



**Homeland
Security**

Privacy Office, Mail Stop 0655

February 28, 2022

SENT VIA E-MAIL TO: emma.lewis@americanoversight.org

Emma Lewis
American Oversight
1030 15th Street, NW B255
Washington, DC 20005

Re: 20-cv-01367 / 2020-HQLI-00030

Dear Ms. Lewis:

This is the 15th interim release of records related to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), received on March 19, 2020.

For this production the DHS reviewed 507 pages of potentially responsive records. The DHS has determined to release 154 pages in their entirety, withhold in part 294 pages, pursuant to FOIA Exemptions (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7)(c), and (b)(7)(e), and to withhold in full 11 pages pursuant to FOIA Exemption (b)(5). These pages are Bates stamped with DHS-PRIV-ICE-01367-005015 through DHS-PRIV-ICE-01367-005473.

4 pages are being sent to other Federal agencies or components for consultation. 42 pages were found to be duplicates. Further, 2 pages were found to be non-responsive.

If you have any questions regarding this release, please contact Andrew Freidah, United States Department of Justice's Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, at Andrew.f.freidah@usdoj.gov.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Eric A. Neuschaefter".

Eric A. Neuschaefter
Senior Director, FOIA Litigation, Appeals, Policy,
and Training (Acting)

Enclosed: 459 Pages

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 30 Mar 2020 12:24:26 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

No issues here.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 8:07 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

*Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement*

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

202-732 (b)(6); (office)

202-834 (b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 8:02 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Good morning:

Am I clear to respond?

Thanks,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 11:30 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Good morning again all:

I have accepted all changes, and edited for readability. The most current version is below:

(b)(5)

--

If this works for all, I will send.

Thanks,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 11:08 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(5)

Please let me know if you have questions or concerns.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 9:34 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Good morning all:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Please let me know if you have questions or concerns.

V/R,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 5:30 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Tae,

Can you please let us know if you have any concerns about this? If you don't, we'd like to respond to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) with this information. Thanks!

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

202-732 (b)(6); (office)

202-834 (b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 4:08 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #MASTAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - can you provide the draft of what you propose to send to Tae for clearance. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Thanks, Staci

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 3:19 PM

To: Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

#MASTAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Okay – we will await confirmation.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (office)
202-834-(b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 3:17 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #MASTAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

I have a 3:30pm call with DD and EADS. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 3:14 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #MASTAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

*Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement*

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

202-732-(b)(6); (office)

202-834-(b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 3:11 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #MASTAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 3:01 PM
To: Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #MASTAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Subject: FW: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance
Importance: High

Staci (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thoughts?

Thanks,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

*Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement*

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

202-732 (b)(6); (office)

202-834 (b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 1:50 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Subject: FW: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Importance: High

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Acting Deputy Chief Human Capital Officer, Strategy & Services
ICE Office of Human Capital

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

202-430 (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) Mobile Phone)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @iceunion.org>

Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 11:31 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @iceunion.org>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @iceunion.org>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

<https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2020/03/24/politics/coronavirus-new-york-self-quarantine/index.html>

Thank you,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

National ICE Council

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 23 Mar 2020 18:46:31 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Today's Honduras Flight

Yes, was just doing so

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 2:46 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Today's Honduras Flight

You can respond to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) question

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 2:43 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Today's Honduras Flight

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Mar 23, 2020, 2:30 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Today's Honduras Flight

(b)(5)

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 8:36 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Today's Honduras Flight

Thanks.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Mar 23, 2020, 8:21 AM
To: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Today's Honduras Flight

Derek/Matt – Today's flight to Honduras was cancelled. Folks are working to get it rescheduled for tomorrow. Please see below for details on what occurred yesterday in Honduras once the flight landed. We will keep you updated on our progress for tomorrow's flight.

From: Boyd, Valerie (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 5:49 AM
To: Cloe, David (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Chalkley, Marie (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Grabe, Scott (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, DANLEY, ROBERT (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Paschall, Robert (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Rehberg, Sarah (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Gountanis, John (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, BREKKE, IAN (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Today's Honduras Flight

Honduras is urgently asking for a writeup this morning demonstrating our medical procedures to prevent the transfer of individuals with COVID-19 on removal flights. I revised the document from the chain below and added a line about the CBP checks.

Can folks review for accuracy by 8am?

When our first flight back to Honduras landed yesterday and Honduras placed the people in quarantine, 50 people escaped the quarantine, including a guy with an Interpol notice. There is national news/panic about whether these people might have COVID-19. Honduras has only found ~15 of the people so far.

The Foreign Minister needs to share a writeup with the Health Minister to get buy-in for today's flight to take place. Marlen was reviewing whether we could push back the departure time to buy a little time to get GOH more comfortable, at their request.

The Foreign Minister seemed willing for today's flight to proceed, and I emphasized that it will be a Presidential-level problem for us if the 100+ Americans scheduled to return home on that plane can't leave. But it's not entirely in his control and this document will help him lock it in with others.

From: Cloe, David (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 2:18 PM
To: Chalkley, Marie (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov;
Glabe, Scott (b)(6); Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6); Boyd, Valerie (b)(6); Paschall, Robert (b)(6); Rehberg, Sarah (b)(6); Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov;
Gountanis, John (b)(6); BREKKE, IAN (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: FW: Corona/Removals/243d Follow Up

Marie – A few additional edits on top of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) in the first attachment; no edits to the second or third attachments.

David L. Cloe
Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere
DHS Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans
(b)(6) (O); (b)(6) (M)

From: Chalkley, Marie (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, March 16, 2020 11:03 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Glabe, Scott (b)(6); Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6); Boyd, Valerie (b)(6); Cloe, David (b)(6); Paschall, Robert (b)(6); Rehberg, Sarah (b)(6); Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Gountanis, John (b)(6); BREKKE, IAN (b)(6); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: RE: Corona/Removals/243d Follow Up

Good morning all—

Re-circulating the attached documents for any additional edits/comments this morning. We would like to use the "Removals and COVID-19" document as a single-source for talking points for our interagency colleagues and foreign partners as we get questions.

--

Marie Chalkley

(b)(6) | (O) (b)(6) | (M) (b)(6)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Saturday, March 14, 2020 6:54 PM

To: Glabe, Scott (b)(6) Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6) Boyd, Valerie (b)(6) Cloe, David (b)(6) Paschall, Robert (b)(6) Chalkley, Marie (b)(6) Rehberg, Sarah (b)(6) Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Gountanis, John (b)(6) BREKKE, IAN (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Corona/Removals/243d Follow Up

Importance: High

(b)(5)

Also, thanks for hosting the calling and helping us layout the path forward on these issues.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Glabe, Scott (b)(6)

Sent: Saturday, March 14, 2020 6:13 PM

To: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6) Boyd, Valerie (b)(6) Cloe, David (b)(6) Paschall, Robert (b)(6) Chalkley, Marie (b)(6) Rehberg, Sarah (b)(6) Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Gountanis, John (b)(6) BREKKE, IAN (b)(6)

Subject: Corona/Removals/243d Follow Up

Importance: High

Thanks all for jumping on the call.

Follow up actions:

1. Review/suggest revisions to attached documents (All)
2. Proactively reach out to foreign governments/embassies as appropriate (ICE, OIA)

3. Immediately notify this group if a removals cooperation issue presents a significant impact to operations (ICE)

Thanks!
Scott

Scott L. Glabe
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6) (c)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 19 Apr 2020 20:08:17 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Hott, Russell; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Travel Summaries

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Interesting

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 19, 2020, 3:52 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Travel Summaries

Here are the medical transfer sheets from Richwood Correctional Center. The temp readings are a little hard to read, but I saw 7 detainees with a temperature of 99.0 to 99.6 that were cleared for travel.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)	99.0
	99.2
	99.0
	99.1
	99.6
	99.3
	99.4

The case that is highlighted in yellow was the one to test positive first. According to the flight nurse notes, he had a fever on the plane:

1600 PAX#8 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) C/O fever and chills. PAX wearing surgical mask. No allergies/past medical history/current medications noted on MTF. Written comment on MTF states, "healthy - clear for travel". PAX states he began with a dry cough, mild sore throat, and body aches yesterday. PAX further states he sought medical attention for similar symptoms and was evaluated by medical staff at detention facility at approximately 0700 hrs this morning. PAX states he "was given two pills, but he doesn't know what they were". No documentation regarding medication administration noted on MTF. Current temperature = 102.5 degrees Fahrenheit. Repeat, verification temperature = 102.3 degrees Fahrenheit. Temperature obtained at detention facility = 99.1 degrees Fahrenheit at 0804 hrs. Temperature obtained on flight line = 96.4 degrees Fahrenheit at 1230 hrs. Mild erythema noted to conjunctiva bilaterally. Oxygen saturation 89% and heart rate 90 bpm on right

index finger. Oxygen saturation verified on both right middle finger, and left index finger and found to correlate with initial reading. Capillary refill <3 sec. No cyanosis noted. FOIC made aware. PAX able to speak in full sentences. No increased work of breathing noted. Skin pink and dry. PAX administered Tylenol 1 GM PO. 2 **RN Signature:** Hooded pullover removed. PAX wearing light sweater underneath pullover. Aircraft descending for landing and all staff instructed to return to seats. Medication administration documented on MTF.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 2:14 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Travel Summaries

Hi (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Attached are the requested medical summaries from Richwood. Please see below comments from medical as well.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @lasallecorrections.com>
Date: Sunday, Apr 19, 2020, 11:18 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @lasallecorrections.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @lasallecorrections.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @lasallecorrections.com>
Subject: Travel Summaries

I have enclosed the travel summaries as requested. I had to break it into several attachments due to the volume. As you can see when you open the first attachment, I provided a copy of the names that were to go out that day. Also listed on the first page are the 4 names that did not leave. 2 due to being febrile that were isolated and swabbed and 2 due to maintenance medication issues.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MSN, RN, HSA
Richwood Correctional Center

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 30 Apr 2020 01:54:09 +0000
To: Hott, Russell; Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -
- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

Thx Russ!!!!

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Hott, Russell [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, Apr 29, 2020, 9:52 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

Good evening,

California numbers are included. Please let me know if this would be helpful for all 50 states, and we can run that down.

Thanks,
Russ

	Total Population	Total COVID + Cases	Per Capita	Deaths
Virginia	8,470,000	14,339	590.69	492
DC	705,749	4,106	171.88	205
Maryland	6,080,000	20,113	302.29	929
California	39,540,000	48,226	819.88	1,935
United States	327,170,000	1,035,045	316.09	58,964
BOP	171,434	1,313	130.56	30
ICE	29553	425	69.53	0

From: Lucero, Enrique M [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:17 PM
To: Hott, Russell [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

Your idea is a hit, can you provide the same numbers for CA?

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 8:00 PM
To: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

Curious, do we have numbers from California?

Tony H. Pham
Principal Legal Advisor
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

From: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 29, 2020 7:58 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

Absolutely !

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, Apr 29, 2020, 7:45 PM
To: Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

Take a look at the below that Russ put together. Should be exhibit A. We are going to put on our website.

	Total Population	Total COVID + Cases	Per Capita	Deaths
Virginia	8,470,000	14,339	590.69	492
DC	705,749	4,106	171.88	205
Maryland	6,080,000	20,113	302.29	929
United States	327,170,000	1,035,045	316.09	58,964
BOP	171,434	1,313	130.56	30
ICE	29553	425	69.53	0

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, Apr 29, 2020, 7:40 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: TRO Impacting Yuba County Jail and Mesa Verde Detention Facility -- Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020)

All-

As anticipated, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California issued a temporary restraining order this evening requiring the production of information and documents regarding all detainees in the Yuba County Jail and the Mesa Verde Detention Facility by noon on Friday and made clear that it intends to conduct “bail hearings” for all detainees in the facilities. A summary of the order follows, and the order is attached.

Zepeda-Rivas v. Jennings, No. 20-02731 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 20, 2020). On April 20, 2020, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) on behalf of 7 individual plaintiffs and a putative class, filed a habeas petition and motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking release of a large portion of the detainees from the Yuba County Jail and the Mesa Verde Detention Facility. The TRO motion and habeas petition argued

that the risk of exposure in the facilities is far greater than in other environments, the facilities have inadequate protections in place to protect against and respond to the spread of COVID-19, Plaintiffs cannot meaningfully socially distance from each other to decrease their risk for COVID-19, and their continued detention in these circumstances violates the Fifth Amendment right to reasonable safety and warrants the release of a significant portion of the detainees regardless of whether they are subject to mandatory detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Government filed a response, arguing that the case should be stayed pursuant to the first-to-file rule due to the filings and subsequent decision in *Frailhat v. ICE*, No. 19-1546 (C.D Cal. Apr. 20, 2020), ECF No. 132. The Government further argued that ICE had already engaged in measures to reduce the population at these facilities, was continuing to engage in case reviews, and had taken steps sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs were unable to succeed on a due process conditions of confinement or deliberate indifference claim. The Government also opposed class certification, including on commonality and typicality grounds. On April 29, 2020, the district court provisionally certified a class of all detainees at Mesa Verde Detention Facility and the Yuba County Jail and granted a TRO requiring ICE to take measures that will enable social distancing, including providing to the district court and Plaintiffs by noon on May 1, 2020, the names, ages, any health vulnerabilities, and any criminal information (including RAP sheets and Forms I-213), of every detainee at the facilities. The district court intends to implement a system for considering the detainees' individual bail applications, modeled after a system used in *Savino v. Souza*, No. 20-10617 (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2020). The order states, "this Court—likely with the assistance of several Magistrate Judges—will consider bail applications from class members over a roughly 14-day period. After that period, the parties and the Court will have a better understanding of the number of people who will continue to be detained during the public health crisis, which in turn could affect the relief (if any) to be ordered by way of preliminary injunction." The district court denied the Government's motion to stay these proceedings in light of the nationwide order granted in *Frailhat v. ICE*, No. 19-1546 (C.D Cal. Apr. 20, 2020), ECF No. 132.

The district court scheduled a case management conference for tomorrow at 4:00 p.m. for the purpose of assessing progress in compliance with this order, scheduling a preliminary injunction hearing, and discussing the process by which the district court will consider individual bail applications. The Government had requested a 24-hour stay of the order prior to its issuance, but the district court denied a stay.

(b)(5)

Thanks,

Tony H. Pham
Principal Legal Advisor
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 26 Apr 2020 21:08:34 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

I'm good if you are. Thx

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 5:05 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 5:00 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 3:35 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-734-(b)(6);
Cell: 202-515-(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 3:00 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

Understood. Got it, thx. Can you send me that guidance when you can. I'm sure Matt/Henry will ask.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 2:03 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536

Desk: 202-73 (b)(6);
Cell: 202-515 (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 1:26 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

Thx

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 1:09 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

Thanks.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director

500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 12:27 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 12:18 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

Sorry Tae, (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP

Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services

IHSC Medical Director

500 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20536

Desk: 202-732-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Cell: 202-515-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 11:58 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 11:05 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) and Tae,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP

Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services

IHSC Medical Director

500 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20536

Desk: 202-735 (b)(6);

Cell: 202-515 (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 11:39 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Rivera, Ada (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Apr 25, 2020, 10:34 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

GM Tae -

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is putting together guidance for clinicians in the field and needs your advice to complete.
Please see below.

Thx - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Apr 24, 2020, 4:38 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

???

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Apr 24, 2020, 4:31 PM
To: Smith, Stewart D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 24, 2020 4:25 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

Whack-a-mole

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Apr 24, 2020, 3:53 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Apr 24, 2020, 2:53 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Tuesday Guatemalan Flight

Gents,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 28 Mar 2020 15:56:19 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

Thx

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 11:29 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

FYI

From: Lucero, Enrique M [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 11:27 AM
To: Davis, Mike P [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>, Loiacono, Adam V [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

[REDACTED]

Let me know if that isn't enough.

Thanks,

Henry

From: Davis, Mike P [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 11:09 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>, Loiacono, Adam V [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

(b)(5)

Michael P. Davis
Executive Deputy Principal Legal Advisor
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202.732._____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (mobile)
_____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Please note that this message may contain sensitive and/or legally privileged information (attorney work product, attorney-client communication, deliberative process, personally identifiable information, law enforcement sensitive, etc.) and should be handled accordingly.

From: Lucero, Enrique M _____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 11:05 AM
To: Davis, Mike P _____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Loiacono, Adam V _____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

(b)(5)

From: Davis, Mike P _____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 11:01 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M _____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Loiacono, Adam V _____(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

(b)(5)

Michael P. Davis
Executive Deputy Principal Legal Advisor
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202.732. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (mobile)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Please note that this message may contain sensitive and/or legally privileged information (attorney work product, attorney-client communication, deliberative process, personally identifiable information, law enforcement sensitive, etc.) and should be handled accordingly.

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 10:54 AM
To: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

Sending in the event these are helpful for any litigation.

Thanks,

Henry

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 10:53 AM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

Attached is the current medical care guidance that is utilized for IHSC staff facilities and recommended for non-IHSC staffed facilities.

These are also good documents to show our response to COVID-19.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 10:44 AM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

FYSA.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Mar 28, 2020, 10:39 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_LEADERSHIP (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_MEDSVCS (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_CHIEFS (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_HSA (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_PHSP_COMMITTEE (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_AHSA (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_FMC_C (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_FMC_E (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_FMC_W (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, IHSCInfo (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #IHSC_Nursemanagers (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, IHSC Taskings (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: UPDATE 3/28/2020 | Reference sheet 2019 novel coronavirus: Detainee Care

ALCON –

Please see revised Interim Reference Sheet on Novel Coronavirus: Detainee Care, version 8.0 March 28, 2020. This version replaces all previous versions. Please share widely with staff and stakeholders as appropriate. We will continue to review CDC information daily and will update as needed.

Please visit the new 2019 Novel Coronavirus Resource Page: [2019 Novel Coronavirus Resource Page](#)

Please see [Current Guidance](#) to ensure viewing of the most current versions of the Interim Reference Sheet and referenced materials including:

- [Reducing the Risk of COVID-19 Transmission](#) (includes strategies for optimizing PPE use)

- [Dental Care - Prioritizing Care and Staying Safe](#)
- [IHSC Interim COVID-19 Risk Assessment](#)
- [IHSC Health Care-Related Exposure Risk Assessment](#)
- [Return to Work Information](#)
- [Patient education resources](#)

Please promptly add and update information to the [Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking tool](#) to facilitate accurate daily reporting to senior ICE and DHS leadership.

WHAT'S NEW

Version 8.0

- Added language to address that there is no centralized listing of areas in the US with ongoing or sustained community transmission. State and local health departments may have listings of case counts in their jurisdictions and may be referenced to assess whether the detainee had been in a US community with ongoing or sustained community transmission of COVID-19 in the past 14 days.
- Revised recommendation for observation of detainees under monitoring or cohorting
- Added a section with recommendation to the Field Office Director or designee with considerations for domestic release and movement of detainees for medically necessary continuity of care
- Added information on reporting staff with confirmed COVID-19 to local health departments for public health investigations and interventions and to avert threats to public health and safety
- Added links to [Dental Care - Prioritizing Care and Staying Safe](#)
- Moved information on documentation in the [Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool](#) and on documentation in the [Cohort Tracker](#) to a separate section on REPORTING

Version 7.0

- Recommendations to reduce the risk of transmission now link to a separate [Reducing the Risk of COVID-19 Transmission](#) document on the [2019 Novel Coronavirus Resource Page](#). This document includes strategies for optimizing personal protective equipment (PPE)

Thank you all for your attentiveness to this rapidly evolving epidemic.

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DrPH, MA, CAPT USPHS

Chief, Public Health, Safety, and Preparedness (PHSP) Unit
DHS/ICE/ERO/ICE Health Service Corps

Office: 202-741-(b)(6);

Cell: 202-210-(b)(7)(C)

Fax: 866-573-8531

Email: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

In office: Mon, Wed

Telework: Tue, Thu, Fri

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 27 Apr 2020 16:38:46 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: UPDATE Guatemala

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 27, 2020, 12:32 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE Guatemala

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: UPDATE Guatemala

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 27, 2020, 12:15 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE Guatemala

This is what I got from State just now.

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 11:24 AM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE Guatemala

(b)(5)

Thanks,

Henry

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 9:40 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE Guatemala

Reaching out to State and WH.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 9:36 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Albence,
Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: UPDATE Guatemala

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 3:17 PM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: UPDATE Guatemala

Good afternoon,

(b)(5)

Thanks

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 9:15 PM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @HQ.DHS.GOV>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Flight Update Apr 26

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

IAO Flight schedule, only update is to pax count for Tuesday's Guatemala mission.

Sunday, April 26, 2020

No Removal Flights Scheduled

Monday, April 27, 2020

Honduras – Approved

Departure: 0520 EDT

Foreign Departure: 0910 EDT

Routing: Miami, FL – Houston, TX – Honduras – Miami, FL

- UAC – 6
- Title 42 – 0
- Total – 83

Colombia – (Postponed until 05.04.20)

Departure: 0700 EDT

Foreign Departure: 0700 EDT

Routing: Alexandria, LA – Brownsville, TX – Colombia -Alexandria, LA

- UAC – 0
- Title 42 – 4 (4 Single Adults)
- Total – 77

Tuesday, April 28, 2020

El Salvador – Approved

Departure: 0525 EDT

Foreign Departure: 0910 EDT

Routing: San Antonio, TX – Houston, TX – El Salvador – San Antonio, TX

- UAC – 3 (Title 42)
- Title 42 – 3 (3 Title 42)
- Total – 57

Guatemala – Pending

Departure: Pending

Foreign Departure: Pending

Routing: Brownsville, TX – Houston, TX – Guatemala – Brownsville, TX

- UAC – 0
- Title 42 – 0
- Total – 120

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 8 Apr 2020 13:58:34 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Thanks

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 8:52 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Tae –

Here are the salient points:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please share with Henry and others as appropriate.

Thx - (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 7:04 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:50 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:41 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:38 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 5:34 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:26 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 4:27 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

OPLA got it from (b)(6) and then OPLA sent it to Domestic Ops for the tasking.

It was in an email that I attached to the first one.

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 3:23 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 4:21 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 3:17 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 4:01 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 9:05 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

That list came from someone at IHSC.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 9:38 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Cell: 202-515-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 9:35 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Below is the list as of this moment for your awareness.

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP

Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6);
Cell: 202-515-(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 9:29 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thanks!

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Saturday, April 4, 2020 5:18 PM
To: #ERO FODS (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO DFODS (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

UPDATE: Please see the updated guidance below. The previous version of this guidance is rescinded.

This message is sent from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (a)Assistant Director, Field Operations

To: Field Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors

Subject: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review

Background:

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has taken a number of significant and proactive measures in response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019

(COVID-19) pandemic, in order to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 to aliens detained in its custody, its workforce, and stakeholders at its detention facilities. As more becomes known about the virus, ERO will continue to update its practices and guidance in this regard. General ICE COVID-19 guidance is available [here](#) and will be updated and supplemented on an ongoing basis.

On March 18, 2020, you were directed to review the cases of aliens detained in your area of responsibility who were over the age of 70 or pregnant to determine whether continued detention was appropriate. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed a [list](#) of categories of individuals identified as potentially being at higher-risk for serious illness from COVID-19. Expanding on that list, ERO has identified the following categories of cases that should be reviewed to re-assess custody:

- Pregnant detainees or those having delivered in the last two weeks
- Detainees over 60 years old
- Detainees of any age having chronic illnesses which would make them immune-compromised, including but not limited to:
 - Blood Disorders
 - Chronic Kidney Disease
 - Compromised immune system (e.g., ongoing treatment such as chemotherapy or radiation, received an organ or bone marrow transplant, taking high doses of corticosteroids or other immunosuppressant medications)
 - Endocrine disorders
 - Metabolic disorders
 - Heart disease
 - Lung disease
 - Neurological and neurologic and neurodevelopment conditions

As part of your ongoing application of the CDC's Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities (available [here](#)), please identify all cases within your AOR that meet any of the criteria above and validate that list with assistance from IHSC or your Field Medical Coordinator to ensure the conditions listed are still present and do result in the detainee potentially having a higher risk for serious illness from COVID-19. After identifying a case as meeting any of the above criteria, you should review the case to determine whether continued detention remains appropriate in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The presence of one of the factors listed above should be considered a significant discretionary factor weighing in favor of release. To be clear, however, it may not always be determinative. Field offices must remain cognizant of the requirements of mandatory detention. Section 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) mandates the detention of certain categories of criminal and terrorist aliens during the pendency of removal proceedings. Such aliens may

not be released in the exercise of discretion during the pendency of removal proceedings even if potentially higher-risk for serious illness from COVID-19. INA § 236(c); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(1)(i). Such aliens may only be released following a final order issued by an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or a federal court granting the alien relief, dismissing proceedings, or terminating proceedings. Similarly, pursuant to section 241(a)(2), certain criminal and terrorist aliens subject to a final order of removal may not be released during the 90-day removal period even if potentially higher-risk for serious illness from COVID-19. INA § 241(a)(2). For alien's subject to discretionary detention under section 236(a), please remember that release is prohibited, even if the alien is potentially higher-risk for serious illness from COVID-19, if such release would pose a danger to property or persons. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).

When reviewing cases of alien's subject to discretionary detention under 236(a), the following must be completed:

- **Cases involving any arrests or convictions for any crimes that involve risk to the public regardless of the date of arrest or conviction must be reviewed and approved by a Deputy Field Office Director (DFOD) or higher before a determination is made to release.**
 - Examples of crimes that involve a risk to the public include any crime that: involves any form of violence, driving while intoxicated, threatening behaviors, terroristic threats, stalking, domestic violence, harm to a child, or any form of assault or battery. This list is not intended to be comprehensive. If there is any doubt whether a crime involves risk to the public, consult with your Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) field location and your respective Deputy Assistant Director for Domestic Operations before a custody redetermination is completed.
- You may consider the age of an arrest or conviction as a mitigating or an aggravating factor, but the age of an arrest or a conviction does not automatically outweigh public safety concerns.

With regard to arriving aliens and certain other aliens eligible for consideration of parole from custody, under current circumstances and absent significant adverse factors, the fact that an alien is potentially higher-risk for serious illness from COVID-19, may form the basis for a determination that “continued detention is not in the public interest,” justify release under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5).

For other aliens for whom there is discretion to release, field offices remain responsible for articulating individualized custody determinations, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances presented in the case. The fact that an alien is potentially higher-risk for serious illness from COVID-19 should be considered a factor weighing in favor of release. You may also consider alternatives to detention consistent with ICE ATD policies, if ATD is determined to sufficiently mitigate the risk of flight.

Any releases attributed to reviews of COVID-19 susceptibility shall be documented in the ENFORCE Alien Removal Module (EARM) under Special Class - COVID-19 Chronic Care Release. As previously communicated, these individuals should be placed on ATD if possible.

Please contact your local OPLA field location should you have any questions or concerns regarding your authority to release in any individual case.

For any questions on this guidance, please contact your respective Deputy Assistant Director for Domestic Operations.

Limitation on the Applicability of this Guidance. This message is intended to provide internal guidance to the operational components of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It does not, is not intended to, shall not be construed to, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any person in any matter, civil or criminal.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 9 Apr 2020 14:59:33 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:54 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately
Importance: High

Tae –

Need you north/south head nod on this.

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:52 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Thanks (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:50 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Got thanks – I made the change and will now share this with FMC leadership.
Thanks!

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:43 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

I had reviewed it yesterday but did not send it back.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:20 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately
Importance: High

Here you go- thanks.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately
Importance: High

Please review and comment- thanks.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 10:17 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP

Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536

Desk: 202-732-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 10:11 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 10:01 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Importance: High

See Tae's needing a clarification. What say you?

R, (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE

Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps

Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov

Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 9:59 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thanks

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 8:52 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Tae –

Here are the salient points:

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Please share with Henry and others as appropriate.

Thx - (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 7:04 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:50 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 9 Apr 2020 15:01:39 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Cool, I'm good

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 11:00 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

Thx, Tae. It does.

R/ (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 11:00 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 10:54 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Updated Guidance: COVID-19 Detained Docket Review-- Effective Immediately
Importance: High

Tae –

Need you north/south head nod on this.

Thx (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 1 Jun 2020 14:46:33 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@usdoj.gov
Subject: RE: SOW for COVID-19 Testing

Sorry (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - I included you by mistake. Please disregard. Thanks

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: Monday, June 1, 2020 10:17 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@usdoj.gov
Subject: FW: SOW for COVID-19 Testing

Here is the draft SOW - BTW

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2020 9:30 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: SOW for COVID-19 Testing

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 22, 2020 8:02 PM
To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: SOW for COVID-19 Testing

Good evening, Russ. Attached is the statement of work for OAQ. (b)(5)

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Assistant Director, Detention Management
DHS/ICE/ERO/CM
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

This e-mail communication may contain privileged, sensitive and/or confidential information, and is intended for internal government use only. Please do not forward or distribute outside the agency.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 7 Apr 2020 00:55:35 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Staffing Crisis at Hudson County Correctional Facility

This is awful.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:53 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Staffing Crisis at Hudson County Correctional Facility

More terrible news from Hudson County.

Assuming this is correct, this is the fourth staff member to pass away.

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 5:34 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Staffing Crisis at Hudson County Correctional Facility
Importance: High

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

More bad news below from ERO NYC at Hudson County Jail. Another contract staff member has passed away due to COVID-19 related complications.

Thanks

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations East
500 12th Street S.W MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 06, 2020, 6:29 PM
To: Decker, Thomas (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Staffing Crisis at Hudson County Correctional Facility

Hudson County – below email FYI.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Deputy Field Office Director
DHS ICE ERO – New York, New York
(212) 863-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (desk)
(972) 800-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2020 6:14 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Staffing Crisis at Hudson County Correctional Facility

All,

The main administrative staffer for commissary at Hudson County, Sergio iRossini has just died from complications related to COVID-19.

Thank you,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officer
ICE/ERO
201 Varick Street (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
New York, NY 10014
646-296-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (cell)
212-863-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (office)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, April 06, 2020 1:53 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Staffing Crisis at Hudson County Correctional Facility
Importance: High

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 28 May 2020 23:37:03 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 7:32 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

Thx, (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Tae -?

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 7:29 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MSHS, BSN, RN, CCHP
CDR, U.S. Public Health Service

Deputy Assistant Director, Health Systems Support
(202) 732-^{(b)(6);} Office
(202) 836-^{(b)(7)(C)} BB

From: ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 7:01 PM

To: ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)}

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)}

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

Thx ^{(b)(6);}
^{(b)(7)(C)}

Tae ^{(b)(5)}

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)}

From: ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 7:00 PM

To: ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)}

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)}

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

^{(b)(5)}

Respectfully,

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} MSHS, BSN, RN, CCHP
CDR, U.S. Public Health Service
Deputy Assistant Director, Health Systems Support
(202) 732-^{(b)(6);} Office
(202) 836-^{(b)(7)(C)} BB

From: ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 6:44 PM

To: ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>, ^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)}

^{(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)} @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

Adding (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) please confirm with (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Thx

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 6:43 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 6:10 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 5:15 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 4:01 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

Attachment for reference

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 28, 2020, 3:37 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 1:07 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
206-835 (b)(6); Office
206-793 (b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:33 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

I am having a call with the facility at 10:30 PST and should have an answer to you shortly after.

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

206-835 (b)(6); Office
206-793 (b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 9:30 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

FYSA

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 28, 2020 11:13 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: #IHSC_LEADERSHIP (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Tacoma COVID-19 OPLAN

Please see attached. (b)(5)

Thx - (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 9 Apr 2020 21:48:11 +0000
To: Hott, Russell
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Proposal for Attorney Calls

Thx Russ

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, Apr 09, 2020, 5:43 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Proposal for Attorney Calls

Good evening Tae,

(b)(5)

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,
Russ

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 9 Apr 2020 22:02:40 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject: RE: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Proposal for Attorney Calls

Haven't had a chance to look yet.

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 5:58 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Proposal for Attorney Calls

(b)(5)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 5:49 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Proposal for Attorney Calls

FYSA

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, Apr 09, 2020, 5:43 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Proposal for Attorney Calls

Good evening Tae,

(b)(5)

Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,
Russ

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 10 Apr 2020 18:07:38 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Hott, Russell; Cronen, C M; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Wong, Ricardo; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Temperature Check Guidance

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, April 10, 2020 2:00 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Temperature Check Guidance

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: IHSCInfo (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Apr 10, 2020, 1:45 PM
Subject: Temperature Check Guidance

A Message from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) **Deputy Assistant Director of Clinical Services, IHSC**

To All IHSC Staff
April 10, 2020

Temperature Check Guidance

Effective immediately, all detainees that are removed, released or transferred must have a temperature check annotated on their transfer summary by a health care provider prior to departing the detention facility. Any health care provider qualified to take a temperature reading can assist with this screening.

IHSC health care staff:

- Must complete the temperature check no more than 12 hours prior to facility departure.

- Handwrite the date and time of the temperature check, the temperature reading, and the staff member's name on the transfer summary; all information must be clearly legible.
- Copy and include the transfer summary in the detainee's medical record to document their temperature within 12 hours of their departure from the facility.
- Must complete and document temperature checks *prior* to providing Field Operations or custody staff the transfer summary documents.

Facility administrative and clinical leadership should collaborate with Field Operations and facility custody staff to coordinate detainee facility departure times, to ensure health care providers are available to perform this screening in a timely manner.

In alignment with CDC's guidance for identifying ill persons, a detainee with a temperature of 100.4 degrees or higher may not depart the facility for removal or transfer. Health staff should immediately refer the detainee to a medical provider for further evaluation.

Considerations when releasing into the United States detainees with confirmed or suspected COVID-19, detainees exposed to a person with confirmed or suspected COVID-19, or detainees under monitoring for having risk of exposure to COVID-19 include the following:

- If the detainee will be released before the recommended medical isolation, cohorting, or monitoring period is complete, discuss release of the individual with state or local health department in the jurisdiction where the facility is located.
- Provide the health department with the detainee's name, intended address, email address, and all available telephone numbers.
- Facilitate safe transport, continued shelter, and medical care, as part of release planning.
- Make direct linkages to community resources to ensure proper medical isolation and access to medical care if needed.
- Facilitate coordination by the detainee for a family member or friend to provide transportation.
- Advise the detainee to avoid public transportation, commercial ride sharing (e.g., Uber, Lyft), and taxis.
- Give the detainee the CDC's What To Do if You Are Sick fact sheet.

Please see Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities.

For additional information, please contact the appropriate point of contact:

- CAPT (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chief, Medical Services Unit and Deputy Medical Director, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov;
- CAPT (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chief, Nursing Services Unit and IHSC Chief Nurse, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; or
- LCDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chief, Health Operations Unit, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov.

DO NOT REPLY to this email address. This mailbox is used for outgoing IHSC communications only, and it is not monitored for any content, including responses. If you have any questions, please contact a member of the IHSC Communications Unit (ICU).

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 27 Mar 2020 20:15:42 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Temporary Measures to Reduce COVID-19 Exposure at ERO Field Offices [FOD]

Thanks (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 4:10 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Temporary Measures to Reduce COVID-19 Exposure at ERO Field Offices [FOD]

From: ERO Assistant Directors (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2020 1:24 PM
Subject: Temporary Measures to Reduce COVID-19 Exposure at ERO Field Offices [FOD]



Enforcement and Removal Operations Assistant Director for Field Operations

To: Field Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors

In response to COVID-19, ERO leadership will be implementing procedures to limit its public facing operations for a temporary period in order to mitigate the potential spread of COVID-19 consistent with the Center for Disease Control (CDC) guidelines.

A temporary scaling back of public facing operations as outlined below is not unprecedented, and as such, ERO Field Offices should be prepared to implement these temporary measures to reduce the potential risk of transmission of COVID-19 to staff and other visitors to our workplace.

Field Offices can use existing lines of communications with stakeholder organizations, such as AILA and other Non-Governmental Organizations to message these temporary changes. This information should also be sent to Consular Officials, posted on the public facing ICE

website and an aggressive media campaign in conjunction with the local Public Affairs Officer to ensure a wide distribution of these precautionary measures. In addition, Field Offices should closely collaborate with the Federal Protective Service and their contracted security staff at federal buildings as well as private security and ERO employees to ensure awareness and implementation of these procedures.

Effective immediately, please adhere to the following temporary operational changes until further notice:

Temporary Operational Changes:

1. For cases being released from the Southwest Border, the initial reporting requirement to an ERO Field Office will generally be scheduled for 60 days after release as opposed to the current practice of scheduling such reporting for 30 days or less post release.
2. To the extent possible, ERO will limit the acceptance of bonds to locations with “bond windows” or other appropriate barriers that will limit exposure to staff.
 - a. Generally, only the individual appearing to post the bonds will be permitted to enter the office. Anyone accompanying such individuals (e.g., for support, or children accompanied by another adult), will be asked by security not to enter the building.
3. Eliminate non-mission critical meetings with the public and encourage the use of technology (e.g., VTC) to conduct stakeholder meetings to the extent practicable.
4. Suspend social visitation of aliens detained at ICE detention facilities and encourage non-contact legal and congressional visitation.
5. Engage with DOJ EOIR to institute VTC hearings for detained cases, where sufficient IT equipment is available, to reduce transportation and the potential exposure of detainees and others attending hearings.
 - a. Engage with EOIR to limit those permitted to attend immigration court hearings to attorneys and witnesses for detained cases.
6. Coordinate with USCIS to conduct credible and reasonable fear interviews telephonically where practicable.
7. Temporarily change in-person reporting requirements to telephonic reporting.
8. Temporarily permit the filing of Form I-246, Application for Stay of Deportation or Removal, through the mail accompanied by money orders, certified funds, or request for fee waivers only.

To notify those with upcoming scheduled appointments of the temporary change in procedures, case officers will:

1. Call those who have telephone numbers on file,
2. Call and/or email attorneys listed as legal representatives, and
3. Update EARM with reporting changes and subsequent telephonic reporting details to include the date and time called and/or emailed along with the details of the next scheduled appointment.
4. Additionally, upon request, case officers will send an email to counsel as proof that their client complied with the reporting requirements in lieu of an original signature on OREC/OSUP documentation.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ERO Assistant Director, Field Operations

This message expires one year from the date it was sent, pursuant to ERO policy.

NOTICE: This communication may contain privileged or otherwise confidential information. If you are not an intended recipient or believe you have received this communication in error, please do not print, copy, retransmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Please inform the sender that you received this message in error and delete the message from your system.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 17 Apr 2020 14:31:07 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Hott, Russell; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kelly, Christopher S
Subject: RE: Test Kit Discussion

Call in # does not appear to be working

-----Original Appointment-----

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 9:28 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Johnson, Tae D; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Hott, Russell; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kelly, Christopher S
Subject: Test Kit Discussion
When: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:30 AM-11:00 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: Telecon 877-852-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) PIN (b)(7)(E)

-----Original Appointment-----

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:53 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kelly, Christopher S
Subject: Test Kit Discussion
When: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:30 AM-11:00 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: Telecon 877-852-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) PIN (b)(7)(E)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Please include necessary ERO folks, as appropriate.

-----Original Appointment-----

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 17, 2020 8:09 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kelly, Christopher S
Subject: Test Kit Discussion
When: Friday, April 17, 2020 10:30 AM-11:00 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada).
Where: Telecon 877-852-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) PIN (b)(7)(E)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 26 Apr 2020 11:06:18 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Test machine and kit tracking.

Got it, thanks

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Apr 26, 2020, 7:04 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Test machine and kit tracking.

Tae -

Another part of the ask that will be ongoing.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, Apr 23, 2020, 4:20 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Test machine and kit tracking.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Thoughts,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Chief of Staff
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Office of Enforcement & Removal Operations
500 12th Street SW
Washington, D.C. 20536

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

(202) 732- (b)(6); office)

(202) 770- (b)(7)(C) (cell)

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 28 Apr 2020 00:31:00 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Testing for Colombian flight

10-4

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 27, 2020, 7:52 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Testing for Colombian flight

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 27, 2020, 6:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Testing for Colombian flight

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Apr 27, 2020, 7:39 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Testing for Colombian flight

Tae,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(5)

What do you think?

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 24 Apr 2020 19:22:08 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Time Frame for Taskings

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Apr 24, 2020, 3:14 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Time Frame for Taskings

Hello Tae,

(b)(5)

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MSHS, BSN, RN, CCHP
CDR, U.S. Public Health Service
Deputy Assistant Director, Health Systems Support
ICE Health Service Corps
500 12th St. SW, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Washington, DC 20536
(202) 732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Office
(202) 836-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) BB

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 29 Mar 2020 14:54:00 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Just catching up to this. Stand by one. Sorry

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 10:53 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 9:33 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Time Sensitive - ICE Council - NYC Travel and Quarantine Guidance

Good morning all:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Please let me know if you have questions or concerns.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 24 Apr 2020 00:30:09 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Kelly, Christopher S
Subject: RE: [OPA] Question from Reuters about Guatemalan deportation flights

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, Apr 23, 2020, 8:21 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Kelly, Christopher S
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: [OPA] Question from Reuters about Guatemalan deportation flights

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2020 8:11 PM
To: #ICE OPA ERO Issue Paper (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: [OPA] Question from Reuters about Guatemalan deportation flights

Evening all, Reuters is running a piece tonight and tomorrow morning regarding tests provided by HHS to test individuals for COVID-19 prior to boarding a removal flight. They are asking us to confirm the bullets below. OPA would also like to provide a comment attributable to ICE to add to the piece.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 29 Feb 2020 21:27:36 +0000
To: Hott, Russell
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Thank you Russ

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Feb 29, 2020, 4:25 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Good afternoon,

For your review and consideration, we've put together some draft guidance on coronavirus. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

Thanks,
Russ

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Saturday, February 29, 2020 7:22 AM
To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Thanks, Russ. Standing by to assist.

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 4:29 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Yes, CM will take the first blush.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 4:13 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

(b)(5)

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 4:09 PM

To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Some of this may be useful.

From: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 1:05 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

All,

First attachment is original.

Second attachment is track changes from CAT, EMU, IHSC, and Safety and Health.

Third attachment is clean version. Chris

cmc

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 12:45 PM
To: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

I apologize if I am double tapping anyone.

First ICE's changes
Second all other track changes but IC
Third clean document

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Supervisory Special Agent
(A) Unit Chief
Emergency Management Unit
Office of Intelligence
Homeland Security Investigations
Washington, DC 20536
202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (D)
210-304 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (C)
540-428 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) AoF Warrenton

From: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 12:25 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

CAT, Safety and Health, and EMU are working it. We will then forward to ERO for consolidation.

cmc

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 09:20
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

I need bullets on things we are doing to prepare from your perspective divisions. Sorry - short turn.

From: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 11:19 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Need this done ASAP. Can ERO and CAT please take the lead?

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Ashooh, Emma (b)(6)
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 11:15 AM
To: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6) Brown, Katherine (b)(6) Stahl, Adam (b)(6) Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COOK, CHARLES (b)(6) Corbin, Susan (b)(6) SEGUIN, DEBBIE W (b)(6) SCHORR, STEPHEN <(b)(6)>, Propis, Ryan (b)(6) Heighberger, Eric <(b)(6)>, Feder, Mark J CAPT (b)(6) Dyson, Nicole (b)(6) Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: ESEC-BBIC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Apologies—document attached!

From: Ashooh, Emma
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 11:14 AM
To: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6) Brown, Katherine (b)(6) Stahl, Adam (b)(6) Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COOK, CHARLES (b)(6) Corbin, Susan (b)(6) SEGUIN, DEBBIE W <(b)(6)>, SCHORR, STEPHEN (b)(6) Propis, Ryan <(b)(6)>; Heighberger, Eric <(b)(6)>; Feder, Mark J CAPT (b)(6); Dyson, Nicole (b)(6) Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: ESEC-BBIC

(b)(6)

Subject: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

All,

AS1 has requested a fulsome narrative on what DHS is currently doing to protect the Homeland from COVID-19 as well as what each component is prepared to do should the situation worsen or evolve.

There are specific questions and comments in the document for you to answer. Some of this information may overlap with the Coronavirus Messaging Guidance so you can take language from there, but AS1 is requesting this new document as an easier to digest narrative on COVID-19 efforts, so please keep it as **concise and straightforward** as possible.

We need your edits/input in tracked changes **no later than 1:30pm today**.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this tasker.

Best,
Emma

Emma Ashooh
Office of the Executive Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

O: (b)(6)

C:

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 29 Feb 2020 02:30:44 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !
Attachments: Lucero Declaration MPP.DRAFT (MPD.CRC).docx

For visibility

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 9:29 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !

10-4 thank you

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CFO
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 819 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 9:23 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !

Plus (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for awareness.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 9:00 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !
Importance: High

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(Copying principal stakeholders)

See below as reference.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CFO
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 819 (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Mehringer, Holly (b)(6)
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 8:32 PM
To: GRABLE, SAMUEL D (b)(6); CAINE, JEFFREY (b)(6)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>,
Allan, Thomas G RDML (b)(6), Bennett, Craig A SES (b)(6)
Rose Pat (b)(6), Barth, John <(b)(6)> Moore, Patrick
(b)(6) Olsen, Kathleen (b)(6)
Cc: Marcott, Stacy (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Money

All

Apologize for the short fuse tasker...but by 10:00 tomorrow morning (Saturday, 29 February), we request your best guess estimate on what funding your Component thinks it needs to support the current Coronavirus situation as we move forward. Please include any assumptions you are using...

Please take into account assumptions that have been discussed today about extending medical screening to the land Port of Entry, additional PPE requirements, any other requirements we may not be thinking of. Please see below for additional details from the dialogue between AS2 and DUSM.

A ROM number is good for now...knowing we will be refining later. We have a call with DUSM at noon tomorrow to discuss your inputs. Also, if you would like, I can set up a call for 8:30 tomorrow morning. I am available to discuss, if you have questions.

Holly

Holly C Mehringer
Budget Director
Department of Homeland Security

From: Alles, Randolph

Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 8:11 PM

To: Corrado, Janene (b)(6) Marcott, Stacy (b)(6)

Mehring, Holly (b)(6)

Cc: Edgar, Troy (b)(6)

Subject: Fwd: Money

Let's pull together what we can tonight and tomorrow morning.

V/R

R. D. "Tex" Alles

(b)(6) (cell)

From: Alles, Randolph (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 20:07

To: AS2KTC; MORGAN, MARK A; Albence, Matthew; Schultz, Karl ADM; Pekoske, David

Cc: Benner, Derek N; PEREZ, ROBERT E; Gountanis, John; ALFONSO-ROYALS, ANGELICA; Cogswell, Patricia; Ray, Charles W ADM; Rasicot, Gary; Corrado, Janene; Marcott, Stacy; Mehring, Holly; Edgar, Troy

Subject: Re: Money

Understand, we'll work to get it together ASAP. It will be rough.

V/R

R. D. "Tex" Alles

(b)(6) (cell)

From: AS2KTC (b)(6)

Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 8:02:48 PM

To: Alles, Randolph (b)(6) MORGAN, MARK A (b)(6)

Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Schultz, Karl ADM (b)(6)

Pekoske, David (b)(6)

Cc: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; PEREZ, ROBERT E

(b)(6); Gountanis, John (b)(6) ALFONSO-ROYALS,
ANGELICA (b)(6) Cogswell, Patricia
(b)(6) Ray, Charles W ADM (b)(6); Rasicot, Gary
(b)(6)

Subject: Money


Tex, I know you were working toward dollar figures next week, but the secretary is being asked today about supplemental amounts for the department of homeland security. Even if we refine the numbers later, he is going to need an ask from each of the relevant components ASAP. I know a lot of crap has hit on the same day today, but if we want to get money in the supplemental we need to be negotiating on it now.

If any particular component agency does not need it under virtually any circumstances, so be it, otherwise, we need to take the best estimates that we can as quickly as we can. We need to be arming the secretary with this information.

Ken

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

(b)(5)



Page 092

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 093

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 094

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 095

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

(b)(5)

Executed in Washington, D.C. on February __, 2020.

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 29 Feb 2020 03:06:20 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 10:04 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 9:23 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !

Plus (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for awareness.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 9:00 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: **HOT** - Initial ROM needed by Saturday 0830 !
Importance: High

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(Copying principal stakeholders)

See below as reference.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CFO
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 819 (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Mehringer, Holly (b)(6)
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 8:32 PM
To: GRABLE, SAMUEL (b)(6); CAINE, JEFFREY
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Allan, Thomas G RDM (b)(6)
Bennett, Craig A SES (b)(6); Rose, Pat (b)(6); Barth, John
(b)(6); Moore, Patrick (b)(6); Oisen, Kathleen
(b)(6)
Cc: Marcott, Stacy (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Money

All

Apologize for the short fuse tasker...but by 10:00 tomorrow morning (Saturday, 29 February), we request your best guess estimate on what funding your Component thinks it needs to support the current Coronavirus situation as we move forward. Please include any assumptions you are using...

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Holly

Holly C Mehringer

Budget Director
Department of Homeland Security
Office: (b)(6) Mobile: (b)(6)

From: Alles, Randolph
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 8:11 PM
To: Corrado, Janene (b)(6) | Marcott, Stacy
(b)(6) | Mehringer, Holly (b)(6)
Cc: Edgar, Troy (b)(6)
Subject: Fwd: Money

Let's pull together what we can tonight and tomorrow morning.

V/R

R. D. "Tex" Alles

(b)(6) (cell)

From: Alles, Randolph (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 20:07
To: AS2KTC; MORGAN, MARK A; Albence, Matthew; Schultz, Karl ADM; Pekoske, David
Cc: Benner, Derek N; PEREZ, ROBERT E; Gountanis, John; ALFONSO-ROYALS, ANGELICA;
Cogswell, Patricia; Ray, Charles W ADM; Rasicot, Gary; Corrado, Janene; Marcott, Stacy;
Mehringer, Holly; Edgar, Troy
Subject: Re: Money

Understand, we'll work to get it together ASAP. It will be rough.

V/R

R. D. "Tex" Alles

(b)(6) (cell)

From: AS2KTC (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 8:02:48 PM
To: Alles, Randolph (b)(6) | MORGAN, MARK A
(b)(6); Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Schultz,
Karl ADM <(b)(6)>; Pekoske, David <(b)(6)>

Cc: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>: PEREZ, ROBERT E

(b)(6) Gountanis, John (b)(6) ALFONSO-

ROYALS, ANGELICA (b)(6) Cogswell, Patricia

(b)(6) Ray, Charles W ADM (b)(6) Rasicot,

Gary (b)(6)

Subject: Money

Tex, I know you were working toward dollar figures next week, but the secretary is being asked today about supplemental amounts for the department of homeland security. Even if we refine the numbers later, he is going to need an ask from each of the relevant components ASAP. I know a lot of crap has hit on the same day today, but if we want to get money in the supplemental we need to be negotiating on it now.

If any particular component agency does not need it under virtually any circumstances, so be it, otherwise, we need to take the best estimates that we can as quickly as we can. We need to be arming the secretary with this information.

Ken

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 8 Apr 2020 23:08:58 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc:
Subject: RE: **Review and Clear** 20042022 | Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

Thank you

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, Apr 08, 2020, 6:58 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: **Review and Clear** 20042022 | Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

Sir,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: ERO Communications (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 5:55 PM
To: #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; ERO Communications (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: **Review and Clear** 20042022 | Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Field Ops concurs and Removal had edits in red, in addition to a strikethrough, below.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Management and Program Analyst
ERO Executive Information Unit
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

202.732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (C)

NOTICE: This communication may contain privileged or otherwise confidential information. If you are not an intended recipient or believe you have received this communication in error, please do not print, copy, retransmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Please inform the sender that you received this message in error and delete the message from your system.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 5:49 PM
To: ERO Communications (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; ADR Archive (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: 20042022 | Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

Hello,

Please see Removal's edits in red, along with strikethrough. Cleared by AD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

The following message is sent on behalf of Tae Johnson, Deputy Executive Associate Director:

To: Assistant Directors, Field Office Directors, Deputy Field Office Directors, and Assistant Field Office Directors

Subject: Implications of COVID-19 Travel Restrictions on Post-Order Custody Reviews

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 4:44 PM
To: ERO Communications (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF
(b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: 20042022 | Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

Hi (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Could you please run this by Field Ops and Removal for concurrence before we distro?

Thank you,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 4:02 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF
(b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: RE: Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

Copy that, thanks.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) - please have Ops and RMD officially clear and lets push this out. Thanks.

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 3:57 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: RE: Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Date: Wednesday, Apr 08, 2020, 3:38 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Lucero, Enrique M
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Subject: FW: Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

(b)(5)

From: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, April 8, 2020 3:11 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Proposed Broadcast Guidance on Post-order Custody and COVID-19

Tae-

(b)(5)

Thanks,

Adam V. Loiacono

Deputy Principal Legal Advisor for Enforcement and Litigation

Office of the Principal Legal Advisor

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Iphone: 202-500-(b)(6);

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

— ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE — ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT —

This communication and any attachments may contain confidential and/or sensitive attorney/client privileged information or attorney work product and/or law enforcement sensitive information. It is not for release, review, retransmission, dissemination, or use by anyone other than the intended recipient. Please notify the sender if this email has been misdirected and immediately destroy all originals and copies. Furthermore do not print, copy, re-transmit, disseminate, or otherwise use this information. Any disclosure of this communication or its attachments must be approved by the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This document is for INTERNAL GOVERNMENT USE ONLY and may be exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(5), (b)(7).

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 27 Apr 2020 15:51:55 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: Testing GUATs

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 28 Feb 2020 16:06:56 +0000
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov)
Subject: Updated N-95 Mask Count 2-28-2020.xlsx
Attachments: Updated N-95 Mask Count 2-28-2020.xlsx

[illegible]

Notes: (1) Plan for three (3) N95 masks per employee. The employee must be fit tested. N95 masks may be re-used until frayed or torn. N95 are for employees to avoid being infected.
(2) Surgical masks are to be worn by the suspected-of-infected detainee to prevent spread to others. These are disposed of after each use.

						Md Contract	Other Contract	Surgical Masks	Surgical Masks	Surgical Masks	Surgical Masks
N 95 Required	#1	N 95 Onhand	N 95 Ordered	(b)(7)(E)	(b)(7)(E)	PHS Contract	HHS Contract	PHS Surge	HHS Surge	PHS Surge	HHS Surge
200		None	None								
200		400	None								
200		1,040	None								
200		1870	None								
200		700	None								
200		440	None								
200		300	300								
200		340	None								
200		540	None								
200		280	None								
200		980	None								
200		240	None								
200		1,760	None								
200		1,485	None								
200		8040	None								
200		3879	None								
200		300	None								
200		340	None								
1070		1410	300								

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 15 Mar 2020 02:14:24 +0000
To: Johnson, Tae D [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov
Subject: White_Paper_Reducing_office_visitors - [REDACTED] edits
Attachments: White_Paper_Reducing_office_visitors - [REDACTED] edits.docx

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Field Operations Division



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Field Operations Division



(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 15 Mar 2020 23:32:02 +0000
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov)
Subject: White_Paper_Reducing_office_visitors - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) edits (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Attachments: White_Paper_Reducing_office_visitors - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) edits (b)(6); (b)(7)(C).docx



**U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)**

(b)(5)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Field Operations Division



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Field Operations Division



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

DRAFT

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 15 Mar 2020 15:44:43 +0000
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov)
Subject: White_Paper_Reducing_office_visitors (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) edits (b)(6)
Attachments: White_Paper_Reducing_office_visitors (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) edits (b)(7) docx



**U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)**

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Field Operations Division



(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 23 Feb 2020 21:57:25 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)
Attachments: FW: (U//FOUO) COVID-19 (Update 29) - Worldwide (Awareness NOC 0051-20), (U//FOUO) OPS-NOC Note (Interim Update): COVID-19 Worldwide (b)(7)(E)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Feb 23, 2020, 4:22 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)

From: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Feb 23, 2020, 3:41 PM
To: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)

Afternoon sir,

Please see the below and attached updates regarding the Corona Virus.

At this time there are no reports of ICE employees, family members overseas, contractors, or detainees diagnosed with the Corona Virus. IHSC is currently monitoring 25 detainees, of which 3 are in isolation, across 3 facilities. Thanks, Chris

ICE CAT Director
COVID-19
cmc

From: JIOC-ICE (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, February 23, 2020 12:00 PM
To: DHSCAT (b)(6) NOC.MGMT (b)(6) DHSCMAC (b)(6) (b)(7)(E) @hq.dhs.gov'

(b)(6) (b)(7)(E) @hq.dhs.gov'
 (b)(6)
Cc: NOC.SWO.Restricted (b)(6) Cronen, C M
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; JIOC-
 ICE (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)

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Good Afternoon,

ICE provides the following responses to NOC RFI: AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture

(b)(7)(E)

The first chart provides accountability of the total number of ICE employees, dependents, and FSNs in China and Hong Kong. The second chart reflects the number of detainees in ICE custody that the ICE Health Services Corps is monitoring for COVID-19. There are no confirmed cases of detainees having contacted COVID-19:

Location	ICE (HSI+ERO) Employees in China	ERO Direct Hires in China	ICE Dependents in China	ICE LES/FSN in China	Employees stationed in China but on Leave
Beijing	(b)(7)(E)				
Guangzhou					
Hong Kong					

IHSC Response: IHSC is currently monitoring 25 detainees across 3 facilities with 3 in isolation.

Facility	Total in isolation	Total under monitoring
Otay Mesa Detention Center (San Diego CDF)	2	14
Port Isabel	1	5
South Texas Ice Processing Center (Pearsall)	0	3
Subtotal	3	22
Total	25	

V/R

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Criminal Analyst

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

500 12th Street, SW - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Washington, DC 20536

Desk/STE: 202-732- (b)(6);

Fax: 202-732-3133 (b)(7)(C)

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: 23 Feb 2020 13:45:04 +0000
To: Cronen, C M
Cc: #C_Virus
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) COVID-19 (Update 29) - Worldwide (Awareness (b)(7)(E))
(b)(7)(E)

Good morning Sir,

NOC SWO's note for COVID19. Overall no new information from Saturday.

V/R

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Supervisory Special Agent
(A) Unit Chief
Emergency Management Unit
Office of Intelligence
Homeland Security Investigations
Washington, DC 20536
202-731 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (D)
210-304 (b)(7)(C) (C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Feb 23, 2020, 7:54 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) COVID-19 (Update 29) - Worldwide (Awareness NOC 0051-20)

From: NOC.SWO
Sent: Sunday, February 23, 2020 7:53:31 AM (UTC-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)
Cc: NOC.SWO
Subject: (U//FOUO) COVID-19 (Update 29) - Worldwide (Awareness (b)(7)(E))

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(U) **Overview:** As of 0400 ET 23 Feb, the WHO reported there were 78,810 (+1,016) confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 2,462 (+103) confirmed deaths worldwide. The number of confirmed cases in the U.S. remains at 17. CDC confirmation is still pending

on the 30 passengers from the Cruise Ship (C/S) DIAMOND PRINCESS who initially tested positive for COVID-19.

(U) The CDC and DOS have published Level 2 Travel Health Notices and Travel Advisories for Japan and South Korea (exercise increased caution when traveling to these countries, as they are experiencing sustained community transmission of respiratory illnesses).

(U) DOS reports Italy has put several towns on quarantine, including closures of schools, public transportation, restaurants, shops, and other public places after two deaths were attributed to COVID-19, along with 62 confirmed cases in the region.

(U) Marine Corps Air Station Miramar will continue to operate as a quarantine facility to support passengers requiring mandatory quarantine from LAX until Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, CA is ready to receive passengers. The quarantine and isolation site at March ARB demobilized. The Center for Domestic Preparedness located in Anniston, AL is anticipated to be fully operational on 24 Feb to receive future asymptomatic patients.


(U) All remaining AMCITs from the DIAMOND PRINCESS, who were confirmed as negative for COVID-19 and disembarked, remain under travel restrictions to the U.S until 4 Mar. Sixty-eight AMCITs (62 positive for COVID-19) remain hospitalized in Japan. Evacuees that repatriated on 17 Feb, will remain isolated or quarantined until 2 Mar. There are 64 AMCIT passengers from the WESTERDAM remaining in Phnom Penh.

(U) USCG reports Motor Vessel (M/V) YM UPWARD, which was in China on 8 Feb, arrived in Tacoma, WA on 22 Feb. USCG reports M/V NICOLAI MAERSK, which was in China on 15 Feb, will arrive at Dutch Harbor, AK on 24 Feb. CBP crew restrictions will be implemented while in port.

(U) FEMA is supporting HHS with 56 (IMAT-A) Teams. As of 0553 ET 23 Feb, DHS CWMD reported 27,003 (+450) travelers have received enhanced screening; including 65 (n/c) who were referred to CDC for further screening. HHS SOC remains at Level 1 (Full Activation).

(U) For additional information, refer to the [DHS Common Operating Picture](#) and the [Homeland Security Information Network](#).

(U) **Distribution:** DHS HQ Leadership and Senior Staff; DHS Component Leadership and Operations Centers; WHSR; Federal Interagency Operations Centers; and State and Local Mission Partners.



(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Senior Watch Officer
 DHS Office of Operations Coordination
 National Operations Center
 Comm: (202) 282-
 Secure: (202) 447-

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From: JIOC-ICE
Sent: 23 Feb 2020 14:20:40 +0000
To: #ICE-Watch_SLN_NOCnote
Subject: (U//FOUO) OPS-NOC Note (Interim Update): COVID-19 Worldwide (b)(7)(E)
(b)(7)(E)

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The following is the COVID-19 Snapshot as of 0700, 23 Feb 20.

Snapshot
WHO Reports (as of 0400 ET 23 Feb): - Worldwide Confirmed Cases: 78, 810 (+1016) - Worldwide Confirmed Deaths: 2, 462 (+103) - AMCIT Deaths (outside U.S.): 1 (Wuhan, China)
HHS Reports (as of 0910 ET 22 Feb): - U.S. Domestic Confirmed Cases: 17 (n/c) <i>Confirmed cases are located in medical facilities throughout the U.S.</i> - U.S. Domestic Unconfirmed Cases: 30 (-1) <i>Includes 30 presumptive positive cases repatriated from C/S DIAMOND PRINCESS who are in medical facilities throughout the U.S.</i>
U.S.-based Quarantine (as of 2000 ET 21 Feb): 332 (-94) <i>*Includes evacuees released from Ashland (-57), March ARB (-1), and Travis AFB (-36) on 21 Feb.</i>
DHS Screening Actions (11 Airports) (as of 0553 ET 23 Feb): - Total CBP Referred to CWMD: 47, 985 (+610) - CWMD Cleared (no further screening): 20, 917 (+160) - CWMD Referred for Self-Monitoring: 27, 003 (+450) - CWMD Referred to CDC: 65 (n/c) - CDC Referred to Quarantine: 16 (n/c) - CDC Hospitalized: 0 (n/c) - CDC Referred to Self-Monitor: 0 (n/c) - CDC Cleared: 49 (+1) - Pending Disposition Status: 0 (-1)

Distribution: NOC DHS Component Actions Report Recipients, Federal Interagency Operations Centers, and White House

V/r

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
500 12th Street, SW - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Washington, DC 20536
Desk/STE: 202-732- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Fax: 202-732-3133

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~~Approval~~

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 19 May 2020 14:18:46 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

FYSA – I sent too. Thx

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 10:17 AM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Jaclyn - We have confirmed that the four locations are all CLIA certified. Updated POC information and phone numbers are below. Thank you.

PHO – 500 kits

Florence Detention Center

Attn: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

(O) 520-868 (b)(6);
(C) 310-606 (b)(7)(C)

HOU – 400 kits

Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Attn: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

15850 Export Plaza Drive

Houston, TX 77032

(O) 281-985 (b)(6);
(C) 202-321 (b)(7)(C)

NOL: 700 kits

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: AHSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

96B George Thompson Road

Alexandria, LA 71303

Office: (318) 483 (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

SNA – 400 kits

Port Isabel

Attn: acting HSA CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

27991 Buena Vista Road

Los Fresnos, TX 78566

Office (956) 5 (b)(6);
Cell 202-809- (b)(7)(C)

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 8:49 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Good Morning Tae,

See below for the questions from HHS. Can you please provide the information requested? Onsite Phone numbers and POCs, and confirmation that the new sites meet the CLIA certification standards and have devices available to process the tests?

Thank you,
Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino

Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) 2
(email)

From: Roach, Jessica (HHS/OASH) <Jessica.Roach@hhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 8:42 AM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Great, thanks Jackie. One point of clarification and one additional request.

- 1) The test ship in kits of 24 – I've noted the number of kits next to each location below for a total of 84 kits.
- 2) These will be shipping from the Strategic National Stockpile and require phone numbers for an on-site point of contact. **Can you please provide phone numbers by COB today?**

Also, I wanted to confirm that these sites have devices, meet CLIA certification standards, etc. since they are different than the locations where we originally sent the devices.

Thanks!

Jess

Jessica L. Roach, MPH
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 7:27 AM
To: Roach, Jessica (HHS/OASH) <Jessica.Roach@hhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Jessica,

Below are the shipping addresses and quantities this month for the test kits. Let me know if you need anything further.

Thanks!
Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino

Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) (b)(6)
(email) (b)(6)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 7:21 AM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6); Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
Corrado, Janene (b)(6); COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Good morning Jaclyn -

Shipping addresses are below. Please let me know if you need additional information. Thx

PHO – 500 tests 21 kits

Florence Detention Center
Attn: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
3250 North Pinal Parkway
Florence, AZ 85132

HOU – 400 tests 17 kits

Immigration & Customs Enforcement
Attn: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
15850 Export Plaza Drive
Houston, TX 77032

NOL: 700 tests 29 kits

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
96B George Thompson Road
Alexandria, LA 71303

SNA – 400 tests 17 kits

Port Isabel

Attn: HSA CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
27991 Buena Vista Road
Los Fresnos, TX 78566

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 9:46 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Thanks. I'll let HHS know that we will provide tomorrow.

Jaclyn Rubino
Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) (b)(6)
(email) (b)(6)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 9:45:34 PM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6) Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

We will get you the addresses in the morning. Apologies for the delay.

Sent with BlackBerry Work

(b)(7)(E)

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 9:25 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Re: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Good Evening Henry,

Following up to get the information to HHS on where to send the Abbott test kits. HHS is standing by to ship the weekly allotment of test kits to your desired locations. Please advise if someone at ICE already gave them the information. If not, my POC is standing by for us to provide it. I am guessing that shipments should go to the locations with the devices to read results, however need confirmation and numbers.

Thanks,
Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino
Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) (b)(6)
(email) (b)(6)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 1:00:37 PM

To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6) Corrado, Janene (b)(6)

COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)

Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Apologies, I thought this would be for new machines. I will resend where the 2000 monthly kits should be sent shortly.

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)

Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 12:57 PM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Corrado, Janene (b)(6)

COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)

Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Henry,

To clarify, this would only be for the 84 Abbott ID Now test kits that HHS is shipping us. This is not anything new. Would the same quantities go to the three locations where the devices are?

Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino

Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(b)(6)

(email) (b)(6)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 12:51 PM

To: Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)

Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)

Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Hi Janene,

Shipping locations below for machines and test kits:

PHO – 3 Machines, 1000 tests

Florence Detention Center

C/O (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

ELP – 2 Machines

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

AFOD Mission Support

US DHS ICE ERO – El Paso Field Office

11541 Montana, Suite E Room 101

DAL – 2 Machines

(a)AFOD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

1209 Sunflower Lane,

Alvarado, TX 76009

NOL: 3 Machines, 1000 tests

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

96B George Thompson Road

Alexandria, LA 71303

MIA: 2 Machines, 500 tests

ICE-Krome Service Processing Center

18201 SW 12th Street.

Miami, FL 33194

ATTN: Acting OIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ATL: 3 Machines Total broken out below:

2 Machines, 500 tests

Attn: Assistant Warden (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Stewart Detention Center (STWRTGA)

146 CCA Rd
Lumpkin, GA 31815

1 Machine

Attn: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Irwin County Detention Center (IRWINGA)
132 Cotton Dr
Ocilla, GA 31774

Thanks,

Henry

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Corrado, Janene (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 11:57 AM
To: COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6) Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Hi Henry –

Can you confirm the shipping addresses for the second round of test kits?

Thank you!

Janene

Janene M. Corrado
Acting Chief of Staff
Office of the Under Secretary for Management
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6) Direct
(b)(6) Cell

(b)(6)



"With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values." ...DHS Mission

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 14 May 2020 14:36:28 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M; Albence, Matthew; Kelly, Christopher S; Benner, Derek N
Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests for ICE

FYSA

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 8:58 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Abbott COVID Tests for ICE

Tae-

(b)(5)

I'll let you know if there is a change.

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 19 May 2020 10:44:18 +0000
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov)
Subject: FW: Additional Machines

PHO – 500 kits

Florence Detention Center
C/O (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
3250 North Pinal Parkway
Florence, AZ 85132

HOU – 400 kits

Immigration & Customs Enforcement
ATTN: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
15850 Export Plaza Drive
Houston, TX 77032

NOL: 700 kits

Alexandria Staging Facility
Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
96B George Thompson Road
Alexandria, LA 71303

SNA – 400 kits

Port Isabel
Attn: HSA XXXXXXXX
27991 Buena Vista Road
Los Fresnos, TX 78566

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 2:01 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Additional Machines

Here are the addresses, who should I send these to?

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 1:49 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Please see the consolidated responses below as requested:

PHO – 3

Florence Detention Center
C/O (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
3250 North Pinal Parkway
Florence, AZ 85132

ELP – 2

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
AFOD Mission Support
US DHS ICE ERO – El Paso Field Office
11541 Montana, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
El Paso, Texas 79936
Office 915-856 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell 915-472 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

DAL – 2

(a)AFOD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
1209 Sunflower Lane,
Alvarado, TX 76009

HOU – 2

Immigration & Customs Enforcement
ATTN: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
15850 Export Plaza Drive
Houston, TX 77032

SNA - 4

1 Machine
Dilley
300 El Rancho Way
Dilley, TX 78017

2 Machines Port Isabel
PIDC
27991 Buena Vista Road
Los Fresnos, TX 78566

1 Machine Laredo
ICE ERO
500 East Mann Road (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Laredo, Texas 78041

NOL:

Alexandria Staging Facility
Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
96B George Thompson Road
Alexandria, LA 71303

MIA:

ICE-Krome Service Processing Center
18201 SW 12th Street.
Miami, FL 33194
ATTN: Acting OIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ATL:

2 Machines
Attn: Assistant Warden (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Stewart Detention Center (STWRTGA)
146 CCA Rd
Lumpkin, GA 31815

POC: Assistant Warden (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [@Corecivic.com](mailto:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@Corecivic.com)
Office: 229-838 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 478-33 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

1 Machine

Attn: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Irwin County Detention Center (IRWINGA)
132 Cotton Dr
Ocilla, GA 31774

POC: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [@irwincdc.com](mailto:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@irwincdc.com)
(229) 402 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations, Eastern Operations
500 12th Street S.W. MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [@ice.dhs.gov](mailto:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov)
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:05 PM

To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 12:11 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Eastern operations FODs were contacted and I am awaiting the addresses.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

I will send mine to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for consolidation if you want to do the same so he can compile the list for final submission.

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations, Eastern Operations
500 12th Street S.W. MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 12:53 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Additional Machines

(b)(5) Please get shipping locations and addresses for your respective FODs.

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 11:49 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott,

Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

OK, thanks everyone. We will go with the following – at least to start, in terms of placement of the stationary machines.

NOL – 4
SNA – 4
PHO – 3
ATL – 3
ELP – 2
MIA - 2
DAL – 2
HOU - 2

Roving machines = 3

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:40 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:07 AM

To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 9:04 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:55 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 8:45 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:30 AM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 8:12 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

Thx

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Corrado, Janene (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:09 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Additional Machines

Good morning, Henry -

Director Albence advised that there is a need for 15 additional machines and 3000 tests. Can you tell me what locations the machines would go to if we can get them? We're working to find additional capacity for ICE.

Hope you are well.

Kind regards-

Janene

Janene M. Corrado
Acting Chief of Staff
Office of the Under Secretary for Management
Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 30 May 2020 04:26:58 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: ASF COVID Positive 05-29-2020

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 29, 2020, 11:01 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF COVID Positive 05-29-2020

11 cases for the Indian charter tested positive at the ASF.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 29, 2020, 9:52 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF COVID Positive 05-29-2020

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Please see below from ERO NOL for 11 detainees positive at ASF. These cases were being dragged for India SHRC flight. First two from Dallas and the remainder from NOL.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Unit Chief
Domestic Operations Division-East
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
500 12th St, SW
Washington, DC 20024
202-732-(b)(6); Desk
202-359-(b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 29, 2020, 10:46 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF COVID Positive 05-29-2020

The SHRC flight to India
The first two are stages are from Dallas
The rest are ours.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Field Office Director
New Orleans Field Office
ICE - Enforcement & Removal Operations
1010 E. Whatley Rd
Oakdale, LA 71463
Mobile: (225) 892-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 29, 2020 9:33 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF COVID Positive 05-29-2020

Was this group part of a charter that is being staged?

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Unit Chief
Domestic Operations Division-East
Enforcement and Removal Operations

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
500 12th St, SW
Washington, DC 20024
202-732-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) Desk
202-359-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 29, 2020, 10:28 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF COVID Positive 05-29-2020

On May 29, 2020, the following detainees have tested positive for COVID-19 at ASF:

The SIR will have one less person listed as he had an SIR previously done (diagnosed at Winn – he is still positive).

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Field Office Director
New Orleans Field Office
ICE - Enforcement & Removal Operations
1010 E. Whatley Rd
Oakdale, LA 71463
Mobile: (225) 892-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 12 May 2020 23:05:08 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 6:31 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

15 positive cases in NOL that were manifested for tomorrow...

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 4:57 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

ERO NOL reported that they have 15 detainees who tested positive for COVID-19. These were Guatemalans who are manifested for the Guatemalan flight tomorrow. 14 were returned to Catahoula and 1 was returned to Olla.

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations East
500 12th Street S.W MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Desk)

From: Witte, Diane L (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 12, 2020, 5:51 PM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

Hi Ricardo,

The below detainees tested positive for COVID-19 when they were brought to ASF for testing before the Guatemala flight. IHSC at ASF did the testing and got the results. The detainees will be returned to the facilities they came from.

These 14 detainees were returned to Catahoula Correctional Center:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

This detainee was returned to Olla:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 5 May 2020 17:23:21 +0000
To: Albence, Matthew; Kelly, Christopher S; Benner, Derek N
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: FW: Consent for Treatment

No change in the ATL medical case we're tracking. Status report is below.

From: Giles, Thomas P [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 10:09 AM
To: Wong, Ricardo [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Good morning Ricardo –

Here is the latest update on the Guatemala in the Hospital.

[(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)] is still the same, he is admitted to the hospital and is very critical.
He is intubated on Mechanical Ventilation. He is still requiring a high FIO2 (oxygen requirement) of 100%.
He is on mild sedation, becomes anxious but opens his eyes and follows simple verbal command.

Our plan is to still release him once he returns to the facility. However, his discharge date is still unknown at this time.

Thanks

Tom

From: Giles, Thomas P
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 10:55 AM
To: [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo
[(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Good morning [(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)]

Please see update below.

Thanks you

Tom

Detainee Name: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Alien Number: [REDACTED]
Date of Birth: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Country of Citizenship: Guatemala
Date of Arrival: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Relevant Medical History: Diabetes, hyperlipidemia
ID Hospital/Room #: Piedmont Columbus/ ICU 10 Bed 25
Date of Admission: 4/17/2020
Number of Hospital Days: 16
Current Diagnosis: Pneumonia
Attending MD: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Vital signs: Temp 98.6 HR 118 R.22 B/P 118/61 SAT 95% @100%FIO2
Current Status: Critical Condition/Intubated. Remains off of paralytic agents. Following simple commands but becomes anxious.
Medications: Currently receiving Vitamin C, Potassium, Lasix 20mg IV bid, Combivent and Albuterol. Fentanyl and Propofol drips currently in use.
Discharge date: Pending
Report provided by: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) RN

From: Giles, Thomas P
Sent: Sunday, May 3, 2020 8:40 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Good evening

Here is the latest update on the Guatemalan in the hospital.

This is the update on (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) today.

The physician taking care of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) called. The patient received the Convalescent Plasma yesterday. He developed a fever (which was expected) and he also experienced some fluid overload and because of the fluid overload, his oxygen demand increased (he went from FIO2 of 80% to FIO2 of 100%). The physician is going to pull some of the fluid overload off with Lasix IV and this will probably decrease his need of the high oxygen demand. He is still intubated, on Mechanical Ventilation. The paralytic agent is discontinued and he is on mild sedation. He does open his eyes and responds to simple commands.

Thanks

Tom

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Giles, Thomas P [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, May 03, 2020, 9:51 AM
To: [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Good morning
Here is the latest update on the hospital case. Thx

Detainee Name: [REDACTED]
Alien Number: [REDACTED]
Date of Birth: [REDACTED]
Country of Citizenship: Guatemala
Date of Arrival: [REDACTED]
Relevant Medical History: Diabetes, hyperlipidemia
ID Hospital/Room #: Piedmont Columbus/ ICU 10 Bed 25
Date of Admission: 4/17/2020
Number of Hospital Days: 15
Number of ICU Days: 4
Current Diagnosis: Pneumonia
Attending MD: [REDACTED]
Vital signs: Temp 99.5 HR 118-150 R.18-20 B/P 112/61 SAT 89-92% @80%FIO2
Current Status: Critical Condition/Intubated. Remains off of paralytic agents. Following simple commands but becomes anxious.
Medications: Currently receiving Vitamin C, Potassium, Lasix 20mg IV bid, Combivent and Albuterol.
Discharge date: Pending
Report provided by: [REDACTED] RN

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Giles, Thomas P [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 02, 2020, 10:08 AM
To: [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Good morning

Below is this mornings update.

Thank you

Tom

Detainee Name: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Alien Number: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Date of Birth: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Country of Citizenship: Guatemala
Date of Arrival: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Relevant Medical History: Diabetes, hyperlipidemia
ID Hospital/Room #: Piedmont Columbus/ ICU 10 Bed 25
Date of Admission: 4/17/2020
Number of Hospital Days: 15
Number of ICU Days: 4
Current Diagnosis: Pneumonia
Attending MD: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Vital signs: Temp 100.6 Max temp past 12 hours 101.8 HR 110-135 R.18-20 B/P 116/53 SAT 92% @80%FIO2
Current Status: Critical Condition/Intubated. Weaned off of paralytic agents for past 12 hours. Following simple commands but becomes anxious.
Medications: Currently receiving Vitamin C, Potassium, Lasix 20mg IV bid, Combivent and Albuterol.
Discharge date: Pending
Report provided by: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) RN

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Giles, Thomas P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 01, 2020, 7:22 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Good evening

Here is the latest on the hospital case

Detainee Name: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Alien Number: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Date of Birth: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Country of Citizenship: Guatemala
Date of Arrival: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Relevant Medical History: Diabetes, hyperlipidemia
ID Hospital/Room #: Piedmont Columbus/ ICU 10 Bed 25

Date of Admission: 4/17/2020

Number of Hospital Days: 15

Number of ICU Days: 4

Current Diagnosis: Pneumonia

Attending MD: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Vital signs: Temp 99 P.94 R.19 B/P 90/46 SAT 95% @85%FIO2 (previous shift)

Current Status: Critical Condition/Intubated. Multiple unsuccessful attempts made to receive report from nursing staff. O2 requirements decreased to 80%FIO2 and trying to wean off the paralytic agents

Medications: Currently receiving Vitamin C, Potassium, Lasix 20mg IV bid, Combivent and Albuterol.

Discharge date: Pending

Report provided by: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thanks

Tom

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Giles, Thomas P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Friday, May 01, 2020, 5:23 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Consent for Treatment

Hi (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Here is the latest update on the Guatemalan in the hospital.

Thx

Tom

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Friday, May 01, 2020, 5:21 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @corecivic.com>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Giles, Thomas P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Consent for Treatment

Hello CDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

I connected (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) physician with the Guatemalan Consulate for them to explain to her the convalescent plasma donation process for patients.

The Consulate had (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) spouse speak to his physician and she gave him permission to do provide him with convalescent plasma.

Thanks

Regards

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Officer in Charge
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Lumpkin, GA
Office: (229) 838 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @dhs.gov

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 4:47 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @corecivic.com>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Consent for Treatment

Alcon,

I have received a request from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for the use Convalescent Plasma for patients with COVID-19 for (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

I have forwarded the request to the IHSC Deputy Medical Director, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for guidance.

He has stated due to the critical condition of the patient; the hospital should obtain the consent of the wife as next of kin. In her absence, the hospital ethics board can provide consent.

Hopefully ERO has provided the family contact information.

Kind regards,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DNP, MSN, FNP
CDR USPHS
Field Medical Coordinator
Columbia Sub Field Office
1835 Assembly Street (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Columbia, SC 29201

(202) 809 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Work Cell
(888) 425 - (b)(6) Secure Fax

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 24 Mar 2020 21:29:30 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Hott, Russell
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject: RE: Urgent Letter regarding Remote Legal Access and Representation During COVID-19 Pandemic

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 7:20 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Urgent Letter regarding Remote Legal Access and Representation During COVID-19 Pandemic

Tae,

Please see our draft response.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Chief of Staff
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Office of Enforcement & Removal Operations
500 12th Street SW
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(202) 770 (b)(7)(C) cell)

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From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 10:01 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Urgent Letter regarding Remote Legal Access and Representation During COVID-19 Pandemic

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Monday, Mar 23, 2020, 9:56 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #ICE DD STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Urgent Letter regarding Remote Legal Access and Representation During COVID-19 Pandemic

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 9:40 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ICE DD STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Urgent Letter regarding Remote Legal Access and Representation During COVID-19 Pandemic

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @immcouncil.org>
Date: Monday, Mar 23, 2020, 7:00 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @immcouncil.org>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @aila.org>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @immcouncil.org>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @immcouncil.org>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @aila.org>
Subject: Urgent Letter regarding Remote Legal Access and Representation During COVID-19 Pandemic

Dear Tae, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

We appreciate your assistance.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Managing Director of Programs
Pronouns: She/Her/Hers
202-507-(b)(6); @immcouncil.org

American Immigration Council
1331 G Street NW, (b)(6);
Washington, DC 20005
www.AmericanImmigrationCouncil.org
www.ImmigrationImpact.com

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 5 May 2020 12:09:20 +0000
To: Albence, Matthew; Lucero, Enrique M
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S; Benner, Derek N
Subject: RE: VA case

On it

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 8:00 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: VA case

(b)(5)

VA] 2 Virginia police officers test positive for coronavirus after physically detaining man in Culpeper

WTTG [5/4/2020 9:50 PM, Lindsay Watts, 53K, VA] reports that two Virginia police officers have coronavirus after they physically detained a man accused of assaulting his girlfriend. Police in Culpeper said the suspect, who is in the country illegally, also tested positive for the virus. Police said even though Immigration and Customs Enforcement was contacted, the suspect was released the same day he was arrested. Maj. Chris Settle, with the Town of Culpeper Police Dept., said three officers responded to a domestic violence call around 2 a.m. on April 28. He said the suspect was assaulting his girlfriend even as police responded. He said a few days later, two of the officers tested positive for the virus. "As of today, they have mild symptoms at home in the early parts of this, and we're hoping for the best," he said. The third officer is in quarantine. Settle said police contacted ICE to notify them of the arrest. He said typically immigration officers would pick up the suspect from jail, but that didn't happen this time. "ICE did not come get him, and I think for obvious reasons," said Settle. "I think because he had covid-19." Settle said police were not notified of the suspect's bond hearing and at the hearing, he was released on bond back into the community. Police have not released his name or mugshot to retain his medical privacy. Settle said there has been some pushback from the community on that decision. It's unclear where the suspect could be now. Police said his girlfriend has a restraining order against him, so he can't go home. ICE tells FOX 5 it will be difficult to provide details without the suspect's name. The agency says cases are

evaluated on a case by case basis and if detention was appropriate, ICE would coordinate with ICE Health Service Corps about an appropriate detention location that could manage any medical condition a detainee had. [Editorial note: consult source link for video]

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 19 Apr 2020 18:08:06 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: WEB Mail Attempt - Mitigation Strategy C-19 Options Paper
Attachments: COVID-19 Removal Mitigation Options CLEAN (IHSC + ICE Air + CMD + FO) CV2.docx

Please see attached.

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:29 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: WEB Mail Attempt - Mitigation Strategy C-19 Options Paper

10-4, please send me your clean version and I will review from that. thx

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:28 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: WEB Mail Attempt - Mitigation Strategy C-19 Options Paper

I have edits, so please hold on any major edits.

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 1:27 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: WEB Mail Attempt - Mitigation Strategy C-19 Options Paper

Reviewing now as wll, let me know if you have edits....

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, April 19, 2020 12:56 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: WEB Mail Attempt - Mitigation Strategy C-19 Options Paper

Trying from Web mail as my Outlook is taking a personal day:

All,

Please see the consolidated C-19 Mitigation Options Paper. Much thanks to the ADs for self-consolidating much of the comments. I inserted a few minor edits and comments myself.

Items of note:

(b)(5)

I have included a track changes and a clean version for your review. There are substantial comments in addition to edits with good discussion points for all.

Please let me now if you need anything further and thanks all for the timely submissions.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Chief of Staff

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Office of Enforcement & Removal Operations

500 12th Street SW
Washington, D.C. 20536

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [@ice.dhs.gov](mailto:ice.dhs.gov)


(202) 732- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (office)

(202) 770- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (cell)

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
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(b)(5)



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PRE-DECISIONAL//DELIBERATIVE

(b)(5)




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PRE-DECISIONAL//DELIBERATIVE

(b)(5)

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PRE-DECISIONAL//DELIBERATIVE

(b)(5)



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PRE-DECISIONAL//DELIBERATIVE

(b)(5)



From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 25 May 2020 17:21:51 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Winn Correctional Center - Positive COVID-19 Results

Good lord

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, May 25, 2020, 12:49 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Winn Correctional Center - Positive COVID-19 Results

10 more cases at Winn

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, May 25, 2020, 11:06 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Winn Correctional Center - Positive COVID-19 Results

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

ERO NOL reported that they have 10 detainees who tested positive for COVID-19 at Winn.

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations East
500 12th Street S.W MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C) (Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, May 25, 2020, 10:43 AM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Winn Correctional Center - Positive COVID-19 Results

The following detainees have tested **positive** for COVID-19.

1. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Field Office Director
New Orleans Field Office
ICE - Enforcement & Removal Operations
1010 E. Whatley Rd
Oakdale, LA 71463
Mobile: (225) 892- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 21 May 2020 00:36:56 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 8:35 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 8:26 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 8:22 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 5:49 PM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

Thx. Henry.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 5:24 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 4:54 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Total Numbers for COVID-19 Testing

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MPH, CCHP, FACHE

Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps

Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov

Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 6 May 2020 12:22:51 +0000
To: Albence, Matthew; Kelly, Christopher S; Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: FW: VA case
Attachments: ERO WAS ES - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) - HQ edits v2.docx

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 4:47 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: VA case

(b)(5)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 3:31 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: VA case

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Please see the attached ES on the VA case.

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations, Eastern Operations
500 12th Street S.W. MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 1:11 PM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: VA case

Anything yet?

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 7:08 AM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: VA case

Please have WAS get us some details on this report as soon as they can.

Thanks.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 7:03 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: VA case

Can we run this down?

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 8:00 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: VA case

(b)(5)

VA] 2 Virginia police officers test positive for coronavirus after physically detaining man in Culpeper

WTTG [5/4/2020 9:50 PM, Lindsay Watts, 53K, VA] reports that two Virginia police officers have coronavirus after they physically detained a man accused of assaulting his girlfriend. Police in Culpeper said the suspect, who is in the country illegally, also tested positive for the virus. Police said even though Immigration and Customs Enforcement was contacted, the suspect was released the same day he was arrested. Maj. Chris Settle, with the Town of Culpeper Police Dept., said three officers responded to a domestic violence call around 2 a.m. on April 28. He said the suspect was assaulting his girlfriend even as police responded. He said a few days later, two of the officers tested positive for the virus. "As of today, they have mild symptoms at home in the early parts of this, and we're hoping for the best," he said. The third officer is in quarantine. Settle said police contacted ICE to notify them of the arrest. He said typically immigration officers would pick up the suspect from jail, but that didn't happen this time. "ICE did not come get him, and I think for obvious reasons," said Settle. "I think because he had covid-19." Settle said police were not notified of the suspect's bond hearing and at the hearing, he was released on bond back into the community. Police have not released his name or mugshot to retain his medical privacy. Settle said there has been some pushback from the community on that decision. It's unclear where the suspect could be now. Police said his girlfriend has a restraining order against him, so he can't go home. ICE tells FOX 5 it will be difficult to provide details without the suspect's name. The agency says cases are evaluated on a case by case basis and if detention was appropriate, ICE would coordinate with ICE Health Service Corps about an appropriate detention location that could manage any medical condition a detainee had. [Editorial note: consult source link for video]

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(www.blackberry.com)

Law Enforcement Sensitive – For Official Use Only
Deliberative

May 5, 2020

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deliberative

Law Enforcement Sensitive – For Official Use Only

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deliberative
Law Enforcement Sensitive – For Official Use Only

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 28 Feb 2020 17:50:21 +0000
To: Hott, Russell
Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today
Attachments: DHS Coronavirus Response and Coordination Efforts.docx
Importance: High

Sorry – left you off

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 12:21 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today
Importance: High

I need bullets on things we are doing to prepare from your perspective divisions.
Sorry - short turn.

From: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 11:19 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Need this done ASAP. (b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Ashooh, Emma (b)(6)
Date: Friday, Feb 28, 2020, 11:15 AM
To: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6) Brown, Katherine (b)(6) Stahl, Adam (b)(6) Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COOK, CHARLES (b)(6) Corbin, Susan (b)(6) SEGUIN, DEBBIE W (b)(6) SCHORR, STEPHEN (b)(6) Propis, Ryan

(b)(6) >, Heighberger, Eric <(b)(6)>, Fedor, Mark J CAPT
(b)(6) Dyson, Nicole <(b)(6)>, Kelly, Christopher S
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: ESEC-BBIC (b)(6)
Subject: RE: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

Apologies—document attached!

From: Ashooh, Emma
Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 11:14 AM
To: DOREY, DAVID (b)(6) Brown, Katherine (b)(6)
Stahl, Adam (b)(6) Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COOK,
CHARLES (b)(6) Corbin, Susan (b)(6) SEGUIN, DEBBIE W
(b)(6) SCHORR, STEPHEN (b)(6) Propis,
Ryan (b)(6); Heighberger, Eric (b)(6) Fedor, Mark J
CAPT (b)(6); Dyson, Nicole (b)(6); Kelly, Christopher S
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: ESEC-BBIC (b)(6)
Subject: [Urgent Tasker] COVID-19 Response and Coordination by 1:30pm today

All,

AS1 has requested a fulsome narrative on what DHS is currently doing to protect the Homeland from COVID-19 as well as what each component is prepared to do should the situation worsen or evolve.

There are specific questions and comments in the document for you to answer. Some of this information may overlap with the Coronavirus Messaging Guidance so you can take language from there, but AS1 is requesting this new document as an easier to digest narrative on COVID-19 efforts, so please keep it as **concise and straightforward** as possible.

We need your edits/input in tracked changes **no later than 1:30pm today**.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this tasker.

Best,
Emma

Emma Ashooh
Office of the Executive Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

O: (b)(6)
C: [redacted]

PRE-DECISIONAL / DRAFT / FOUO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

PRE-DECISIONAL / DRAFT / FOUO

PRE-DECISIONAL / DRAFT / FOUO

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

DRAFT

PRE-DECISIONAL / DRAFT / FOUO

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 14 May 2020 20:06:05 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc: Barrera, Staci A; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: GEO Testing Estimates
Attachments: Requested Covid-19 Testing of Detainees.pdf

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(E)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 3:40 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: PDF Attachment

This just received from GEO requesting to test all detainees at 4 facilities and for ICE to reimburse.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>
Date: Tuesday, May 12, 2020, 3:20 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>
Subject: Fw: PDF Attachment

Good Afternoon (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Please see attached letter requesting COVID-19 testing at four of our contracted facilities.

Thank you,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

The GEO Group, Inc.®
4955 Technology Way
Boca Raton, Florida 33431

Tel: 561 999 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fax: 561 999 (b)(6)
Mobile: 561 373 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com
www.geogroup.com

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Corporate Headquarters
4955 Technology Way
Boca Raton, Florida 33431

TEL: 561 893 0101
866 301 4436
Fax: 561 443 1833
www.geogroup.com

May 12, 2020

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Director
DHS / ICE / Office of Acquisition Management (OAQ)
Detention Compliance and Removals

Re: Requested Covid-19 Testing of Detainees

Dear (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

This letter requests approval to initiate testing of detainees for COVID-19 at four of our Immigration Customs Enforcement contracted processing centers (Aurora, Tacoma, Adelanto and Mesa Verde). Although ICE has currently provided for ABBOTT antibody COVID-19 testing for departing detainees at the Karnes Residential and Montgomery Detention facilities, GEO also believes it is important to immediately initiate volunteer testing at each of the other four facilities for all detainees and staff.

We acknowledge that GEO is advocating taking a more aggressive approach, which may exceed the current procedures recommended by the CDC. However, it is our company's desire to do everything within our control to help ensure the safety and security of staff and detainees in our care during this pandemic.

Again, we believe that testing of COVID-19 within detention facilities will become the norm in the near future. GEO would like to advance this foreseeable initiative and begin testing now.

The specific testing protocol GEO will be utilizing is being provided by Cardiotropic Labs, LLC and is the SARS-CoV-2 assay, a molecular diagnostic test for GEO that detects SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 disease. Cardiotropic Lab utilizes the **Hologic's Panther Fusion system**, a fully automated, high-throughput diagnostic platform that is widely used across the United States. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has granted Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the Company's Panther Fusion system. Each SARS-CoV-2 is \$85.00/per test.

GEO is requesting ICE's permission to proceed with the testing of all detainees, not already tested, at the four referenced facilities. Further, we are asking to be reimbursed for the associated cost of the tests which are contractual out-of-scope services. GEO would track and verify all funds applied to the Covid-19 tests.



I appreciate your consideration and partnership as we work together during these unprecedented times. Please advise how you would like for GEO to proceed and if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Vice President, Contract Administration
The GEO Group, Inc.

cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) President, GEO Secure Services, LLC
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Senior Vice President GEO Secure Services, LLC
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Senior Vice President, Client Relations GEO Group, Inc.
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Regional Vice President, Western Region GEO Secure Services, LLC
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chief Medical Officer, GEO Secure Services, LLC
Enrique M. Lucero, Executive Associate Director ERO
Tae Johnson, Deputy Executive Assistant Director ERO
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Assistant Director/ICE Health Services

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 15 Feb 2020 13:48:35 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)

Yes, thanks (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Feb 15, 2020, 8:46 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)

Not sure if you are aware of these numbers below...

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, Feb 15, 2020, 7:10 AM
To: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: #C_Virus (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>Ml
Subject: FW: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)
Good morning Sir,

BLUF:

IHSC reported ICE has only **21 (-1)** aliens being monitored in **four (-1 Tacoma ICE Processing Center)** detention facilities for the CoronaVirus.

No Changes to ICE's personnel and family member status overseas.

V/R

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Supervisory Special Agent
Acting Unit Chief
Emergency Management Unit
Office of Intelligence
Washington, DC 20536
202-731-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) p)

210-304-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: JIOC-ICE (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Saturday, February 15, 2020 12:00 AM
To: DHSCAT (b)(6) NOC.MGMT (b)(6)
DHSCMAC (b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(6)
'OCRSoIncidentManagementTeam@hq.dhs.gov'
(b)(6)
Cc: NOC.SWO.Restricted (b)(6) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Cronen, C M
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; JIOC-ICE (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: (U//FOUO) AS2 RFI (Update): China Posture (b)(7)(E)

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Good Morning,

ICE provides the following responses to NOC RFI: AS2 RFI (Update):
China Posture (b)(7)(E)

The first chart provides accountability of the total number of ICE employees, dependents, and FSNs in China and Hong Kong. The second chart reflects the number of detainees in ICE custody that the ICE Health Services Corps is monitoring for COVID-19. There are no confirmed cases of detainees having contacted COVID-19:

Location	ICE (HSI+ERO) Employees in China	ERO Direct Hires in China	ICE Dependents in China	ICE LES/FSN in China	Employees stationed in China but on Leave
Beijing	(b)(7)(E)				
Guangzhou					
Hong Kong					

IHSC Response: IHSC is currently monitoring **21** detainees across **4** facilities with **4** in isolation.

Facility	Total in isolation	Total under monitoring
----------	-----------------------	---------------------------

Honolulu Federal Detention Center	1	1
Montgomery Processing Center (Houston)	0	1
Otay Mesa Detention Center (San Diego CDF)	3	9
Port Isabel	1	5
Subtotal	5	16
Total	21	

V/r,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Section Chief

Joint Intelligence Operations Center

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

500 12th Street, SW - (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Washington, D.C. 20536

Desk/STE: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

JWICS/C-Lan: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@dhs.ic.gov

HSDN/B-Lan: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@dhs.sgov.gov



~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 19 May 2020 14:19:04 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Ditto!!!!

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 10:18 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Thx, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission....Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 10:17 AM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: Re: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS
Importance: High

Good Day Ms. Rubino,

All 4 facilities are CLIA certified. Please see below for POCs and respective on-site contact phone #s for each facility.

PHO – 21 kits

Florence Detention Center

Attn: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

(O) 520-868-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(C) 310-606-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

HOU – 17 kits

Houston CDF

Attn: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

15850 Export Plaza Drive

Houston, TX 77032

(O)281-985-
(C)202-321-

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

NOL: 29 kits

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: AHSA

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

96B George Thompson Road

Alexandria, LA 71303

Office: (318) 483-

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

SNA – 17 kits

Port Isabel Service Processing Center

Attn: acting HSA CMDR

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

27991 Buena Vista Road

Los Fresnos, TX 78566

Office (956) 5-

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Cell 202-809-

From:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 8:58 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

– please assist in proving this info. Need ASAP.

Thx

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE

Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps

Desk: 202-732-

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov>

Desk: 202-732-

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 8:53 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

(b)(5)

From: Rubino, Jaclyn <(b)(6)>

(b)(6)

Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 8:49 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Good Morning Tae,

See below for the questions from HHS. Can you please provide the information requested? Onsite Phone numbers and POCs, and confirmation that the new sites meet the CLIA certification standards and have devices available to process the tests?

Thank you,
Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino

Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) 2
(email) (b)(6)

From: Roach, Jessica (HHS/OASH) <Jessica.Roach@hhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 8:42 AM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Great, thanks Jackie. One point of clarification and one additional request.

- 1) The test ship in kits of 24 – I've noted the number of kits next to each location below for a total of 84 kits.
- 2) These will be shipping from the Strategic National Stockpile and require phone numbers for an on-site point of contact. **Can you please provide phone numbers by COB today?**

Also, I wanted to confirm that these sites have devices, meet CLIA certification standards, etc. since they are different than the locations where we originally sent the devices.

Thanks!

Jess

Jessica L. Roach, MPH
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 7:27 AM
To: Roach, Jessica (HHS/OASH) <Jessica.Roach@hhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Jessica,

Below are the shipping addresses and quantities this month for the test kits. Let me know if you need anything further.

Thanks!
Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino

Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 7:21 AM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6); Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
Corrado, Janene (b)(6); COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Good morning Jaclyn -

Shipping addresses are below. Please let me know if you need additional information. Thx

PHO – 500 tests 21 kits

Florence Detention Center

Attn: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

HOU – 400 tests 17 kits

Immigration & Customs Enforcement

Attn: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

15850 Export Plaza Drive

Houston, TX 77032

NOL: 700 tests 29 kits

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

96B George Thompson Road

Alexandria, LA 71303

SNA – 400 tests 17 kits

Port Isabel

Attn: HSA CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

27991 Buena Vista Road

Los Fresnos, TX 78566

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 9:46 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Thanks. I'll let HHS know that we will provide tomorrow.

Jaclyn Rubino
Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) 202.447.0507
(cell) 202.603.3811
(email) (b)(6)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 9:45:34 PM
To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6) Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

We will get you the addresses in the morning. Apologies for the delay.

Sent with BlackBerry Work

(b)(7)(E)

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)
Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 9:25 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Corrado, Janene (b)(6) COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Re: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Good Evening Henry,

Following up to get the information to HHS on where to send the Abbott test kits. HHS is standing by to ship the weekly allotment of test kits to your desired locations. Please advise if someone at ICE already gave them the information. If not, my POC is standing by for us to provide it. I am guessing that shipments should go to the locations with the devices to read results, however need confirmation and numbers.

Thanks,
Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino
Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) 2 (b)(6)
(email) (b)(6)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 1:00:37 PM

To: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6) Corrado, Janene (b)(6)

COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)

Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Apologies, I thought this would be for new machines. I will resend where the 2000 monthly kits should be sent shortly.

From: Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)

Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 12:57 PM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Corrado, Janene (b)(6)

COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6)

Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Henry,

To clarify, this would only be for the 84 Abbott ID Now test kits that HHS is shipping us. This is not anything new. Would the same quantities go to the three locations where the devices are?

Jackie

Jaclyn Rubino

Executive Director, Strategic Programs Division
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(desk) (b)(6)
(cell) (b)(6)
(email) (b)(6)

From: Lucero, Enrique M [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 12:51 PM

To: Corrado, Janene [REDACTED] COURTNEY, PAUL [REDACTED]

Rubino, Jaclyn [REDACTED]

Cc: Johnson, Tae D [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Hi Janene,

Shipping locations below for machines and test kits:

PHO – 3 Machines, 1000 tests

Florence Detention Center

C/O [REDACTED]

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

ELP – 2 Machines

[REDACTED]

AFOD Mission Support

US DHS ICE ERO – El Paso Field Office

11541 Montana, [REDACTED]

DAL – 2 Machines

(a)AFOD [REDACTED]

1209 Sunflower Lane,

Alvarado, TX 76009

NOL: 3 Machines, 1000 tests

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: HSA [REDACTED]

96B George Thompson Road

Alexandria, LA 71303

MIA: 2 Machines, 500 tests

ICE-Krome Service Processing Center

18201 SW 12th Street.

Miami, FL 33194

ATTN: Acting OIC [REDACTED]

ATL: 3 Machines Total broken out below:

2 Machines, 500 tests

Attn: Assistant Warden [REDACTED]

Stewart Detention Center (STWRTGA)

146 CCA Rd

Lumpkin, GA 31815

1 Machine

Attn: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Irwin County Detention Center (IRWINGA)

132 Cotton Dr

Ocilla, GA 31774

Thanks,

Henry

Enrique M. Lucero

Executive Associate Director

Enforcement and Removal Operations

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Corrado, Janene (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 11:57 AM

To: COURTNEY, PAUL (b)(6) Rubino, Jaclyn (b)(6)

Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Abbott COVID Tests - DHS

Hi Henry –

Can you confirm the shipping addresses for the second round of test kits?

Thank you!

Janene

Janene M. Corrado

Acting Chief of Staff

Office of the Under Secretary for Management

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6) Direct

(b)(6) Cell

(b)(6)



"With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the

American people, our homeland, and our values." ...DHS Mission

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 12 May 2020 12:50:21 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Copy that, thanks

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 8:50 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Funny, I was just pinging DHS on that. Nothing yet...

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 8:47 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Have we heard anything back from them – by chance?

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 3:22 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: Lucero, Enrique M
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 3:20 PM
To: 'Corrado, Janene' (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Hi Janene,

Shipping locations below for machines and tests:

PHO – 3 Machines, 1000 tests

Florence Detention Center

C/O (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

ELP – 2 Machines

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

AFOD Mission Support

US DHS ICE ERO – El Paso Field Office

11541 Montana, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

DAL – 2 Machines

(a)AFOD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

1209 Sunflower Lane,

Alvarado, TX 76009

NOL: 3 Machines, 1000 tests

Alexandria Staging Facility

Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

96B George Thompson Road

Alexandria, LA 71303

MIA: 2 Machines, 500 tests

ICE-Krome Service Processing Center

18201 SW 12th Street.

Miami, FL 33194

ATTN: Acting OIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ATL: 3 Machines Total broken out below:

2 Machines, 500 tests

Attn: Assistant Warden (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Stewart Detention Center (STWRTGA)

146 CCA Rd

Lumpkin, GA 31815

1 Machine

Attn: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Irwin County Detention Center (IRWINGA)

132 Cotton Dr

Ocilla, GA 31774

Thanks,

Henry

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Corrado, Janene (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:14 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Re: Additional Machines

Thank you! We have not confirmed the additional capacity yet...but am hopeful we can come through. I am assuming these would go to new locations, from the original 3?

Janene M. Corrado
Acting Chief of Staff
Office of the Under Secretary for Management
Department of Homeland Security
(b)(6)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:11:04 AM
To: Corrado, Janene (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Good morning Janene,

I hope you are doing well. I will provide address shortly.

Thanks,

Henry

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Corrado, Janene (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 8:09 AM

To: Lucero, Enrique M. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [redacted]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Additional Machines

Good morning, Henry -

Director Albence advised that there is a need for 15 additional machines and 3000 tests. Can you tell me what locations the machines would go to if we can get them? We're working to find additional capacity for ICE.

Hope you are well.

Kind regards-

Janene

Janene M. Corrado
Acting Chief of Staff
Office of the Under Secretary for Management
Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)
[redacted]

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 19 May 2020 10:00:36 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Thx (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, May 18, 2020, 11:59 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Additional Machines

I don't know if (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ever got back to you, but I found these addresses (b)(5)
(b)(5) There are addresses here for Houston, Florence and
ASF.

PHO – 3

Florence Detention Center
C/O (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
3250 North Pinal Parkway
Florence, AZ 85132

HOU – 2

Immigration & Customs Enforcement
ATTN: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
15850 Export Plaza Drive
Houston, TX 77032

NOL:

Alexandria Staging Facility
Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
96B George Thompson Road
Alexandria, LA 71303

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 2:01 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Additional Machines

Here are the addresses, who should I send these to?

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 1:49 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Please see the consolidated responses below as requested:

PHO – 3

Florence Detention Center

C/O (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

3250 North Pinal Parkway

Florence, AZ 85132

ELP – 2

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

AFOD Mission Support

US DHS ICE ERO – El Paso Field Office

11541 Montana, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

El Paso, Texas 79936

Office 915-856 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Cell 915-472 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

DAL – 2

(a)AFOD (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

1209 Sunflower Lane,

Alvarado, TX 76009

HOU – 2

Immigration & Customs Enforcement

ATTN: IHSC CMDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

15850 Export Plaza Drive

Houston, TX 77032

SNA - 4

1 Machine

Dilley
300 El Rancho Way
Dilley, TX 78017

2 Machines Port Isabel
PIDC
27991 Buena Vista Road
Los Fresnos, TX 78566

1 Machine Laredo
ICE ERO
500 East Mann Road (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Laredo, Texas 78041

NOL:

Alexandria Staging Facility
Attn: HSA (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
96B George Thompson Road
Alexandria, LA 71303

MIA:

ICE-Krome Service Processing Center
18201 SW 12th Street.
Miami, FL 33194
ATTN: Acting OIC (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

ATL:

2 Machines
Attn: Assistant Warden (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Stewart Detention Center (STWRTGA)
146 CCA Rd
Lumpkin, GA 31815

POC: Assistant Warden (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [@Corecivic.com](mailto:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@Corecivic.com)
Office: 229-838- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 478-33- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

1 Machine
Attn: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Irwin County Detention Center (IRWINGA)
132 Cotton Dr
Ocilla, GA 31774

POC: Health Services Administrator (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) [@irwincdc.com](mailto:(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@irwincdc.com)
(229) 402- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations, Eastern Operations
500 12th Street S.W. MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:05 PM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

(b)(5)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 12:11 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Additional Machines

Eastern operations FODs were contacted and I am awaiting the addresses.

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

I will send mine to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) for consolidation if you want to do the same so he can compile the list for final submission.

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations, Eastern Operations
500 12th Street S.W. MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Desk)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 11 May 2020 18:03:44 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 12:24 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

Hello Tae,

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 12:19 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

Tae – I'm continuing email issues. Been on the phone with IT support. Email is now up and running.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Anything you can provide on this?

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 10:20 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 10:02 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

Below are the two Haitians who refused testing.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 9:56 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

Good morning,

Females cut from Haiti flight:

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Both arrived from Basile, refused testing, cut from flight, and returned to Basile.

(b)(5)

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CDR, USPHS, PharmD
Health Services Administrator
Alexandria Staging Facility
96 George Thompson Drive
Alexandria, LA 71303
Office: (318) 483- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Fax: (318) 483-1704
iPhone: (202) 875- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov



"Protecting, Promoting, and Advancing the Health and Safety of the Nation."

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 8:21 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

Good Morning ASF,

Can you give me the names and A#s of the two who refused? (b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, May 11, 2020 6:16 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: ASF Covid Testing 05.11.20

Good morning,

ASF testing is complete for the Haitians. Seven female transients arrived. Only five were tested due to two refusing. The nurses performed symptom screens on the two refusals, but they were still cut from the flight.

1. Country Testing: **Haiti**
2. Number of Test Administered: 5
3. Invalid Test Results (ReTest): 0
4. Number of Positive Results: 0
5. Number of Negative Results: 5
6. Number of Pending Detainees to Test: 0
7. How many staff members were trained: 19 to date

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CDR, USPHS, PharmD
Health Services Administrator
Alexandria Staging Facility
96 George Thompson Drive
Alexandria, LA 71303
Office: (318) 483- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Fax: (866) 734-0591

iPhone: (202) 875-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov



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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 15 May 2020 00:50:21 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 14, 2020, 8:36 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

They were moved on Tuesday for staging.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 14, 2020, 7:32 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 14, 2020, 8:26 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 14, 2020, 8:16 PM

To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

Three more for the flight ended up positive.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 14, 2020, 7:13 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Three more detainees are positive at ASF.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Unit Chief
Domestic Operations Division-East
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
500 12th St, SW
Washington, DC 20024
202-732-(b)(6); Desk
202-359-(b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 14, 2020, 7:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ASF Detainees Positive for COVID-19

Hi (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

IHSC at ASF was testing Guatemalan detainees for COVID-19 today for tomorrow's removal flight and the below three detainees tested positive. SIR is forthcoming.

1. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (from ATL)
2. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (from DET)
3. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (from PHI)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 21 May 2020 19:12:22 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: BOP COVID care at MCC San Diego

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 21, 2020, 3:08 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: BOP COVID care at MCC San Diego

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 21, 2020, 2:50 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: BOP COVID care at MCC San Diego

Additional info re: BOP testing.

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 21, 2020 2:32 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: BOP COVID care at MCC San Diego

All,

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

MD USPHS

Deputy Medical Director

ICE Health Service Corps/ERO/ICE/DHS

610 W. Ash St (b)(6); San Diego, CA 92101

(O) 619-338-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 7 May 2020 18:44:07 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, May 07, 2020, 2:13 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Fw: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement

Tae -

(b)(5)

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 1:53 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, CCHP
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-73 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 1:04 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement

FYI

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD USPHS
Deputy Medical Director
ICE Health Service Corps/ERO/ICE/DHS
610 W. Ash (b)(6); San Diego, CA 92101
(O) 619-338 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 10:02 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement

Please advise them to bring their concerns up to their leadership.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DrPH, MA, CAPT USPHS
Chief, Public Health, Safety, and Preparedness (PHSP) Unit
DHS/ICE/ERO/ICE Health Service Corps
Cell: 202-210 (b)(6);
Fax: 866-573-8531
Email: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
In office: Mon, Wed
Telework: Tue, Thu, Fri

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 1:00 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement
Importance: High

Please see below. Your thoughts?

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD, FS
United States Public Health Service
Clinical Director
ICE Medical Referral Center-Krome
Department of Homeland Security
18201 SW 12th Street, Miami, FL. 33194

Voice 305 207 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Fax. 305 207 2196
iPhone 202 321 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Email (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 11:36 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: COVID 19 Checklist Requirement
Importance: High

Good morning IHSC team,

(b)(5)

I am available to discuss any concerns you may have.

(b)(5)

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Assistant Field Office Director
Krome Service Processing Center
18201 SW 12th Street
Miami, FL 33194
(305) 207-(b)(6);
(305) 970-(b)(7)(C) Desk
Cellular

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 12 May 2020 23:31:59 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: COVID Rapid Test Machines

FYSA

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:03 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: COVID Rapid Test Machines

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 12, 2020, 6:43 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: COVID Rapid Test Machines

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 4:12 PM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: COVID Rapid Test Machines

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 12, 2020, 5:05 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: COVID Rapid Test Machines

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Field Office Director

Office: (602) 76 (b)(6);

Cell: (520) 709- (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 12:50 PM

To: #ERO FODS (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO DFODS (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: COVID Rapid Test Machines

Importance: High

Good Afternoon,

(b)(5)

Thanks for your patience and cooperation.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

*(A) Deputy Assistant Director
Western Operations*

*U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations*

Desk: (954) 236- (b)(6);

Cell: (786) 229- (b)(7)(C)

E-mail: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Field Operations | 500 12th Street SW (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) | Washington, DC 20536

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 11 Feb 2020 18:58:56 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cc: Hott, Russell
Subject: FW: draft employee message
Attachments: Interim Reference Sheet 2019-nCoV v2_1 20200210.pdf

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Please share this information with GEO, MTC, CoreCivic and LaSalle. Thanks

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 7:44 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: draft employee message

Attached is our updated guidance to IHSC-staffed facilities.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, February 11, 2020 7:41 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: draft employee message

ALCON,

Please see attached updated IHSC Interim Reference Sheet on 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV); this was updated yesterday and disseminated to IHSC medical staff. Some of the information contained in the attached may be helpful in you communiques.

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CCHP, FACHE

Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 5:45 PM
To: Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: draft employee message
Importance: High

Good evening,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Hope this helps,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (office)
202-834-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 9:26 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: draft employee message

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Thanks
Staci

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, February 10, 2020 9:25 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: draft employee message

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

We're reviewing it this morning. We received some additional information through yet another chain (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) team) so we are looking that over as well to see if anything should be included. I will forward that to you in case you haven't received it.

Thanks!

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

*Chief Human Capital Officer
Office of Human Capital
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement*

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)

202-834 (b)(7)(C) cell)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 6:34 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: draft employee message

10-4

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CFO

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

202 819(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
Date: Friday, Feb 07, 2020, 5:12 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov, Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
Subject: RE: draft employee message

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Date: Friday, Feb 07, 2020, 4:54 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: RE: draft employee message

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

We have also been directed by DHS to track PPE and related C-virus spending to DHS budget. That message has already gone out through mission support directors. **See below.**

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 8:36 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6);
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
Subject: Coronavirus Project Codes Forthcoming
Importance: High

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Deputy Budget Director
Immigration & Customs Enforcement

(T) 202.732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(E) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 4:49 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

Subject: draft employee message

Importance: High

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Vr,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)



Interim Reference Sheet on 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)

ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC)

Version 2.1, February 10, 2020 1545 EST

What's new in this version

- Updates to patient identification have been made based on revised guidance and definitions issued by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
- Appendix A screening questions were updated
- Appendix C is added to provide an early management algorithm
- Appendix D is added to provide information on exposure risk assessment based on exposure risk categories
- Appendix E is added to provide information on recommend actions based on exposure risk and symptomatic or asymptomatic status.

Situation Summary

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is closely monitoring an outbreak caused by a novel (new) coronavirus (2019-nCoV) first identified in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. The situation is evolving. For the most current information, check the CDC information page at <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html> frequently for updates.

While most of the people identified with 2019-nCoV have association with Hubei Province, there have been a few people identified with 2019-nCoV throughout mainland China and in other countries, including the United States.

CDC interim guidance for health care professionals, including clinical criteria, is available at <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html>

ICE Health Service Corps Recommendations

Note: recommendations will be updated if and as necessary to address the evolving public health situation.

1. During intake medical screening:

- a. Ask all detainees if they have had close contact¹ with a person with laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV in the past 14 days**
 - i. If yes, assess for symptoms of fever or respiratory illness.
 - a. If detainee has a fever or symptoms of respiratory illness, refer to #3 below
 - b. If the detainee does not have fever or respiratory illness, observe for 14 days; house in a single cell room if available; if a single cell room is not available, house detainees as a cohort for 14 days.
 - c. For IHSC-staffed medical clinics, add a Global Alert / Medical Alert in the electronic health record that states, *“Contact with laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV. The last reported date of contact was mm/dd/yyyy.”* Click [here](#) for the eCW guide for adding a Global Alert.
- b. Ask all detainees if they have traveled from or through mainland China in the past 14 days**
 - i. If yes → for IHSC-staffed medical clinics, add a Global Alert / Medical Alert in the electronic health record that states, *“Intake travel history includes mainland China. The last reported day in China was mm/dd/yyyy.”* Click [here](#) for the eCW guide for adding a Global Alert.
 - c. For detainees with recent, relevant travel history, and fever and/or symptoms of respiratory illness → refer to #3 below
 - d. For detainees with recent, relevant travel history, and no fever or symptoms of respiratory illness → observe for 14 days; house in a single cell room if available. If a single cell room is not available, house detainees as a cohort for 14 days. Refer to appendices D and E for additional guidance on exposure risk assessment and recommended actions based on exposure risk.
 - i. If detainee is housed in a facility without IHSC medical staffing, medical staff should notify their assigned IHSC Field Medical Coordinator.
 - ii. Request a medical alert in following usual protocols stating that “the detainee is under observation through mm/dd/yyyy due to recent travel from or through mainland China.” Release the medical alert at the completion of the 14-day observation period.
 - iii. If an asymptomatic detainee under observation with a relevant recent travel history must be released in the U.S., notify the local health department including the intended address and telephone number of the detainee’s intended destination.
- e. See also Appendix D, *IHSC Interim Recommendations for Risk Assessment of Persons with Potential 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV Exposure in Travel-, Community-, or Custody Settings***

2. ***During sick call, health assessment, or other clinical encounter in which a detainee presents with or complains of fever and/or respiratory illness, or is observed with signs of fever and/or respiratory illness:***
 - a. **Ask the detainee if they have traveled from or through China in the past 14 days or if they have had close contact¹ with a person with laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV or their respiratory secretions in the past 14 days**
 - b. If yes → refer to #3 below
3. ***For detainees with fever and/or symptoms of respiratory illness and recent relevant travel history or close contact¹ with a person with laboratory-confirmed coronavirus or their respiratory secretions in the past 14 days:***
 - a. See also Appendix D, *IHSC Interim Recommendations for Risk Assessment of Persons with Potential 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV Exposure in Travel-, Community-, or Custody Settings* and Appendix E, *IHSC Interim Recommended Actions Based on Risk Assessment of Persons with Potential 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV Exposure in Travel-, Community-, or Custody Settings*
 - b. Place a tight-fitting surgical mask on the detainee
 - c. Promptly consult with a medical provider, preferably the Clinical Director or designee
 - d. Place the detainee in a private medical housing room, ideally in an airborne infection isolation room if available. If no single occupancy medical housing unit room is available, placement in other areas of the facility may be utilized to house the ill detainee separately from the general detention population
 - e. Implement standard, airborne and contact precautions, including use of eye protection
 - f. Call the local and/or state health department for notification and to request guidance on medical evaluation and testing; currently, all testing is only available through coordination with the local and/or state health department
 - g. If the detainee has underlying illness or is acutely ill, or symptoms do not resolve, consult with the Regional Clinical Director, and/or Infectious Disease program.
 - h. If the detainee is referred to a local hospital, call the hospital in advance to notify of the recent relevant travel history and respiratory symptoms
 - i. Promptly notify the facility's staff responsible for infection prevention and control (e.g., in IHSC facilities, notify the Infection Prevention Officer, or the Facility Healthcare Program Manager if the facility does not have an Infection Prevention Officer position); if the Infection Prevention Officer or Facility Healthcare Program Manager is not available, IHSC staff should notify the Infection Prevention Group at (b)(7)(E)@ice.dhs.gov
 - j. Facilities without IHSC medical staffing should notify their assigned Field Medical Coordinator
 - k. IHSC Infection Prevention Officers, Facility Healthcare Program Managers, Field Medical Coordinators, or designees should notify the Regional Infection Prevention Supervisory Nurse immediately. Detainees in isolation for respiratory illness and

relevant recent travel history should wear a tight-fitting surgical mask when outside of the room under airborne and contact precautions

1. The contagious period for 2019-nCoV is still undetermined
 - i. If the detainee tests positive for 2019-nCoV and symptoms have resolved, consult with the Infectious Disease Program and/or local health department regarding appropriate release from isolation
 - ii. If the detainee tests negative for 2019-nCoV, had high or medium exposure risk (see Appendix D), and symptoms have resolved, release from isolation after the 14-day period after exposure ended (if the exposure end date is known), or 14 days after entering DHS custody (if the exposure end date is unknown)

4. *Infectious disease public health actions:*

- a. Implement cohorting with restricted movement for detainees housed with the ill detainee or who have been in close contact¹ with the ill detainee for the duration of the most recent incubation period (14 days after last exposure to the ill detainee)
- b. Monitor cohorted detainees daily to observe for fever and symptoms of respiratory illness
- c. Refer exposed detainees with new onset respiratory illness to a medical provider for evaluation
- d. Report cohorting through routine IHSC cohort reporting protocols
- e. Document any ill detainee who is suspected of having 2019-nCoV on the Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
- f. Document any asymptomatic meeting the criteria for observation on the Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
- g. Recommend to Field Office Director or designee that detainees cohorted due to high or medium exposure risk (see Appendix D) or known exposure to an ill person not be transferred or transported.
- h. If a cohorted detainee must be released in the U.S., notify the local health department including the intended address and telephone numbers of the detainee's intended destination.
- i. Discontinue cohorting when:
 - i. The index patient receives an alternate diagnosis that excludes 2019-nCoV, or
 - ii. A 14-day incubation period completes with no new cases

¹Per CDC 2019-nCoV guidance (<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html>), a close contact is currently defined as:

a) being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters), or within the room or care area, of a novel coronavirus case for a prolonged period of time while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment or PPE (e.g., gowns, gloves, NIOSH-certified disposable N95 respirator, eye protection); close contact can include caring for, living with, visiting, or sharing a health care waiting area or room with a novel coronavirus case.— or —

b) having direct contact with infectious secretions of a novel coronavirus case (e.g., being coughed on) while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment.

See CDC's [Interim Healthcare Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients Under Investigation for 2019 Novel Coronavirus](#). Data to inform the definition of close contact are limited. Considerations when assessing close contact include the duration of exposure (e.g., longer exposure time likely increases exposure risk) and the clinical symptoms of the person with novel coronavirus (e.g., coughing likely increases exposure risk as does exposure to a severely ill patient). Special consideration should be given to those exposed in health care settings.

Resources and references

- **IHSC Official Guidance**

Guidance number	Guidance name	Type
05-02	Occupational Health Directive	Policy
05-02 G-04	Occupational Health Guide: Workforce Health	Guide
05-02 G-1	Occupational Health Guide: Bloodborne Pathogens and Other Potentially Infectious Materials	Guide
05-02 G-2	Occupational Health Guide: Personal Protective Equipment Program	Guide
05-02-G-03	Occupational Health Guide: Respiratory Protection Program	Guide
05-06	Infectious Disease Public Health Actions Directive	Policy
05-06 G-01	Infectious Disease Public Health Actions Guide: Contact and Outbreak Investigation Guide	Guide
05-06 G-02	Infectious Disease Public Health Actions Guide: Isolation and Management of Detainees Exposed to Infectious Organisms	Guide
05-06 G-03	Infectious Disease Public Health Actions Guide: Surveillance and Reporting	Guide

- [Novel Coronavirus 2019, Wuhan, China | CDC](#)
- [2019 Novel Coronavirus \(2019-nCoV\) | TDSHS](#)
- [nCOV2019 | CDPH](#)
- [Novel Coronavirus Outbreak 2020 | Washington State Department of Health](#)
- [Coronavirus | NYC Health](#)
- [2019 Novel \(New\) Coronavirus | NYDOH](#)

- [2019 Novel Coronavirus \(2019-nCoV\) | Florida Department of Health](#)
- [2019 Novel Coronavirus \(2019 nCoV\) | Frequently Asked Questions | IDPH](#)

Points of contact for questions


- [IHSC Staff](#): Regional Infection Prevention Supervisory Nurses, PHSP Unit Senior Public Health Analyst, PHSP Unit Chief
- [Facilities without IHSC Medical Staffing](#): Assigned Field Medical Coordinators
- [Public health agencies](#) (b)(7)(E) [@ice.dhs.gov](mailto: @ice.dhs.gov)

Appendix A: Intake Screening Questions


Updated February 3, 2020

- Have you been in mainland China in the past 14 days?
 - If yes:
 - Last date in mainland China:
 - Have you had a fever or respiratory symptoms in the past 14 days? (nurse also screens for current objective/subjective signs)
 - If yes, what date did you first notice symptoms?: mm/dd/yyyy
 - If yes, implement standard, airborne, and contact precautions including eye protection, isolate and refer to a medical provider, add Medical Hold, notify FHPM, IPO, or designee.
 - If no, add Global Alert/Medical Alert and place in single room, if available, or cohort for observation for 14 days since travel from mainland China ended
 - If no, add Global Alert/Medical Alert and place in single room, if available, or cohort for observation for 14 days since travel from mainland China ended
- Have you been in close contact with a person with laboratory-confirmed 2019-novel coronavirus in the past 14 days?
 - If yes:
 - Last date you had contact with that person: mm/dd/yyyy
 - If yes:
 - Have you had fever and/or respiratory illness with onset in the past 14 days?
 - If yes, what date did you first notice symptoms?: mm/dd/yyyy
 - If yes, implement standard, airborne, and contact precautions including eye protection, isolate and refer to a medical provider, add Medical Hold, notify FHPM, IPO, or designee.
 - If no, house in single room (preferred) if available, implement daily checks for 14 days, add Medical Hold, notify FHPM, IPO, or designee.
- If no travel from or through mainland China in the past 14 days AND no close contact with a person with laboratory-confirmed 2019-novel coronavirus in the past 14 days?
 - Routine intake

Appendix B: Intake Screening Algorithm



Appendix C: Early Management Algorithm




Appendix D. IHSC Interim Recommendations for Risk Assessment of Persons with Potential 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Exposure in Travel-, Community-, or Custody Settings¹

Version 1.0, February 10, 2020

Exposure Risk Category	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Definition	IHSC Detention Setting Definition
High risk	Travel from Hubei Province, China	Travel from Hubei Province, China in the past 14 days
High risk	Living in the same household as, being an intimate partner of, or providing care in a non-healthcare setting (such as a home) for a person with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection <i>without using recommended precautions</i> for home care and home isolation The same risk assessment applies for the above-listed exposures to a person diagnosed clinically with 2019-nCoV infection outside of the United States who did not have laboratory testing.	Living in the same 2–4-person cell or sleeping with head position within 6 feet of a person with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u>
Medium risk	Travel from mainland China outside Hubei Province AND not having any exposures that meet a high-risk definition	Travel from or through mainland China outside Hubei Province in the past 14 days AND not having any exposures that meet a high-risk definition
Medium risk	Close contact ² with a person with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection, and not having any exposures that meet a high-risk definition. - The same risk assessment applies for close contact with a person diagnosed clinically with 2019-nCoV infection outside of the United States who did not have laboratory testing. - On an aircraft, being seated within 6 feet (two meters) of a traveler with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection; this distance correlates approximately with 2 seats in each direction (refer to graphic)	Close contact ² with a person with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u> , and not having any exposures that meet a high-risk definition On an aircraft, bus, or van, being seated within 6 feet (two meters) of a traveler <u>with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u>; this distance correlates approximately with 2 rows or 2 seats in each direction
Medium risk	Living in the same household as, an intimate partner of, or caring for a person in a nonhealthcare setting (such as a home) to a person with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection <i>while consistently using</i>	Housing in the same unit as a person with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u> but not in the same 2–4-person cell and not sleeping with head position within 6 feet of a

Exposure Risk Category	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Definition	IHSC Detention Setting Definition
	<i>recommended precautions</i> for <u>home care</u> and <u>home isolation</u>	person with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u>
Low risk	Being in the same indoor environment (e.g., a classroom, a hospital waiting room) as a person with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection for a prolonged period of time but not meeting the definition of close contact	Being in the same indoor environment (e.g., general detention population, dining hall, recreation, work duty, library, or religious services) as a person with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection for a prolonged period of time</u> but not meeting the definition of close contact ²
Low risk	On an aircraft, being seated within two rows of a traveler with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection but not within 6 feet (2 meters) (refer to graphic) AND not having any exposures that meet a medium- or a high-risk definition (refer to graphic)	On an aircraft, bus, or van being seated within two rows of a traveler with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u> but not within 6 feet (2 meters) (refer to graphic) AND not having any exposures that meet a medium- or a high-risk definition (refer to graphic)
Low risk	N/A	Direct close contact ² with a person under investigation for 2019-nCoV that is pending laboratory confirmation
No identifiable risk	Interactions with a person with symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection that do not meet any of the high-, medium- or low-risk conditions above, such as walking by the person or being briefly in the same room.	Interactions with a person with <u>symptomatic laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV infection</u> or a person under investigation for 2019-nCoV that do not meet any of the high-, medium- or low-risk conditions above, such as walking by the person or being briefly in the same room.
No risk	N/A	Exposure to an <u>asymptomatic</u> person who was exposed to another person with high-, medium, low-, or no identifiable risk of exposure to 2019-nCoV

Graphic



Sample seating chart for a 2019-nCoV aircraft contact investigation showing risk levels based on distance from the infected traveler.¹

¹Source and adapted from [CDC | Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential 2019 Novel Coronavirus \(2019-nCoV\) Exposure in Travel associated or Community Settings](#)

²Close contact is defined as—

a) being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters) of a 2019-nCoV case for a prolonged period of time while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment or PPE (e.g., gowns, gloves, NIOSH-certified disposable N95 respirator, eye protection); close contact can occur while caring for, living with, visiting, or sharing a health care waiting area or room with a 2019-nCoV case – *or* –

b) having direct contact with infectious secretions of a 2019-nCoV case (e.g., being coughed on) while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment.

See CDC's updated [Interim Healthcare Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients Under Investigation for 2019 Novel Coronavirus](#).

Data to inform the definition of close contact are limited. Considerations when assessing close contact include the duration of exposure (e.g., longer exposure time likely increases exposure risk) and the clinical symptoms of the person with 2019-nCoV (e.g., coughing likely increases exposure risk as does exposure to a severely ill patient). Special consideration should be given to those exposed in health care settings.

Appendix E. IHSC Interim Recommended Actions Based on Risk Assessment of Persons with Potential 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) Exposure in Travel-, Community-, or Custody Settings¹

Version 1.0, February 10, 2020

Exposure Risk Category	CDC Recommended Movement Restrictions and Public Activities	CDC Recommended Medical Evaluation	CDC Recommended Travel Considerations	IHSC Detention Setting Selected Recommended Actions (used in conjunction with Reference Sheet)
SYMPTOMATIC [refer also to Interim Reference Sheet on 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)]				
High risk	Immediate isolation.	Medical evaluation is recommended; diagnostic testing for 2019-nCoV should be guided by CDC's PUI definition but is recommended for symptomatic people with a known high-risk exposure. If medical evaluation is needed, it should occur with pre-notification to the receiving HCF and EMS, if EMS transport indicated, and with all recommended infection control precautions in place.	Controlled; air travel only via air medical transport. Local travel is only allowed by medical transport (e.g., ambulance) or private vehicle while symptomatic person is wearing a face mask.	• Promptly place a surgical mask over the patient's face and nose • Refer to a provider • Promptly place in an airborne infection isolation room (AII); priority for AII room use • Consult with the local health department for guidance on testing for 2019-nCoV • Consult with Regional Clinical Director and Infectious Disease Program • Implement strict hand hygiene • Implement standard precautions • Implement contact precautions • Implement airborne precautions • Implement administrative controls • Request medical hold • Recommend no transfer or transport

Exposure Risk Category	CDC Recommended Movement Restrictions and Public Activities	CDC Recommended Medical Evaluation	CDC Recommended Travel Considerations	IHSC Detention Setting Selected Recommended Actions (used in conjunction with Reference Sheet)
				• Document in Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
Medium risk	Immediate isolation.	Medical evaluation and care should be guided by clinical presentation; diagnostic testing for 2019-nCoV should be guided by CDC's PUI definition If medical evaluation is needed, it should occur with pre-notification to the receiving HCF and EMS, if EMS transport indicated, and with all recommended infection control precautions in place.	Controlled; air travel only via approved air medical transport. Local travel is only allowed by medical transport (e.g., ambulance) or private vehicle while symptomatic person is wearing a face mask.	• Promptly place a surgical mask over the patient's face and nose • Refer to a provider • Promptly place in an AII room; priority for AII room use • Consult with the local health department for guidance on testing for 2019-nCoV • Consult with Regional Clinical Director and Infectious Disease Program • Implement strict hand hygiene • Implement standard precautions • Implement contact precautions • Implement airborne precautions • Implement administrative controls • Request medical hold • Recommend no transfer or transport • Document in Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
Low risk	Recommendation to avoid contact with others and public activities while symptomatic	Person should seek health advice to determine if medical evaluation is needed. If sought, medical evaluation and care should be guided by clinical	Recommendation to not travel on long-distance commercial conveyances or local	• Promptly place in an AII room if available, or other single room • Use discretion to prioritize AII room needs, including high and medium

Exposure Risk Category	CDC Recommended Movement Restrictions and Public Activities	CDC Recommended Medical Evaluation	CDC Recommended Travel Considerations	IHSC Detention Setting Selected Recommended Actions (used in conjunction with Reference Sheet)
		presentation; diagnostic testing for 2019-nCoV should be guided by CDC's PUI definition	public transport while symptomatic	risk and symptoms consistent with 2019-nCoV, tuberculosis (TB), influenza, varicella, etc. • Refer to a provider • Consult with the local health department for guidance on testing for 2019-nCoV • Consult with Regional Clinical Director and Infectious Disease Program • Implement strict hand hygiene • Implement standard precautions • Implement contact precautions • Implement airborne precautions • Implement administrative controls • Request medical hold • Recommend no transfer or transport • Document in Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
No Identifiable Risk²	No restriction	Routine medical care	No restriction	No restriction
No risk	No restriction	Routine medical care	No restriction	No restriction

ASYMPTOMATIC

[refer also to Interim Reference Sheet on 2019-Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV)]

High risk	Remain quarantined (voluntary or under public health orders on a case-by-case basis) in a location to be determined by public health authorities. No public activities.	Daily active monitoring	Controlled	• Cohort alone or as a group with other asymptomatic persons under monitoring for 14 days after exposure risk ended • Prioritize medical housing unit needs based on acuity and suspected or known contagiousness • Implement strict hand hygiene • Implement standard precautions • Monitor for fever and symptoms • Add medical alert • Recommend no transfer or transport during monitoring period • Document in Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
Medium risk	To the extent possible, remain at home or in a comparable setting. Avoid congregate settings, limit public activities, and practice social distancing.	Travelers from mainland China outside Hubei Province with no known high-risk exposure: Self-monitoring with public health supervision All others in this category: Active monitoring	Recommendation to postpone additional long-distance travel after they reach their final destination. People who intend to travel should be advised that they might not be able to return if they become symptomatic during travel.	• Cohort alone or as a group with other asymptomatic persons under monitoring for 14 days after exposure risk ended • Prioritize medical housing unit needs based on acuity and suspected or known contagiousness • Implement strict hand hygiene • Implement standard precautions • Monitor for fever and symptoms • Add medical alert • Recommend no transfer or transport during monitoring period

				• Document in Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
Low risk	No restriction	Self-observation	No restriction	• Cohort alone or as a group with other asymptomatic persons under monitoring for 14 days after exposure risk ended • Prioritize medical housing unit needs based on acuity and suspected or known contagiousness • Implement strict hand hygiene • Implement standard precautions • Monitor for fever and symptoms • Document in Lower Respiratory Illness Tracking Tool
No identifiable risk	No restriction	None	No restriction	No restriction
No risk	No restriction	None	No restriction	No restriction

¹Source and adapted from [CDC | Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential 2019 Novel Coronavirus \(2019-nCoV\) Exposure in Travel associated or Community Settings](#)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 21 May 2020 00:54:52 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Expanded Testing Plans / Aurora GEO COVID-19 Testing Operational Plans
Attachments: COVID-19 Testing Operational Plan Aurora.pdf, COVID-19 Testing Operational Plan- Housing.pdf

Please see attached (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 6:42 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Expanded Testing Plans / Aurora GEO COVID-19 Testing Operational Plans

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 5:36 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Expanded Testing Plans / Aurora GEO COVID-19 Testing Operational Plans

Attached is Denver's plan for Aurora.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, May 20, 2020 3:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Expanded Testing Plans / Aurora GEO COVID-19 Testing Operational Plans

Good Afternoon,

Please see attached operation plan and housing plan for the implementation of mass COVID-19 testing in the Aurora ICE Processing Center. Below is an additional information from the (A)OIC, which I feel is important for you to have.

(b)(5)

V/R,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(A)Deputy Field Office Director
ICE - Enforcement Removal Operations
12445 East Caley Avenue
Centennial, CO 80111

(720)875- Office/Direct
(303)304- Mobile

HSDN: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @dhs.sgov.gov

Unclass: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

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(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 249

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 250

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 20 May 2020 14:17:12 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: FW: Expanded Testing Plans
Attachments: COVID-19-Testing-Operational_Plan ADF.doc
Importance: High

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 6:29 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Jennings, David W
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Expanded Testing Plans
Importance: High

All,

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Thank you,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

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(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 254

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 14 May 2020 15:22:33 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: FW: GEO Testing - Point of Clarification

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 11:16 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: GEO Testing - Point of Clarification

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Please schedule a telecon with all those on this email as soon as possible.

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 11:13 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: GEO Testing - Point of Clarification

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:47 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: GEO Testing - Point of Clarification

(b)(5)

Thx - (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:34 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: GEO Testing - Point of Clarification

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2020 10:10 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: GEO Testing - Point of Clarification

Tae –

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thx

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 30 Jan 2020 15:32:21 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: IHSC - Coronavirus Messaging
Attachments: Interim Reference Sheet for Coronavirus, WHS- Workforce Health Advisory_ Novel Coronavirus.pdf, Interim Reference Sheet on Novel Coronavirus v.1_20200122.pdf

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Here is the get back from today's call.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2020 10:17 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: IHSC - Coronavirus Messaging

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 3:10 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: IHSC - Coronavirus Messaging

Hello (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

The first attachment is the IHSC broadcast message. The two PDF documents are the referenced links.

Please advise if you have additional questions.

Thank you.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MS
Chief of Staff | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202.732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Email: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: IHSCInfo
Sent: 23 Jan 2020 18:15:30 +0000
To: IHSCInfo
Subject: Interim Reference Sheet for Coronavirus

A Message from (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) **Deputy Assistant Director of Clinical Services, IHSC**

To All IHSC Staff
January 23, 2020

Interim Reference for Coronavirus

On January 22, 2020, ICE Health Services Corps (IHSC) announced a health advisory regarding the novel (new) coronavirus. To review the health advisory, [click here](#).

IHSC Clinical Services Division developed an interim reference for how to address coronavirus within our health care system. The document includes a summary of the situation to date, as well as recommendations:

- during intake medical screening;
- during sick call examination or other clinical encounter with a detainee who presents with, or complains of, respiratory illness;
- for detainees with recent relevant travel history and symptoms of respiratory illness; and
- for infectious disease public health actions.

The interim reference sheet is available on the IHSC Public Health, Safety, and Preparedness (PHSP) SharePoint page. To view the document directly, [click here](#).

For additional information and points of contact, please visit the PHSP SharePoint page or click [here](#).

DO NOT REPLY to this email address. This mailbox is used for outgoing IHSC communications only, and it is not monitored for any content, including responses. If you have any questions, please contact a member of the IHSC Communications Unit (ICU).

Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
Workforce Health and Safety Division
Health Advisory

January 22, 2020

TO: DHS Workforce

SUBJECT: ALERT-2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), Wuhan, China

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is closely monitoring an outbreak caused by a novel (new) coronavirus in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. Chinese authorities identified the new coronavirus, which has resulted in approximately 300 cases of confirmed human infections in China: 2 cases in Thailand, 1 in Japan, 1 in Korea, 1 in Taiwan and 1 in Nepal.



Coronaviruses are a large family of viruses, some causing illness in people and others that circulate among animals, including camels, cats and bats. Rarely, animal coronaviruses can evolve and infect people and then spread between people such as has been seen with MERS and SARS. Most of the patients in the outbreak in Wuhan, China have reportedly had some link to a large seafood and animal market, suggesting a zoonotic origin to the outbreak.

This is a rapidly evolving situation and information will be updated as it becomes available. What you need to know now:

*CDC and the World Health Organization (WHO) have issued a level 1 travel notice (practice usual precautions) for this destination.

*The Coronavirus can be spread by Human to Human Transmission

*Standard recommendations to prevent infection spread include regular hand washing, covering mouth and nose when coughing and sneezing, thoroughly cooking meat and eggs.

*Avoid close contact with anyone showing signs of respiratory illness, such as coughing and sneezing, who has traveled to Wuhan, China or neighboring area.

*There is now one confirmed case in the United States.

Signs and Symptoms:

Common signs of infection include respiratory symptoms, fever, cough, shortness of breath and breathing difficulties. In more severe cases, infection can cause pneumonia, severe acute respiratory syndrome, kidney failure and even death.

This Safety and Health Information Bulletin is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations. The Bulletin is advisory in nature, for internal DHS use only; informational in content, and is intended to assist supervisors and employees in providing a safe and healthful workplace.

Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
Workforce Health and Safety Division
Health Advisory



What can travelers do to protect themselves?

- Avoid non-critical travel to Wuhan, China and Hubei Province – for DHS employees.

If you are planning on traveling to the affected area:

- Avoid animals (alive or dead), animal markets, and eating raw or undercooked meat.
- Avoid close contact with anyone showing symptoms of respiratory illness such as coughing and sneezing.
- Wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. Use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer if soap and water are not available.
- Minimize physical contact and use hand sanitizer after hand shaking activity.

If you traveled to Wuhan and feel sick, you should:

- Stay home. Except for seeking medical care, avoid contact with others.
- Seek medical care right away. Before you go to a doctor's office or emergency room, call ahead and tell them about your recent travel and your symptoms.
- Do not travel while sick
- Cover your mouth and nose with a tissue or your sleeve (not your hands) when coughing or sneezing.

Wash hands often with soap and water for at least 20 seconds. Use an alcohol-based hand sanitizer if soap and water are not available. Disinfecting surfaces:

When: Coronaviruses can live for long periods on surfaces, so regular cleaning and disinfection should be performed when working with potentially infected populations. Surface disinfection should be performed after interaction with a suspected sick individual as well as periodically through a work shift.

What: Broad-spectrum hard surface disinfectants from the EPA registered disinfectants found at [EPA Disinfectants and Sterilizers](#) are effective against similar viruses. Special chemicals are not needed; household bleach is also effective in a solution of 3/4 Cup per 1 gallon of water – spray or wipe on, let sit 5 minutes, then wipe off. Read and follow all

This Safety and Health Information Bulletin is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations. The Bulletin is advisory in nature, for internal DHS use only; informational in content, and is intended to assist supervisors and employees in providing a safe and healthful workplace.

Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
Workforce Health and Safety Division
Health Advisory

disinfectant product information and directions, including any Personal Protective Equipment needed while using the product.

This is an emerging, rapidly evolving situation and Workforce Health & Safety will provide updated information as it becomes available.

References:

1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention- <https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/han00424.asp>
2. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention - <https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/notices/watch/novel-coronavirus-china>
3. World Health Organization - <https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus>
4. https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/list_a_sterilizer.pdf

This Safety and Health Information Bulletin is not a standard or regulation, and it creates no new legal obligations. The Bulletin is advisory in nature, for internal DHS use only; informational in content, and is intended to assist supervisors and employees in providing a safe and healthful workplace.



Interim Reference Sheet on Novel Coronavirus, Wuhan, China

ICE Health Service Corps

Version 1.0, January 22, 2020 4:30 pm EST

Situation Summary

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is closely monitoring an outbreak caused by a novel (new) coronavirus (2019-nCoV) first identified in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China. The situation is evolving. For the most current information, check the CDC information page at <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html> frequently for updates.

While most of the people identified with 2019-nCoV have association with Wuhan City, there have been a few people identified with 2019-nCoV in other countries in Asia. On January 21, 2020, the CDC announced that an individual was identified in the U.S. with confirmed 2019-nCoV with recent travel from Wuhan City.

CDC interim guidance for health care professionals, including clinical criteria, is available at <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html>

ICE Health Service Corps Recommendations

Note: recommendations will be updated if and as necessary to address the evolving public health situation.

1. During intake medical screening:

- a. Ask Chinese national detainees if they have traveled from or through China in the past 14 days
- b. If yes → ask detainee if they have been in Wuhan City in the past 14 days (i.e., recent relevant travel history)
- c. If yes → for IHSC-staffed medical clinics, add note in electronic health record “yellow sticky note” area that states, “*Intake travel history includes Wuhan City, China. The last reported day in Wuhan City was mm/dd/yyyy*”
- d. For detainees with recent, relevant travel history, and symptoms of respiratory illness → refer to #3 below
- e. For detainees with recent, relevant travel history, and no symptoms of respiratory illness → observe for 14 days; house in a single cell room if available. If a single cell room is not available, staff should accommodate social distancing to the extent feasible

- i. If detainee is housed in a facility without ICE Health Service Corps medical staffing, medical staff should notify their assigned ICE Health Service Corps Field Medical Coordinator
 - ii. Request a medical hold in following usual protocols stating that “the detainee is under observation through mm/dd/yyyy due to recent travel from or through Wuhan, China.” Release the medical hold at the completion of the 14-day observation period
 - iii. If an asymptomatic detainee under observation with a relevant recent travel history must be released in the U.S., notify the local health department including of the intended address and telephone number
- 2. ***During sick call, physical examinations, or other clinical encounter in which a detainee presents with or complains of respiratory illness, or is observed with signs of respiratory illness:***
 - a. Ask the detainee if they have traveled from or through China in the past 14 days
 - b. If yes → ask detainee if they have been in Wuhan City in the past 14 days
 - c. If yes → refer to #3 below
- 3. ***For detainees with recent relevant travel history and symptoms of respiratory illness:***
 - a. Place a tight-fitting surgical mask on the detainee
 - b. Promptly consult with a medical provider, preferably the Clinical Director or designee
 - c. Place the detainee in a private medical housing room, ideally in an airborne infection isolation room if available. If no single occupancy medical housing unit room is available, placement in other areas of the facility may be utilized to house the ill detainee separately from the general detention population
 - d. Implement airborne and contact precautions, including use of eye protection
 - e. Call the local and/or state health department for notification and to request guidance on medical evaluation and testing; currently, all testing is only available through coordination between the local health department and the CDC
 - f. If the detainee is referred to a local hospital, call the hospital in advance to notify of the recent relevant travel history and respiratory symptoms
 - g. Promptly notify the facility’s staff responsible for infection prevention and control (e.g., in ICE Health Service Corps facilities, notify the Infection Prevention Officer, or the Facility Healthcare Program Manager if the facility does not have an Infection Prevention Officer position); if the Infection Prevention Officer or Facility Healthcare Program Manager is not available, IHSC staff should notify the Infection Prevention Group at (b)(6)
 - h. Facilities without ICE Health Service Corps medical staffing should notify their assigned Field Medical Coordinator
 - i. ICE Health Service Corps Infection Prevention Officers, Facility Healthcare Program Managers, Field Medical Coordinators, or designees should notify the Regional Infection Prevention Supervisory Nurse immediately. Detainees in

isolation for respiratory illness and relevant recent travel history should wear a tight-fitting surgical mask when outside of the room under airborne and contact precautions

4. Infectious disease public health actions:

- a. Implement cohorting with restricted movement for detainees housed with the ill detainee or who have been in close contact¹ with the ill detainee for the duration of the most recent incubation period (14 days from the most recent symptom onset)
- b. Monitor cohorted detainees daily to observe for fever and symptoms of respiratory illness
- c. Refer exposed detainees with new onset respiratory illness to a medical provider for evaluation
- d. Report cohorting through routine ICE Health Service Corps cohort reporting protocols
- e. Recommend to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations that cohorted detainees not be transferred or transported
- f. If a cohorted detainee must be released in the U.S., notify the local health department including of the intended address and telephone numbers
- g. Discontinue cohorting when:
 - i. The index patient receives an alternate diagnosis that excludes 2019-nCoV, or
 - ii. A 14-day incubation period completes with no new cases

¹Per CDC 2019-nCoV guidance (<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-nCoV/clinical-criteria.html>), a close contact is currently defined as:

a) being within approximately 6 feet (2 meters), or within the room or care area, of a novel coronavirus case for a prolonged period of time while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment or PPE (e.g., gowns, gloves, NIOSH-certified disposable N95 respirator, eye protection); close contact can include caring for, living with, visiting, or sharing a health care waiting area or room with a novel coronavirus case.— or —

b) having direct contact with infectious secretions of a novel coronavirus case (e.g., being coughed on) while not wearing recommended personal protective equipment.

See CDC's [Interim Healthcare Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients Under Investigation for 2019 Novel Coronavirus](#). Data to inform the definition of close contact are limited. Considerations when assessing close contact include the duration of exposure (e.g., longer exposure time likely increases exposure risk) and the clinical symptoms of the person with novel coronavirus (e.g., coughing likely increases exposure risk as does exposure to a severely ill patient). Special consideration should be given to those exposed in health care settings.

POCs for questions:

ICE Health Service Corps Staff: PHSP Unit Chief and Regional Infection Prevention Supervisory Nurses
Facilities without ICE Health Service Corps Medical Staffing: Assigned Field Medical Coordinators
Public health agencies: (b)(7)(E) [redacted]@ice.dhs.gov

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 12 May 2020 23:04:07 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: FW: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing
Attachments: 20055019 Litigation Question COVID-19 Testing_Field_Operations v3
CLEAN.docx

FYSA

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 7:03 PM
To: Loiacono, Adam V <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

Adam – please see attached.

From: Loiacono, Adam V <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 9:33 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

Sorry. Thanks!

Adam V. Loiacono
Deputy Principal Legal Advisor for Enforcement and Litigation
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Iphone: 202-500-
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

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From: Johnson, Tae D <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 9:25 AM
To: Loiacono, Adam V <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P <(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

Hi Adam - Responses are due a 2pm today. We will send forward shortly thereafter. Thx

From: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 9:15 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

Good morning, Tae. Just checking in on this.

Adam V. Loiacono
Deputy Principal Legal Advisor for Enforcement and Litigation
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From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:13 PM
To: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

10-4

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 2:10 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

Thanks, Tae. Please note this isn't a "today" or "this weekend" question. This can wait until early next week.

Adam V. Loiacono
Deputy Principal Legal Advisor for Enforcement and Litigation
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Desk: 202-732-(b)(6);

Iphone: 202-50-(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

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From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 2:10 PM

To: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

We will get this tasked out for a response Adam.

From: Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, May 8, 2020 1:51 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Litigation Question -- COVID-19 Testing

Tae-

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Any information ERO can provide would be helpful.

Thanks,

Adam V. Loiacono
Deputy Principal Legal Advisor for Enforcement and Litigation
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Desk: 202-732-
Iphone: 202-50-
@ice.dhs.gov

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**U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Response to Litigation for COVID-19 Testing
May 12, 2020**

(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

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SENSITIVE**

1



(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

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SENSITIVE**

2



(b)(5); (b)(7)(E)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT
SENSITIVE**

3

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 1 Jun 2020 12:22:55 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); Cronen, C M; Hott, Russell; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Noteworthy COVID-19 Victory -- Rodriguez Alcantara v. Archambeault, No. 20-0756 (S.D. Cal. filed Apr. 21, 2020)
Attachments: Rodriguez Alcantara, et al. v. Archambeault, et al., --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2020 WL 2773765 (SDCA May 26, 2020).docx

FYSA

From: Pham, Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, June 1, 2020 8:14 AM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Davis, Mike P (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Loiacono, Adam V (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Noteworthy COVID-19 Victory -- Rodriguez Alcantara v. Archambeault, No. 20-0756 (S.D. Cal. filed Apr. 21, 2020)

All-

Good morning and my apologies for the late summary. I wanted to share some good news on the COVID-19 litigation front. Earlier last week, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California **denied** Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in the *Rodriguez Alcantara* case dealing with the Otay Mesa Detention Center. This is a noteworthy win because the district court previously granted an emergency temporary restraining order requiring a custody review of all members of the provisionally certified class. The order is attached, and a short summary follows.

***Rodriguez Alcantara v. Archambeault*, No. 20-0756 (S.D. Cal. filed Apr. 21, 2020).** On May 26, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California denied Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In doing so, the district court found that circumstances at the Otay Mesa Detention Center (OMDC), which had persuaded the court to issue a temporary restraining order on May 1, 2020, had changed and Plaintiffs could no longer show a likelihood of success on the merits. The district court found that, despite OMDC still having the largest number of COVID-19 cases among all immigration detention centers, the majority of the subclass members who remain in detention are currently housed in units with no positive cases. The district court also found that the subclass members who were not released have significant criminal histories and that the government's interest in protecting the community is not adequately served by alternatives to detention. "[G]iven the reduction in the population and the current housing situation at OMDC, the policies and procedures instituted at OMDC to address COVID-19, and Defendants' acquisition and use of information concerning medically vulnerable individuals at OMDC[,] the district court held that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their due

process claim. Based on the change of circumstances and the steps that ICE had taken, the district court also held that the analysis for a preliminary injunction tilted in ICE's favor. The ACLU had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus involving four plaintiffs detained at OMDC and a motion for class certification and for temporary restraining order on April 21, 2020. On April 30, 2020, the district court had granted provisional certification to the subclass members and issued an emergency temporary restraining order directing ICE to review the subclass member records and "release all subclass members suitable for release in the discretion of [ICE] after considering the subclass members' health, public safety, and mandatory detention requirements, with appropriate conditions to protect the public, and the health, safety and well being of each subclass member."

Thanks,

Tony H. Pham
Principal Legal Advisor
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(O) 202.732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(M) 202.748 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
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United States District Court,
S.D. California.

ADRIAN RODRIGUEZ ALCANTARA;
YASMANI OSORIO REYNA; MARIA
FLOR CALDERON LOPEZ; MARY
DOE; on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-
Petitioners,

v.

GREGORY ARCHAMBEAULT, San
Diego Field Office Director,
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; et al., Defendants-
Respondents.

Case No.: 20cv0756 DMS (AHG)

|
Filed 05/26/2020

**ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION**

DANA M. SABRAW United States District
Judge

On April 30, 2020, this Court granted provisional certification to a subclass of medically vulnerable civil immigration detainees at Otay Mesa Detention Center (“OMDC”), and issued an emergency temporary restraining order (“TRO”) directing Defendants to review the records of these subclass members and “release all subclass members suitable for release in the discretion of Defendants after considering the subclass members’ health, public safety and mandatory detention requirements, with

appropriate conditions to protect the public, and the health, safety and well being of each subclass member.” (ECF No. 38 at 2.) Since that time, Defendants have released ninety-two of the 134 subclass members. One subclass member is scheduled for release upon receipt of sponsorship information. Thirty-four subclass members remain in detention based on Defendants’ determination that they pose a danger to the community.¹ One subclass member died after contracting COVID-19.

¹ The most recent spreadsheet lists thirty-seven subclass members who remain in custody, but three of those individuals have been transferred out of OMDC in preparation for removal.

Although the infection rate at OMDC is declining, and the detainee population has decreased to approximately thirty-eight percent of capacity, OMDC still has the highest number of COVID-19 cases among immigration detention facilities in the nation, with 160 cases as of May 22, 2020. Plaintiffs assert the current situation continues to violate their constitutional rights, and thus the Court should convert the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. Specifically, Plaintiffs seek an injunction (1) prohibiting Defendants from (a) re-detaining subclass members who have been released and (b) accepting new admissions to OMDC, and (2) ordering Defendants to release the remaining subclass members under appropriate release plans.² Defendants oppose the motion. They argue the current conditions at OMDC refute a finding that Plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, and that the other factors weigh against the issuance

of a preliminary injunction. After reviewing the parties' briefs, the record on file, and hearing oral argument from counsel, the Court agrees with Defendants and denies Plaintiffs' motion.

- ² Plaintiffs also request that the Court expand the subclass definition to include individuals age 45 or older and individuals with any medical condition that places them at heightened risk should they contract COVID-19. The Court addressed these issues in its May 1 Order, and declines to reconsider them on the present motion.

I. BACKGROUND

As set out in the Court's May 1, 2020 Order, OMDC has the capacity to house 1,970 detainees. Before the Court issued the TRO, there were 987 individuals housed at OMDC, which translated to approximately fifty percent of capacity. As of May 22, 2020, the total number of individuals housed at OMDC had decreased to 758, which is approximately thirty-eight percent of capacity. Of that 758, 489 are civil immigration detainees and 269 are United States Marshals Service criminal detainees. The present case is brought on behalf of the civil immigration detainees only.

As to the thirty-four civil detainee subclass members who remain in custody, the most recent spreadsheet indicates they are housed

throughout the facility. Specifically, four are in segregated housing units, one is in the medical unit, twenty-five are in pods with double-bunk cells, and four are in pods with an open, sleeping-bay design.

Only one of these pods, L Pod, has detainees who have tested positive for COVID-19. L Pod is a double-bunk cell unit with a dayroom area containing seventeen affixed tables with four stools each, televisions, and an attached outdoor recreation area. Each cell has its own toilet and sink. The dayroom is 3,686.5 square feet, and the cells are 97.3 square feet. As of May 22, 2020, there were fifteen detainees housed in L Pod, which has capacity for 128, so L Pod is operating at twelve percent of capacity. Four subclass members are currently in L Pod, and all detainees in L Pod are currently in single cells.

As set out in the May 1 Order, OMDC has instituted a number of new policies and practices to address the spread of COVID-19 in the facility, including (1) the suspension of new detainee admissions, social visits, volunteer entry and regularly scheduled facility audits, (2) health screening of all persons entering the facility, (3) posting educational materials on COVID-19 throughout the facility, (4) increased sanitation, (5) provisions of masks to detainees, and (6) requiring employees to use personal protective equipment. All of these measures, including the practice of protective cohorting, remain in place. Social distancing throughout the facility is possible.

Despite all of these measures, OMDC continues to have the highest number of COVID-19 cases among all immigration

detention centers: 160 as of May 22, 2020. That is sixty-two more cases than were reported on April 30, 2020, the date the TRO issued. However, the rate of infection at the facility appears to be decreasing. Whereas the infection rate more than tripled between April 15 and April 30 (from twenty-seven to ninety-eight positive cases), the infection rate was considerably lower between April 30 and May 22 (from ninety-eight to 160 positive cases).

II. DISCUSSION

As set out in the Court's May 1 Order, the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is the same as for issuing a temporary restraining order. *Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.*, 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). To meet that standard, Plaintiffs must demonstrate "[they are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." *Am. Trucking Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles*, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

A. Likelihood of Success

"The first factor under *Winter* is the most important—likely success on the merits."

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). While Plaintiffs carry the burden of demonstrating likelihood of success, they are not required to prove their case in full at this stage but only such portions that enable them to obtain the injunctive relief they seek. *See Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).

As stated in the Court's previous orders, the only claim alleged in this case is that Defendants are violating Plaintiffs' rights to substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. To prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs must show their continued confinement or their conditions of confinement amount to punishment. *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). In *Bell*, the Supreme Court stated that "if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.'" *Id.* at 539. "Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." *Id.* The Ninth Circuit, expanding upon *Bell*, has held that a condition or restriction of confinement "is 'punitive' where it is intended to punish, or where it is 'excessive in relation to [its non-punitive] purpose,' or is 'employed to achieve objectives that could be accomplished in so many alternative and less harsh methods[.]'" *Jones v. Blanas*, 393 F.3d 918, 934 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

In the May 1 Order granting Plaintiffs' request for a TRO, the Court found Plaintiffs

had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their due process claim based on the conditions then in effect at Otay Mesa. Specifically, the Court noted Otay Mesa had the highest number of COVID-19 cases among all immigration detention centers in the country, and that all but one of its housing units was on quarantine status with at least one positive case in each of those quarantined units. The first of those factors has not changed since the Court issued the TRO: Otay Mesa still has the largest number of COVID-19 cases among all immigration detention centers. However, other factors have changed, and lead this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim.

First, with respect to the subclass members who remain in detention, the record reflects the majority of them, thirty to be exact, are currently in housing units with no positive cases. That is a stark contrast to the situation that existed before the TRO issued, where medically vulnerable detainees were being housed throughout the facility with other detainees who had tested positive. As of May 20, 2020, only four subclass members were in that situation. (*See* May 20, 2020 Spreadsheet of Detainees in Continued Detention at Column K, Rows 3, 7, 18, 26) (listing L Pod as “Current Housing Unit”). It appears three of them tested positive for the coronavirus before the TRO was issued and have presumably recovered. (*See id.* at Column N, Rows 7, 18, 26.) The fourth individual may be at increased risk, but other factors mitigate against that risk. Specifically, L Pod is currently at twelve percent of capacity, with just fifteen detainees in a unit designed for 128, and all

fifteen detainees are currently in single cells. Thus, the current housing situation for subclass members is considerably different from the housing situation that was in place before issuance of the TRO.³

- ³ It also bears noting that none of the four individuals currently housed in L Pod fit within the age requirements of the subclass. (*See id.* at Column E, Rows 3, 7, 18, 26) (listing ages as under 60).

Second, the government interest in the detention of subclass members who remain at OMDC is markedly different from the government interest in the detention of subclass members who have already been released. For subclass members who have been released, the government interest in detention was presumably limited to ensuring those individuals would appear at their deportation proceedings. That interest may be achieved by alternatives to detention, as reflected by Defendants’ decision to release those subclass members under appropriate conditions. For subclass members who have not been released, the government interest extends beyond merely ensuring attendance at deportation proceedings. As indicated on the Spreadsheet, those subclass members have demonstrated criminal history, much of it significant, which raises the additional government interest in protecting the community. That interest may not be adequately served by alternatives to detention, and it fundamentally alters the analysis of whether the continued confinement of these subclass members violates their substantive due process rights.

The final factor that changes the Court's analysis of the likelihood of success factor is Defendants' accounting of and for subclass members. Before issuance of the TRO, Defendants were unable to provide the Court with an accurate number of medically vulnerable civil immigration detainees in OMDC, or an accurate accounting of where those detainees were being housed. Since that time, however, Defendants have identified the medically vulnerable civil immigration detainees at OMDC, and they have also identified their locations. The absence of this information was an important component of the Court's analysis of the request for the TRO. Defendants' acquisition and use of that information in their detention and housing decisions since the TRO was issued, and their provision of that information to Plaintiffs' counsel and the Court, provides some assurance that the constitutional rights of subclass members are now being protected.

Given the reduction in the population and the current housing situation at OMDC, the policies and procedures instituted at OMDC to address COVID-19, and Defendants' acquisition and use of information concerning medically vulnerable individuals at OMDC, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on their due process claim. Accordingly, this factor weighs against issuance of a preliminary injunction.

B. Remaining Factors

In light of the Court's finding that Plaintiffs have failed to show, at "an irreducible

minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the merits," the Court cannot enter injunctive relief based on the remaining three factors. *Martin v. Int'l Olympic Comm.*, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, the Court briefly addresses these factors below.

Given the dearth of information provided by Defendants before issuance of the TRO, the Court found Plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing on the irreparable injury factor. In the abstract, it was undisputed that subclass members were more susceptible to "severe and dire consequences" if they contracted COVID-19. (ECF No. 41 at 17.) The parties disputed whether subclass members were more likely to contract COVID-19 in the first instance, but given the conditions in place prior to the TRO, the Court sided with Plaintiffs that subclass members were at considerable risk.

As explained above, those conditions have now changed, and reflect a lesser risk that subclass members will contract the virus. OMDC is now operating at thirty-eight percent capacity, all but four subclass members are currently housed in units without any positive cases, and the remaining four are in a unit that is at twelve percent capacity with only fifteen detainees in a unit designed for 128, all of whom are in single cells. As mentioned above, three of these four have already contracted the coronavirus and recovered, which may lessen the likelihood they will be reinfected or suffer any "severe and dire consequences" should that happen. Thus, although there remains a chance that subclass members could contract the virus and suffer irreparable injury, that likelihood is significantly less under the current

conditions at OMDC.

The current conditions at OMDC also change the analysis of the balance of equities and the public interest factors. As set out above, Defendants have taken additional measures to mitigate the spread of the virus at OMDC, which lessens the need for court intervention. And Plaintiffs have not shown the public interest, specifically, the need to protect the community, would be served by the issuance of an injunction releasing the remaining subclass members.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Should circumstances change, Plaintiffs are free to seek relief from the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 20 May 2020 14:16:45 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: FW: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 8:00 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

From Seattle...

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 6:42 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 6:01 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

206-835 (b)(6); Office
206-793 (b)(7)(C) Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:10 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

10-4

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:09 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

Desk 954 236 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 3:08 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

That will work....your cell?

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 12:07 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

How about after the FOD call?

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 3:05 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Asher, Nathalie R (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

206-835 (b)(6);
206-793 (b)(7)(C) Office
Cell

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 5:18 AM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Jennings, David W (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

Gents, FYI.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 2:28 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

FYSA

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 1:24 PM

To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

FYSA

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Monday, May 18, 2020 2:23 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>

Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Notice to Proceed - GEO Covid 19 Testing - Adelanto, Tacoma, Mesa Verde, Aurora

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

DHS / ICE / Office of Acquisition Management (OAQ)

Detention Compliance and Removals

Unit Chief - Acting

Phone: (202) 733-(b)(6);

Cell: (202) 380-(b)(7)(C)

Email: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 12 May 2020 19:23:12 +0000
To: Hott, Russell
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: PDF Attachment
Attachments: Requested Covid-19 Testing of Detainees.pdf

FYSA

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 3:20 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Subject: Fw: PDF Attachment

Good Afternoon (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Please see attached letter requesting COVID-19 testing at four of our contracted facilities.

Thank you,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

The GEO Group, Inc.®
4955 Technology Way
Boca Raton, Florida 33431

Tel: 561 999 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Fax: 561 999 7648
Mobile: 561 373 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com
www.geogroup.com

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 17 May 2020 02:38:23 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Positives at ELP.

(b)(5)

Thx

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 16, 2020, 3:32 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Positives at ELP.

16 so far at Otero; the Department of Health is only reporting positives...

ELP said they think they've tested about 170 so far.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 16, 2020, 11:50 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Positives at ELP.

Per DFOD (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

El Paso has

14 new positives at otero. Operations affected due to Dept of Health testing - I'll send you an email on that.

2 new cases at the EPC. Operations still running.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 2 Mar 2020 12:37:31 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: FW: Respirators

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Monday, Mar 02, 2020, 7:22 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Respirators

Th (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Including others.

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 6:49 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Respirators

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

The CDC has guidance on alternative respirators for those in non-surgical settings. These respirators would still need to be administered under a comprehensive OSHA Respiratory Protection Program. Some of these respirators do not require fit testing while others do. I have provided the link below. Please look under the "Surgical N95 and Use of alternatives to N95 respirators," for the specific information. I am sorry that I was not aware of this information when asked last Thursday. Have a wonderful day.

<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/respirators-strategy/conventional-capacity-strategies.html>

V/R,

LCDR (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) DNP, FNP-C, RN, LPC-MHSP, AAHIVM-S

Eastern Regional Supervisory Infection Prevention Nurse
United States Public Health Service
DHS/ICE/ERO/ICE Health Service Corps
Washington, DC

Cell: 202-774-(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Fax: 866-573-8531

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 1 May 2020 23:01:12 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: SND Covid-19 Update

10-4

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 01, 2020, 6:52 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: SND Covid-19 Update

Five more positive cases at Otay today.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 01, 2020, 4:56 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: SND Covid-19 Update

Five more at Otay

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 5:56 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: SND Covid-19 Update

Good afternoon (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) and Mr. Wong,

We had 5 detainees from OMDC test positive bringing our total 121. Thank you and have a nice weekend.

V/r,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Special Assistant to the Field Office Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations, San Diego
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
619-436-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Desk
619-251-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Cell

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 31 Mar 2020 16:43:51 +0000
To: Hott, Russell
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Social Distancing

Thanks Russ

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, Mar 31, 2020, 12:43 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Social Distancing

Good afternoon Tae,

Attached please find the list of 13 facilities over 70%.

Thanks,
Russ

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 11:18 AM
To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Social Distancing

Russ - can we get a list of facilities above 70% generated by current pop as opposed to ADP? Thx

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, Mar 26, 2020, 7:53 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, #ERO CHIEFS OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Social Distancing

Good morning,

Attached please find a list of the facilities over 70% capacity. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

Thanks,
Russ

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 12:01 PM

To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS

OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Social Distancing

(b)(5)

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:25 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO CHIEFS

OF STAFF (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Social Distancing

Good morning Mr. Johnson,

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Please let us know if you have any questions or concerns or whether you have a preference in moving forward.

Thanks,
Russ

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 10:05 AM

To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Social Distancing

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 25 Mar 2020 00:58:12 +0000
To: Albence, Matthew; Lucero, Enrique M; Benner, Derek N
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S
Subject: RE: Releases of vulnerable population (pregnant females)
Attachments: Facility Actions in Response to COVID-19 (002) (003).docx

Sorry guys, please use this version of the attachment. Fresh off the press.

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 8:55 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Releases of vulnerable population (pregnant females)

Thanks much

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, Mar 24, 2020, 8:40 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Releases of vulnerable population (pregnant females)

With updated attachment

From: Lucero, Enrique M
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 8:39 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Releases of vulnerable population (pregnant females)

A scrub of pregnant females resulted in:

3 released (1 ATD)

3 Continued Detention

1 Medical hold until 3/27

6 pending release today (5 SNA and 1 new case identified today from SLC)

The over-60 review is due at COB today. Results won't be compiled until midday tomorrow.

Additionally I attached everything we have done thus far that can be utilized for OPA and OCR to discuss our response.

From: Lucero, Enrique M
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 5:51 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Releases of vulnerable population (70 years old and over)

(b)(5)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 5:46 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Releases of vulnerable population (70 years old and over)

10-4. Thanks.

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 5:43 PM

To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Releases of vulnerable population (70 years old and over)

This is the over-70 year old list:

Continued Detention, Released, Pending Release/Removal

CD	Released	Pending
31	17	8

There were a total of 56 detained and 17 have been released with an additional 8 pending release or imminent removal. Cases that were released on ATD will be coded in our system to track their compliance. Several cases were in the POCR process with no SLRFF.

Two more lists are being worked on which include 60 years old and over and pregnant females.



U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Actions Taken in Detention Facilities in Response to COVID-19

March 24, 2020

Detention facilities are complex, multi-employer settings that include government and private employers. Each is organizationally distinct and responsible for its own operational, personnel, and occupational health protocols and may be prohibited from issuing guidance or providing services to other employers or their staff within the same setting. In addition, detention facilities may house individuals from multiple law enforcement agencies or jurisdictions with differing policies and procedures.

There are many opportunities for COVID-19 to be introduced into a detention facility, including daily staff ingress and egress; transfer of detained persons between facilities and systems, to court appearances, and outside medical visits; and visits from family, legal counsel, and other community members. Some settings, particularly jails and detention centers, have high turnover, admitting new entrants daily who may have been exposed to COVID-19 in the surrounding community.

ICE has issued guidance on the following subject areas to mitigate the risk to staff and detainees to the greatest extent possible. While some activities must necessarily be curtailed, essential services will continue, including, for example, medical and mental health services, telephone access, cleaning, laundry, waste disposal, and critical infrastructure repairs.

SOCIAL VISITATION:

As of March 13, 2020, social visits with ICE detainees at all detention facilities are suspended until further notice in order to mitigate the potential transmission of COVID-19. ICE recognizes the considerable impact of suspending personal visitation, and has requested service providers that currently offer teleconferencing, video visitation (e.g., Skype, Facetime), email and/or tablets to detainees, to increase use of these communication services, with extended hours where possible.

Detention facilities should make a timely effort to identify indigence in the detainee population to ensure indigent detainees are afforded the same telephone access and telephone-related privileges as other detainees. A detainee is considered "indigent" if he/she has less than \$15.00 in his/her account for 10 days. Each facility must ensure all detainees are able to make calls to the ICE-provided list of free legal service providers and consulate at no charge to the detainee or the receiving party, and that indigent detainees may request a call to immediate family or others in personal or family emergencies or on an as-needed basis to maintain community ties.

In recognition of the current COVID-19 crisis and the curtailment of detainee visiting, the ICE detainee telephone system (DTS) provider, Talton Communications (Talton) is offering to provide detainees either one free 15-minute video call per week or two free five-minute calls per week beginning the week of March 23, 2020. These are on a per week basis for the next four weeks but may be curtailed sooner if the visitation ban is lifted.

Free calls will be available at the 33 DTS contract facilities where Talton is the primary telephone service provider. Video visits will be applicable at their 21 facilities with tablets.



U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IGSA facilities where Talton is not the primary telephone service provider will not offer free video/calling capability unless provided by the local jurisdiction because they are not on the ICE DTS platform.

Additionally, ICE has agreed to fund additional telephone and video above and beyond that which vendors are offering through the duration of the pandemic.

LEGAL VISITS:

Detainee access to legal counsel remains a paramount requirement and ICE has asked facilities to accommodate access to the maximum extent practicable. Unless and until it is determined to pose a risk to the safety and security of the facility, legal visitation will continue.

ICE has instructed facilities that non-contact legal visitation (e.g., Skype or teleconference) should be offered first to limit exposure to detainees, but if the attorney believes the legal visit requires contact, the facility should permit the visit. For in-person visits to occur, the attorney must undergo screening using the same procedures as staff. ICE will require all legal visitors to provide and wear PPE (e.g., gloves, N-95 masks, and eye protection) while visiting any facility. Visitors may also be required to go through similar testing as employees of the detention facility.

The overall authority to approve legal visits lies with the Warden or Facility Administrator; however, the facility should notify its local Field Office Director as soon as possible of any denied legal visits.

LEGAL RIGHTS GROUP PRESENTATIONS:

Government-sponsored Legal Orientation Programs (LOPs) carried out by the Department of Justice Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) and authorized by congressional appropriations currently operate at a limited number of detention sites and may continue to make presentations to detainees. No more than four LOP presenters may be allowed in a facility at any time and they will need to undergo screening using the same procedures as staff. ICE will require all legal visitors to provide and wear PPE (e.g., gloves, N-95 masks, and eye protection) while visiting any facility. Non-LOP legal rights group presentations offered by volunteers are suspended until further notice.

STAFF-DETAINEE COMMUNICATION VISITS:

ICE has instructed facilities that detainees should continue to have frequent opportunities for informal contact with facility managerial and supervisory staff and with ERO field office staff. Regular communication is particularly important at a time when feelings of fear and confusion are experienced by many detainees.

Field Office Directors monitor both facility staff and ERO officers to promote continued interaction with detainees. ICE staff-detainee communication may be conducted in-person (with appropriate PPE to protect ERO officers, detainees, and facility staff) or through non-contact visitation using videoconferencing, phone calls, e-mail, or other communication services.



U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

VOLUNTEERS:

Volunteer visits to ICE detention facilities are suspended until further notice unless approved by the Assistant Directors for Field Operations and Custody Management. The exception to this suspension is the Chaplain who, if a volunteer, should continue to be available to provide pastoral care and counseling to detainees who request it, both through group programs and individual services. To conduct counseling or in-person services, the Chaplain must undergo screening using the same procedures as staff. Other volunteers, contractors, and community groups that augment and enhance the religious program are suspended until further notice to reduce the risk of possible transmission of COVID-19 to detainees.

TOURS:

Facility tours are suspended until further notice, excluding Members of Congress, Congressional Member Delegations (CODELs), and Congressional Staff Delegations (STAFFDELs) who will not be prevented from accessing facilities for the purpose of conducting oversight. To safeguard visitors, detainees, and ICE and facility staff, congressional visitors may be subject to special screening procedures, including undergoing testing similar to that administered to facility employees. Legal representatives, CODELs, and STAFFDELs will be required to wear PPE while visiting any facility.

STAFF TRAINING:

All ERO in-person staff training related to the ICE detention standards or facility compliance is suspended until further notice, to include conferences, Contracting Officer Representative (COR) training, and Field Office Compliance Training. All staff licenses and certifications are required to be up to date.

SCREENING OF FACILITY STAFF:

ICE has advised facilities to perform enhanced health screening of both ICE and facility staff in areas with "sustained community transmission." "Sustained community transmission" is determined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and information is available on this resource page: <https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-in-us.html>. Such screening includes self-reporting and temperature checks. Employees performing the screening must have appropriate PPE, to include the N-95 respirator, face shield/goggles, gloves, and a gown.

ICE has also instructed that given the public health emergency, staff who refuse the enhanced health screening should be denied entry to the facility.

DETAINEE SCREENING:

The ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC) has developed guidance for IHSC-staffed facilities to help in the risk assessment and management of detained individuals with potential exposure to COVID-19, and this guidance was disseminated to ICE detention facilities for possible adoption at their sites. Version 6.0, issued March 6, 2020, addresses intake medical screenings, monitoring, encounters, laboratory testing, and public health actions. The CDC remains the authoritative source for information about how to protect



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individuals and reduce exposure to the virus. ICE continues to encourage facilities to follow CDC guidelines as well as those of their state and local health departments.

ICE requests that Wardens and Facility Administrators ensure ICE detainees are given guidance and educated in a language that they fully understand on basic hygiene measures to keep themselves healthy. Links for detainee/patient education resources in multiple languages are included in the IHSC guidance and information on the CDC website.

MODIFIED OPERATIONS:

ICE has asked Wardens and Facility Administrators to implement modified operations to maximize social distancing in facilities, as much as practicable. For example, officials should consider staggered mealtimes and staggered recreation times in order to limit congregate gatherings. The agency has also advised officials that any community service projects should also be suspended until further notice.

DETAINEE TRANSFERS:

Facilities have been instructed to restrict transfers of detainees to and from other jurisdictions and facilities unless necessary for medical evaluation, isolation/quarantine, clinical care, or extenuating security concerns.

CLEANING SUPPLIES AND PPE: Ensure that sufficient stocks of hygiene supplies (soap, hand sanitizer, tissues), personal protective equipment (PPE) (to include facemasks, N95 respirators, eye protection, disposable medical gloves, and disposable gowns/one-piece coveralls), and medical supplies (consistent with the healthcare capabilities of the facility) are on hand, and have a plan in place to restock as needed if COVID-19 transmission occurs within the facility.

CLEANING/DISINFECTING PRACTICES: Adhere to [CDC recommendations for cleaning and disinfection during the COVID-19 response](#). Several times a day using [household cleaners and EPA-registered disinfectants](#), clean and disinfect surfaces and objects that are frequently touched, especially in common areas (e.g., doorknobs, light switches, sink handles, countertops, toilets, toilet handles, recreation equipment). Ensure that transport vehicles are thoroughly cleaned after carrying a confirmed or suspected COVID-19 case.

HYGIENE: Reinforce healthy hygiene practices and provide and restock (as feasible) hygiene supplies throughout the facility, including in bathrooms, food preparation and dining areas, intake areas, visitor entries and exits, visitation rooms, common areas, medical, and staff-restricted areas (e.g., break rooms).

Provide detained persons and staff no-cost, unlimited access to supplies for hand cleansing, including liquid soap, running water, hand drying machines or disposable paper towels, and no-touch trash receptacles. Provide alcohol-based hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol where permissible based on security restrictions.



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HOUSING:

If space allows, reassign bunks to provide more space between individuals, ideally 6 feet or more in all directions. Ensure that bunks are cleaned thoroughly if assigned to a new occupant. Arrange bunks so that individuals sleep head to foot or foot to foot, depending on the layout, to increase the distance between them. Rearrange scheduled movements to minimize mixing of individuals from different housing areas.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 23 Mar 2020 15:50:33 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Reporting to CAT

Thanks (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2020 8:12 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Reporting to CAT

This is what we sent to the FODs:

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 3:02 PM
To: #ERO FODS (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; #ERO DFODS (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: COVID-19 - Daily Reporting Tasking to JIOC - Update

The following message is sent on behalf of (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Assistant Director for Field Operations:

To: Field Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors
Subject: COVID-19 - Daily Reporting Tasking to JIOC - Update

In response to COVID-19, ICE leadership wants to ensure they have an accurate account of affected employees.

The Crisis Action Team (CAT) will be responsible for tracking and updating leadership regarding the impact to our workforce. The Incident and Special Response Unit (ISRU) will be the main point of contact to the ICE CAT for the Field Operations division.

Going forward, please submit your **daily reporting by 1030 hours (EST)** to the ERO Incident Response mailbox (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov), to include (**updated instructions in blue**):

1. Office Locations: (AOR name and sub-office/facility if applicable)
2. Number of employees who tested positive for COVID-19 (If an employee tests positive, continue to report that number on each daily report for the duration of this event)

3. Number in quarantine due to illness OR known contact with infected individual (If the employee in quarantine is confirmed positive, move that number to the tested positive column. If the person tests negative or completes their quarantine, remove that number from the next day's report)
4. Significant operational impact to the AOR due to the aforementioned categories (Use the drop-down menu to select the appropriate impact – None, Minimal, Substantial, Critical)
5. Describe Impact (Include the start and end date for anyone in quarantine along with the impact the loss of that employee is having)

Please utilize the updated spreadsheet for reporting.

If you have any questions, please contact ISRU Unit Chief (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) at (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov.

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From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2020 8:10 PM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: FW: Reporting to CAT

From: Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Date: Thursday, Mar 19, 2020, 8:00 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6);

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Barrera, Staci A (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Pham,

Tony H (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher

S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: Reporting to CAT

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 2 Apr 2020 19:13:08 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 2:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>;
Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6);
Cell: 202-515-(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 2:46 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Does that help?

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 2:37 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

Tae -

(b)(5)

Thx again.

R/ (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Thursday, Apr 02, 2020, 12:12 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

Has this information been shared with the FOD?

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 12:05 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

Thx (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Tae – can you point us int eh right direction on this?

Thx (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE

Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 12:02 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Request for Compassionate Release
Importance: High

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 2:52 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

Need to discuss further.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD
Deputy Assistant Director Clinical Services
IHSC Medical Director
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, DC 20536
Desk: 202-732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Cell: 202-515-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 2:35 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Request for Compassionate Release

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD USPHS
Deputy Medical Director
ICE Health Service Corps/ERO/ICE/DHS
610 W. Ash St. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) San Diego, CA 92101
(O) 619-338 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 11:13 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Request for Compassionate Release

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(I guess we'll be seeing more of these too)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD
Central Regional Director
ICE Health Service Corps
27991 Buena Vista Blvd
Los Fresnos, TX 78566
Phone: 956-548 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Fax: 956-504-7284
Cell: 202-839 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 9:28 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Subject: RE: Request for Compassionate Release

CDR (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) health conditions, although vulnerable, can be appropriately treated while being detained.

At this moment there have been no confirmed cases of COVID-19 at the facility in which (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) is detained. U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is monitoring COVID-19 closely and has developed measures to reduce exposure to COVID-19, protect the detained population, and optimize employee health and availability for duty.

Thanks,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MD
Central Regional Director
ICE Health Service Corps
27991 Buena Vista Blvd
Los Fresnos, TX 78566
Phone: 956-548 (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
Fax: 956-504-7284
Cell: 202-839 (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 11:15 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>
Subject: FW: Request for Compassionate Release

Good morning Ma'am,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) RN, CCHP
LCDR, United States Public Health Service
Field Medical Coordinator-Central Region
ICE Health Service Corps

Immigration Customs Enforcement
Enforcement Removal Operation
327 Industrial Drive
Jonesboro, LA 71251
Work Cell: 512-592 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
efax: (866) 588-2716
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

The Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service:

"Protecting, promoting, and advancing the health and safety of the nation."

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>
Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 11:10 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com>
Subject: Request for Compassionate Release

Sir,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) **BSN, RN**
HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATOR
GEO SECURE SERVICES

The GEO Group, Inc.®
Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center
1133 Hampton Dupre Rd
Pine Prairie, LA 70576

Tel: 337 599 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) • Fax: 337 599 2199
Mobile: 318 541 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @geogroup.com
www.geogroup.com

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dissemination, forwarding, printing or copying of this email is strictly prohibited. If you have received this email in error, please immediately notify by replying to this email.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 24 May 2020 15:54:48 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Requesting Plan Review

Agreed

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, May 24, 2020, 11:38 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Requesting Plan Review

Thx, Tae.

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, May 24, 2020, 11:33 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Requesting Plan Review

We sent to Denver GEO folks, not sure about the others. Will send this to (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) to share with the others.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, May 24, 2020, 11:28 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Requesting Plan Review

Thx.

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, May 24, 2020, 11:24 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Requesting Plan Review

Please see below

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 23, 2020, 4:10 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Requesting Plan Review

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Saturday, May 23, 2020, 3:56 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Requesting Plan Review

More from CDC

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 29 Mar 2020 23:16:43 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

Agreed. (b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 7:12 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 7:00 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

Please see attached.

R/ (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
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Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 6:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

Can you please resend?

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 6:42 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
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Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 6:40 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
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Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

You bet.

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(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 4:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

Thx (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
202 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) office)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 4:46 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

R/ (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

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Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 4:00 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Return of USCs from Abroad

FYSA

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 3:55 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 3:49 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 3:19 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Return of USCs from Abroad

FYSA –

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 3:14 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 2:57 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>;
Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 2:43 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>,
Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

Here is what little information we have on this.

From: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 2:26 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

10-4. Thanks

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Mar 29, 2020, 2:21 PM
To: Albence, Matthew (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Benner, Derek N (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Return of USCs from Abroad

(b)(5)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 29 Mar 2020 23:24:19 +0000
To: Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad
Attachments: DRO Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan (ver 1 October 9, 2009).doc

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 7:12 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
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Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

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R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Executive Assistant (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov
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Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 6:51 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
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To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>

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Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
"IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>


Sent: Sunday, March 29, 2020 4:51 PM

To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Return of USCs from Abroad

Thx (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Enrique M. Lucero
Executive Associate Director
Enforcement and Removal Operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement



Detention & Removal Operations Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan

Detention and Removal Operations Headquarters
500 12th Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20536



**U.S. Immigration
and Customs
Enforcement**

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FORWARD

Pandemic influenza has the potential to seriously disrupt the ability of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) and its subordinate components from carrying out functions that are critically important to national security. To mitigate the effects of a pandemic influenza outbreak on DRO operations, its staff, and the individuals under its care, I am authorizing this contingency plan. The plan outlines preparation, response, and recovery activities for conducting DRO-specific operations in the presence of a pandemic virus. The DRO Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan is compliant with all directives regarding Federal Executive Branch continuity of operations programs and the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza*. It is also consistent with the guidance provided in the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy, its supporting COOP Plan, and the ICE Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan.

This plan is in effect immediately. DRO Headquarters personnel and DRO components should review this plan on a regular basis or at a minimum of every 12 months to ensure it accurately reflects the mission essential functions and staffing required to perform such functions during an event severe enough to warrant implementation of this plan.

Approval

Authority: _____

Title: Director, Office of Detention and Removal Operations

David J. Venturella

Printed Name

Approval

Authority: _____

Title: Assistant Director, Enforcement

Thomas D. Homan

Printed Name

Policy

Writer: _____

Title: Chief (Acting), DRO Response Coordination Division

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Printed Name

RECORD OF REVISIONS

All changes to this document constitute a revision and will be documented in the Record of Revisions section. Annual reviews will also be documented in the Record of Revisions section regardless of whether the review results in a change to the Plan.

Information contained in the annexes may be revised as needed to conform to changes in organizational structure and/or personnel. Such changes can be accomplished without the need for approval by the DRO Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan approval authority. See Section XII of this document for additional guidance on maintaining the currency of the Plan.

REVISION	DATE	NAME	DESCRIPTION
1	October 15, 2009	(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)	This constitutes a complete revision of the DRO Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The introduction of a pandemic influenza virus at any point into the DRO system has the potential to seriously disrupt normal operations. A comprehensive, well exercised pandemic influenza contingency plan, tailored specifically for DRO operations, can help to mitigate the worst effects of the disease and permit a more rapid recovery to normal operations. DRO's Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan supports the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza* and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan. The plan is applicable to all DRO personnel regardless of location. It does not apply to DRO contractors, Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) facilities, or Contract Detention Facilities (CDFs). Field Office Directors and Program Managers are encouraged to supplement this plan, as necessary, with locally applicable policies, plans, and procedures.

The goal of this plan is to allow the Office of Detention and Removal Operations and its subordinate components to maintain their mission essential functions despite the existence and spread of a pandemic influenza virus. The *Detention and Removal Operations Headquarters (HQ) Continuity of Operations Plan* lists DRO HQ's mission essential functions. In prioritized order they are:

1. Provide nationwide detention and removal operations management.
2. Identify all high-risk alien fugitives and absconders.
3. Ensure all aliens identified as criminals are expeditiously removed.

Each Field Office has a similar set of mission essential functions that must be sustained. Maintaining the health of the workforce and its contact populations will be a critical element for the continuation of DRO's mission essential functions. Therefore, an ancillary goal of this plan is promoting a healthy operating environment through the proper application of actions known to limit the spread of the pandemic influenza virus.

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations will implement a three-pronged strategy aimed at mitigating the effects of the virus. The strategy encompasses surveillance, social distancing, and separation of the infected from the uninfected. Surveillance includes all those activities to understand the nature of the virus and its presence and prevalence within the DRO system. It also includes robust, on-going communications capability to report on the status of infected populations and potential threats to operations. Once it becomes apparent that the virus has become a threat, social distancing techniques will be implemented. Social distancing is designed to limit opportunities for passing the virus between an infected but asymptomatic person and a healthy person. Finally, for individuals having or suspected of having pandemic influenza, DRO will take steps to separate the infected from the uninfected. Steps in separation may include isolation and quarantine.

This strategy of surveillance, social distancing, and separation will be applied to all major DRO functions: arrest and intake, detention, removal, and mission support. With regard to pandemic influenza, DRO's most vulnerable point is at arrest and intake, or when an ICE representative first comes into contact with a potential carrier of the virus. It is at this point that the most aggressive precautionary procedures will be implemented in an effort to limit the opportunities

for carrying the virus into the other components of the DRO system. Throughout the detention and removal phases of DRO operations, additional preventative actions will be added to stop, slow, or limit the spread of pandemic virus.

The concept of operations for the DRO Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan follows the standard incident management construct of “Prepare”, “Respond”, “Recover”. In the Preparedness Phase, DRO offices and programs at all levels will take steps necessary to prepare both their facilities and their staffs for a possible pandemic influenza outbreak. Key to this effort will be the education and training of the workforce. Other considerations include the acquisition of necessary equipment, the refinement of internal surveillance and detection procedures, and a review of contracts, plans, and policies to ensure the adequacy of their scope and relevance. The Preparedness Phase is also the proper time to develop relationships and communications protocols with partners both within and without the Office of Detention and Removal Operations.

During the Response Phase, a premium will be placed on the discipline of individual teams to implement the preventative strategies and procedures outlined in this plan. This includes following the guidance related to donning and disposing of Personal Protective Equipment, the exercise of proper hygienic procedures, and the possible isolation of infected staff or detainees. More stringent procedures may also need to be enacted for individuals having business with DRO, such as detainee family members, delivery persons, legal representatives, and members of the media and the clergy.

Actions to be taken during the Recovery Phase include preparing for a possible new wave of the pandemic influenza virus and recovery to normal operations. The largest portion of the activities in the Recovery Phase is focused on performing an assessment of the effects of the pandemic virus on all phases of DRO operations. As necessary, supply stocks should be replenished and staffing shortfalls arising from pandemic-related illness or death should be addressed. Finally, a comprehensive after-action report should be drafted to capture the lessons learned and best practices resulting from all actions related to the pandemic outbreak and the response to it. Any lessons learned should be entered into a Corrective Action Program for resolution.

Questions concerning this plan can be directed to:

Detention and Removal Operations Headquarters

ATTN: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

500 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20536

(202) 732- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @dhs.gov

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I. INTRODUCTION

No less than other types of natural and man-made disasters, pandemic influenza has the potential to cause severe disruptions to normal human activities. These disruptions can be sharp, immediate, and brief, or they can be relatively minor, develop slowly and persist for a long period. The effects on daily operations may be direct, as in the loss of significant number of staff. The effects can also be indirect, as in the failure to receive goods and services because a supplier's operations have been diminished by the pandemic. A complicating factor is that pandemic influenza and its effects tend to come in waves, and it is never certain that the end of one outbreak won't be followed by an even stronger wave of illnesses.

The *Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza* defines a "pandemic" as "...a worldwide epidemic¹ [that occurs] when a new or novel strain of influenza virus emerges in which humans have little or no natural immunity and develops the ability to infect and be passed between humans". Medical experts have pointed to the limitations on this definition, noting that there is no mention of how severe the infections might be, nor how easily the virus is transmitted once it enters the human population. Experts also disagree on the requirement for the influenza to spread worldwide before declaring the conditions "pandemic"; severe, regional outbreaks of a disease have been labeled "pandemic", such as the troubling prevalence of H.I.V. in Africa. If there is disagreement on the precise definition of "pandemic influenza", health officials are unanimous that "...the only sure bet is to expect the unexpected²".

Pandemic influenza is a continuity of operations (COOP) issue. While the influenza virus has no effect on infrastructure and thus does not require a more typical COOP response such as the relocation of emergency support staff to an alternate work location, the sudden loss of large numbers of key personnel, whether through extended absenteeism or through death, has great potential for preventing an organization from carrying out its essential functions. Like all COOP events, a comprehensive, well exercised contingency plan can serve to mitigate the worst effects of a pandemic influenza and permits a more rapid, complete recovery to normal operations.

II. PURPOSE

This plan provides the concept of operations and general procedures designed to mitigate the effects of pandemic influenza on the mission essential functions of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Detention and Operations (DRO) and its components. It supplements the DRO Headquarters Continuity of Operations Plan and the ICE Pandemic Influenza Contingency by providing guidelines for the conduct of DRO-specific functions under conditions of a pandemic influenza virus.

¹ Epidemic - A pronounced clustering of cases of disease within a short period of time; more generally, a disease whose frequency of occurrence is in excess of the expected frequency in a population during a given time interval.

² Altman, Lawrence K., MD. "Is This a Pandemic? Define 'Pandemic'." *The New York Times*, 9 June 2009, A1.

In addition to establishing good business practices for maintaining mission essential functions, this plan also implements the directives contained in the *National Continuity Policy*, the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza*, and other Federal Executive Branch continuity guidelines.

III. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

This plan applies to all DRO personnel regardless of location. It does not apply to DRO contractors, nor does its applicability extend to Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) facilities or Contract Detention Facilities (CDFs). The maintenance of essential functions at contract facilities and the health of DRO contractors are the responsibility of the employer. Although this plan does not apply to IGSA or CDFs, detainee health at those locations will remain a concern for DRO.

This is a generic pandemic influenza contingency plan. The guidelines it contains are not specific to any particular strain of pandemic virus. While much of the information contained in the plan is applicable to seasonal flu outbreaks, the scope of this plan does not include specific guidance for operations conducted in the presence of seasonal flu.

This plan addresses functions that are the particular responsibility of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations. They include arrest and intake, detention, removal, and mission support operations. For all other ICE planning and procedural issues associated with pandemic influenza, DRO personnel should consult the ICE Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan.

IV. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

The following assumptions apply to this plan:

1. Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal;
2. The clinical disease attack rate will be 30 percent in the overall population during the pandemic. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40 percent) and decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20 percent will become ill during a community outbreak;
3. Rates of serious illness, hospitalization, and deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus and differ by an order of magnitude between more and less severe scenarios;
4. Rates of absenteeism will depend on the severity of the pandemic. In a severe pandemic, absenteeism attributable to illness, the need to care for ill family members, and fear of infection may reach 40 percent during the peak weeks of a community outbreak, with lower rates of absenteeism during the weeks before and after the peak;
5. The typical incubation period (interval between infection and onset of symptoms) for influenza is approximately 2 days;

6. Persons who become ill may shed virus and can transmit infection for one-half to one day before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the risk of transmission will be greatest during the first 2 days of illness;
7. Epidemics will last 6 to 8 weeks in affected communities;
8. Multiple waves (periods during which community outbreaks occur across the country) of illness are likely to occur with each wave lasting 2 to 3 months;
9. Additional emergencies and disasters will occur during a pandemic influenza event;
10. United States borders will remain open. Specific Ports of Entry (POEs) will be temporarily closed due to related or unrelated hazards;
11. Every DRO law enforcement officer has been fitted and medically cleared to wear the N-95 mask;
12. SPCs, CDFs, and dedicated IGSAs will have at least one housing unit available to use for isolation of suspected pandemic influenza cases.

V. PANDEMIC INFLUENZA MITIGATION STRATEGY

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations will implement one overarching strategy to inform all of its efforts to reduce the threat of pandemic influenza to its mission, its staff, and the individuals with whom it maintains contact during daily operations. The strategy represents the framework upon which a viable concept of operations for addressing pandemic influenza can be built. In concert with the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza*, the goal of this strategy is to stop, slow, or otherwise limit the spread of the pandemic influenza virus within the DRO system. DRO's pandemic influenza strategy is a three-pronged approach: Surveillance, Social Distancing, and Separation of the Sick from the Well.




Figure 1. DRO's Pandemic Influenza Mitigation Strategy. The strategy represents a combination of surveillance, social distancing, and separation measures designed to mitigate the worst effects of the disease.

1. **Surveillance:** In order to effectively mitigate the threats from pandemic influenza, it is first necessary to understand the virus and its effects. It is also necessary to continuously monitor the pandemic situation as it evolves. Surveillance is the continuous and systematic process of collecting, analyzing, interpreting and disseminating descriptive information to monitor public health and to ensure timely interventions to reduce the incidence of illness and death. An effective surveillance program includes monitoring the disease at all levels: global, national, State, and local.
 - a. **Global Surveillance:** Maximum preparation time is gained by monitoring the pandemic situation as it develops overseas, before it reaches the United States. Global monitoring is also necessary for the protection of DRO officers and agents who must travel globally on official business. The World Health Organization (WHO) is responsible for the surveillance and publication of facts and statistics for the health-related aspects of pandemic influenza. WHO's Global Alert and Response Network's web site should be reviewed on a regular basis to understand the nature and geographic spread of the pandemic flu virus.
<http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/>
 - b. **National, State, and Local Surveillance:** Pandemic influenza may be exported to the United States from abroad or it may originate here. Once it is located within the American population, a program of National, State, and local surveillance is required. Surveillance at the National level permits DRO officials to anticipate where significant outbreaks may occur or are occurring. State and local surveillance will be necessary for DRO officers and agents operating in communities where the virus exists, allowing them to implement appropriate preventative measures. As the virus spreads, it is important for DRO officials to increase contact with health officials at the National, State, and local levels. Such contact will drive better coordinated responses between the various agencies. The United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) is an excellent resource for conducting domestic surveillance for the pandemic.
<http://www.cdc.gov/>
 - c. **Surveillance within a DRO Facility:** As pandemic influenza becomes more prevalent nationally, it becomes prudent to increase surveillance within DRO facilities in order to monitor the virus' spread to the DRO population. Surveillance should be extended to include not just detainees, but all staff and all visitors to a DRO facility. Detainees, especially new arrivals, should be aggressively monitored for signs of influenza. Staff and visitors should be encouraged to self-monitor – to regularly judge the state of their own health – and to seek medical attention and to remain away from the facility if they believe themselves exposed to or infected with the virus.
2. **Social Distancing:** Pandemic influenza is spread without great difficulty when a person infected with the virus comes into close contact – normally six feet or less -- with an uninfected person. Limiting the opportunities when people are in direct, close contact with one another is an effective pandemic influenza mitigation strategy. Social distancing is an infection control strategy designed to reduce the duration and/or intimacy

of social contacts and thereby limit the transmission of influenza. Social distancing is aimed at individuals who are not yet infected with the virus.

There are two basic categories of social distancing techniques: Contact interventions and transmission interventions.


- a. **Contact Interventions:** Contact interventions are prescribed methods to reduce or eliminate incidences of contact with infected individuals until the disease has run its course. Possible contact intervention methods include:
 - (1) Allowing telework when feasible;
 - (2) Employing a modified work schedule to reduce the number of individuals in a facility at the same time;
 - (3) Increased use of video teleconferencing and conference calls;
 - (4) Canceling all non-essential travel;
 - (5) Postponing schools and other training events;
 - (6) Expanding Alternatives to Detention, when feasible;
 - (7) Shifting to satellite feeding as opposed to cafeteria dining;
 - (8) Reducing the number of mass meetings for both staff and detained populations.
 - b. **Transmission Interventions:** In many cases it is not possible to eliminate close contact between individuals. Transmission interventions limit the spread of the disease and allow human contact to continue through the application of basic and enhanced hygiene practices. Included among these practices are:
 - (1) Using a face mask;
 - (2) Covering a cough or sneeze with a tissue or the upper part of one's sleeve;
 - (3) Maintaining at least six feet of separation between individuals;
 - (4) Placing a physical barrier (e.g. glass, plastic) between individuals;
 - (5) Refraining from handshaking;
 - (6) Modifying visitation procedures to reduce the length of time and proximity of contact;
 - (7) More frequent cleaning and disinfection of hard surfaces where the virus may linger;
 - (8) Maintaining proper hygiene through regular, thorough handwashing.
3. **Separation of the Sick from the Well:** Eventually situations will arise when a suspected or confirmed case of pandemic influenza is present in the DRO population. The virus may be introduced through a staff member, a detainee, or a visitor to a DRO facility. For these situations it is critical to move very quickly to separate exposed or ill individuals from the rest of the DRO population in order to limit the further spread of the disease. There are three primary separation techniques that may be employed:

- a. **Cohorting:** Cohorting is the grouping together of individuals sharing similar characteristics. To the extent possible, detainees who arrive at a facility at the same time should be handled as a group and kept physically separated from other members of the detained population until it can be determined with reasonable certainty that they have not been infected with the pandemic virus. The staff assigned to provide services to the cohort should avoid working with other detainees. If this is unavoidable, staff members should ensure they thoroughly wash their hands and dispose of any articles of clothing that may have been contaminated while working with the cohort. After determining they do not carry the infection, individuals from the cohort may join other members of the detained population.
- b. **Quarantine:** Quarantine is the separation of individuals who have been exposed to an infection but are not yet ill from others who have not been exposed to the transmissible infection. It is a form of cohorting that is put into effect after determining that an individual or individuals have been exposed to the virus. Quarantined groups should come under additional medical surveillance and be subject to a greater number of transmission interventions. Until it can be demonstrated that the exposed individuals are not infected, the cohort should remain in quarantine, have their movements and activities restricted, and be serviced by a select group of staff who do not crossover to service other parts of the detained population. Staff members who may have been exposed through contact with a sick family member, another staff member, or a detainee should be encouraged to remain at home until it is positively concluded they are not infectious.
- c. **Isolation:** Isolation is the separation of infected individuals from those who are not infected. After receiving positive evidence of infection with a pandemic virus, an individual should be separated from the non-infected population. To the extent possible, individual rooms in separate sections of the facility should be designated to house the infected. Again, movement and contact with infected individuals should be kept to a minimum. Isolation applies to both staff members and detainees.

Applying the Mitigation Strategy. DRO's pandemic influenza mitigation strategy – surveillance, social distancing, and separation – can be applied at all times and to all aspects of detention and removal operations. Depending upon the course of the pandemic and the particular operation being conducted, certain components of the strategy may predominate over the others. Experience and effective mission planning will help determine which component should receive the largest focus.

Figure 2 illustrates the major operations carried out by DRO personnel. Within each operation there are opportunities for an officer, agent, or support personnel to come into contact with an individual who has been exposed to or is carrying the pandemic influenza virus. There are some operations, however, where the threat of infection to responding personnel is higher and more thorough mitigation procedures are warranted.

Figure 2. Major DRO Operations and Their Vulnerability to a Pandemic Influenza Virus. DRO officers, agents, support personnel, and detainees are at their greatest risk of exposure to the virus during the arrest and intake phase and during the first hours of detention when the least amount of information regarding viral infection is available.



into the target DRO system will have the greatest positive impact on disease mitigation.

VI. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

The nature of pandemic influenza makes it nearly impossible to avoid being exposed to the virus and possibly becoming infected. This is particularly true for a majority of DRO personnel for whom close contact with potential carriers of the virus is a regular occurrence. For that reason the concept of operations outlined here is designed specifically for mitigating the worst effects of the virus and does not assume a complete avoidance of exposure to the disease is possible during the course of daily DRO activities. Implementation of this concept will help to reduce the potential for a severe outbreak of pandemic influenza within the DRO system and the need for extraordinary measures to maintain a minimal operating capability. In the event a severe outbreak does occur, Annex A provides a series of branch plans to address operational concerns during such an event.

Mission Essential Functions. The goal of this concept is to allow the Office of Detention and Removal Operations and its subordinate components to maintain their mission essential functions despite the existence and spread of a pandemic influenza virus. The *Detention and Removal Operations Headquarters (HQ) Continuity of Operations Plan* lists DRO HQ's mission essential functions. In prioritized order they are:

PRIORITY	MISSION ESSENTIAL FUNCTION
1	Provide nationwide detention and removal operations management.
2	Identify all high-risk illegal alien fugitives and absconders.
3	Ensure all aliens identified as criminals are expeditiously removed.

Table 1. DRO Headquarters' Mission Essential Functions.

Each DRO Field Office has its own set of mission essential functions applicable within its particular Area of Responsibility. Most Field Office mission essential functions roughly mirror those of DRO Headquarters. It is these functions, at a minimum, that must be maintained during a pandemic influenza outbreak.

A key element to preserving DRO's ability to execute these essential functions is protecting the health and well being of its staff and the individuals with whom the staff has direct contact. These individuals may be coworkers, family members, detainees, or visitors to detention facilities, such as detainee family members, legal representatives, or members of the clergy. A healthy staff and a healthy contact population reduce the need to adjust normal operations to address pandemic influenza concerns. Thus, a second important component to this concept of operations is the implementation of more stringent requirements designed to promote a healthy living environment and reduce exposure to potential infection for the DRO staff and its contact population.

Course of the Pandemic. One of the great challenges associated with pandemic influenza is its unpredictability. The precise response to the pandemic depends upon the virulence and transmission potential of the disease. It will also depend upon the how widespread the virus is and the timing of its arrival at a particular location. At any one time the virus may be present at some isolated location or it may be widespread across an Area of Responsibility, a region, or the entire nation. The virus might also be encountered as DRO personnel travel abroad on a directed mission. For an agency with the global responsibilities and large geographic spread of DRO facilities, the simultaneous implementation of a specific set of response activities across the entire DRO system is unlikely. The precise response measures to be carried out will be dictated by the local situation, and the guidance provided through this concept of operations should not be applied inflexibly, without regard to actual events as they unfold. Field Office Directors will have considerable latitude in responding to the presence of the virus within their Areas of Responsibility.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined a phased approach to dealing with pandemic influenza. The phases, along with DRO recommended activities for each phase, are presented in Table 1 for reference purposes. However, the DRO activities outlined in this contingency plan are not tied strictly to these published guidelines. Instead, the concept of operations will follow the standard incident management phasing construct of "Prepare", "Respond", "Recover".

World Health Organization (WHO) Global Pandemic Phases					
Inter-Pandemic Period		Pandemic Alert Period			Pandemic Period
1	2	3	4	5	6
No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human disease is considered to be low.	No new influenza virus subtypes have been detected in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza subtype poses a substantial risk of human disease.	Human infection(s) with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.	Small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized, suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.	Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).	Pandemic phase: increased and sustained transmission in general population.
General DRO Activities for the WHO Global Pandemic Phases					
1	2	3	4	5	6
Complete and/or update a Pandemic Influenza Response Plan; Coordinate and share plans with outside health and public safety agencies; Inventory Personal Protective Equipment. Identify shortfalls; Inventory equipment required for detainee medical support. Identify shortfalls; Provide training and education for all staff; Conduct annual fit-testing refresher course; Conduct telework activity for non-essential personnel; Develop communications messages for responding to media requests. Prepare and submit annual budget for COOP-related activities; On-going monitoring for health situations that may effect DRO operations.			Increased pandemic influenza surveillance; Review & refine support with outside health and public safety agencies; Provide additional pandemic influenza training for staff; Identify potential at-risk populations on staff; Complete fit testing of employees; Review plans, policies, and contracts for currency.	Conduct surge capacity planning; Close gaps in equipment shortfalls; Identify personnel for cross-training or backfill positions; Conduct tabletop and functional exercises; Be prepared to release Personal Protective Equipment inventory.	Complete COOP mission essential functions; Conduct aggressive medical surveillance; Use social distancing techniques for the well; Separate the sick from the well; Be prepared for surge operations; Conduct reporting; Conduct media relations; Prepare for recovery operations

Table 2. World Health Organization Global Pandemic Phases and Corresponding DRO Actions. The DRO actions are applicable regardless of location. More specific information related to these items, as well as additional activities, are contained elsewhere in the document.

1. **Prepare:** DRO's preparedness activities correspond roughly to the first four pandemic phases recognized by the World Health Organization. In the Preparedness Phase, DRO offices and programs at all levels will take steps necessary to prepare both their facilities and staffs for a possible pandemic influenza outbreak. The recommended preparatory actions are:
 - a. **Identify a Multidisciplinary Pandemic Influenza Planning Committee:** A multidisciplinary planning committee should be established at DRO Headquarters and all Field Offices to coordinate planning and preparation activities for pandemic flu. Membership should include personnel with experience in law enforcement, medical care, logistics, communications, and training. Ad hoc membership could include representatives from local public health and safety offices. The committee should meet at least quarterly to assess readiness and to plan future activities. More frequent meetings will be warranted as the pandemic threat increases.
 - b. **Conduct a Risk and Vulnerability Assessment:** Headquarters and Field Office senior leadership should mandate the completion of a pandemic influenza risk and vulnerability analysis. Pandemic influenza risks should be continually evaluated at each location, and all processes necessary to support detention and removal operations should be analyzed to identify the activities which are most vulnerable to disruption in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. Corrective actions, or actions for mitigation of the threat, can then be identified and implemented. The vulnerability analysis should review and catalogue mission critical personnel, essential information technology and communications services, and the essential goods and services provided by contractors and subcontractors.
 - c. **Conduct a Pandemic Influenza Plan Review:** Pandemic influenza plans should be reviewed at least annually to ensure relevance and currency. Any significant updates to the plan should be shared, as necessary, with DRO Headquarters, other Field Offices, other government agencies, and local public health and safety agencies. Continuity of Operations (COOP) plans should also be reviewed and revised to ensure the currency of critical factors such as orders of succession and delegations of authority.
 - d. **Conduct a Pandemic Influenza Policy Review:** Unit policies should be reviewed regularly to ensure they contain the latest guidance regarding important issues such as absence from work due to illness, overtime, travel restrictions, receipt of vaccines, respirator use and telework.
 - e. **Educate and Train the Workforce:** DRO Headquarters and all Field Offices should implement an ongoing program to educate and train the workforce regarding the threats from pandemic influenza. Training events should cover proper hygiene techniques and the use of Personal Protective Equipment. All training should be documented in unit training records. Additional information regarding the education of the workforce is contained in Section XII of this plan.
 - f. **Prepare a Communications Strategy:** DRO Headquarters and all Field Offices should develop a pandemic influenza communications strategy. The strategy should outline the processes that will be used to communicate with the workforce

and with detained populations. The processes identified should include telephonic recall procedures, email, and the use of language-specific and culturally sensitive training materials such as posters, brochures, and web sites. The strategy should outline reporting procedures including what information needs to be collected and the frequency of such reporting. Public affairs guidance and messages should be developed and disseminated to indicate how requests from the media will be handled.

- g. Identify and Coordinate with Local Medical Providers and Law Enforcement Agencies:** Field Offices should identify a partner network of medical providers and law enforcement agencies that may be able to provide assistance in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. Medical contacts should include the location and contact information for local acute care hospitals. Law enforcement contact should include any agency that may book an individual into a DRO facility, as well as any agency that could receive an individual from DRO custody or that could provide backfill support in the event of a surge. Regular coordination with these service providers is highly recommended.
- h. Procure and/or Inventory Required Equipment:** DRO Headquarters and Field Offices should identify and procure equipment needed to mitigate the effects of pandemic influenza. Items to be procured include stocks of Personal Protective Equipment for staff and detainees, disinfectants, pharmaceuticals, and mortuary affairs equipment. Information Technology equipment for the support of telework options should also be procured, tested, and disseminated. Included in this equipment should be air cards, secure tokens, and Government Emergency Telecommunications (GETS)/Wireless Priority Service (WPS) cards.
- i. Analyze and Document Staffing Issues:** DRO Headquarters and Field Offices should review the characteristics of their staffs and document any issues which are relevant to pandemic influenza. Personnel with specialized training in emergency medical services should be identified. Staff members who are in identified high-risk categories (e.g. law enforcement, medical) or in at-risk categories (e.g. immunocompromised, pregnant) should likewise be identified and provisions made for their protection or possible reassignment to other duties. All employee emergency contact information should be reviewed and updated as necessary.
- j. Provide Respirator Fit-Testing for High-Risk Populations:** All personnel who are in regular contact with detainees are considered to be in a high-risk population and should be fit-tested for a respirator. Fit-testing is a recurring requirement and should be completed at least annually.
- k. Review Contracts:** As part of their vulnerability assessments, DRO Headquarters and Field Offices should review all active contracts to determine any potential difficulties that may prevent their fulfillment in the event of pandemic influenza. As necessary, the contracts should be modified to ensure DRO's mission essential functions can continue. Secondary and tertiary vendors for essential items should be identified.

- l. Prepare an Annual Budget:** In developing annual budgets, DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices should consider the requirements for general Continuity of Operations (COOP) programs and for the pandemic influenza mitigation program in particular.
 - m. Develop and Disseminate Family Support Guidance:** DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices should develop and disseminate pandemic influenza guidance for families. The guidance could include information on developing a family readiness packet that addresses key health and security issues. ICE HQ has developed excellent family support guidance that may be used as is, or tailored to meet the needs of individual offices and personnel.
 - n. Receive Pandemic and Seasonal Influenza Vaccinations:** All DRO personnel and their family members are encouraged to receive pandemic and seasonal influenza vaccinations as they become available. Field Offices should be prepared to establish vaccination procedures for detainees in the event such an action is directed.
- 2. Respond:** DRO's response activities correspond to Phases 5 and 6 of the construct proposed by the World Health Organization. The decision to move from preparedness to the response phase is triggered by noticeable increases in human-to-human transmissions of the virus. During the Response Phase, a premium will be placed on the discipline of individual teams to implement the preventative strategies and procedures outlined in this plan. The goal of the Response Phase is the maintenance of DRO's mission essential functions. Response actions include:
 - a. Distributing Personal Protective Equipment:** The Field Offices will distribute Personal Protective Equipment, along with guidance on its use, in an effort to slow the spread of the virus. Individual items of PPE will be tracked to ensure their use remains within prescribed guidelines for maintaining effectiveness. Equipment will be replenished as necessary.
 - b. Implementing Social Distancing Techniques:** As part of the Response Phase, DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices will implement both contact and transmission interventions as part of an overall mitigation strategy. Variations in work schedules, teleworking, travel restrictions and proper hygiene are some of the social distancing techniques that should be considered.
 - c. Adjusting Normal Operations to Mitigate the Influenza Spread:** In addition to social distancing techniques, the Field Offices will be prepared to institute a number of adjustments to routine operations for arrest and intake, detention operations, and removals. Part of these operational adjustments include:
 - (1) Increased medical surveillance of detainees to identify suspect and positive influenza cases;
 - (2) Cohorting, quarantine, and isolation of detainees;
 - (3) More frequent disinfection of facilities and vehicles;
 - (4) Limitations on visitation;

(5) Variations on feeding, recreation, and other mass gathering to limit detainee contact.

d. Prepare to Implement Surge Operations: If adjustments to routine operations fail to create a manageable response to the spread of the disease, Field Offices should be prepared to implement surge operations. Surge operations may be necessary due to high absenteeism of essential staff or the closure of a key facility due to the number of detainees reporting influenza-like symptoms. Surge operations include but are not limited to:

- (1) Staff realignment using cross-trained individuals
- (2) Staff augmentation from locations outside a particular facility, including non-impacted locations outside the Area of Responsibility;
- (3) Authorization for overtime and other adjustments to scheduling personnel;
- (4) Implementing emergency bed space procedures to free up additional space at facilities not impacted by the disease;
- (5) Establishing adequate temporary mortuary facilities.

e. Implementing a Communications Strategy: DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices will implement and refine the communications strategy developed in the Preparedness Phase. Each location will designate a single spokesperson to answer media requests or to coordinate such requests with ICE HQ Office of Public Affairs. Each location must also implement and refine its internal strategy for communicating with detainees and staff. Consideration must also be given to opening regular communications channels with other DRO offices and with partner agencies in public health and safety.

f. Reporting: In addition to ad hoc communications, DRO Headquarters and Field Offices will implement standard reporting procedures and times. All DRO personnel should be directed to self-report changes in health status that may require their absence from official duties.

g. Planning for Recovery Operations: As with any Continuity of Operations event, recovery planning should begin as soon as the situation at a particular location stabilizes. Such activities include the planning to reopen a closed facility and the deliberate archival of pertinent records to support completion of an after-action report following a return to normal operations.

3. Recover: DRO's Recovery Phase corresponds to portions of Phase 6 of the World Health Organization's phasing construct. Actions to be taken during the Recovery Phase include preparing for a possible new wave of the pandemic influenza virus, as well as recovery to normal operations. Recovery activities include:

a. Maintaining Enhanced Surveillance: DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices will continue an enhanced surveillance posture in order to anticipate a possible future wave of pandemic influenza.

- b. Restocking Infection Control Supplies:** DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices will take advantage of any lull in pandemic activity to inventory and restock infection control supplies such as Personal Protective Equipment and disinfectants.
- c. Addressing Human Capital Concerns:** Depending upon the severity of the outbreak, DRO Headquarters and the Field Office will need to collaborate on addressing human capital concerns. Such issues may involve compensation for overtime worked, compensation for job-related disabilities incurred as a result of working with the ill, advance leave, and the replacement of staff due to long-term illness or death resulting from the virus.
- d. Completing and Submitting a Pandemic Influenza After-Action Report:** DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices will each write a pandemic influenza after-action report and submit it to their respective higher headquarters. The reports should include both lessons learned and best practices resulting from dealing with the most recent wave of pandemic influenza.
- e. Addressing Open Issues through a Unit Corrective Action Program:** DRO Headquarters and the Field Offices will enter open items identified in after-action reports into a unit Corrective Action Program. A responsible party for achieving closure on the item will be identified, along with a reasonable date to close the action.

Consult Annex E for a complete listing of preparedness, response and recovery actions required by each DRO office.

VII. ELEMENTS OF A VIABLE COOP CAPABILITY

Pandemic influenza is a continuity of operations issue, dealing with the maintenance of essential functions despite losses in personnel due to influenza-related death or illness. Federal Continuity Directive 1 (FCD 1), *Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements* provides guidance on the 12 components of a viable COOP capability. While the information contained in FCD 1 applies to any COOP event, several of the components require particular attention with regard to pandemic influenza.

- 1. Budgeting and Acquisition of Resources:** As part of its annual continuity of operations budget preparation, program managers should consider the requirements for preparing for a possible pandemic influenza outbreak. Such requirements include the restocking of Personal Protective Equipment; increased stocks of cleaning supplies; possible participation in pandemic influenza exercises; and additional Information Technology hardware to support telework and social distancing strategies. Managers at all levels should review regularly the Centers for Disease Control outlooks regarding future influenza threats, conduct a vulnerability analysis, and then adjust their budget submissions accordingly.

Vendors are not immune to the pandemic virus, and thus the potential exists for an interruption in the flow of essential goods and services due to the incapacitation of one or more suppliers. Prior to a pandemic outbreak, program managers should work with vendors to discuss contingency plans for sustaining the delivery of goods and

services while the virus runs its course. A vulnerability analysis should be conducted to identify and address the most significant threats to the supply chain. Secondary and tertiary sources for the most essential goods and services should be identified. ICE's Office of Asset Management can assist in locating suitable alternative vendors.

2. **Orders of Succession:** Having an unambiguous chain of command is essential during a crisis. Pandemic influenza can seriously disrupt weakly defined leadership lines, leading to confusion and delays in decision making. Senior leaders at all levels, particularly those in mission critical positions, must clearly define and communicate appropriate orders of succession that will take effect following an incapacitation due to death or prolonged illness. Federal Executive Branch COOP policy requires personnel in mission essential positions to identify, in prioritized order, at least three other positions capable of assuming the duties of that position. In the case of pandemic influenza, essential personnel may wish to consider identifying more than three positions in their orders of succession. Non-essential personnel may also wish to identify suitable back-up personnel. In all instances, personnel should be trained in the requirements of the position to which they are succeeding. Orders of succession should be reviewed regularly for currency.
3. **Delegations of Authority:** In certain instances there are strict legal guidelines regarding the authorities a person may exercise by virtue of his or her position. There are also prohibitions against other people using those powers unless a delegation of authority is made. Senior leaders must identify which legal authorities are reserved to their positions. As necessary, a formal delegation of authority memorandum should be executed specifying the particular conditions under which authority will be passed and who will assume that authority. In some cases a time or geographic restriction in those authorities must be considered and made clear in the delegation of authority. It is recommended that all delegation authority undergo review by an ICE legal representative. All delegations of authority should be reviewed at least annually.
4. **Continuity Facilities:** Continuity facilities exist primarily as a temporary alternate work place in the event of a loss of functionality at the normal operating location. Under a pandemic influenza scenario, where the facility and all its business systems remain fully functional, continuity facilities become an additional location that can be used to provide social distancing. Small groups of employees can work out of the continuity facility, reducing the number of person-to-person contacts and the opportunities for possible transmission of the virus.

Prior to opening a continuity facility as a social distancing option, several factors must be considered. The alternate work site must be capable of providing adequate medical care for the workers, including the capability to screen for the pandemic influenza virus. The site must also be prepared to provide any additional hygienic measures that may be necessary to clean and disinfect the facility. Other services such as transportation, food, laundry, and communications support should be in place to handle the needs of the deployed workforce.

DRO HQ personnel will coordinate with the ICE COOP Program Manager prior to using the Mt Weather Emergency Operations Center as an alternate work site during

a pandemic influenza outbreak. Other locations are encouraged to coordinate with the custodians of their alternate operating facilities prior to their use.

5. **Continuity Communications:** For some employees, telework provides yet another option for practicing social distancing. Such an option only becomes viable through extensive preparation and testing. In addition to the procurement of the necessary supporting technology – computers, air cards, secure tokens, and GETS/WPS access – a telework policy must be drafted. Teleworking personnel must agree to abide by the policy, particularly those sections related to the handling of personal or sensitive information. Teleworking must be tested at least quarterly in order to ensure its effectiveness.
6. **Human Capital:** Human capital concerns will be paramount during a pandemic influenza outbreak. Special consideration must be given over to compensation issues including the use of overtime, flex-time, the use of sick leave and of administrative leave. Human capital concerns also extend to staffing issues and how particular positions will be filled in the event of catastrophic illness or death. Policy and procedures related to human resources will need to be reviewed in light of the potential threat of pandemic influenza. Communications with the labor unions and union employees will be required during the review process.
7. **Test, Training, and Exercise Program:** The requirements of the COOP Test, Training, and Exercise Program should include scenarios related to operations in the presence of pandemic influenza. Section XII of this Plan provides additional information for tests, training, and exercising for the pandemic influenza threat.

VIII. RESPONSIBILITIES

The success of this plan is dependent upon the decisions of senior officials within the Office of Detention and Removal Operations and the coordinated actions of all DRO personnel.

1. The Director, DRO will:
 - a. Support the Assistant Secretary in matters related to ICE's continuity of operations responsibilities during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - b. Direct all actions related to DRO's preparedness and response to pandemic influenza;
 - c. Mandate additional measures not contained in this plan in order to preserve DRO's mission essential functions and protect health of DRO staff and its contact populations;
 - d. Approve this plan for implementation;
2. The Chief, Office of Policy and Communications will:
 - a. Coordinate with the ICE HQ Office of Policy regarding pandemic influenza policy statements;
 - b. Develop and promulgate DRO-specific policies to address and clarify pandemic influenza issues for detention and removal operations;

- c. Coordinate with the ICE HQ Office of Public Affairs on internal and external communications for pandemic influenza;
 - d. Assist the Field Office Directors in developing pandemic influenza communications strategies and messages for all aspects of detention and removal operations.
- 3. The Director, Division of Immigration Health Services will:
 - a. Direct the activities of DIHS staff and operations nationwide;
 - b. Provide influenza-related medical guidance to the Director and Assistant Directors;
 - c. Recommend changes to routine DRO operations for the purposes of mitigating the effects of pandemic influenza;
 - d. Oversee the provision of pandemic-related health services for ICE detainees at IGSA detention facilities and state agencies nationwide;
 - e. Ensure medical escorts are trained in screening for pandemic influenza symptoms.
- 4. The Assistant Director for Management will:
 - a. Provide oversight and guidance for all aspects related to the efficient management of DRO facilities, workforce, and mission support operations during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - b. Support the Assistant Director for Operations on issues related to the management of Field Office operations during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - c. Support the Assistant Director for Enforcement on issues related to enforcement operations during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - d. Ensure DRO budget submissions adequately address the threat from pandemic influenza and other COOP-related activities.
- 5. The Assistant Director for Operations will:
 - a. Provide oversight and guidance for all aspects related to the efficient management of field operations during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - b. Coordinate with the Assistant Director for Management on operational issues associated with DRO facilities, workforce, budgeting and acquisition for pandemic influenza events;
- 6. The Assistant Director for Enforcement will:
 - a. Provide oversight and guidance for all aspects related to the efficient management of enforcement operations during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - b. Coordinate with the Assistant Director for Management on enforcement issues associated with the DRO workforce, budgeting and acquisition for pandemic influenza events.

7. The Deputy Assistant Director, Mission Support Division will:
 - a. Assist in the coordination and submission of budgets for pandemic influenza-related items;
 - b. Assist in coordination of pay and benefit discussions regarding issues such as overtime and leave policies during a pandemic influenza;
 - c. Work with the Office of Human Capital on the hiring of personnel to replace DRO employees lost to influenza-related sickness or death;
 - d. Provide guidance on the use of purchase cards during emergency operations.
8. The Deputy Assistant Director, Detention Management Division (DMD) will:
 - a. Ensure DMD participation in the development of detention management policies and procedures for pandemic influenza;
 - b. Assist Field Offices in the acquisition of essential goods and services to combat the threat of pandemic influenza;
 - c. Ensure the maintenance of detention standards throughout the course of a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - d. Assist in the planning for additional bed space capacity during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - e. Assist in the investigation of any detainee complaints regarding pandemic influenza-related health services.
9. The Deputy Assistant Director, Removal Management Division will:
 - a. Develop and promulgate guidance regarding removals during a pandemic influenza;
 - b. Provide case management guidance for pandemic influenza operations;
 - c. Provide assistance with transportation planning for removals;
 - d. Ensure travel documents contain any information regarding hazards to travel during a pandemic influenza outbreak.
10. The Deputy Assistant Director, Compliance Enforcement Division will:
 - a. Provide guidance on the use of Alternatives to Detention during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
 - b. Provide guidance on possible reductions to the National Fugitive Operations Program to alleviate stresses on intake at detention facilities.
11. The Deputy Assistant Director, Response Coordination Division will:
 - a. Ensure the currency of this plan;
 - b. Recommend changes to DRO's pandemic influenza mitigation procedures, through appropriate channels, to the Director, DRO;
 - c. Coordinate with the National Incident Response Unit on all issues related to ICE guidance on pandemic influenza;

- d. Coordinate pandemic influenza activities with the Field Incident Response Coordinator at each Field Office;
- e. Assist Field Office Directors in establishing and maintaining robust pandemic influenza mitigation programs;
- f. Ensure appropriate DRO representation at pandemic influenza exercises;
- g. Ensure the DRO Headquarters Emergency Operations Center is adequately staffed to support pandemic influenza emergency operations;
- h. Gather responses from DRO Headquarters and field operating units for a comprehensive pandemic influenza after-action report;
- i. Manage the DRO Pandemic Influenza Corrective Action Program to address deficiencies in DRO's approach to mitigating pandemic influenza.

12. The Chief, Juvenile and Family Residential Management Unit will:

- a. Ensure the adequate provision of pandemic influenza-related medical and mental health services to unaccompanied children and family members in DRO custody;
- b. Liaise with other DHS components on issues related to juvenile care during a pandemic influenza outbreak;
- c. Identify gaps and shortfalls in pandemic influenza care and treatment at DRO's family residential facility to the Detention Health Care Unit;
- d. Ensure health-related coordination is completed prior to the transfer of juveniles and family members into and out of DRO custody.

13. The Chief, Flight Operations will:

- a. Coordinate with DIHS on health screening procedures for flight crew, staff, and individuals involved in DRO flight programs;
- b. Promulgate flight operations guidance during a pandemic influenza outbreak to DRO components and partner organizations;
- c. Coordinate with Department of Justice flight operations on guidance for disinfecting aircraft during a pandemic influenza outbreak.

14. The Field Office Directors will:

- a. Be responsible for all efforts to promote good health practices and mitigate the threat of pandemic influenza within their Areas of Responsibility;
- b. Ensure DRO's Mission Essential Functions continue without significant interruption within their Areas of Responsibility;
- c. Recommend changes to routine DRO operations for the purposes of mitigating the effects of pandemic influenza;
- d. Direct completion of a risk and vulnerability to determine programs and procedures at risk from pandemic influenza;

- e. Direct the review of contracts to ascertain their viability under conditions of pandemic influenza;
- f. Establish telework policies and agreements;
- g. Coordinate with local public health and safety officials on possible partnering activities for pandemic influenza;
- h. Develop an annual budget that reflects requirements for pandemic influenza and other COOP-related items.

15. The Field Incident Response Coordinators will:

- a. Support the Field Office Director in developing and implementing programs to mitigate the threat of pandemic influenza;
- b. Coordinate with DRO Headquarters' Incident Response Unit personnel on issues related to pandemic influenza;
- c. Prepare, as necessary, a local pandemic influenza response plan;
- d. Review, at least annually, the pandemic influenza plans of DRO and any partner organizations;
- e. Work with the Field Office Senior Training Officer to develop and implement pandemic influenza awareness training for all personnel;
- f. Ensure new personnel in law enforcement and other mission critical positions are fit-tested for the N-95 respirator;
- g. Ensure the recurring requirement for N-95 respirator refresher training is completed;
- h. Ensure pandemic-influenza reporting is accomplished in accordance with ICE Headquarters' guidance;
- i. Capture key events, lessons learned, and best practices for inclusion in a comprehensive pandemic influenza after-action report.

16. All personnel will:

- a. Complete all required pandemic influenza-related training;
- b. Take steps to practice recommended hygienic practices to mitigate the spread of pandemic influenza;
- c. Self-monitor their own health for the symptoms of influenza;
- d. Seriously consider receipt of pandemic and seasonal vaccinations when offered;
- e. Maintain a Family Readiness Kit.

IX. LOGISTICS

Field Offices will develop plans to address the logistics associated with a pandemic influenza outbreak. In some cases the planning factors deal with procuring the specialized equipment

necessary to mitigate the effects of pandemic influenza. In other cases the issues center on maintaining the security of the supply chain covering all goods and services required to support detention and removal operations.

1. **Ensuring Adequate Stocks of Supplies:** Annex A contains a list of recommended items that detention facilities should have on hand to deal with the additional medical and hygienic requirements associated with pandemic influenza. Field Office personnel should conduct regular inventories to ensure an adequate supply of consumable and durable equipment to mitigate and treat pandemic influenza is readily available. On-hand supplies should be sufficient to last for the duration of a pandemic influenza wave, normally six to eight weeks. Trigger points should be established for the acquisition of additional supplies as stocks are depleted.
2. **Addressing Supply Shortages:** An unanticipated high demand for certain supplies may result in a shortage. As soon as a potential shortage of required equipment becomes apparent, personnel should identify the issue to DRO Headquarters for assistance in addressing the shortfall. Cross-leveling of equipment may be possible across the different Field Offices, and temporary stocks of needed equipment may be available from other Federal, State, and local partner organizations. Vendors should be approached with a request for an expedited delivery of equipment, or orders should be modified to increase the amount of supplies for subsequent deliveries. DRO Headquarters and Field Offices should identify secondary and tertiary vendors who may be able to fulfill orders the primary vendor cannot. In the event that additional supplies will not be available for some time, Field Office Directors and program managers should prioritize the personal and programs that will receive the remaining inventory.
3. **Developing Alternate Delivery Procedures:** Under conditions of a severe pandemic, Field Offices should develop and implement alternate procedures for the receipt of essential goods and services. This normally entails establishing supply drop-off points at locations outside the DRO facility. Supplies should be handled with aprons and gloves and disinfected prior to final delivery.
4. **Providing Security for Medical Stockpiles:** Certain medical supplies, particularly vaccines and other medications, may require additional levels of security while in transit and storage. Field Office Directors should develop contingency plans for safeguarding the medical stockpile.
5. **Mortuary Affairs:** Field Office Directors should assess the current capacity for handling deceased persons at each detention facility. Provisions should be made for the establishment of temporary morgue sites somewhere within the facility. Special considerations for handling the remains of the deceased are given in Annex C.

X. TRANSPORTATION

Transporting an individual with an undetermined health condition represents one of the best ways to introduce a pandemic influenza virus into the DRO system. In light of this, significant caution must be exercised when moving detainees into or between detention

facilities. Proper planning and the implementation of some preventative measures can help to reduce the probability of spreading the influenza virus among the detained population.

1. **Ground Transportation:** In moving detainees by ground transportation, several mitigation strategies should be considered:
 - a. **Vehicle Selection:** If time and availability permits, DRO personnel executing ground movement should select a vehicle appropriate for the operation. The optimum vehicle to use would offer a physical barrier between the driver and the detainee(s). When moving multiple detainees, a larger vehicle that would permit some separation between the detainees is preferred.
 - b. **Increased Ventilation:** While in transit, make every effort to increase the air flow into and out of the interior compartments of the vehicle.
 - c. **Availability and Use of Protective Equipment:** All vehicles should carry Personal Protective Equipment for both the DRO personnel and the individuals being transported. If tolerable, detainees should don a surgical mask. DRO personnel will consider the use of a respirator.
 - d. **Provide Medical Guidance to Detainees:** Prior to entering the vehicle, detainees will be provided verbal or written guidance on cough etiquette and respiratory hygiene.
 - e. **Provide Notification to and from Receiving Facility:** DRO personnel will provide suitable notification to the receiving facility when transporting an individual with an undetermined or suspect health condition. In turn, the receiving facility will provide the transporting officer or agent with guidance regarding receipt procedures. One procedure may be the requirement for a rapid medical screening of the individual at a remote location prior to entering the facility. Detention facilities should develop and clearly communicate their procedures for taking receipt of a detainee with a suspect health condition.
2. **Air Transportation:** Transportation by air brings additional complications to the movement of detainees. Air travel is not as flexible as ground transportation to changes to operations and scheduling. The confined interior precludes the ability for a rapid and complete exchange of contaminated air. The shackling of detainees during flight severely limits their ability to cover their mouths and noses prior to a cough or sneeze. In moving detainees by air transportation, several mitigation strategies should be considered:
 - a. **Pre-screening Prior to Departure to the Airport:** Detainees should be pre-screened for possible pandemic influenza symptoms prior to departing for the airport. Symptomatic or suspect cases should be separated immediately from other detainees to avoid spreading the disease further. The symptomatic or suspect case can be rescheduled for a flight after no longer showing symptoms for 48 hours.
 - b. **Availability and Use of Protective Equipment:** If tolerable, detainees should don a surgical mask while in transit to the airport and during flight.

- c. **Final Screening by Flight Nurse Prior to Departure:** The JPATS Flight Nurse will evaluate all detainees for their fitness to fly. Detainees with unstable medical conditions will not be allowed to board the aircraft. The JPATS Flight Nurse (or in his or her absence, the Senior Officer in Charge) will have final discretion over the boarding of any individuals. The Medical Transportation Coordinator or the Aeromedical Branch Chief in Kansas City must be notified of any anticipated refusals for boarding.
3. **Disinfecting Vehicles:** During a pandemic influenza outbreak, transporting vehicles must be clean and disinfected with greater frequency and greater diligence. Consult Annex D for more explicit guidance regarding the disinfection of vehicles.

XI. TESTS, TRAINING, AND EXERCISES

A comprehensive Test, Training, and Exercise (TT&E) Program supports all phases of the DRO Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan. A regular TT&E cycle raises the awareness for all DRO personnel to the threat of pandemic influenza. It also permits structured opportunities to evaluate the readiness of personnel, policies, procedures, data, facilities, and systems to support DRO mission essential functions under conditions of pandemic influenza. The results of TT&E events will be submitted to a Corrective Action Program for the development and implementation of corrective actions or for the identification of “Best Practices”.

1. **Testing.** Tests are designed to assess, validate, or identify for subsequent correction, all components of plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities used in response to a pandemic influenza event. The following are the minimum testing standards for the DRO Pandemic Influenza Program:
 - a. **Alert and Notification:** Conduct an alert and notification drill with unit personnel. The drill will test the currency of unit recall rosters and the speed and accuracy with which information can be passed. Ideally, alert and notification drills should be conducted at least quarterly;
 - b. **Telework:** At least quarterly, individuals designated for telework should test their ability to carry out their assigned duties remotely. Issues uncovered during the telework test should be identified to the unit Information Technology officer for resolution;
 - c. **Fit-testing:** N-95 Respirator fit-testing is mandatory for all DRO law enforcement officers. Field Office Directors and Headquarters program managers will identify other individuals for whom testing is mandatory. Initial fit-testing for designated employees will be conducted upon arrival. Refresher training will be conducted annually thereafter.
2. **Training.** Training is designed to familiarize continuity personnel with their roles and responsibilities in support of DRO’s Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan. The following are the minimum training standards for the training Program:

- a. **Awareness Training:** All DRO personnel will receive pandemic influenza awareness training. A Pandemic Influenza training module is available via the ICE Virtual University web site. This training should be conducted annually. Additionally, DRO Headquarters and Field Office senior leaders will receive annual training on continuity responsibilities, orders of succession, delegations of authority, devolution operations, and reconstitution.
 - b. **Independent Study 520: Introduction to Continuity of Operations Planning for Pandemic Influenzas:** The Federal Emergency Management Agency's Emergency Management Institute offers a short, online course entitled, "Introduction to Continuity of Operations Planning for Pandemic Influenzas (IS 520)". This training is recommended for COOP Program Managers at DRO Headquarters and at the Field Offices.
<http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is520.asp>
3. **Exercises.** Exercises use simulated situations to evaluate the readiness of DRO to perform its Mission Essential Functions in pandemic influenza conditions. DRO personnel are encouraged to seek out opportunities to exercise with Federal, State and local partner agencies to maximize the benefits of the collaboration.
 - a. **Exercise DETERMINED ACCORD:** The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sponsors a tabletop exercise (TTX) for pandemic influenza. The TTX series is entitled Exercise DETERMINED ACCORD. The purpose of the exercise is to test and improve continuity readiness for a pandemic event, to mitigate vulnerabilities during an influenza pandemic outbreak, and to identify gaps or weaknesses in pandemic plans, policies, and procedures. Consult with training offices at FEMA Region Headquarters for the availability of an Exercise DETERMINED ACCORD event.
4. **Documentation.** All test, training, and exercise activities will be documented in unit training records. Documentation will include the date of the event and the name of the participants. For training events, documentation will also include the name of the instructor providing the training.
5. **Corrective Action Program.** At DRO HQ, the COOP Program Manager will establish a Corrective Action Program to identify, track, and provide remedial actions to address issues identified during pandemic influenza-related testing, training, and exercising. Similar programs should be established at each Field Office. The Corrective Action Program will also be the focal point for identifying and implementing any activity or procedure identified as a "Best Practice".

XII. PLAN MAINTENANCE

The DRO HQ COOP Program Manager (PM) is responsible for the maintenance of this plan. The PM has the authority to accomplish minor changes to the plan to ensure its currency and

accuracy. Such changes may be accomplished without the need to obtain signature approval from the Director, DRO.

- Such minor changes typically do not materially affect the established process. Examples include title/name changes, formatting corrections, and typographical errors discovered after procedure approval.
- Minor changes shall be summarized in the Record of Changes section with the date of the change and change number indicated.
- Changes that, in the judgment of the COOP PM, substantially alter the process or desired outcome of the procedure shall be accomplished as a complete revision and submitted through the DRO Assistant Directors to the Director, DRO for approval.
- The COOP PM is granted discretionary authority to implement immediate changes to this plan to conform to a developing situation. Such immediate changes should be communicated to the Director, DRO through the Assistant Directors as soon as possible after implementing the change.

As a minimum, an annual review of the entire plan shall be conducted. Completion of this review shall be documented in the “Record of Revisions” section that accompanies this plan. Additional reviews will be conducted following DRO HQ participation in higher headquarters’ exercises and upon issuance of major changes to the ICE Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan.

Any amendment to the plan that results in significant changes to operations should be discussed with other stakeholders. These stakeholders may include medical service providers and law enforcement agencies at the Federal, State, or local levels, non-governmental organizations, foreign consulates, or private industry.

ANNEX A: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

A stockpile of essential equipment should be established and maintained to allow for independent operations lasting for six to eight weeks. Regular inventories of the available equipment should be conducted, and trigger points should be established to indicate when replacement stocks should be ordered.

CATEGORY	RECOMMENDED ITEM	NOTES
Fit Testing	• Fit-test kits ▪ Hood ▪ Sweet test solution ▪ Bitter test solution ▪ Nebulizers • N-95 Respirators ▪ Style 8511 for DRO personnel ▪ Style 8110 for personnel with small faces • Ziplock plastic bags for storage of three masks	Each fit-test kit services 150 individuals.
Infection Control	• N-95 Respirators for DRO personnel • Surgical masks for detainees • Hand sanitizer • Bar soap • Hard-surface cleaning materials • Aerosol disinfectant • Chlorine bleach • Bio-wipes • Spray bottles for applying cleaning solutions • Tissues • Gloves (Sizes Small through Extra Large) • Goggles • Face Shields • Gowns or aprons	A rough guide for determining the required number of N-95 respirators is: 3 masks per day times 120 days times the number of personnel requiring respirators. A list of all EPA-approved disinfectants is available at: www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm
Medical	• Specimen Collection Kits • Rapid influenza test kits • Viral transport media	

	• Anti-viral medications • Influenza vaccines (if released) • Routine and chronic medications	
CATEGORY	RECOMMENDED ITEM	NOTES
Mortuary Affairs	• Body bags • Dry ice • Refrigerated storage • 8 ½" x 11" plastic sleeves, 2 per deceased ▪ To protect paperwork • Clear tape, waterproof ▪ To seal plastic sleeves • Clear plastic bags ▪ For personal effects of the deceased • Washcloths and towels ▪ For cleaning and padding • Strips of materials ▪ To tie legs together • Identification cards	See Annex C for more guidance on Mortuary Affairs.
Education and Training	• Posters • Brochures • Video	Ensure the availability of material targeted to differences in language, culture, and educational levels.

ANNEX B:

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA INFECTION CONTROL GUIDANCE

Influenza viruses are transmitted person to person predominantly via mucous membrane exposure to infectious respiratory secretions discharged initially as large droplets. These droplets can transmit influenza virus to susceptible persons present in the occupied space within 6 feet from the source patient. Large droplets, however, tend to settle out of the air in a relatively short period and eventually come to rest on a variety of environmental surfaces. Environmental surfaces in homes, healthcare facilities, and other places of business include, but are not limited to, large housekeeping surfaces (e.g., floors, walls, windows, tables and countertops), equipment and appliances, and surfaces frequently touched by hand (e.g., door handles, light switches, bathroom and kitchen surfaces, phones, computers). Aerosolization of virus (i.e., production of tiny particles) from respiratory secretions can occur, but exposure to these particles is not considered to be a primary means of spread.

Some strains of influenza virus may persist for 24 to 48 hours on hard, nonporous surfaces. On porous surfaces such as cloth or paper, the same virus can last for 8 to 12 hours. An aggressive program of infection control that includes regular cleaning and disinfection of surfaces where the virus may linger is an important mitigation tool¹. Likewise, a disciplined program of personal hygiene can help to eliminate many opportunities for direct contact transmissions between infected and non-infected individuals.

The following table provides guidance for controlling the spread of pandemic influenza.

¹ A list of all Environmental Protection Agency-registered disinfectants can be found at <http://www.epa.gov/oppad001/chemregindex.htm>.

Item	Method or Task	Recommended Action	Frequency
1	Hand Hygiene	• Wash hands for 15-20 seconds ▪ Use plain or antimicrobial soap and water ▪ Use alcohol-based hand sanitizers ▪ Wash both sides of hands to include the wrist area, between fingers, and under fingernails • Avoid touching eyes, nose, and mouth with unsanitized hands or gloved hands • If using disposable gloves, roll slowly off the wrist to the fingertips ▪ Dispose of immediately ▪ Clean and sanitize hands	Frequently, but most particularly: ▪ After sneezing or coughing into the hand ▪ Before eating ▪ Before and after touching an ill person; ▪ After being exposed to a bodily secretion; ▪ After contact with an ill person's surroundings
2	Cough/Sneeze Etiquette Respiratory Hygiene	• Cover the mouth and nose with the upper part of the sleeve, not the hand; or • Cover the mouth and nose with a tissue; ▪ Dispose of the tissue after a single use ▪ Sanitize hands • Wear a surgical mask • Wear a respirator (following fit-testing)	Any time during active pandemic period
3	Eye Protection	• Wear goggles; • Wear a face mask	• When using a cleaning method where there is a potential for splashing liquids • When treating patients and there is a potential for contacting bodily

			secretions (e.g. vomiting)
4	Facility Cleaning	• Follow all manufacturer's instructions regarding the use of cleaning and disinfecting materials; • Encourage the use of Personal Protective Equipment for the Environmental Services staff; ▪ Disposable gloves; ▪ Gowns or aprons; ▪ Eye protection, if splashes are anticipated • Large, hard-surface cleaning: ▪ Avoid cleaning methods that produce mists or aerosols ▪ Use wet-dusting techniques ▪ Clean large surfaces (e.g. floors) using normal detergents/disinfectants, following manufacturer's instructions; ▪ Exchange cleaning solutions frequently; ▪ Replace soiled mop heads and cloths with clean items; • Office Areas: ▪ Frequent use of room air deodorizers to disinfect the air is not recommended; ▪ Clean and disinfect commonly touched areas: ▪ Door handles; ▪ Telephone receivers and touch pads; ▪ Computer keyboards; ▪ Computer printers ▪ Remote controls; ▪ Elevator buttons; ▪ Desk tops; ▪ Supply cabinets; ▪ Refrigerator and microwave door handles; ▪ Vending machines	• Areas housing the ill should be cleaned daily and upon departure of the ill person • Commonly touched areas should be cleaned at least daily

		▪ Electronic equipment can be cleaned using hand-sanitizing wipes.	
5	Laundry	• Wear gloves; • Consider the use of a gown or apron; • During collection, handle soiled items with a minimum of fluffing or agitation; • Follow manufacturer's instructions for: ▪ Detergent use; ▪ Laundry additives; ▪ Bleach; ▪ Appropriate water temperature; • Use dryer setting appropriate for the material ▪ Line drying is permitted • Clean hands before removing materials from the washer or dryer.	Any time during active pandemic period
6	Eating Utensils	• Follow manufacturer's instructions for: ▪ Detergent use; ▪ Appropriate water temperature; • Ensure hands have been sanitized or gloved when handling clean utensils, dishes, and trays	Any time during active pandemic period
7	Solid Waste Disposal	• In health care settings: ▪ Use Personal Protective Equipment when handling open waste containers; ▪ Follow normal waste containment procedures; ▪ Use current procedures for treating regulated medical waste ▪ Treated medical waste can be deposited in municipal solid waste landfills as per normal procedures; • In non-health care settings: ▪ Disposable tissues used to contain coughs, sneezes, or nasal discharges can be tossed in	Any time during active pandemic period

		standard waste receptacles; ▪ Clean and sanitize hands after emptying waste containers; ▪ Non-medical waste can be deposited in municipal solid waste landfills as per normal procedures.	
8	Ground Vehicles	• Generally, all vehicles should be maintained properly to include cleanliness (interior and exterior). When needed, vehicles should be cleaned before and after each use. • While in transit: ▪ Prior to entering the vehicle, passengers should be advised of proper cough and respiratory etiquette; ▪ Maximize ventilation and air flow exchange to the extent tolerable by all passengers ▪ If tolerable, place a surgical mask on detainees; ▪ DRO personnel should consider the use of respirators ▪ Notify the receiving facility if a detainee with a possible viral infection is being transported; ▪ Driver will follow the instructions of the receiving facility regarding delivery of the detainee. • After transit: ▪ Clean and sanitize hands; ▪ Drive vehicle to a location away from pedestrian traffic ▪ Open all doors and windows ▪ Turn ventilation system on HIGH for 10 minutes ▪ Don Personal Protective Equipment ▪ Clean and sanitize vehicle ▪ Wipe down hard surfaces with a sanitizing wipe, including: ▪ Steering wheels;	Any time during active pandemic period Driver's compartment should be cleaned after each use of the vehicle Passenger compartment should be cleaned at least daily, or when an obvious spillage of bodily fluids has taken place.

		▪ Gear shift; ▪ Radio buttons; ▪ Door knobs and buttons; ▪ Dashboard ▪ Avoid using cleaning methods that produce mists or aerosols or disperse dust ▪ Use wet-dusting techniques ▪ Sensitive equipment can be cleaned using hand-sanitizing wipes; • Consider the use of disposable plastic covers for the protection of sensitive items ▪ Dispose of plastic covers in plastic bags; • Dispose of cleaning rags and protective gloves in plastic bags; • Clean and sanitize hands	
9	Limit Mass Gatherings	• Limit visitors to the facilities; • Encourage telework for applicable personnel; • Consider staggering work shifts; • Space workers farther apart; ▪ Consider the use of continuity facilities • Cancel non-essential travel; • Cancel non-essential face-to-face meetings; • Postpone training events that can be deferred; • Encourage the use of conference calls or video conferencing	Any time during active pandemic period
10	Other Actions	• All personnel should: ▪ Get vaccinated for both pandemic and seasonal influenza variants; ▪ Stay home if sick; ▪ Leave work if feeling ill; ▪ Avoid crowded places (at work or outside work) if in an at-risk category;	Any time during active pandemic period

		▪ Eat well; ▪ Exercise; ▪ Get plenty of sleep	
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ANNEX C: MORTUARY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

In the event of a severe pandemic flu, it is anticipated that the services of community funeral homes and local medical examiners could become temporarily unavailable. In that instance, detention facilities would have responsibility for the initial processing and storage of bodies of deceased detainees. The following guidance provides detailed procedures for caring for the deceased should it become necessary.

The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) estimates that for a severe pandemic flu the death rate in the general community would be 6 deaths per 1000 persons who become ill. The DHHS estimate assumes that 30% of the population will become sick with the flu and that 2% of those who become sick with pandemic flu die from it.

This guidance for the care of the deceased includes the following elements:

- Communication with local health department and medical examiner about pandemic flu planning;
- Procedures for setting up a temporary morgue (if community resources become unavailable);
- Detailed procedures for the care of the deceased, including lists of needed supplies; and a
- Description of the forms required for identifying and tracking the deceased.

It should be noted that those attending to the deceased are at much greater risk of contracting pandemic flu from exposure in the general community or through contact with someone who is ill with pandemic flu than from contact with the deceased.

- Dead bodies do not cause epidemics.
- Use standard precautions when in contact with blood or body fluids, including good hand washing.

Item	Task	Recommended Action
1	Preparation for the care and management of the deceased	• Identify a person to be responsible for care of the deceased planning; • Communicate with the local health department and medical examiners office regarding care of the deceased issues during a pandemic influenza; • Identify vendors who can support requirements for mortuary affairs; ▪ Body bags; ▪ Dry ice; ▪ Refrigeration units • Estimate the number of detainee deaths that may result from a worst-case pandemic influenza scenario; • Identify a suitable location for a temporary morgue and temporary burial plots
2	Develop local facility plans for the care of the deceased.	• Develop facility-specific plans for locating, tracking, and caring for the deceased; • Consult with chaplains regarding the accommodation of religious practices. • Develop protocols for recording detainee deaths; • Develop protocols for communicating detainee deaths to ICE and appropriate health officials.
3	Procure necessary supplies	• Develop methods for storing and inventorying required materials for the care of the deceased.
4	Conduct a training event	• Conduct training on the care of the deceased; • Document the results of the training; • Identify and implement any corrective actions.
5	Implement infection control procedures for handling the deceased	• Clean and sanitize hands prior to touching the remains; • Don Personal Protective Equipment; ▪ Single-layer gloves; ▪ Surgical mask; ▪ If there is a risk of splashes from bodily fluids,

		don gown and eye/face protection • Place a surgical mask over the nose and mouth of the deceased; • Avoid wiping eyes, nose, and mouth; • Do not smoke, eat, or drink when handling the body; • Do not spray or place a disinfectant on the body; • Clean and sanitize all surfaces on equipment used to transport the deceased.
6	Prepare the body	• Straighten the body; • Without using force, close the eyelids; • Close the person's mouth by placing a rolled towel under the chin; ▪ Ensure dentures, if any, are in person's mouth; • Remove all IV lines, monitors, and other equipment; • Bathe any part of the body that is soiled with blood or other body fluids; • Remove and replace any soiled dressings; • Remove jewelry and/or eyeglasses; ▪ Document any items removed; • Pad the wrist and ankles with rolled-up washcloths and tie them together loosely
7	Complete documentation	• Prepare <i>Pandemic Flu Death Record</i>; • Make three (3) copies; • Place two (2) copies in plastic sleeves; ▪ Seal sleeves with waterproof, transparent tape; • Maintain one (1) copy in a notebook or file; • Prepare identification tag.
8	Attach documentation to the body	• Attach one copy of the <i>Pandemic Flu Death Record</i> (in plastic sleeve) to the right wrist. • Attach identification tag to the right toe using a plastic twist-tie.
9	Place the body into a body bag	• Put clothing and personal effects in a separate plastic bag; • Place the bag of clothing and personal effects

		inside the body bag; • Remove the surgical mask from the deceased's face prior to closing the body bag; • Ensure that the bag is fully sealed and that no body fluids are leaking; • Ensure that the outside of the body bag is clean; • Attach one copy of the <i>Pandemic Flu Death Record</i> (in plastic sleeve) to the outside of the body bag.
10	Store the body for future transport and burial	• Refrigerate the remains between 34 and 37 degrees Fahrenheit. ▪ Employ dry ice if required ▪ Exercise care in handling the remains • If refrigeration is not available, move body to temporary burial site ▪ Observe religious rituals
11	Complete infection control measures	• Properly dispose of any soiled or used materials; • Remove gloves properly; • Wash hands thoroughly
12	Notify medical examiners office and local health department	• Note the pandemic influenza-related death
13	Complete and submit an after-action report	• Identify lessons learned; • Identify best practices; • Enter open findings into a Corrective Action Program for resolution and closure.

<Facility Name> <Address> <Phone>		
Last Name:	First Name:	MI:
Alien #: Date of Birth: ____/____/____ Date of Death: ____/____/____		
Place of Death ☐ Institution in: ☐ General Population ☐ Airborne infection isolation room ☐ SSU ☐ SHU ☐ Other single cell/room ☐ Community Hospital ☐ Other _____		
Type of Death: ☐ Influenza/no complicating condition ☐ Influenza/complicating condition(s) _____ ☐ Other _____		
DNR Order ☐ Yes ☐ No Autopsy ☐ Yes ☐ No		
Preliminary Cause of Death:		
Clinical Synopsis of Events Leading to the Death (including clinical care provided): <i>(continue on additional page if more room needed)</i>		
Location of Body: (1) Date:		
(2) Date:		
(3) Date:		
Next of Kin: _____ Notified? ☐ Y ☐ N Address: _____ _____ Phone: _____	Religion of deceased: _____ Religious ritual requirements? _____	
Personal effects accompanying body (list all):		
Staff person completing report:		
Name (print):	Title:	
Signature:	Date:	
Note: This document serves the following purposes: 1) provides local facility with a record of the death, 2) provides record of the location where the body is stored, 3) provides documentation to maintain with the body, 4) serves as the Pandemic Influenza Death Record.	Form instructions: Make 3 copies, placing 2 in sealed plastic sleeves. 1) Attach 1 sealed copy to right wrist of detainee; 2) Secure 1 sealed copy to the outside of body bag; and 3) Maintain 1 copy on file.	

Table C-2. Pandemic Influenza Death Record.

ANNEX D:
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

No staff member shall offer any statements or respond to any questions from the media without first being approved by the Public Information Officer or Field Office Director and cleared by DRO Headquarters.

DRO personnel should consult ICE Office of Public Affairs' Standard Operating Procedure for more specific guidance on handling requests from the media.

ANNEX E:
ORGANIZATIONAL CHECKLISTS

**APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E:
ORGANIZATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR DRO HEADQUARTERS**

ITEM	PHASE	ACTIVITY	TASK	OPR	FREQUENCY
1	Preparedness	Policy	- Conduct a review of policies related to pandemic influenza operations - Vaccinations; - Respirator Protection; - Leave; - Telework; - COOP; - GETS/WPS; - Detainee Death Reporting.	P	A
			Develop/revise policy for pandemic influenza	P	AR
			- Promulgate new/revised policy statements - For major changes to policy, share with partner organizations outside DRO	P, AD	AR
		Planning	- Appoint a Multidisciplinary Pandemic Influenza Planning Committee. Select members from: - Law Enforcement - Logistics - Training - Communications - Medical Care - Emergency Management	AD	AR
			Prepare or revise DRO Pandemic Influenza Plan Coordinate with ICE and other key stakeholders	RCD	A

A = Annually Q = Quarterly AR = As Required

AD = Assistant Director P = Policy and Communication MS = Mission Support Division RCD = Response Coordination Division

			Promulgate new or revised DRO Pandemic Influenza Plan	AD	AR
		Human Capital	Identify potential at-risk populations on staff	D	AR
			Develop and disseminate Family Support Guidance (in concert with ICE)	RCD	AR
			Coordinate pay and benefit discussions regarding issues such as overtime and leave related to pandemic influenza	MS	AR
		Budgeting & Acquisition	Prepare and submit budget for DRO HQ COOP-related activities, including pandemic influenza	RCD, MS	A
			Procure Personal Protective Equipment for staff	MS	AR
			Procure cleaning and disinfecting supplies	MS	AR
			Procure equipment necessary for telework	MS	AR
			Review contracts for their currency and relevance to the Pandemic Influenza situation	MS	A, AR
			Develop lists of alternate vendors for essential equipment	MS	AR
		Communications	Develop and promulgate messages and strategies for communicating with the media	AD, P	AR
			Coordinate messages with internal and external Public	P	AR

			Affairs agencies		
		Coordination	• Coordinate with outside public health and safety agencies on pandemic influenza responses	AD, D, RCD	AR
		TT&E	• Require all employees to complete ICE Pandemic Influenza training via Virtual University	AD	A
			• Procure and distribute Pandemic Influenza training materials ▪ Posters; ▪ Video; ▪ Brochures	RCD	AR
			• Conduct fit-test refresher training	RCD	A
			• Coordinate alert & notification exercise	RCD	Q
			• Coordinate DRO HQ telework exercise	RCD	Q
			• Ensure DRO HQ participation in higher headquarters' exercises	RCD, D	AR
			• Identify DRO HQ personnel who should complete IS-520 training (Introduction to COOP Planning for Pandemic Influenzas)	RCD	AR
		Surveillance	• Monitor global pandemic influenza situation	D, RCD	AR
			• Communicate findings of pandemic influenza surveillance	D	AR

2	Response	Resources	Distribute Personal Protective Equipment	MS	AR
		Human Capital	Implement Social Distancing Techniques	AD	AR
		Communications	Implement Communications Strategy	P	AR
			Establish Emergency Operations Center to coordinate reporting	RCD	AR
		Planning	Begin planning for Recovery operations	RCD	AR
3	Recovery	Planning	Plan and prepare for possible next wave of pandemic influenza	RCD	AR
		Budgeting & Acquisition	Acquire replacement supplies	MS	RCD = AR
		Human Capital	Replace staff that may have been lost due to pandemic influenza-related illness or death.	MS	AR
		TT&E	Complete and submit an after-action report.	RCD	AR
			Enter action items into a Corrective Action Program for closure	RCD	AR

A = Annually Q = Quarterly AR = As Required

AD = Assistant Director P = Policy and Communication MS = Mission Support Division RCD = Response Coordination Division

A = Annually Q = Quarterly AR = As Required

AD = Assistant Director P = Policy and Communication MS = Mission Support Division RCD = Response Coordination Division

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX E: ORGANIZATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR DRO FIELD OFFICES

ITEM	PHASE	ACTION
1	Preparedness	• The Field Office will develop Pandemic Flu Health and Safety Guidance to include: ▪ Signs and Symptoms ▪ Modes of Transmission ▪ Hygiene/Sanitary Measures ▪ Coughing/Sneezing Etiquette • Encourage Emergency Kits both at work and at home. Provide guidance on what to include in emergency kits. • Anticipate fear and anxiety Ensure employees receive, and encourage review of all guidance provided by elements dealing with Headquarters Action Plans, such as Public Affairs, Training and Development, Health and Safety Office. • List of high-risk countries with current outbreak status to be provided to Field Office employees as the list of infected countries changes. • Require all Field Office employees to complete the ICE on-line Pandemic Influenza course currently available through the virtual learning center. • Flu videos, Muster modules and Job aids will be disseminated to Headquarters and field personnel as developed by the Office of Training and Development and as needed for specific employment roles. • Encourage use of annual influenza vaccine. • Enforce travel restrictions; namely, that no employee may travel on official business internationally without an approved country clearance. • Maintain and update regularly a point of contact notification list for use at all subsequent Threat Conditions. • Determine minimum staffing requirements to maintain continuity of Field Office Mission. • Establish baseline data for sick leave surveillance. • Establish leave policies; non-punitive, liberal leave, mandatory sick leave. • Establish policies for expedited disciplinary protocols for unwarranted absenteeism. • Establish policy for determining when a previously sick employee will be allowed to return to work. • Determine need for alternate work schedules, staggered

		shifts, and work at home to minimize gathering of employees during higher threat levels. • Provide essential management personnel with docking stations or laptops so they can work from home during higher threat levels.
2	Response	• Restrict visitation to DRO Detention facilities. • Invoke daily contact log for all personnel. • Initiate appropriate protective and responsive measures for high-risk populations, including custody staff and medical personnel based upon risk analysis and available vaccines and prophylaxis. • Implement PPE protocols for essential DRO employees. • Support HQs' plan to establish and disseminate workforce protection guidelines (i.e., recommendations for protective equipment, anti-virals, vaccine, and social distancing measures). • Limit access to detention facilities. • The FOD will implement Telework/Telecommute policies and/or alternate work schedules affecting Low Risk and Non-Mission Critical personnel. DRO will consider effects of absenteeism and/or changes to shift length/frequency, snow days & OPM sick leave policies. IMPLEMENT Family Plans. • Ensure Continuity of Operation Plans (COOP) reflects procedures for heightened alert and office/facility closings should the need be determined. • Initiate rapid response into areas with confirmed or suspected incidences of infection. • Recommend all personnel implement safe work practices plus the following: clean, disinfect contaminated facilities or items used by symptomatic DRO employees, detainees or members of the public; implement avoidance measures and/or use of surgical masks by symptomatic individuals. Emphasize frequent hand-washing and respiratory etiquette. • Implement Contingency Plans for secure detention as required to support border security. • Request augmentation for staff at detention centers who are unable to work. • Assess ability to maintain critical services during and subsequent to pandemic and develop contingency plans to support operations. • Request HQ deploy Rapid Response assets to augment

		the protection of detention and other facilities as directed.
3	Recovery	• Prepare for the possibility of subsequent waves of a pandemic event. • Assess damage to Field Office operations and programs and develop a phased recovery plan. • Continue to monitor information regarding the status of the pandemic event. • Ensure continuity and/or recovery of essential functions. • Assess staffing needs and the capacity of staff to return to normal operations. • Continue enhanced reporting to assist in identifying phases of recovery including the initial, intermediate (which may be prolonged), and final phase of returning to normal levels. • Discontinue social distancing measures that may have been implemented during the Response Phase. • Continue implementation of mental health support plan for staff. • Collect and summarize documentation of financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event. • Develop a plan to replace depleted supplies and inventories. • Evaluate the overall response to the pandemic • Make improvements and revisions to the plans based on evaluation and lessons learned. • Prepare after-action report

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX E: ORGANIZATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR DIHS HEADQUARTERS

ITEM	PHASE	ACTION
1	Preparedness	• Develop and distribute checklists to facilitate compliance with each response phase • Review, revise and develop institutional plans, protocols, exercises, and evaluation tools for influenza pandemic response (Annex K, L and M). • Monitor new information from CDC, WHO, and state and local health departments. • Review and update DIHS Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP); share COOP with key staff in field locations • Procure the necessary information technology (IT) equipment to support operations, including blackberries for on-call support and laptops to support telecommuting. • Identify an agency spokesperson. • Identify essential personnel. • Establish and maintain (update) contact lists, including DIHS and ICE staff, health department, law enforcement and other key stakeholders. • Establish a communication plan, including identification of a spokesperson, identification of key points of contact, identification of key stakeholders. • Develop an education and training plan that addresses the needs of staff and patients, and identify training materials—in different languages and at different reading levels; existing materials are preferred, especially those identified from Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) agencies. • Distribute approved materials to educate healthcare providers about novel and pandemic influenza in accordance with CDC guidance. • Direct staff to stay home if they are sick with influenza-like-illness. • Provide consultation to healthcare providers, as needed, on suspect novel influenza cases. • Consider recommendations for interim enhancements to intake screening; communicate new recommendations to field staff. • Provide guidance to field locations for cohorting contacts to suspect, probable, and confirmed influenza cases, and for releasing detainees from cohorting

		▪ Communicate cohorting plans with ICE/DRO and detention facility staff. • Develop and provide updated case reporting information and materials to clinical staff, such as an approved, standardized surveillance questionnaire form. • Develop a tool for collection, entry, and analysis of data regarding suspect, probable, and confirmed cases in accordance with CDC case definitions. • Maintain current influenza case reporting systems to monitor morbidity and mortality. • Develop a reporting system for staff to report daily aggregate data on the number of suspected, probable, and confirmed influenza-associated cases among detainees and staff, and absenteeism among staff due to the pandemic event. • Identify resources for procurement of supplies and pharmaceuticals. ▪ Consider procuring enough consumable resources such as N95 respirators and surgical masks for the duration of a pandemic wave (6-8 weeks). • Estimate the potential impact of a pandemic on staff and detainees based on current facility staffing and detainee bed count at each location. • Provide guidance to field locations in establishing staffing contingency plans for anticipated illness, absenteeism, and exhaustion related to the pandemic event ▪ Estimate the minimum number and categories of personnel needed to care for a surge of influenza patients per day/shift and use to project staffing needs. ▪ Create a list of essential positions that are needed to maintain operations. ▪ Create a list of non-essential positions that can be re-assigned to support critical operations. • Facilitate inventory and procurement of supplies and pharmaceuticals. Revise and/or develop inventory and procurement templates • Develop a mental health support plan for staff ▪ Identify referral sources in the community, including Military Treatment Facilities and public and private resources ▪ Identify training resources • Review and update Pandemic Influenza Family Support Guidance • Prepare and distribute templates for documenting financial
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		and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event, including staff time • Document financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event, including staff time
2	Response	• Implement and maintain appropriate transmission-based precautions. • Monitor new information from CDC, WHO, and state and local health departments. • Activate COOP if and when it becomes necessary. • Distribute lap tops to key personnel who may need to work at home after hours and on weekends. • Identify key subject matter experts for various aspects of the response. • Ensure that key personnel have blackberries or cell phones; distribute additional blackberries or cell phones as needed for on-call support. • Establish a communication plan, including identification of a spokesperson, identification of key points of contact, identification of key stakeholders, schedule regular conference calls; reinforce clearance process for communications. • Establish an on-call schedule for after hours and weekends to respond to questions, concerns, and deliverables. • Establish an expedited clearance process for release of information. • Update staff regularly and provide guidance throughout the influenza pandemic event as new information and guidance become available. • Communicate with ICE/DRO and provide Situation Reports. • Establish communications with other stakeholders. • Provide guidance to staff to stay home if sick with influenza-like-illness. • Implement enhanced reporting for detection of suspect, probable, and confirmed cases until no longer needed. • Consider and keep facilities/agencies apprised of any determinations made regarding altered standards of care (each change in standard of care will be the result of the evolving pandemic and will be a measured/proportionate response). • Implement mental health support plan for staff. • Provide Pandemic Influenza family Support Guidance to

		staff • Document financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event, including staff time.
3	Recovery	• Prepare for the possibility of subsequent waves of a pandemic event. • Assess damage to DIHS operations and programs and develop a phased recovery plan. • Continue to monitor information regarding the status of the pandemic event. • Ensure continuity and/or recovery of essential functions. • Assess staffing needs and the capacity of staff to return to normal operations. • Continue enhanced reporting to assist in identifying phases of recovery including the initial, intermediate (which may be prolonged), and final phase of returning to normal levels. • Discontinue social distancing measures that may have been implemented during the Response Phase. • Continue implementation of mental health support plan for staff. • Collect and summarize documentation of financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event. • Develop a plan to replace depleted supplies and inventories. • Evaluate the overall response to the pandemic (Annex M). • Make improvements and revisions to the plans based on evaluation and lessons learned. • Prepare after-action report

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX E: ORGANIZATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR DIHS FIELD LOCATIONS

ITEM	PHASE	ACTION
1	Preparedness	• Distribute checklists to facilitate compliance with each response phase (Annex A). • Adhere with the DIHS Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan; communicate contingencies through the supervisory chain of command. • Consult with the DIHS Medical Director or DIHS Deputy Director for Clinical Services on clinical matters. • Participate in emergency and pandemic planning meetings and training exercises with ICE, local and state public health authorities, federal agencies, and other partner agencies. Staff will obtain supervisory approval for participating in such planning and training activities. • During U.S. Stage 0, communicate with state and local public health authorities regarding planning for availability of stockpile supplies and pharmaceuticals for staff and detainees. • Communicate new information to staff as new information becomes available. • Establish and maintain (update) contact lists, including DIHS and ICE staff, health department, law enforcement and other partner agencies • Maintain communication with DIHS and ICE staff. Communication will follow the usual chain of command unless otherwise instructed by the DIHS Office of the Director. • Develop protocols for cohorting contacts to suspect, probable, and confirmed influenza cases among detainees, and for releasing detainees from cohorting; communicate cohorting plans with ICE/DRO and detention facility staff. Maintain communication with ICE/DRO regarding bed space considerations due to cohorting (Annex C). • Establish a staffing contingency plan for anticipated illness, absenteeism, and exhaustion related to the pandemic event (Annex D). ▪ Estimate the minimum number and categories of personnel needed to care for a surge of influenza patients per day/shift and use to project staffing needs. ▪ Create a list of essential positions that are needed to

		maintain operations. ▪ Create a list of non-essential positions that can be re-assigned to support critical functions. • Establish a plan for reassignment of high-risk personnel (e.g., pregnant women, staff with respiratory conditions, immuno-compromised staff) to low risk duties. • Develop a staff recall roster and practice staff recall process. • Inventory existing supplies and pharmaceuticals (Annex E). • Identify resources for procurement of supplies and pharmaceuticals ▪ Procure enough consumable resources such as N95 respirators and surgical masks for the duration of a pandemic wave (6-8 weeks) in consultation with DIHS Headquarters. ▪ Establish a plan for obtaining regular medications and supplies if pharmacy, supply, and delivery services become disrupted. • Implement an education and training plan that addresses the needs of staff and patients. • Identify staff that is trained to perform fit testing for N95 respirators. • Ensure that new staff receives fit-testing for N95 respirators, medical clearance for using N95 respirators. DIHS staff shall not provide medical clearance for staff. • Reinforce proper use of personal protective equipment, hand hygiene and other infection control measures. • Establish a plan to maintain essential medical services and manage chronically ill, immunocompromised, pregnant, and other high-risk patients. • Encourage staff to have the annual influenza vaccination in accordance with vaccination guidelines. • As supplies of a pandemic vaccine become available, consider key staff to be recommended for vaccination in accordance with CDC guidance. • Maintain currency regarding recommendations from CDC on use of antivirals for treatment and prophylaxis; keep in mind that CDC guidance may change frequently. • Develop procedures to actively identify suspect influenza cases. • Follow CDC and state or local health department guidance regarding collection and transport of specimens and laboratory testing. • Conduct follow-up of suspected novel influenza cases,
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		including evaluation of contacts. • Establish a plan for continuity of operations in the event of power failure ▪ Identify essential procedures that require electricity ▪ Identify alternate procedures and supplies that could be utilized in place of electric powered medical equipment ▪ Procure supplies • Prepare for the possibility that deaths may occur due to the pandemic event (Annex G). ▪ Coordinate with ICE/DRO regarding the possibility of deaths and how they will be managed. • Implement a mental health support plan for staff ▪ Identify referral sources in the community, including Military Treatment Facilities and public and private resources ▪ Identify training resources • Distribute templates for documenting financial expenditures and resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event. • Document financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event, including staff time. • Develop a plan for staff members to stay at the facility if necessary ▪ Develop plan in conjunction with ICE and facility management ▪ Encourage staff to have an emergency bag packed and stored at the facility ▪ Personal emergency supplies include but are not limited to clothes, water, prescription medications, spare eyeglasses, hygiene products, battery-powered or hand cranked radios, batteries, energy bars, etc.
2	Response	• Implement and maintain appropriate infection controls and transmission-based precautions on all shifts. • Adhere with the DIHS Pandemic Influenza Contingency Plan. • Consult with the DIHS Medical Director or DIHS Deputy Director for Clinical Services on clinical matters. • Communicate new information to staff as new information becomes available. • Maintain communication with DIHS and ICE staff. Communication will follow the usual chain of command

		unless otherwise instructed by the DIHS Office of the Director. • Encourage staff to have the annual influenza vaccination in accordance with vaccination guidelines. • As supplies of a pandemic vaccine become available, consider key staff to be recommended for vaccination in accordance with CDC guidance. • Maintain currency regarding recommendations from CDC on use of antivirals for treatment and prophylaxis; keep in mind that CDC guidance may change frequently. • Implement procedures to enhance intake screening and identify suspect influenza cases. • Follow CDC and state or local health department guidance regarding collection and transport of specimens and laboratory testing. • Conduct follow-up of suspected novel influenza cases, including evaluation of contacts. • Implement protocols for cohorting contacts to suspect, probable, and confirmed influenza cases, and for releasing detainees from cohorting; communicate cohorting plans with ICE/DRO and detention facility staff. Maintain communication with ICE/DRO regarding bed space considerations due to cohorting. • Report suspect, probable, and confirmed influenza cases in accordance with instructions from the DIHS Epidemiology Unit and in accordance with state and local regulations. • Implement staffing contingency plans as needed. • Implement mental health support plan for staff. • Provide Pandemic Influenza family Support Guidance to staff (Annex H). • Document financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event, including staff time
3	Recovery	• Prepare for the possibility of subsequent waves of a pandemic event. • Continue to monitor information regarding the status of the pandemic event. • Assess and document damage to DIHS operations and programs and develop a phased recovery plan. • Ensure continuity and/or recovery of essential functions. • Assess staffing needs and the capacity of staff to return to normal operations.

		• Continue enhanced reporting to assist in identifying phases of recovery including the initial, intermediate (which may be prolonged), and final phase of returning to normal levels. • Remove social distancing measures that may have been implemented during the Response Phase. • Continue implementation of mental health support plan for staff. • Submit documentation of financial and other resources expended addressing the pandemic influenza event. • Develop a plan to replace depleted supplies and inventories. • Evaluate the site's medical response to the pandemic • Make improvements and revisions to the plans based on evaluation and lessons learned.
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ANNEX F: OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS

The mission essential functions associated with detention and removal operations require DRO personnel to work closely with the public. In the course of this work, DRO officers, agents, and mission support personnel place themselves at risk of contracting a variety of illnesses. This is particularly true when a pandemic influenza virus is loose in the community. Without a natural immunity to the virus, any human contact, whether it is with detainees, co-workers, office visitors, or family members, carries the potential for transferring a debilitating infection.

List of Appendices and Tabs

- Appendix 1: Arrest & Intake
 - Tab 1: Criminal Alien Program
 - Tab 2: 287g
 - Tab 3: Fugitive Operations
 - Operation at a Residence
 - Operation at a Workplace
 - Tab 4: Office of Investigations
 - Tab 5: Law Enforcement Assists
 - Tab 6: Alternative to Detention Violations
 - Tab 7: Walk-Ins
 - Tab 8: Customs and Border Protection
- Appendix 2: Detention
- Appendix 3: Removal

APPENDIX 1 to ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR ARREST & INTAKE PROGRAMS

TAB 1 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To identify potential health risks of criminal aliens while still in the custody of another law enforcement agency;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• ICE representative interviews criminal alien prior to transfer into DRO custody	Unknown	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for interview
		III	• Delay interview, if possible ▪ Consider the subject's anticipated release date • If delay is not possible: ▪ Have holding facility personnel place a surgical mask on the subject; ▪ ICE Officer will use Personal Protective Equipment; ▪ If feasible, have a barrier placed between officer and criminal alien; ▪ During interview, ask subject about recent health status
		Not ill:	• Conduct interview as normal; • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion; • Clean and sanitize self after conclusion of interview
2	• Transfer from holding facility to DRO custody	Unknown	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for pick-up
		III	• Delay pick-up until detainee is well, if possible;

			• If delay is not possible: ▪ Notify supervisor of potential encounter with infected individual; ▪ Consider type of vehicle to be used for transport ▪ Try to select a vehicle with a separate containment area for detainee; ▪ If required to transfer multiple subjects at one time, consider how they will can be separated or protected from the ill during transit; ▪ Place a surgical mask on the ill subject(s); ▪ ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; ▪ If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit ▪ Ask detainee(s) about recent health status; ▪ Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; ▪ Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; ▪ Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Not ill	• Normal transfer procedures; ▪ Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
3	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly

4	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 ▪ Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
5	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	Ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
6	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 2 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR 287g PROGRAMS

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To identify potential health risks of criminal aliens while still in the custody of another law enforcement agency;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• ICE notified by 287g official to take detained individual into custody	Unknown	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for pick-up
2	• Transfer from 287g holding facility to DRO custody	III	• Delay pick-up until detainee is well, if possible; • If delay is not possible: ▪ Notify supervisor of potential encounter with infected individual; ▪ Consider type of vehicle to be used for transport ▪ Try to select a vehicle with a separate containment area for detainee; ▪ If required to transfer multiple subjects at one time, consider how the will can be separated or protected from the ill during transit; ▪ Place a surgical mask on the ill subject(s); ▪ ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; ▪ If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit ▪ Ask detainee(s) about recent health status; ▪ Educate detainee(s) about

			cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; ▪ Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; ▪ Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Not ill	• Normal transfer procedures; ▪ Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
3	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
4	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 ▪ Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
5	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	Ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
6	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 3 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
PROGRAMS: RESIDENTIAL ENCOUNTER

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To mitigate the threat of pandemic influenza virus infecting arresting officers;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic influenza virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Conduct operational planning for fugitive operation at a residence	Unknown	• Review any available medical information on the target and the target's community ▪ Review any information available from A-file; ▪ Ascertain from local health officials, the prevalence of pandemic infection in the target's community and population
2	• Conduct an operational briefing for fugitive operation at a residence	Unknown	• During briefing, discuss options for protecting officers and mitigating spread of an infection while in transit to the detention facility;
3	• Conduct fugitive operation at residence	Unknown	• Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion; • If feasible, consider conducting the operation outside the residence to limit exposure with other individuals who may have pandemic influenza; • Evaluate individual for fever; • Ask individual questions regarding recent health status: ▪ Cough? ▪ Sore throat? ▪ Chills? ▪ Muscle ache?

			• Nasal congestion? • Diarrhea or vomiting? • Fatigue?
4	• Transport from residence to holding facility for processing.	Not ill	• Normal transfer procedures; • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
		III	• Ensure individual is wearing surgical mask; • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; • Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Seriously ill	• Contact Emergency Medical Services for transport to a capable medical facility
4	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
5	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 • Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
6	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	III	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.

7	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor
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TAB 3 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR FUGITIVE OPERATIONS
PROGRAMS: WORKPLACE ENCOUNTER

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To mitigate the threat of pandemic influenza virus infecting arresting officers;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic influenza virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Conduct operational planning for fugitive operation at a workplace	Unknown	• Review any available medical information on the target and the target's community ▪ Review any information available from A-file;
2	• Conduct an operational briefing for fugitive operation at a workplace	Unknown	• During briefing, discuss options for protecting officers and mitigating spread of an infection while in transit to the detention facility;
3	• Conduct fugitive operation at workplace	Unknown	• Meet with owner, manager, or human resources person upon arrival; ▪ Attempt to determine health condition of target(s); • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion; • Evaluate individual for fever; • Ask individual questions regarding recent health status:

			▪ Cough? ▪ Sore throat? ▪ Chills? ▪ Muscle ache? ▪ Nasal congestion? ▪ Diarrhea or vomiting? ▪ Fatigue?
4	• Transport from workplace to holding facility for processing.	Not ill	• Normal transfer procedures; • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
		III	• Ensure individual is wearing surgical mask; • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit; • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; ▪ Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Seriously ill	• Contact Emergency Medical Services for transport to a capable medical facility
4	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
5	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 ▪ Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
6	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	III	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.

		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
7	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 4 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS PROGRAMS

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To identify potential health risks of criminal aliens while still in the custody of the Office of Investigations;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• ICE notified by OI official to take detained individual into custody	Unknown	• Request health evaluation from OI holding facility prior to departing for pick-up
2	• Transfer from OI holding facility to DRO custody	III	• Notify supervisor of potential encounter with infected individual; • Consider type of vehicle to be used for transport ▪ Try to select a vehicle with a separate containment area for detainee; ▪ If required to transfer multiple subjects at one time, consider how the will can be separated or protected from the ill during transit; • Place a surgical mask on the ill subject(s); • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit • Ask detainee(s) about recent health status; • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; ▪ Receive guidance on delivery

			procedures;
		Not ill	• Normal transfer procedures; ▪ Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
3	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
4	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 ▪ Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
5	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	Ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
6	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 5 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTS

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To identify potential health risks of detainees while still in the custody of another law enforcement agency;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• ICE notified by arresting law enforcement agency to take detained individual into custody	Unknown	• Request health evaluation from holding agency prior to departing for pick-up
2	• Transfer from holding agency to DRO custody	III	• Delay pick-up until detainee is well, if possible; • If delay is not possible: ▪ Notify supervisor of potential encounter with infected individual; ▪ Consider type of vehicle to be used for transport ▪ Try to select a vehicle with a separate containment area for detainee; ▪ If required to transfer multiple subjects at one time, consider how the will can be separated or protected from the ill during transit; ▪ Place a surgical mask on the ill subject(s); ▪ ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; ▪ If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit ▪ Ask detainee(s) about recent health status; ▪ Educate detainee(s) about

			cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; ▪ Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; ▪ Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Not ill	• Normal transfer procedures; ▪ Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
3	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
4	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 ▪ Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
5	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	Ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
6	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 6 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: VIOLATORS

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To mitigate the threat of pandemic influenza virus infecting arresting officers;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic influenza virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Program contractor notifies ICE of violation to ATD and requests individual be detained	Unknown	• Inquire of program contractor as to any known health threats; • Develop fugitive operations plan and /or worksheet; ▪ Review Form I-213; ▪ During mission planning, consider a possible pandemic influenza scenario and prepare mitigation options accordingly.
2	• Encounter with ATD violator	Unknown	• Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer discretion; • Evaluate individual for fever; • Ask individual questions regarding recent health status: ▪ Cough? ▪ Sore throat? ▪ Chills? ▪ Muscle ache? ▪ Headache? ▪ Nasal congestion? ▪ Diarrhea or vomiting? ▪ Fatigue?
3	• Transfer of ATD violator to detention facility	Not ill	• Normal transfer ▪ Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
		Ill	• Place a surgical mask on the ill

			subject(s); • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; ▪ Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Seriously ill	• Contact Emergency Medical Services for transport to a capable medical facility
3	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
4	• Complete forms processing	Any status	• Complete Form I-213 ▪ Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
5	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	Ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	• Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
6	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 7 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR WALK-INS

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To prevent the introduction of pandemic influenza virus into the detention and removal system;
- To ascertain the health status of the individual or individuals arriving at the DRO facility.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Walk-in arrives unannounced at a DRO facility	Unknown	• Direct the walk-in to sit in a pre-identified waiting area; • Provide walk-in with instructional material on cough etiquette and general hygiene; • Place a surgical mask on the individual if tolerable; • Direct the individual not to use telephones, vending machines, or other common-use items in the area; • Maintain at least six feet of separation between individual and foot traffic near the waiting area; • Contact a health professional for a medical evaluation.
2	• Conduct rapid medical evaluation of the individual while in the waiting area • Ascertain individual's health status	Unknown	• Evaluator should don Personal Protective Equipment; • Evaluate individual for fever; • Ask questions regarding health status: ▪ Cough? ▪ Sore throat? ▪ Chills? ▪ Muscle ache? ▪ Headache? ▪ Nasal congestion? ▪ Diarrhea or vomiting?

			• Fatigue?
3	• Move individual from waiting area to holding area	Not ill	• Normal intake
		III	• Ensure individual is wearing surgical mask; • Notify other DRO personnel of the health status of the individual; ▪ Encourage the use of PPE while individual is in transit within the facility • Isolate the individual from the rest of the detained population as much as possible ▪ Use a short-stay unit or negative airflow room, if available ▪ Place sign outside door to indicate potential exposure hazard • Limit individual's access to other spaces in the facility until a formal medical evaluation can be completed • Limit number of caregivers with access to the individual • Annotate health status on appropriate form(s)
		Seriously ill	• Contact Emergency Medical Services for transport to a capable medical facility
4	• Disinfect waiting area	Any status	• Clean surfaces using disinfectant wipes or disinfecting aerosol • Dispose of any residual materials
5	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly

6	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor
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TAB 8 to APPENDIX 1, ANNEX F OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PROGRAMS

GOAL: The goals of this operation are:

- To identify potential health risks of criminal aliens while still in the custody of another law enforcement agency;
- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system.

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• ICE notified by CBP official to take detained individual into custody	Unknown	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for pick-up
2	• Transfer from CBP holding facility to DRO custody	III	• Delay pick-up until detainee is well, if possible; • If delay is not possible: ▪ Notify supervisor of potential encounter with infected individual; ▪ Consider type of vehicle to be used for transport ▪ Try to select a vehicle with a separate containment area for detainee; ▪ If required to transfer multiple subjects at one time, consider how the will can be separated or protected from the ill during transit; ▪ Place a surgical mask on the ill

			subject(s); - ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; - If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit - Ask detainee(s) about recent health status; - Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; - Transmit health information to receiving facility or office; - Receive guidance on delivery procedures;
		Not ill	- Normal transfer procedures; - Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
3	Disinfect self	Any status	- Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected - Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; - Wash hands thoroughly
4	Complete forms processing	Any status	- Complete Form I-213 - Annotate any health-related issues of detainee
5	Clean and disinfect vehicle	Ill	Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
		Not ill	Clean and disinfect vehicle once per day following guidance in Annex B.
6	Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	- Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; - Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of</i>

			<i>Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation, if necessary</i> ▪ Notify supervisor
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APPENDIX 2 to ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR DETENTION PROGRAMS

TAB 1 to APPENDIX 2, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR DETENTION PROGRAMS:
TEMPORARY HOLDING FACILITIES

GOAL: The goal of this operation is:

- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Detainee is brought to a DRO temporary holding facility	Unknown; Had not been questioned prior to arrival	• Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer discretion; • If tolerable, place a surgical mask on the detainee until health status can be determined; • Provide information on cough and respiratory etiquette; • Ask detainee questions regarding health status: ▪ Cough? ▪ Sore throat? ▪ Chills? ▪ Muscle ache? ▪ Headache? ▪ Nasal congestion? ▪ Diarrhea or vomiting? ▪ Fatigue? • If health status is questionable, separate the individual from other detainees. Otherwise, • Cohort with other individuals who arrived at the same time (Considering sex and criminal status).
		III	• If tolerable, place a surgical mask on the subject; • ICE Officer will use Personal Protective Equipment; • To the extent possible, separate ill individual from the remaining

			population ▪ Move to a separate holding cell or a designated open office ▪ Place a sign on the door indicating the presence of a pandemic influenza case. • If a separate room is not available, advise other detainees to maintain a six- foot distance from the ill individual; • Advise all DRO personal in or transiting the holding facility of the presence of a pandemic influenza case; • Arrange for prompt attention from a medical service provider; • Notify supervisor of potential encounter with infected individual.
		Not ill:	• Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion. • Cohort with other individuals who arrived at the same time.
2	• Detainee is processed.	Unknown	• To the extent possible, delay further processing until health can be evaluated.
		III	• Place a surgical mask on the ill subject(s); • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • Maintain as much distance as possible between the detainee and the agent during the course of the processing • Agent will use gloves when fingerprinting detainee; • Annotate any health-related issues of detainee; • Return detainee to separate holding cell if possible; ▪ If a separate cell is

			unavailable, advise detainee to maintain at least six feet of separation with other detainees.
		Not ill	• Normal processing procedures; • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion;
3	• Clean and disinfect processing station prior to next individual sitting down	Any status	• Use disinfectant wipes to wipe down all hard surfaces that may have been contacted by individual • Writing utensils used by detainees will be wiped clean with a sanitizing wipe prior to next use
4	• Clean and disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
5	• Transport to long-term holding facility	III	• Place a surgical mask on the ill subject(s); • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • If feasible, place a barrier between the officer and detainee while in transit; • If possible, stagger detainees in seats or maintain as much distance as possible between detainees; • Transmit health information to receiving facility; • Receive guidance on delivery procedures;

		Not ill	• Normal transport to long-term facility. • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer's discretion
6	• Terminal cleaning of temporary holding cell	Any status	• Encourage use of Personal Protective Equipment by Environmental Services personnel • Normal cleaning and use of disinfectant of all hard surfaces of holding cell
7	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation, if necessary

TAB 2 to APPENDIX 2, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR DETENTION PROGRAMS:
LONG-TERM DETENTION FACILITIES

GOAL: The goal of this operation is:

- To mitigate the threat of a pandemic virus entering the DRO detention system

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Arrival at Long-Term Detention Facility	Any status	• Pause outside of sally port for rapid medical screening of all detainees • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • Ask detainee questions regarding health status: ▪ Cough? ▪ Sore throat? ▪ Chills? ▪ Muscle ache? ▪ Headache? ▪ Nasal congestion? ▪ Diarrhea or vomiting? ▪ Fatigue? • If health status is questionable, separate the individual from other detainees.
2	• Detainees are processed.	Any status	• Limit personnel moving into and out of processing area to the minimum number possible; • ICE representatives will use Personal Protective Equipment; • Establish maximum possible amount of separation between detainees while processing is taking place; • Gloves will be used when handling detainees personal belongings • If detainees are permitted use of telephones, the telephone will be

			sanitized between each use using gloves and a sanitizing wipe
3	• Detainees moved to assigned housing unit	Any status	• Detainees will wear surgical mask in transit between the processing area and the housing unit • Facility staff will don Personal Protective Equipment • Movements should be accomplished when there is a minimum of foot traffic between the processing center and the housing unit.
		Not Ill or Not Symptomatic	• To the extent possible, detainees who arrived together will be kept together for at least 48 hours (considering sex and criminal status) ▪ If populations must be mixed, every attempt should be made to keep the arriving group together in a designated area of the housing unit and their movements restricted for at least 48 hours or until health status can be confirmed.
		Ill (Suspect, Probable, or Confirmed)	• Isolation for the duration of the contagious period (as determined by a medical professional) • If possible, isolate individuals in short-stay units (SSUs) ▪ All medical SSUs must have the same level of care; ▪ Additional short-stay unit accommodations must be approved by a physician

			(Clinical Director, Medical Director, or Deputy Director for Clinical Services)
4	• Recreation	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• Outdoor recreation is encouraged; • Cohorted new arrivals will not mix with other populations until their health status is confirmed; • Recreation equipment will be cleaned and sanitized prior to its use by other groups.
6	• Meals	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• Satellite feeding for cohorted new arrivals is recommended until health status can be confirmed. ▪ If satellite feeding is not feasible, cohorted new arrivals will eat in small groups with maximum separation between individual detainees. ▪ Facility personnel serving cohorted new arrivals should wear Personal Protective Equipment during service and clean-up.
7	• Law Library	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• If possible, limit law library access to cohorted new arrivals until health status can be confirmed. ▪ Detainees will wear surgical mask in transit between the processing area and the housing unit ▪ Cohorted new arrivals will not intermingle with other populations in the law library
		Any status	• Commonly used materials should be cleaned and sanitized between uses

			▪ Computer keyboards; ▪ Computer mouse; ▪ Desktops
8	• Religious Services	Any status	• Cohorted new arrivals should worship separately from other populations until health status can be confirmed; • Chaplains should be consulted regarding any religious ceremony that may require individuals to come into close contact with one another or handle religious materials. If permissible, such actions should be kept to a minimum or deferred for health-related reasons. • Cleaning and disinfecting of religious articles should be encouraged prior to and after their use.
9	• Case Management	Any status	• To the extent possible, attendance at mass hearings or merit hearings should be kept to a minimum. • Cohorted new arrivals should not intermingle with other populations until health status can be confirmed. • Visitors to the hearings (e.g. media, NGOs, legal teams, translators, general public) should be offered surgical masks and hand sanitizer. • Prior to entering the hearing room, visitors should be handed educational material on cough and respiratory etiquette. • Visitors should be encouraged to self-identify any recent health-related issues they have encountered and to absent themselves from the hearing room if their health is in question.

10	• Medical	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• Cohorted new arrivals should not intermingle with other populations until health status can be confirmed. ▪ If feasible, sick call for cohorted new arrivals should take place in their housing unit.
		Any status	• If feasible, stagger seating in medical waiting areas to maintain maximum separation between individuals. • If tolerable, detainees should wear surgical masks. • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at the discretion of medical service personnel.
11	• Cleaning and Disinfection of the Facility	Any status	• Follow guidance outlined in Annex B regarding infection control.

APPENDIX 3 to ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR REMOVAL PROGRAMS

TAB 1 to APPENDIX 3, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR REMOVAL PROGRAMS:
GROUND REMOVAL

GOAL: The goal of this operation is:

- To protect DRO officers and agents from the threat of a pandemic virus during a removal operation

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Transport of detainees to border	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for pick-up • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at officer discretion. • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Consider the use of surgical masks for detainees (based on threat assessment of the prevalence of influenza in the area).
2	• Disinfect self	Any status	• Avoid touching eyes, nose or mouth until disinfected • Dispose of any contaminated equipment or clothing; • Wash hands thoroughly
3	• Clean and disinfect vehicle	Any status	• Clean and disinfect vehicle after delivery following guidance in Annex B.
4	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 2 to APPENDIX 3, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR REMOVAL PROGRAMS:
AIR REMOVAL: JPATS FLIGHT

GOAL: The goal of this operation is:

- To protect DRO officers and agents from the threat of a pandemic virus during a removal operation

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Receive manifest for JPATS flight	Any status	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for pick-up
2	• Out-processing from holding facility en route to airport	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• Perform rapid medical evaluation prior to leaving facility; • Separate out any individual whose health status is uncertain; ▪ The Medical Transportation Coordinator or the Aeromedical Branch Chief in Kansas City must be notified of any anticipated refusals for boarding. • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at discretion of transporting personnel; • Consider the use of surgical masks for detainees; • If using a holding facility at the airport, contact CBP and apprise them of health status of detainees ▪ Transporting personnel will follow any delivery instructions provided by CBP
3	• Arrival at airport	Any status	• JPATS flight nurse will conduct rapid medical evaluation;

			▪ Detainees with unstable medical conditions will be refused boarding; ▪ The Medical Transportation Coordinator or the Aeromedical Branch Chief in Kansas City must be notified of any anticipated refusals for boarding.
4	• Removal	Any status	• Use of Personal Protective Equipment at discretion of transporting personnel; • Consider the use of surgical masks for detainees (Shackling will prevent effective cough and respiratory etiquette).
5	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

TAB 2 to APPENDIX 3, ANNEX F
OPERATIONAL CHECKLISTS FOR REMOVAL PROGRAMS:
AIR REMOVAL: COMMERCIAL FLIGHT

GOAL: The goal of this operation is:

- To protect DRO officers and agents from the threat of a pandemic virus during a removal operation

Item	Task or Action	Health Status At Encounter	Mitigation Recommendations
1	• Receive manifest for commercial flight	Any status	• Request health evaluation from holding facility prior to departing for pick-up • Consult with airline regarding any requirement for medical protection, or any prohibition related to pandemic influenza • Review country clearance documentation for restrictions or warnings regarding health issues in the en route or destination countries
2	• Out-processing from holding facility en route to airport	Not ill or Not Symptomatic	• Perform rapid medical evaluation prior to leaving facility; • Separate out any individual whose health status is uncertain; ▪ The Medical Transportation Coordinator or the Aeromedical Branch Chief in Kansas City must be notified of any anticipated refusals for boarding. • Educate detainee(s) about cough and respiratory etiquette before placing them in the vehicle; • Use of Personal Protective Equipment at discretion of transporting personnel; • Consider the use of surgical masks for detainees; • If using a holding facility at the airport, contact CBP and apprise

			them of health status of detainees ▪ Transporting personnel will follow any delivery instructions provided by CBP
3	• Removal	Any status	• Use of Personal Protective Equipment at discretion of transporting personnel; • Consider the use of surgical masks for detainees; • Limit contacts in the destination country to the extent possible.
5	• Monitor self for any health-related issues resulting from contact	Any status	• If returning from a location with a high incidence of pandemic influenza, consult with supervisor on remaining away from duty until health status can be confirmed; • Monitor health status for 24 hours following contact; • Complete Form CA-2, <i>Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation</i>, if necessary ▪ Notify supervisor

ANNEX G: PANDEMIC INFLUENZA ACRONYMS and GLOSSARY

APHIS	Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
CBO	Community-based organization
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CIP	Critical infrastructure protection
CONUS	Continental United States
COOP	Continuity of Operations
DIHS	Division of Immigration Health Services
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DRO	Detention and Removal Operations
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
ESF	Emergency Support Function
ESF #8	Emergency Support Function #8 - Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #13	Emergency Support Function #13 - Public Safety and Security
FAMS	Federal Air Marshal Service
FBO	Faith-based organization
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FMS	Federal medical station
FPC	Federal Preparedness Circular
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HPAI	Highly pathogenic avian influenza
HSC	Homeland Security Council

HSPD-5	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
HSPD-7	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
HSPD-8	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8
IHR	International Health Regulations
JPATS	Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System
NDMS	National Disaster Medical System
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NRF	National Response Framework
NSC	National Security Council
OCONUS	Outside the continental United States
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PHEO	Public Health Emergency Officer
PHS	U.S. Public Health Service
PHSA	Public Health Service Act
PPE	Personal protective equipment
SNS	Strategic National Stockpile
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USDA	Department of Agriculture
WHO	World Health Organization

GLOSSARY

Affected country - An at-risk country experiencing endemic (widespread and recurring) or epidemic (isolated) cases in humans or domestic animals of influenza with human pandemic potential.

Antiviral medications - Medications presumed to be effective against potential pandemic influenza virus strains. These antiviral medications include the neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (Relenza®).

Arrival screening - Medical screening upon arrival to detect individuals who have signs of illness or who are at high risk of developing illness.

Asymptomatic - Asymptomatic means without symptoms of influenza.

At-risk country - An unaffected country with insufficient medical, public health, or veterinary capacity to prevent, detect, or contain influenza with pandemic potential.

Community-based organization - A private nonprofit organization, Indian tribe or tribally sanctioned organization, or other type of group that works within a community for the improvement of some aspect of that community. Community-based organizations include nonprofit organizations (501 c(3)), faith-based organizations, tribes, and their subsidiaries.

Containment - Contain an outbreak to the affected region(s) and limit of spread of the pandemic through aggressive attempts to contain.

Continuity of Operations - Refers to the capability to ensure the performance of essential functions during any emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operations.

Cough etiquette - Covering ones mouth and nose while coughing or sneezing; using tissues and disposing in no-touch receptacles; and washing your hands to avoid spreading an infection to others.

Countermeasures - Refers to pre-pandemic and pandemic influenza vaccine and antiviral medications.

Critical infrastructure - Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. Specifically, it refers to the critical infrastructure sectors and key resources identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). As defined by HSPD-7, critical infrastructure includes the following sectors and key resources: agriculture and food; public health and health care; drinking water and water treatment systems; energy (including the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas, and electric power except for nuclear facilities); banking and finance; national monuments and icons; defense industrial base; information technology; telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems (including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems); emergency services; postal and shipping; dams; government facilities; commercial facilities; and

nuclear reactors, material, and waste. Critical infrastructure in this Plan is used to refer to the 17 critical infrastructure and key resources included in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.

Delegation of Authority - Identification, by position, the authorities for making policy determinations and decisions at headquarters, field levels, and other organizational locations, as appropriate. Generally, pre-determined delegations of authority will take effect when normal channels of direction are disrupted and terminate when these channels have resumed.

Departure screening - Medical screening prior to departure from a high-risk area to identify individuals who have signs of illness (influenza) or who are at high risk of developing illness.

Devolution - The capability to transfer and sustain authority and responsibility for essential functions from an organization's primary operating staff and facilities, to other employees and facilities.

Disaggregation of disease transmission networks - The disruption of activities and social interactions that facilitate transmission of influenza (e.g., closure of schools, canceling public meetings or large social gatherings, keeping schoolchildren home, and restriction of travel).

En route screening - Surveillance (typically by non-medical personnel) to detect individuals who develop signs of illness (influenza) while en route.

Epidemic - A pronounced clustering of cases of disease within a short period of time; more generally, a disease whose frequency of occurrence is in excess of the expected frequency in a population during a given time interval.

Essential functions - Functions that are absolutely necessary to keep a business operating during an influenza pandemic, and critical to survival and recovery.

Face mask. Disposable surgical or procedure face mask (see definitions of both below).

Geographic quarantine (cordon sanitaire) - The isolation, by force if necessary, of localities with documented disease transmission from localities still free of infection.

Hand hygiene - Hand washing with either plain soap or antimicrobial soap and water and use of alcohol-based products (gels, rinses, foams) containing an emollient that do not require the use of water.

High-throughput rapid diagnostic kit - Medical technology to accurately and rapidly detect influenza strains. The technology is currently being used to rapidly detect avian influenza employing nucleic acid diagnostic primers (short strands of DNA/RNA).

High-risk country - An at-risk country that is located in proximity to an affected country, or in which a wildlife case of influenza with pandemic potential has been detected.

Isolation - Separation of infected individuals from those who are not infected.

Key assets - Subset of key resources that are "individual targets whose destruction could cause large scale injury, death, or destruction of property, and/or profoundly damage our national prestige or confidence."

Key resources - Publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government. This refers to the four key resources identified in HSPD-7 and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. These four key resources include: dams; government facilities; commercial facilities; and nuclear reactors, material, and waste.

Laboratory Response Network - National network of local, State, and Federal public health, food testing, veterinary diagnostic, and environmental testing laboratories supported by CDC that provide the laboratory infrastructure and capacity to respond to biological and chemical terrorism, and other public health emergencies.

Layered protective measures - Rather than focusing on a single measure for mitigation, a layered approach uses an array of measures deployed in tandem, to reduce overall risk. A layered, system-wide, integrated approach to risk reduction includes redundant measures and is designed to avoid a single point of failure. Examples include, implementing pre-departure, en route, and arrival screening measures for international travel.

Localities - Refers to local (county, city, municipal) governments and agencies.

Morbidity - An incidence of ill health. It is measured in various ways, often by the probability that a randomly selected individual in a population at some date and location would become seriously ill in some period of time.

Mortality - An incidence of death in a population. It is measured in various ways, often by the probability that a randomly selected individual in a population at some date and location would die in some period of time.

Orders of succession - Refers to the sequential order or ranking of individuals who would assume authority and responsibility if the leadership is incapacitated or unavailable.

Outbreak - An epidemic limited to localized increase in the incidence of disease, e.g., in a village, town, or closed institution; a cluster of cases of an infectious disease.

Outbreak containment - Disruption of epidemic amplification through the use of medical countermeasures and infection control techniques; “containment” also refers more generally to delaying the geospatial spread of an epidemic.

Pandemic - A worldwide epidemic when a new or novel strain of influenza virus emerges in which humans have little or no immunity, and develops the ability to infect and be passed between humans.

Pandemic vaccine - Vaccine for specific influenza virus strain that has evolved the capacity for sustained and efficient human-to-human transmission. This vaccine can only be developed once the pandemic strain emerges.

Pathogenicity - Refers to the condition or quality of being pathogenic, or the ability to cause disease.

Post-exposure prophylaxis - The use of antiviral medications in individuals exposed to others with influenza to prevent disease transmission.

Pre-pandemic vaccine - Vaccine against strains of influenza virus in animals that have caused isolated infections in humans of pandemic potential. This vaccine is prepared prior to the emergence of a pandemic strain and may be a good or poor match (and hence of greater or lesser protection) for the pandemic strain that ultimately emerges.

Priority country - A priority country is a high-risk or affected country that merits special attention because of the severity of the outbreak, its strategic importance, its regional role, or foreign policy priorities.

Procedure mask - Disposable face mask that is either flat or pleated and is affixed to the head with ear loops.

Prophylaxis - Prevention of disease or of a process that can lead to disease. With respect to pandemic influenza this specifically refers to the administration of antiviral medications to healthy individuals for the prevention of influenza.

Quarantine - Separation of individuals who have been exposed to an infection but are not yet ill from others who have not been exposed to the transmissible infection.

Rapid diagnostic test - Medical test for rapidly confirming the presence of infection with a specific influenza strain.

Reconstitution - Refers to the process by which an organization resumes normal operations.

Respirator - Refers to a particulate respirator, commonly known as N-95 respirator, often used in hospitals to protect against infectious agents. Particulate respirators are “air-purifying respirators” because they clean particles out of the air as one breathes.

Sector. Part or division of the national economy.

Sector-Specific Agency - Federal departments and agencies identified under HSPD-7 as responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources category.

Situational awareness -. Situational awareness is the ability to identify, process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening during an evolving influenza pandemic.

Social distancing - Infection control strategies that reduce the duration and/or intimacy of social contacts and thereby limit the transmission of influenza. There are two basic categories of intervention: transmission interventions, such as the use of facemasks, may reduce the likelihood of casual social contacts resulting in disease transmission; contact interventions, such as closing schools or canceling large gatherings, eliminate or reduce the likelihood of contact with infected individuals.

Standard of care - The level of care that is reasonably expected under the extant circumstances.

States - Refers to State governments and State agencies.

Strategy - Refers to the *National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza*.

Surge capacity - Refers to the ability to expand provision of services beyond normal capacity to meet transient increases in demand. Surge capacity within a medical context denotes the ability of health care or laboratory facilities to provide care or services above their usual capacity, or to expand manufacturing capacity of essential medical materiel (e.g., vaccine) to meet increased demand.

Surgical mask - Refers to disposable face masks that comes in two basic types: one type is affixed to the head with two ties, conforms to the face with the aid of a flexible adjustment to the nose bridge, and may be flat/pleated or duck-billed in shape; the second type of surgical mask is pre-molded, adheres to the head with a single elastic and has a flexible adjustment for the nose bridge.

Surveillance - The continuous and systematic process of collecting, analyzing, interpreting and disseminating descriptive information to monitor public health and to ensure timely interventions to reduce morbidity and mortality.

Symptomatic - Symptomatic means with symptoms of influenza.

Targeted passenger travel restrictions - Travel restrictions to the United States targeting travelers from a high-risk area or from areas unable to meet U.S. criteria for departure and en route screening.

Telecommuting - Working from home or an alternate site and avoiding coming to the workplace through telecommunication (computer access).

Telework - Refers to the activity of working away (home) from the workplace through telecommunication (computer access).

Treatment course (antiviral medications). The course of antiviral medication prescribed as treatment (not prophylaxis) for a person infected with an agent susceptible to the antiviral medication.

Treatment course (vaccine) - The course of vaccine (typically two injections) required to induce protective immunity against the target of the vaccine.

U.S. travelers from affected areas - U.S. citizens traveling to the United States from countries or region where an outbreak (influenza pandemic) has occurred.

Virulence - Virulence refers to the disease-evoking severity of influenza.

Wave - The period during which an outbreak or epidemic occurs either within a community or aggregated across a larger geographical area. The disease wave includes the time during which disease occurrence increases rapidly, peaks, and declines back toward baseline.

ANNEX H: REFERENCES

1.0 General References

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2.0 ICE Policy References

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Wireless Priority Service Policy

National Incident Management System Policy

Functions of the National Incident Response Unit Policy

National Response Plan, Emergency Support Function, Mission Assignment Acceptance Policy

The Maritime Operational Response (MOTR) Plan Policy

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 9 May 2020 02:29:04 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: FDA Decision Reverses April 3rd Approved N-95 Manufacturers

Thx (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Friday, May 08, 2020, 10:27 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FDA Decision Reverses April 3rd Approved N-95 Manufacturers

Henry/Tae

The following references state that the FDA just came out with a new position of approved and unapproved manufacturers of N-95 mask produced in China:

<https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-continues-combat-fraudulent-covid-19-medical-products> (FDA news release dated May 7th)

<https://www.marketwatch.com/amp/story/guid/506549A1-C540-4138-BED9-A0563BF8D243>

<https://www.fda.gov/media/136663/download> (cites 14 authorized manufacturers)

(b)(5)

R/ (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Executive Assistant: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

"IHSC: One Team, One Mission....Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care"

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 23 Feb 2020 21:56:51 +0000
To: Cronen, C M; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: First World response to COVID 19

Thx Chris

From: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Sunday, Feb 23, 2020, 4:40 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: First World response to COVID 19

Afternoon sir,

Fysa below and attached on the changing landscape of countries starting to lock down travel.
Chris

cmc

From: Cronen, C M
Sent: Sunday, February 23, 2020 4:35 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: First World response to COVID 19

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Chris

cmc

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Sunday, February 23, 2020 10:27 AM
To: Cronen, C M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: First World response to COVID 19

Good morning Sir,

(b)(5)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

V/R

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 20 May 2020 00:48:14 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Fwd: CA ICE Testing of Staff and Detainees - Operations Plans

10-4, thanks (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 8:01 PM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Fwd: CA ICE Testing of Staff and Detainees - Operations Plans

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

R/ (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MPH, CCHP, FACHE
Assistant Director | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202-732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Date: Tuesday, May 19, 2020, 7:25 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: Fwd: CA ICE Testing of Staff and Detainees - Operations Plans

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact ICE SOC with questions or concerns.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Please let me know if you would like any further information regarding the operational plans.

Thank you.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 7:10:21 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Subject: Fwd: CA ICE Testing of Staff and Detainees - Operations Plans

Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone
Get [Outlook for Android](#)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 9:51:48 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@geogroup.com>
Subject: CA ICE Testing of Staff and Detainees - Operations Plans

Dave: Attached are the Operations Plans of the California ICE facilities for the implementation of staff and detainee testing. All Facility Administrators are sharing the plans with their respective local ICE leadership. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

I will keep you apprised of any feedback from the client.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

WESTERN REGION VICE PRESIDENT,
GEO SECURE SERVICES

The GEO Group, Inc.
Western Region Office
6100 Center Drive, Suite (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Los Angeles, CA 90045

Tel: 310.348. (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

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www.geogroup.com

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 13 May 2020 15:33:39 +0000
To: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Lucero, Enrique M
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: HEROES ACT released (H.R. 6800) - 5th Coronavirus Relief Package

Thanks Russ

From: Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 11:08 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov> (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: HEROES ACT released (H.R. 6800) - 5th Coronavirus Relief Package

Good morning (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:56 AM

To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: HEROES ACT released (H.R. 6800) - 5th Coronavirus Relief Package

Got it, thanks!

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Assistant Director
ICE/Office of Congressional Relations

From: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 7:54 AM

To: Kovacic, Raymond (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: HEROES ACT released (H.R. 6800) - 5th Coronavirus Relief Package

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 10:28 AM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; Hott, Russell (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: Kelly, Christopher S (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: HEROES ACT released (H.R. 6800) - 5th Coronavirus Relief Package

Good morning All,

(b)(5)

Thanks,

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Assistant Director
ICE/Office of Congressional Relations

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 12, 2020 1:39 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: HEROES ACT released (H.R. 6800) - 5th Coronavirus Relief Package
Importance: High

Gentlemen:

(b)(5)

V/R

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Legislative Analyst/Research Specialist
Office of Congressional Relations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

202-732 (b)(6); (work)

202-731 (b)(7)(C) (cell)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 6 May 2020 15:02:10 +0000
To: Loiacono, Adam V
Subject: RE: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

Otay Mesa

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Loiacono, Adam V [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 06, 2020, 10:11 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

Sorry. Do you know where he was detained prior to being transferred to the hospital?

Adam V. Loiacono
Deputy Principal Legal Advisor for Enforcement and Litigation
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Desk: 202-732-[REDACTED]
Iphone: 202-50-[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov

--- ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE --- ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT ---

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From: Johnson, Tae D [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2020 9:53 AM
To: Loiacono, Adam V [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

Please see below.

From: [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 1:36 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D [REDACTED]@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

No change on the SND hospital case.

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
Date: Tuesday, May 05, 2020, 10:35 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov, Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
Subject: FW: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

Update on SND hospital case.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 11:30 AM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

No change - **Name** (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: IHSC_SanDiego_HSA_Team, (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 7:31 AM
To: #OMDC-MGMT (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>; (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>;
 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

Thank you,

CDR (b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) PharmD, MS, CPH
CDR, U.S. Public Health Service
Health Services Administrator
ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC)
Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Otay Mesa Detention Center
7488 Calzada De La Fuente
San Diego, CA 92158
O:619-661-(b)(6);
C:202-768-(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov

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From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @associates.ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, May 5, 2020 4:21 AM
To: #IHSC_SanDiego_MGMT (b)(7)(E) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: ICU HOSPITAL UPDATE

UPDATED @ 0400 on 05/05/2020

Name: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
A#: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
DOB: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Date of Arrival: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Country Citizenship: EL SALVADOR
Hospital Name: Paradise Valley Hospital (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) ICU
Hospital day # 12
Admitting Diagnosis : Positive COVID-19, PNA
Relevant Medical History : Essential (primary) hypertension, Type 2 DM, Hyperlipidemia, functional dyspepsia
Date of Admission (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Current Diagnosis : Positive COVID-19, PNA
Attending physician : (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Patient's Current Status (Vitals, Meds, Labs, etc.): T: 98.3F oral, BP 148/56 , 84HR, RR 30, O2 98% with current vent settings on Airway Pressure release(APRV) PIP: 20-30; Fio2 80%, P low 0, P high 28. T low 1.0 secs, T high 5 secs
Additional info status: Patient remains intubated 4/27, on APRV, tube feeding via OG Tube Nepro 15cc/hr, and chest tube place 4/29 to the left side. Hemodialysis planned for some time today. Patient continues to be off of propofol and when introduced to some stimuli, patient had some non-purposeful movement. Patient continues to be on amiodarone drip and on levophed (14mcg) for blood pressure support.
Medications: Amiodarone drip, Levophed, Fortaz, Nitro, Atorvastatin, Famotidine, Flagyl, Heparin, Zinc, lispro Insulin sliding scale, Lantus, Percocet PRN , MVI Tylenol PRN
Prognosis: poor
Discharge Plan : none at this time.
Information provided by (name and title) : (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) RN (619) 470- (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (CTR), RN
STG International
ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC)
Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
ICE Otay Mesa Detention Center
7488 Calzada De La Fuente
San Diego, CA 92158
MAIN: 619-661-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
FAX: 619-661-5226
Email: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@associates.ice.dhs.gov



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From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 30 Jan 2020 15:28:59 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: IHSC - Coronavirus Messaging

Thank you.

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 30, 2020 10:17 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: IHSC - Coronavirus Messaging

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C); (b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Monday, January 27, 2020 3:10 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: IHSC - Coronavirus Messaging

Hello (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

The first attachment is the IHSC broadcast message. The two PDF documents are the referenced links.

Please advise if you have additional questions.

Thank you.

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) MS
Chief of Staff | ICE Health Service Corps
Desk: 202.732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Email: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov

IHSC: One Team, One Mission...Leading the Way in Immigration Health Care.

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 15 May 2020 13:39:36 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: IHSC Town Hall

(b)(5)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Sent: Friday, May 15, 2020 9:19 AM
To: Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: IHSC Town Hall
Importance: High

Hey you..

(b)(5); (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)

From: Johnson, Tae D
Sent: 21 May 2020 01:54:58 +0000
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C); Lucero, Enrique M
Subject: RE: Broward/DOH

10-4, thx

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 9:53 PM
To: Lucero, Enrique M (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, Johnson, Tae D (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Broward/DOH

FYSA

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 8:30 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Broward/DOH

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) provide the information below:

/////////
(b)(5)

(b)(5)

GEO decided to test all 32 detainees as a precaution even though they were asymptotic.
16 of the 32 tested positive.

//////////

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations East
500 12th Street S.W MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536

(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732 (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 8:46 PM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: RE: Broward/DOH

(b)(5)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)

From: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 7:33 PM
To: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>, (b)(6); (b)(7)(C) @ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Broward/DOH

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(5)

Thanks

Ricardo A. Wong
Deputy Assistant Director
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Enforcement and Removal Operations
Domestic Operations East
500 12th Street S.W MS5201
Washington, D.C. 20536
(b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov
(202) 732-(b)(6); (b)(7)(C) (Desk)

From: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Date: Wednesday, May 20, 2020, 8:26 PM
To: Wong, Ricardo (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Cc: (b)(6); (b)(7)(C)@ice.dhs.gov>
Subject: FW: Broward/DOH

For visibility.

(b)(5)

(b)(6);
(b)(7)(C)

Sent with BlackBerry Work
(www.blackberry.com)