during an earlier period of U.S.-Pakistan tensions in 2011-2012.

⁵⁶ Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, February 5, 2019.

⁵⁷ Ivan Safranchuk, "Afghanistan and Its Central Asian Neighbors: Toward Dividing Insecurity," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2017.

⁵⁸ In October 2018, the Trump Administration sanctioned several Iranian military officials for providing support to the Taliban. "Treasury and the Terrorist Financing Targeting Center Partners Sanction Taliban Facilitators and their Iranian Supporters," U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 23, 2018.

⁵⁹ Thomas Ruttig, "Climbing on China's Priority List: Views on Afghanistan from Beijing," Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 10, 2018.

⁶⁰ Thomas Ruttig, "Climbing on China's Priority List: Views on Afghanistan from Beijing," Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 10, 2018; Michael Martina, "Afghan Troops to Train in China, Ambassador Says," Reuters, September 6, 2018.

⁶¹ Author interviews with Pakistani military and political officials, Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Pakistan, February 2018.

been the largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction, but New Delhi has not shown an inclination to pursue a deeper defense relationship with Kabul.

Economy and U.S. Aid

Economic development is pivotal to Afghanistan's long-term stability, though indicators of future growth are mixed. Decades of war have stunted the development of most domestic industries, including mining.⁶² The economy has also been hurt by a steep decrease in the amount of aid provided by international donors. Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown an average of 7% per year since 2003, but growth slowed to 2% in 2013 due to aid cutbacks and political uncertainty about the post-2014 security situation. Since 2015, Afghanistan has experienced a "slight recovery" with growth of between 2% and 3% in 2016 and 2017, though the increase in the poverty rate (55% living below the national poverty line in 2016-2017 compared to 38% in 2012-2013) complicates that picture.⁶³ A severe drought affecting northern and western Afghanistan has compounded economic and humanitarian challenges.⁶⁴ Social conditions in Afghanistan remain equally mixed. On issues ranging from human trafficking⁶⁵ to religious freedom to women's rights, Afghanistan has, by all accounts, made significant progress since 2001, but future prospects in these areas remain uncertain.

Congress has appropriated more than \$132 billion in aid for Afghanistan since FY2002, with about 63% for security and 28% for development (and the remainder for civilian operations and humanitarian aid).⁶⁶ The Administration's FY2020 budget requests \$4.8 billion for the ANDSF, \$400 million in Economic Support Funds, and smaller amounts to help the Afghan government with tasks like combating narcotics trafficking.⁶⁷ This is down slightly from both the FY2019 request as well as the FY2018 enacted level of about \$5.5 billion in total funding for Afghanistan (down from nearly \$17 billion in FY2010). These figures do not include the cost of U.S. combat operations (including related regional support activities), which was estimated at a total of \$745 billion since FY2001 as of December 2018, according to the DOD's quarterly Cost of War report, with approximately \$45 billion requested for each of FY2018 and FY2019.⁶⁸ In its FY2020 budget request, the Pentagon identified \$18.6 billion in direct war costs in Afghanistan and \$35.3 billion in "enduring theater requirements and related missions," though it is unclear how much of this latter figure is for Afghanistan versus other theaters.

⁶² Much attention has been paid to Afghanistan's potential mineral and hydrocarbon resources, which by some estimates could be considerable but have yet to be fully explored or developed. Once estimated at nearly \$1 trillion, the value of Afghan mineral deposits has since been revised downward, but those deposits reportedly have attracted interest from the Trump Administration. Mark Landler and James Risen, "Trump Finds Reason for the U.S. to Remain in Afghanistan: Minerals," *New York Times*, July 25, 2017. Additionally, Afghanistan's geographic location could position it as a transit country for others' resources. The United States has emphasized the development of a Central Asia-South Asia trading hub, dubbed a "New Silk Road" (NSR), in an effort to keep Afghanistan economically viable and perhaps also to counter a similar Chinese initiative ("One Belt, One Road").

⁶³ "Afghanistan," CIA World Factbook, last updated February 19, 2019.

⁶⁴ "Afghan Drought 'Displacing More People Than Taliban Conflict,'" BBC, October 17, 2018.

⁶⁵ Afghanistan was ranked as "Tier 2" in the State Department Trafficking in Persons Report for 2017, an improvement from 2016 when Afghanistan was ranked as "Tier 2: Watch List" on the grounds that the Afghan government was not demonstrating increased efforts against trafficking since the prior reporting period.

⁶⁶ SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 30, 2019.

⁶⁷ For more, see CRS Report R45329, *Afghanistan: Legislation in the 115th Congress*, by Clayton Thomas.

⁶⁸ FY2019 Quarter 1 Cost of War Update as of December 31, 2018.

Outlook

Insurgent and terrorist groups have demonstrated considerable capabilities in 2018 and 2019, throwing into sharp relief the daunting security challenges that the Afghan government and its U.S. and international partners face. At the same time, hopes for a negotiated settlement have risen, inspired by developments such as the June 2018 nationwide cease-fire and, more importantly, direct U.S.-Taliban talks, though the prospects for such negotiations to deliver a settlement are uncertain.

U.S. policy has sought to force the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government by compelling the group to conclude that continued military struggle is futile in light of combined U.S., NATO, and ANDSF capabilities. It is still unclear, however, how the Taliban perceives its fortunes; given the group's recent battlefield gains, one observer has said that "the group has little reason to commit to a peace process: it is on a winning streak."⁶⁹

Observers differ on whether the Taliban pose an existential threat to the Afghan government, given the current military balance. That dynamic could change if the United States alters the level or nature of its troop deployments in Afghanistan or funding for the ANDSF. President Ghani has said, "[W]e will not be able to support our army for six months without U.S. [financial] support."⁷⁰ Notwithstanding direct U.S. support, Afghan political dynamics, particularly the willingness of political actors to directly challenge the legitimacy and authority of the central government, even by extralegal means, may pose a serious threat to Afghan stability in 2019 and beyond, regardless of Taliban military capabilities.

A potential collapse of the Afghan military and/or the government that commands it could have significant implications for the United States, particularly given the nature of negotiated security arrangements. Regardless of how likely the Taliban would be to gain full control over all, or even most, of the country, the breakdown of social order and the fracturing of the country into fiefdoms controlled by paramilitary commanders and their respective militias may be plausible, even probable. Afghanistan experienced a similar situation nearly thirty years ago. Though Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan by February 1989, Soviet aid continued, sustaining the communist government in Kabul for nearly three years. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 ended that aid, and a coalition of mujahedin forces overturned the government in April 1992. Almost immediately, mujahedin commanders turned against each other, leading to a complex civil war during which the Taliban was founded, grew, and took control of most of the country, eventually offering sanctuary to Al Qaeda. While the Taliban and Al Qaeda are still "closely allied" according to the UN,⁷¹ Taliban forces have clashed repeatedly with the Afghan Islamic State affiliate. Under a more unstable future scenario, alliances and relationships among extremist groups could evolve or security conditions could change, offering new opportunities to transnational terrorist groups whether directly or by default.

After more than 17 years of war, Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers may reassess notions of what "victory" in Afghanistan looks like, examining the array of potential outcomes, how these outcomes might harm or benefit U.S. interests, and the relative levels of U.S.

⁶⁹ Michael Semple, "The Taliban's Battle Plan," *Foreign Affairs*, November 28, 2018.

⁷⁰ Anwar Iqbal, "Afghan Army to Collapse in Six Months Without US Help: Ghani," *Dawn*, January 18, 2018.

⁷¹ Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, United Nations Security Council, July 27, 2018.

engagement and investment required to attain them.⁷² The present condition, which is essentially a stalemate that has existed for several years, could persist; some argue that the United States “has the capacity to sustain its commitment to Afghanistan for some time to come” at current levels.⁷³ Others counter that “the threat in Afghanistan doesn’t warrant a continued U.S. military presence and the associated costs—which are not inconsequential.”⁷⁴

The Trump Administration has described U.S. policy in Afghanistan as “grounded in the fundamental objective of preventing any further attacks on the United States by terrorists enjoying safe haven or support in Afghanistan.”⁷⁵ For years, some analysts have challenged that line of reasoning, describing it as a strategic “myth” and arguing that “the safe haven fallacy is an argument for endless war based on unwarranted worst-case scenario assumptions.”⁷⁶ Some of these analysts and others dismiss what they see as a disproportionate focus on the military effort, citing evidence that “the terror threat to Americans remains low” to argue that “a strategy that emphasizes military power will continue to fail.”⁷⁷ As many have observed, increased political instability, fueled by questions about the central government’s authority and competence and rising ethnic tensions, may pose as serious a threat to Afghanistan as the Taliban does.⁷⁸

In light of these internal political dynamics, Members of Congress may examine how the United States can leverage its assets, influence, and experience in Afghanistan, as well as those of Afghanistan’s neighbors and international organizations, to encourage more equal, inclusive, and effective governance. Congress could also seek to help shape the U.S. approach to potential negotiations around amending the constitution or otherwise altering the highly centralized Afghan political system, e.g., through legislation and public statements.⁷⁹ Core issues for Congress include its role in authorizing, appropriating funds for, and overseeing U.S. military activities, aid, and regional policy implementation.

Author Information

Clayton Thomas
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

⁷² See, for example Jim Banks, “The Public Deserves an Afghanistan War Progress Report,” *National Review*, October 23, 2018; Seth Jones, “The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: The Perils of Withdrawal,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 26, 2018.

⁷³ Semple, op. cit.

⁷⁴ Charles Pena, “We Can’t Win-and Don’t Have To-In Afghanistan,” *Real Clear Defense*, October 9, 2018.

⁷⁵ U.S. Department of State, “Integrated Country Strategy: Afghanistan,” September 27, 2018.

⁷⁶ A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, “Another Year of the War in Afghanistan,” *Texas National Security Review*, September 11, 2018. See also Micah Zenko and Amelia Mae Wolfe, “The Myth of the Terrorist Safe Haven,” *Foreign Policy*, January 26, 2015.

⁷⁷ Erik Goepner, “In Afghanistan, the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops Is Long Overdue,” Cato Institute, September 29, 2017.

⁷⁸ Sayed Salahuddin, “Strongman’s loyalists show Taliban isn’t only threat in Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*, July 4, 2018.

⁷⁹ Omar Samad, “A Pivotal Year Ahead for Afghanistan,” Atlantic Council, November 27, 2018.

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From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>	
To:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Date:	Sun, 24 Mar 2019 18:59:16 +0000	

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>	
Recipient:	(b)(6)	(b)(6)



Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

March 14, 2019

The Honorable Michael Pompeo
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Pompeo:

We remain concerned about ongoing allegations of politically-motivated retaliation against Department of State personnel and the Department's failure to provide documents and interviews that we, along with other members of Congress, have previously requested. On March 15, 2018 (see attachment A), in response to publicly reported allegations of prohibited personnel practices against career officials at the Department of State, then-Ranking Members Engel and Cummings of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, respectively, requested the State Department provide the records cited below to their respective Committees by March 28, 2018:

- (1) all documents and communications referring or relating to any reassignment or proposed reassignment that was considered or ordered since January 20, 2017, of career or civil service employees at the Department;
- (2) all documents and communications referring or relating to any proposed or actual reassignment or removal of career or civil service employees at the Department since January 20, 2017, based on alleged personal political beliefs, prior service with previous Administrations, or work on prior Administrations' foreign policy priorities, including any documents authored by, copying, involving, or referring to:
 - (a) Christine Ciccone;
 - (b) Makan Delrahim;
 - (c) Sean Doocey;
 - (d) Julia Haller;
 - (e) Brian Hook;
 - (f) Edward Lacey;

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- (g) Matthew Mowers; or
- (h) Margaret Peterlin; and

- (3) all documents and communications referring or relating to proposed or actual personnel actions since January 20, 2017, against Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, including the curtailment of her detail to the Policy Planning staff.

In the March 2018 letter, then-Ranking Members Engel and Cummings also requested transcribed interviews of the officials listed in paragraph 2 above.

In the months that followed, our Committees continued to learn of a worsening track record of retaliation against career State Department employees. In a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 23, 2018, you committed to then-Ranking Member Engel to provide a timeline for providing documents previously requested on this matter. That the Department failed to provide either this timeline or any substantive response to address these ongoing allegations of prohibited personnel practices only added to our concern. On June 19, 2018 (see attachment B), in the wake of media reports that a political appointee had been “vetting career diplomats and American employees of international institutions to determine whether they are loyal to President Donald Trump and his political agenda,” we, along with then-Ranking Member Cummings, wrote the Department again to request that the Department produce the below documents by June 29, 2018:

- (1) all documents or communications referring or relating to State Department Senior Adviser Mari Stull’s efforts to categorize, vet, or research career State Department employees and employees of international institutions, including searches on social media websites;
- (2) all documents or communications referring or relating to lists of career State Department employees and employees of international institutions created by Mari Stull or any other political appointee at the State Department; and
- (3) all documents or communications referring or relating to research conducted by political appointees relating to perceived political views of career employees.

The June 2018 letter also requested that the Department “preserve all documents, communications, and other data (‘records’) that may be required for our oversight and investigative duties.”

On August 22, 2018, then-Ranking Members Engel and Cummings wrote to the Department once again (see attachment C). This time, it was because the Administration had not

The Honorable Michael Pompeo
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only repeatedly ignored oversight requests, but had chosen to promote Brian Hook, one of the individuals reportedly most closely associated with allegations of abuse of power and retaliation against career officials, rather than investigating and appropriately responding to his alleged actions. In the August 22 letter, then-Ranking Members Engel and Cummings reiterated the interview and document requests that had been made previously.

To date, despite three specific requests and multiple follow-up efforts by our offices, the Department has failed to respond to our requests for interviews or provide any responsive records. After nearly a year, it suggests the State Department is stonewalling a legitimate congressional request for information on matters that are squarely within our Committees' oversight jurisdiction. We are therefore restating our demand for a response to our prior queries on this matter, and are prepared to use appropriate tools at our disposal to prompt a substantive response.

Ignoring reports of political litmus tests and retaliation at the Department of State has not made the problem go away. Rather, continuing reports of retaliation suggest it has exacerbated it, while morale at the Department—not to mention the careers of several employees—has suffered.

We understand the State Department has at various times claimed that it cannot provide documents while a State Department Office of the Inspector General (IG) investigation regarding the same matter is ongoing (see Attachment D). This position is false and lacks a foundation in either law or the Department's own past practice. As a co-equal branch of government, Congress has the constitutional responsibility and authority to provide oversight and ensure that Executive Branch governance is effective, efficient, and ethical. While we appreciate the crucial role of inspectors general, Congress' oversight activities cannot be displaced or delayed simply because the Executive Branch is simultaneously in the process of investigating itself. Although the Executive may not wish to formally comment on or characterize the importance of documents and facts while an IG investigation is pending, this in no way provides a justification for withholding the documents and witnesses themselves from Congress to conduct its own investigation and reach its own conclusions. We remind you of the clear precedent that the State Department established when it produced large amounts of material to various House committee chairs who were involved in investigating issues related to the email practices of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This production occurred while numerous other investigations—including by inspectors general—were ongoing.

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The Department has already acknowledged in a court filing on March 1, 2019 that it lacks any legal argument to delay production of the same documents to private entities under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and that it has recently located more than 1,300 potentially responsive records in a FOIA case that overlaps substantially with the records we seek.¹ In that case, which was filed nearly eight months *after* the requests by Congress, the Department plans to begin rolling productions on April 17, 2019.² As you stated when you served alongside us in the House of Representatives, it is unacceptable for Congress to take a back seat to FOIA requesters when it comes to the crucial work of overseeing our national security apparatus.³ You were right then, and we expect you do the right thing now.

To the extent that the Department may have been relying on a legal theory that our requests somehow lapsed at the end of the 115th Congress, we write today to dispense with that argument and hereby formally restate our prior requests. Therefore, we request that the Department provide the following no later than March 21, 2019:

- (1) Any and all documents responsive to the March 15, 2018 letter (Attachment A);
- (2) Any and all documents responsive to the June 19, 2018 letter (Attachment B);
- (3) A schedule of availability for the Committees to conduct transcribed interviews with each of the following individuals, with the first interview to be conducted no later than April 1, 2019, and with all interviews to be conducted no later than April 30, 2019:
 - (a) Christine Ciccone;
 - (b) Makan Delrahim;

¹ See *American Oversight v. U.S. Department of State*, 1:18-cv-02565 (D.D.C.). Joint Status Report filed 3/1/19, ECF No. 10, at para. 3. (online at: <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5755708-Joint-Status-Report-Mari-Stull-Emails.html>). A more precise estimate is not possible because the Department's filing also referred to "415 potentially responsive pages" of calendar entries, whereas the requests associated with case 1:18-cv-02565 referred to documents.

² *Id.*

³ See Rep. Mike Pompeo (R-KS) (noting that the House Select Committee on Benghazi was formed, according to Mr. Pompeo, "because the State Department turned over information in a FOIA request that had not been turned over to the previous committees," and expressing concern that "the State Department and other government agencies may not have provided those other committees the information they need to do complete their task [sic].") *Full text: Clinton testifies before House committee on Benghazi* (online at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/10/22/transcript-clinton-testifies-before-house-committee-on-benghazi/?utm_term=.4557343e643e).

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- (c) Sean Doocey;
- (d) Julia Haller;
- (e) Brian Hook;
- (f) Edward Lacey;
- (g) Matthew Mowers;
- (h) Margaret Peterlin;
- (i) Andrew Veprek;
- (j) John Zadrozny; and
- (k) Kevin Moley

The Committees understand that certain of these individuals listed above are no longer employed by the Department of State. The Committees will also be contacting such individuals directly, but are amenable to the Department, consistent with its past practice, playing a coordinating role in arranging such transcribed interviews. The Committees also note that the individuals named in items (i), (j), and (k) on this list were previously requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee separate from the March 2018 and June 2018 letters referenced above.

Consistent with past practice by the Department, we also request that you produce, also by March 21, 2019:

- (4) Any and all documents that are in the possession, custody, and control, of the Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State⁴ which relate in any way to allegations of prohibited personnel practices against career employees including or similar to those described in Attachments A and B;
- (5) Any and all documents, without redactions, that have been produced to any FOIA requester or plaintiff on any matter that is related to the subject of Committees' inquiry as detailed above and in the accompanying letters.
- (6) Any and all documents, without redactions, that have been identified as potentially responsive in *American Oversight v. U.S. Department of State*, 1:18-cv-02565 (D.D.C).

⁴ While there is no valid basis for withholding documents from Congress due simply to the pendency of an IG investigation, the State Department's Office of Inspector General has already affirmed in writing to committee staff that it has no objection to the provision of such documents, which it already has in a centralized location as the result of its investigation.

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Because these documents have already been collected and are either in the process of being reviewed or have already been produced, this should impose no additional burden on the Department.

Staff for both of our Committees will be in contact with the Bureau of Legislative Affairs to provide instructions on how best to provide these documents to the Committees.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,



ELIOT L. ENGEL
Chairman
House Committee on Foreign Affairs



ROBERT MENENDEZ
Ranking Member
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Attachments:

- A. Engel, Cummings Letter to Pompeo dated March 15, 2018
- B. Engel, Cummings, Menendez Letter to Pompeo dated June 19, 2018
- C. Engel, Cummings Letter to Pompeo dated August 22, 2018
- D. Email from State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs indicating the Department of State's unwillingness to furnish documents

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

March 15, 2018

General John F. Kelly
Chief of Staff
The White House
1650 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

The Honorable John J. Sullivan
Deputy Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear General Kelly and Deputy Secretary Sullivan:

We have obtained extremely disturbing new documents from a whistleblower indicating that high-level officials at the White House and State Department worked with a network of conservative activists to conduct a "cleaning" of employees they believed were not sufficiently "supportive" of President Trump's agenda. They appear to have targeted these staffers despite being fully aware that they were career civil service employees and despite the career employees expressing willingness to support the policy priorities of the Trump Administration.

Over the past year, we have heard many reports of political attacks on career employees at the State Department, but we had not seen evidence of how extensive, blunt, and inappropriate these attacks were until now. In light of this new information, we now request that you produce additional documents regarding these staffing decisions and make several officials available for transcribed interviews with Committee staff.

If these documents are authentic, they appear to show that Deputy Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel Sean Doocey, Deputy White House Counsel Makan Delrahim, National Security Council Senior Director Derek Harvey, and other senior White House officials were communicating with high-level political appointees at the State Department, including:

- Margaret Peterlin, Chief of Staff;
- Christine Ciccone, Deputy Chief of Staff;
- Matthew Mowers, Senior White House Adviser;
- Brian Hook, Director of the Policy Planning Staff;
- Edward Lacey, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff; and
- Julia Haller, White House Liaison.

The documents show that these political appointees characterized career State Department employees in derogatory terms, including as "a leaker and troublemaker"; "Turncoat"; "associated with previous policy"; and "Obama/Clinton loyalists not at all supportive of President Trump's foreign policy agenda."

The documents include communications with a network of conservative outside parties—including former Speaker Newt Gingrich, conservative activist Barbara Ledeen, and former Dick Cheney and John Bolton advisor David Wurmser.

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General John F. Kelly, White House Chief of Staff
The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State
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In one email Mr. Gingrich forwarded to Trump appointees inside the State Department, Mr. Wurmser wrote:

Newt: I think a cleaning is in order here. I hear Tillerson actually has been reasonably good on stuff like this and cleaning house, but there are so many that it boggles the mind...

We are particularly concerned by documents relating to Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, a career civil servant at the State Department. After being targeted by a conservative news outlet, she sent an email to her supervisor, Brian Hook, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, to inform him about the article and seek his assistance to "correct the record." She wrote:

I am and have been a career civil servant for nearly 12 years now. I began government service in the Bush Administration at DOD/NSA. ... I've adapted my work to the policy priorities of every administration I have worked for. I'd welcome an opportunity to discuss this once you're back but in the meantime would welcome your thoughts on how to approach and potentially correct the record. The author of this piece has previously personally targeted me.

Instead of helping Ms. Nowrouzzadeh, Mr. Hook forwarded her email to other political officials at the Department, who then forwarded it to officials at the White House and used it as the basis for a wide-ranging internal discussion that questioned her loyalty to President Trump:

- Referring to Ms. Nowrouzzadeh's previous work on the Iran nuclear agreement, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Mr. Lacey, the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote that "she did a stint with the NSC Staff in the Obama Administration and helped promote and defend the JCPOA—I would say, with enthusiasm."
- Ms. Haller, the White House Liaison, wrote, "As background, she worked on the Iran Deal, specifically works on Iran within S/P [the Policy Planning Staff], was born in Iran and upon my understanding cried when the President won."
- Ms. Haller also wrote to Mr. Doocey and others at the White House, "It is easy to get a detail suspended and because she's a conditional career, we just need to confirm the year she is in."
- Mr. Hook then wrote, "I've emailed friends who tracked the Iran deal for intel on her and waiting to hear back."

Ms. Nowrouzzadeh was removed from her detail to the Policy Planning Staff three months early in a manner she characterized as "not in accordance with that which was explicitly stated in my MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]."

General John F. Kelly, White House Chief of Staff
The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State
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Request for Documents and Transcribed Interviews


In order to evaluate the extent of these personnel actions, and whether any were prohibited under the law, we request that you provide, by March 29, 2018, the following documents and information:

- (1) all documents and communications referring or relating to any reassignment or proposed reassignment that was considered or ordered since January 20, 2017, of career or civil service employees at the Department;
- (2) all documents and communications referring or relating to any proposed or actual reassignment or removal of career or civil service employees at the Department since January 20, 2017, based on alleged personal political beliefs, prior service with previous Administrations, or work on prior Administrations' foreign policy priorities, including any documents authored by, copying, involving, or referring to:
 - (a) Christine Ciccone;
 - (b) Makan Delrahim;
 - (c) Sean Doocey;
 - (d) Julia Haller;
 - (e) Brian Hook;
 - (f) Edward Lacey;
 - (g) Matthew Mowers; or
 - (h) Margaret Peterlin; and
- (3) all documents and communications referring or relating to proposed or actual personnel actions since January 20, 2017, against Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, including the curtailment of her detail to the Policy Planning staff.

We also request transcribed interviews with the officials listed above in (2). To arrange these interviews, or if you have any questions about this request, please contact Janet Kim of the Oversight Committee staff at (202) 225-5051 or Sajit Gandhi of the Foreign Affairs Committee staff at (202) 226-8467. Thank you for your prompt attention to this request.

Sincerely,


Elijah E. Cummings
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform


Eliot L. Engel
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs

General John F. Kelly, White House Chief of Staff
The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Deputy Secretary of State
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cc: The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

The Honorable Ed Royce, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

June 19, 2018

The Honorable Mike Pompeo
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are alarmed by a recent report that senior political appointees at the State Department continue to engage in prohibited personnel practices, including by vetting career State Department officials and American employees of international organizations to determine whether they are sufficiently loyal to President Donald Trump.

On June 13, 2018, *Foreign Policy* reported that Mari Stull, a former food and beverage lobbyist who was appointed as a Senior Adviser to the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs two months ago, "has been quietly vetting career diplomats and American employees of international institutions to determine whether they are loyal to President Donald Trump and his political agenda, according to nearly a dozen current and former U.S. officials." According to this account, Ms. Stull "is actively making lists and gathering intel" and is asking career State Department employees "when they were hired and by whom." She is also reportedly researching "the names of government officials to determine whether they signed off on Obama-era policies."¹

These allegations track closely with the many reports our Committees have received over the past 18 months alleging political attacks on State Department career employees. We had hoped with your personal assurances, including during your testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee on May 23, 2018, that these attacks on career employees would come to an end. During that hearing, you stated that retaliation against career employees had no place at the State Department:

ENGEL: This past March, Ranking Member Cummings, Senator Menendez and I wrote to the State Department expressing concern over allegations that senior officials, including the director of policy planning, retaliated against career State Department employees based on their national origin, or because they were not—they were perceived as not sufficiently loyal to the president. Do you believe officials who targeted career employees in this way should be working at the State Department?

¹ *Trump Appointee Compiles Loyalty List of U.S. Employees at U.N., State*, *Foreign Policy* (June 13, 2018) (online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/13/trumps-vino-vixen-compiles-loyalty-list-of-u-s-employees-at-u-n-state-mari-stull-political-appointee-state-department-international-organization-united-nations-political-retribution-chaos-dysfunction/>).

The Honorable Mike Pompeo
June 19, 2018
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POMPEO: I do not.²

Yet, despite these assurances, it appears the Trump Administration continues to deploy ideological loyalty tests on State Department employees.

At the May 23, 2018, hearing, you also gave your "commitment" to Ranking Member Engel that you would work with us to produce the documents we requested about acts of political retaliation at the State Department:

ENGEL: Thank you. In the letter I sent with Ranking Member Cummings and Senator Menendez, we requested access to e-mails and other documents. ... So far we haven't heard anything. Can you give us an idea of when will we be granted access to those documents?

POMPEO: I can't, but I will get you an answer. You have my commitment. I'll have you an answer on the timeline by the end of this week.³

Despite your personal assurances, you have produced none of the documents we requested in our letter and have provided no firm timeline for production.

For these reasons, we request that you provide to our Committees the following documents by June 29, 2018:

- (1) all documents or communications referring or relating to State Department Senior Adviser Mari Stull's efforts to categorize, vet, or research career State Department employees and employees of international institutions, including searches on social media websites;
- (2) all documents or communications referring or relating to lists of career State Department employees and employees of international institutions created by Mari Stull or any other political appointee at the State Department; and
- (3) all documents or communications referring or relating to research conducted by political appointees relating to perceived political views of career employees.

In addition, we request that you preserve all documents, communications, and other data ("records") that may be required for our oversight and investigative duties. The term "records"

² House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearing on Reviewing the State Department's Budget, Operations, and Policy Priorities* (May 23, 2018).

³ *Id.*


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
is broad and includes log files and metadata. For purposes of this request, "preserve" means taking reasonable steps to prevent the partial or full destruction, alteration, testing, deletion, shredding, incineration, wiping, relocation, migration, theft, or mutation of electronic records, including emails, as well as negligent or intentional handling which would foreseeably make such records incomplete or inaccessible. Specifically, you should:


- (a) exercise reasonable efforts to identify and notify former employees and contractors, subcontractors, and consultants who may have access to such records that they are to be preserved;
- (b) exercise reasonable efforts to identify, recover, and preserve any records which have been deleted or marked for deletion but are still recoverable; and
- (c) if it is the routine practice of any employee or contractor to destroy or otherwise alter such records, either halt such practices or arrange for the preservation of complete and accurate duplicates or copies of such records, suitable for production, if requested.

If you have any questions about this request, please contact Sajit Gandhi with Ranking Member Engel's staff at (202) 226-8467, Janet Kim with Ranking Member Cummings' staff at (202) 225-5051, or Charlotte Oldham-Moore with Senator Menendez's staff at (202) 224-5235. Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,


ELIOT L. ENGEL
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs


ELIAH E. CUMMINGS
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform


ROBERT MENENDEZ
Ranking Member
Committee on
Foreign Relations

cc: The Honorable Ed Royce, Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs

The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6143

MAJORITY (202) 225-5074
MINORITY (202) 225-5051
<http://oversight.house.gov>

August 22, 2018

The Honorable Mike Pompeo
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Pompeo:

We are writing to express our concern with your recent appointment of Brian Hook to lead the State Department's Iran Action Group as Special Representative for Iran, particularly in light of internal documents that show him engaging in significant acts of political retaliation against career State Department employees. We are also troubled that you have refused to produce any documents in response to multiple requests from Congress relating to Mr. Hook's retaliatory actions.

In remarks introducing Mr. Hook in his new role, you asserted that he "has worked tirelessly to advance President Trump's foreign policy priorities across multiple domains."¹ However, internal documents show that he engaged in gross acts of retaliation against career State Department employees.

For example, documents show that Mr. Hook failed to respond to a direct request for help from Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, a career State Department employee, after she was targeted on false and inaccurate grounds by conservative news outlets. Instead of defending his employee, Mr. Hook used Ms. Nowrouzzadeh's request for assistance to start a wide-ranging and factually inaccurate internal discussion that included the questioning of Ms. Nowrouzzadeh's loyalty to President Trump and her national origin.

Ultimately, the State Department failed to defend Ms. Nowrouzzadeh from the false and misleading charges. Ms. Nowrouzzadeh's assignment to the Policy Planning office was cut short by three months, counter to the terms of her Memorandum of Understanding with the office.

In addition, documents obtained by our Committees show that Mr. Hook, in consultation with National Security Council official Derek Harvey, drafted a list characterizing specific career State Department employees in derogatory terms, including as a "leaker and troublemaker";

¹ *Remarks on the Creation of the Iran Action Group*, Department of State (Aug. 16, 2018) (online at www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/285183.htm).

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"Turncoat"; "associated with previous policy"; and "Fully political." One document shows Mr. Hook and his deputy referring to staffers in the Policy Planning staff as "Obama/Clinton loyalists not at all supportive of President Trump's foreign policy agenda."

On March 15, 2018, we wrote to the State Department expressing concern over Mr. Hook's involvement in political retaliation against State Department employees. In our letter, we requested several categories of documents relating to Mr. Hook's actions, and we asked for several State Department officials, including Mr. Hook, to be made available for interviews with our staff.²

However, the State Department has refused to provide any of the documents we requested and has declined to make available Mr. Hook or any of other officials we requested for interviews. In addition, the State Department has not responded to any of our subsequent letters requesting information about other individuals accused of acts of retaliation against career State Department employees.³

During your appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 23, 2018, you testified that you believe retaliation against career employees—including retaliation by Mr. Hook—had no place at the State Department:

RANKING MEMBER ENGEL: This past March, Ranking Member Cummings, Senator Menendez and I wrote to the State Department expressing concern over allegations that senior officials, including the Director of Policy Planning [Brian Hook] retaliated against career State Department employees based on their national origin, or because they were not—they were perceived as not sufficiently loyal to the president. Do you believe officials who targeted career employees in this way should be working at the State Department?

MR. POMPEO: I do not.⁴

² Letter from Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Member Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to General John F. Kelly, White House Chief of Staff, and Deputy Secretary John J. Sullivan, Department of State (Mar. 15, 2018) (online at <https://democrats-oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/documents/2018-03-15.EEC%20Engel%20to%20WH%20%26%20State.pdf>).

³ See, e.g., Letter from Ranking Member Eliot L. Engel, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and Ranking Member Robert Menendez, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State (June 19, 2018) (online at <https://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/06-18-18%20Letter%20to%20Secretary%20Pompeo%20on%20Prohibited%20Personnel%20Practices%20at%20State%20Department.pdf>).

⁴ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearing on Reviewing the State Department's Budget, Operations, and Policy Priorities* (May 23, 2018).

The Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State
Page 3

Request for Information and Documents


Given your decision to promote Mr. Hook and to disregard requests from Congress about his abuses, we request an immediate briefing about the measures the State Department has taken to investigate and stop retaliation against career State Department officials, as well as measures the State Department has taken in response to Mr. Hook's reported role in engaging in prohibited personnel practices. We also request that you provide all previously requested documents by September 4, 2018, including:

- (1) all documents and communications referring or relating to any reassignment or proposed reassignment that was considered or ordered since January 20, 2017, of career or civil service employees at the Department;
- (2) all documents and communications referring or relating to any proposed or actual reassignment or removal of career or civil service employees at the Department since January 20, 2017, based on alleged personal political beliefs, prior service with previous Administrations, or work on prior Administrations' foreign policy priorities, including any documents authored by, copying, involving, or referring to:
 - (a) Christine Ciccone;
 - (b) Makan Delrahim;
 - (c) Sean Doocey;
 - (d) Julia Haller;
 - (e) Brian Hook;
 - (f) Edward Lacey;
 - (g) Matthew Mowers; or
 - (h) Margaret Peterlin;
- (3) all documents and communications referring or relating to proposed or actual personnel actions since January 20, 2017, against Sahar Nowrouzzadeh, including the curtailment of her detail to the Policy Planning staff;
- (4) all documents or communications referring or relating to State Department Senior Adviser Mari Stull's efforts to categorize, vet, or research career State Department employees and employees of international institutions, including searches on social media websites;
- (5) all documents referring or relating to lists of career State Department employees and employees of international institutions created by Mari Stull or any other political appointee at the State Department; and
- (6) all documents or communications referring or relating to research conducted by political appointees relating to perceived political views of career employees.


The Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State
Page 4

If you have any questions about this request, please contact Janet Kim of the Oversight Committee staff at (202) 225-5051 or Sajit Gandhi of the Foreign Affairs Committee staff at (202) 226-8467. Thank you for your prompt response to this request.

Sincerely,



Elijah E. Cummings
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and



Eliot L. Engel
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs

cc: The Honorable Trey Gowdy, Chairman
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

The Honorable Ed Royce, Chairman
House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subject: FW: Can you chat this afternoon early evening?

From: @state.gov]
Sent: Friday, June 01, 2018 1:05 PM
To: @mail.house.gov>;

Subject: RE: Can you chat this afternoon early evening?

The Secretary was clear about getting you a timeline and upon examination of this matter it became clear that the case was referred to OIG and OSC that we can't comment on an ongoing investigation or take any action that would jeopardize its review. In order to allow OSC and OIG to effectively manage this matter independently, we await completion of their review. I think you know this, but OSC -- Office of Special Counsel -- is an independent investigative body that protects personnel from prohibited practices.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: @mail.house.gov>
Sent: Friday, June 01, 2018 11:39 AM
To: @state.gov>;

Subject: RE: Can you chat this afternoon early evening?

Thanks. We were aware of the referral for internal investigations. I wanted to follow up on Secretary Pompeo's commitment to the Ranking Member to provide a timeline of when we can expect to receive and review documents related to the issue of retaliation against career employees. Secretary Pompeo committed to providing this by the end of last week.

From: @state.gov]
Sent: Sunday, May 27, 2018 8:24 AM
To: @mail.house.gov>
Cc: />
Subject: Re: Can you chat this afternoon early evening?

I wanted to respond to you and Mr. Engel following the Secretary's testimony about the letter concerning emails where there was concerns raised by Mr. Engel about reports of possible discrimination based on national origin. He wanted us to respond by end of the week. As you know, we take this issue very seriously and for that reason the matter was immediately to OIG and the Office of Civil Rights. That's where the matter stands pending their review. I'm happy to discuss when you return from Europe.

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From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Fwd: Introductions
Date:	Sat, 9 Sep 2017 15:54:47 -0400

From: Martineau, Geoffrey J <MartineauGJ@state.gov>

Date: September 9, 2017 at 2:28:20 PM EDT

To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>

Cc: Bulgrin, Julie K <BulgrinJK@state.gov>

Subject: Introductions

Hi Charles – Sounds like we are on track for 4 pm. Julie thought you would host the call so the following are the participants, with email addresses in case you want to coordinate with them prior to the call.

Geoff

--

MertenKH@state.gov

Ambassador Kenneth Merten – Per his State

bio, currently “the Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, with responsibility for Haiti, Canada, Caribbean Affairs and the Office of Policy, Planning and Coordination in the same Bureau.”

ChristensenKL@state.gov

Karen Christensen, PDAS for the Bureau of

Consular Affairs

Waiting on contact info
Hurricane Irma

Buddy Stora, Respose Manager for USAID for

[REDACTED] (b)(6) from
OSD

Geoffrey Martineau

U.S. Department of State
Bureau of Legislative Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510
202-647-8708

Check out State's Congressional website at travel.state.gov/congress/

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Fwd: Hurricane Harvey - D Call to Senator Cruz
Date:	Fri, 25 Aug 2017 21:12:28 -0400

From: Seagroves, Cliff C <SeagrovesCC@state.gov>

Date: August 25, 2017 at 6:46:16 PM EDT

To: Risch, Carl C <RischCC@state.gov>, Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>, String, Marik A <StringMA@state.gov>, LoGerfo, Gregory D <LoGerfoGD@state.gov>, Palmieri, Francisco L <PalmieriFL@state.gov>

Cc: Waters, Mary K <WatersMK@state.gov>, Todd, William E (Ambassador) <ToddW@state.gov>, Bulgrin, Julie K <BulgrinJK@state.gov>, Bernier-Toth, Michelle <Bernier-TothM2@state.gov>, Christensen, Karen L <ChristensenKL@state.gov>, Korde, Sonali (AID/A) <skorde@usaid.gov>

Subject: RE: Hurricane Harvey - D Call to Senator Cruz

OFM's Houston Regional Office (OFM/HOU) expects to be closed 8/28 - 8/30. However, to the extent possible, our staff plan to telework those days.

OFM/HOU has been in direct contact with all of the foreign consular posts in the sections of Texas and Louisiana that are most likely to be impacted by Hurricane Harvey. Further, OFM/HOU has a system in place to remain in direct contact with each of the impacted consular posts throughout the course of the storm.

All consular posts have been asked to immediately notify OFM if their personnel are injured or if they suffer any property damages as a result of the storm. They have been asked to send such notifications to either OFMHouston@state.gov or OFM-EmergencyMgt@state.gov. They also have been provided a set of phone numbers to use for this purpose.

Nearly identical guidance today to the foreign embassies here in Washington.

OFM is currently focusing its direct contact and support efforts on the foreign consular posts located in Houston (41), San Antonio (1), Austin (2), and New Orleans (6). OFM/HOU is **currently** most concerned about the consular posts in San Antonio [*Mexico*] and Austin [*Mexico & Ireland*], where current forecasts indicate the possibility of up to 30 inches of rain.

In the storm's wake, per standard procedures and consultations, OFM will determine whether to send additional staff to the region to assist foreign missions with their efforts and responsibilities for conducting citizen services for their nationals impacted by the storm.

OFM's Director (acting) will remain in contact with OFM/HOU's Regional Director (acting) throughout the weekend concerning this matter.

Regards,
Cliff Seagroves
Director (Acting)
Office of Foreign Missions



Connect with the Office of Foreign Missions on Facebook!

Official
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From: LoGerfo, Gregory D
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 6:18 PM
To: Risch, Carl C; String, Marik A; Faulkner, Charles S; Palmieri, Francisco L; Seagroves, Cliff C
Cc: Waters, Mary K; Bulgrin, Julie K; Korde, Sonali (AID/A); Bernier-Toth, Michelle; Christensen, Karen L; Todd, William E (Ambassador)
Subject: RE: Hurricane Harvey - D Call to Senator Cruz

Carl – thanks

Charles:

Please collate this and any additional info an package for D to raise, as needed, with Cruz.

Thanks

Greg

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Risch, Carl C
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 6:14 PM
To: String, Marik A <StringMA@state.gov>; Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>; Palmieri, Francisco L <PalmieriFL@state.gov>; Seagroves, Cliff C <SeagrovesCC@state.gov>
Cc: Waters, Mary K <WatersMK@state.gov>; Bulgrin, Julie K <BulgrinJK@state.gov>; Korde, Sonali (AID/A) <skorde@usaid.gov>; LoGerfo, Gregory D <LoGerfoGD@state.gov>; Bernier-Toth, Michelle <Bernier-TothM2@state.gov>; Christensen, Karen L <ChristensenKL@state.gov>; Todd, William E (Ambassador) <ToddW@state.gov>
Subject: RE: Hurricane Harvey - D Call to Senator Cruz

Pertaining to U.S. citizens in impacted areas of Mexico, U.S. Consulate General Matamoros has posted a warning regarding the hurricane. Mission Mexico is ready to assist U.S. citizens as required. Domestically, the Houston Passport Agency will be open on Monday to assist customers, assuming OPM

guidance permits normal government operations on Monday. In addition, the Houston Passport Office took precautions to protect our equipment in case of a power outage over the weekend.

Carl C. Risch
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, DC

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: String, Marik A
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 5:34 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S; Palmieri, Francisco L; Risch, Carl C; Seagroves, Cliff C
Cc: Waters, Mary K; Bulgrin, Julie K; Korde, Sonali (AID/A); LoGerfo, Gregory D
Subject: RE: Hurricane Harvey - D Call to Senator Cruz

+ Greg.

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Faulkner, Charles S
Sent: Friday, August 25, 2017 5:28 PM
To: Palmieri, Francisco L <PalmieriFL@state.gov>; Risch, Carl C <RischCC@state.gov>; Seagroves, Cliff C <SeagrovesCC@state.gov>
Cc: String, Marik A <StringMA@state.gov>; Waters, Mary K <WatersMK@state.gov>; Bulgrin, Julie K <BulgrinJK@state.gov>; Korde, Sonali (AID/A) <skorde@usaid.gov>
Subject: Hurricane Harvey - D Call to Senator Cruz

Gentlemen,

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Senator Cruz couldn't take a call today because he is monitoring Hurricane Harvey and the emergency response.

In anticipation of the phone call, what could the Deputy say about the Department's role in the preparation and response to this emergency?

(b)(5)

Could you or staff provide me brief points in advance of tomorrow's call? Copying Sonali (re: USAID efforts and OFDA)

Thanks,

Charles

Charles S. Faulkner
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)
(202) 647-1656
FaulknerCS@state.gov

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>	
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner	(b)(6)



From:	FaulknerCS@state.gov
To:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)
Subject:	Fwd: Final Press Release
Date:	Sun, 24 Sep 2017 11:42:05 -0400

Sender:	FaulknerCS@state.gov
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner <(b)(6)>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	csfaulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Fwd: ethics guidance
Date:	Mon, 10 Jun 2019 15:58:43 +0000

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From: Huitema, David P

Sent: Monday, October 1, 2018 2:24:34 PM

To: Faulkner, Charles S

Subject: ethics guidance

Hi Charles. Is there a convenient time today when we could have a quick phone call or meeting? I saw an article last week concerning Raytheon and Yemen, and I think it would be helpful to get a clearer sense of your past lobbying work and the policy issues that you may be involved in for H. It may be there's not much to discuss, or we may be able to provide guidance that will prove helpful in the future.

[REDACTED] (b)(5)

[REDACTED] (b)(5) I have a call from 4:30 to 5:00, but otherwise I'm available all afternoon.

- David

David Huitema

Assistant Legal Adviser

Ethics & Financial Disclosure

U.S. Department of State

(202) 663-3191

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	csfaulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)
Subject:	Fwd: Dear Senator.docx
Date:	Wed, 14 Feb 2018 22:00:20 -0500

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)


Dear Senator:

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)



I deeply appreciate your consideration of these requests, and will make my staff available to yours to refine any of the needed amendments.

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Frances Rauland (b)(6) Barnett, James R <BarnettJR@state.gov>
Subject:	Fwd: Charles Faulkner
Date:	Mon, 5 Mar 2018 17:37:20 -0500

Would you kindly schedule?

From: Caroline Charendoff (b)(6)
Date: March 5, 2018 at 5:24:58 PM EST
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: csfaulkner (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Charles Faulkner

Hi Charles,

Happy to help find a time for you all to speak. It looks like this week is pretty blocked, but please let me know if any of the following windows are open for you next week:

Wednesday, March 14: 1-2pm
Thursday, March 15: 1-2pm, 3-4pm
Friday, March 16: 3-4:30pm

Please let me know if none of the times work on your end and I'll send over some other options.

Thanks,
Caroline

-----Original Message-----

From: Tom Hart
Sent: Friday, March 02, 2018 3:48 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Cc: Charles Faulkner (b)(6); Caroline Charendoff (b)(6); Emily Huie (b)(6); Jacqueline Quinones (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Charles Faulkner

Hey Charles, it was great to meet you too. Copied in a few folks to see when we can chat.

Look forward to it.

Tom Hart

(b)(6)

> On Mar 2, 2018, at 3:16 PM, Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov> wrote:

>

> Tom,

>

> It was nice to meet you in Munich. Let's continue the dialogue when you're free in Washington!
>
> Best,
>
> Charles
>
> Charles S. Faulkner
> Deputy Assistant Secretary
> Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)
> (202) 647-1656<tel:(202)%20647-1656>
> FaulknerCS@state.gov<mailto:FaulknerCS@state.gov>
>

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Frances Rauland (b)(6) Barnett, James R <BarnettJR@state.gov>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)
CC:	Charles Faulkner
Subject:	Fwd: BC letter to Pompeo 9.14.18 v.5 (002).docx
Date:	Sun, 16 Sep 2018 20:58:44 +0000

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From: McNerney, Patricia X

Sent: Saturday, September 15, 2018 3:22:20 PM

To: Thomas, Kenneth A; Faulkner, Charles S

Subject: RE: BC letter to Pompeo 9.14.18 v.5 (002).docx

Draft/Deliberative

(b)(5)

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From: Thomas, Kenneth A

Sent: Saturday, September 15, 2018 2:38 PM

To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>; McNerney, Patricia X <McNerneyPX@state.gov>

Subject: RE: BC letter to Pompeo 9.14.18 v.5 (002).docx

(b)(5)

KAT

From: Faulkner, Charles S

Sent: Saturday, September 15, 2018 2:32 PM

To: McNerney, Patricia X <McNerneyPX@state.gov>; Thomas, Kenneth A <ThomasKA@state.gov>

Subject: Fwd: BC letter to Pompeo 9.14.18 v.5 (002).docx

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From: Faulkner, Charles S

Sent: Friday, September 14, 2018 3:30:38 PM

To: Womack, Todd (Corker)

Subject: BC letter to Pompeo 9.14.18 v.5 (002).docx

Todd,

See minor edits. We are standing by for a formal letter. If you have any questions or the terms changes please call me before sending.

Thanks,

Charles

Official

UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>	
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner	(b)(6)
	Charles Faulkner	

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As part of the oversight responsibility of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Sincerely,

Enclosure As Stated

DRAFT

The Honorable Bob Corker
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Thank you for your letter of September XX.

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Sincerely,

Charles S. Faulkner
Acting Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Legislative Affairs

Cc: The Honorable Bob Menendez

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	(b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject:	FW: Huntsman/Paul Telecon
Date:	Mon, 27 Aug 2018 14:47:26 +0000

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	(b)(6) (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)
Subject:	FW: Human Shields technical redline, per request
Date:	Tue, 24 Jul 2018 21:13:56 +0000

Official
UNCLASSIFIED

From: Unlu, Kathy M
Sent: Tuesday, July 24, 2018 5:07 PM
To: Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Subject: Human Shields technical redline, per request

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)

From:	FaulknerCS@state.gov
To:	jtimmons [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Follow-up
Date:	Mon, 4 Sep 2017 17:29:39 -0400

Jay,

Nice to speak to you earlier. I'm glad we connected. There is a lot of interest in learning the impact of withdrawal from KORUS FTA. As you said, a lot of work went into getting securing the deal. I bet there are large elements of the Congress with their own views on how KORUS can be strengthened. I understood Secretary Tillerson was eager to hear NAM's views and the those of the Hill. I'll let you know what I learn over the next few hours and days.

Best,

Charles

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Charles S. Faulkner

Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bureau of Legislative Affairs (H)

(202) 647-1656

FaulknerCS@state.gov

Sender:	FaulknerCS@state.gov
Recipient:	jtimmons [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6) Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Subject:	CRS Afghanistan
Date:	Mon, 6 May 2019 17:15:29 +0000

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6); Faulkner, Charles S <FaulknerCS@state.gov>

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)
Subject:	Copy of Capitol Hill Contact Info - 116th Congress 2.27.19.xlsx
Date:	Mon, 18 Mar 2019 20:41:09 +0000

Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Charles Faulkner (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	vneralla.asl [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Charles Faulkner
Date:	Thu, 27 Dec 2018 23:02:37 +0000

Let me know if there is anything further we can do.

Best,

CF

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	vneralla.asl [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Coates, Victoria C. EOP/NSC [REDACTED] (b)(6)
CC:	csfaulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Call with Charles Faulkner
Date:	Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:56:52 +0000

Hi,

Can you chat with me? I got some news that I would like to share. I'm in Chapel Hill, NC but can step out to connect.

Charles

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Coates, Victoria C. EOP/NSC [REDACTED] (b)(6) csfaulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)

From:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
To:	Wolf, Chad [REDACTED] (b)(6)
CC:	csfaulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)
Subject:	Call with Charles Faulkner
Date:	Fri, 28 Jun 2019 16:58:11 +0000

Hi,

I'm in Chapel Hill, NC. I got some news I would like to share and would welcome the chance to chat.

[REDACTED] (b)(6)

Charles

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Sender:	"Faulkner, Charles S" <FaulknerCS@state.gov>
Recipient:	Wolf, Chad [REDACTED] (b)(6) csfaulkner [REDACTED] (b)(6)